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ABSTRACT 
The “Particular Situation” in the Futa Jallon: Ethnicity, Region, and Nation in Twentieth-Century 
Guinea 
John Fredrick Straussberger, III 
 
The dissertation begins with a seeming paradox in twentieth-century Guinean history: 
how did ethnic Fulbe, constituting some 40% of Guinea’s population, come to be labeled “neo-
colonial traitors” in a country that was supposedly founded upon a broad-based, multi-ethnic 
nationalism? Less than two decades after Guineans’ 1958 rejection of membership in a reformed 
French community, Guinea’s first president, Sékou Touré, argued that there existed a “particular 
situation” in the Futa Jallon, the historic homeland of the Fulbe, that had caused the Fulbe to 
diverge from the rest of the country. Using Touré’s speech announcing the “particular situation” 
as a point of entry, the dissertation argues that the legacy of hierarchies rooted in the pre-colonial 
Islamic Futa Jallon state, contestation between African political parties during decolonization, 
and the partial failure of the post-colonial state’s attempt to create a “modern” Guinean society 
combined to produce a Fulbe fragment of the Guinean nation.  
The dissertation’s first two chapters examine how the presentation and practice of chiefly 
authority in the Futa Jallon following the imposition of French rule resulted from the 
entanglement of local and colonial discourses, and how the opening of colonial spaces – markets, 
cities, and cash crop fields, for example – allowed room for marginalized groups such as former 
slaves and women to renegotiate Fulbe social hierarchies. The dissertation then examines how 
the practical work of building political coalitions as well as ideological debates about the 
meaning of modernity during decolonization led to the marginalization of Fulbe elites and the 
conceptual “othering” of the Fulbe. The dissertation then shifts to Fulbe (self-)positioning within 
an emerging post-colonial order. One chapter argues that political, economic, and social reforms 
enacted by the Touré-led government marked the Fulbe as resistant to attempts at modernization, 
leading to the elimination of Fulbe elites and the designation of the Fulbe as “anti-citizens.” 
Another follows the pathways of Fulbe exiles, migrants, and merchants took after independence, 
arguing that the Fulbe diaspora created by repression shaped ideas about citizenship, political 
community, and belonging in post-colonial Guinea. The histories examined by the dissertation 
demonstrate that the current welding of political community and ethnicity is the result of 
Guinea’s status as a post-slavery, post-colonial, and post-socialist society, rather than the 
deterministic result of “natural” regional differences or the structure of the colonial state. 
The dissertation is based upon two years of research in Guinea, Senegal, and France. 
Using previously neglected oral and archival sources in French and Pular, it makes several 
significant interventions in Africanist historiography. Countering temporal and conceptual 
frameworks based solely upon colonial intervention, I argue that ideas about ethnicity were 
formed and reformed throughout the twentieth century and that ethnic identities were shaped as 
much by local ideas as they were by the colonial state. I also argue that, contradicting portrayals 
of post-colonial balkanization, debates about the nation and citizenship after independence took 
place in both local and trans-national contexts. Lastly, while previous studies have often cast 
ethnicity and nationalism in Africa as inherently different forms of political thought, I argue that 
both arise from similar processes. The failure of the post-colonial African nation-state is often 
attributed to the supposed immutability of ethnic identity. The political history of Guinea, on the 
other hand, demonstrates that African politicians and parties used ethnicities as an “other” in 
opposition to which they articulated their own visions of the nation. Thus, Fulbe identification 
and Guinean nationalism were in fact mutually formed and their histories closely intertwined 
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A Note on Names, Places, and Pular Words 
 
Throughout the following text I have attempted to reflect the ways both historical actors 
and my present collaborators have used names, places, and Pular words themselves. This has led 
to some idiosyncrasies. Full names are often inverted in the Futa Jallon, at least compared to 
American convention. This means that names are sometimes presented in last name/first name 
order when used that way in conversations and historical sources: for examples, Barry Diawadou 
instead of Diawadou Barry. One is also faced with another challenge in regards to last names. 
The vast majority of Fulbe in the Futa Jallon carry one of four last names: Barry, Diallo, Bah, 
and Sow. There are variations in how these last names are spelled – for example, Bari, or Bâ, or, 
for those with roots in Anglophone countries, Jalloh – and I have sought to reflect particular 
spellings when necessary. The ubiquity of Diallos and Barrys has also led me to identify some 
actors by their first names in the text. This is not meant as a sign of informality, but rather to 
allow for easier identification of specific individuals by the reader. There are also varying 
spellings for the places mentioned in the text. I use the spelling that is common today, except 
when there is a change in status; so, for example, Soudan for the French colony and Mali 
following independence. There is also a town and region in Guinea named Mali, which I identify 
in the text if needed.  
I prefer “Fulbe” instead of the Francophone “Peuhl” and Anglophone “Fulani” (or 
variants), as “Fulbe” and the singular “Pullo” are what are used in Pular. I have also chosen to 
use Latin script Fulbe spellings rather than their French variants: so, kummabite rather than 
koumbabité. Singulars and plurals of Pular words, which can differ significantly, are included in 
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Situating the “Particular Situation” 
On August 22, 1976, Sékou Touré, Guinea’s first president and leader of its only political 
party, the Parti Démocratique de Guinée (PDG), addressed thousands of supporters in the 
“People’s Palace,” or the Guinean National Assembly, on a subject of critical importance.1 PDG 
security forces had uncovered a new plot to overthrow the government. Influential leaders of the 
nation’s largest ethnic group, the Pular-speaking Fulbe, were accused of directing an 
international “neo-colonialist” effort to bring an end to the eighteen year-old PDG regime. By 
the time Touré reached the podium at the Palace, government forces had re-established order. 
Yet unease still lingered. While this particular plot had apparently been stifled in its cradle, more 
worrisome was the idea that Guinea’s largest ethnic community had supposedly, at best, stood 
passively aside while its most prominent members plotted away or, at worst, actively supported 
what Touré called the Fulbe “fifth column” of internal traitors.  
In a nearly two hour-long speech, Sékou Touré claimed that the Fulbe as a whole had 
become traitors to their own nation, and offered three supporting arguments. First, Fulbe elites 
had always been “racist,” and their power and wealth was based upon the exploitation of others, 
mostly former slaves. Their fundamental character flaws, Touré remarked, had roots in the pre-
colonial Futa Jallon theocracy and were exacerbated by the colonial distortion of chiefly 
authority. Second, the large number migrants and merchants who hailed from the Futa were 
traitors to an independent and supposedly self-sufficient Guinea, more interested in making 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 The text of the speech was printed in the state-run newspaper, Horoya. See “’Le racisme Puelh, 
nous devons lui donner un enterrement de première classe, un enterrement définitif’: Une analyse 
géniale du chef de l'État sur les activités criminelles de la 5ème colonne,” Horoya no. 2237, 29 
August – 4 September 1976, pp. 8-43. The speech, entitled “Enterrer le racisme peulh,” was also 
printed in a collection of Sékou Touré’s writings, Unité Nationale, Revolution Démocratique 




money abroad than building their own nation. And third, the Fulbe had never fully committed to 
supporting Guinean sovereignty, instead continuing to align themselves with neo-colonial 
powers and resisting post-colonial attempts to reform Guinean society. The Fulbe’s 
compromised loyalty, Touré argued, had been presaged by the Futa’s divergence from the rest of 
the territory during the September 28, 1958, referendum on the constitution of the Fifth French 
Republic, when Guinean voters chose immediate independence over modified ties with the 
French metropole. Combined, the three developments had produced what Touré called a 
“Particular Situation” in the Futa Jallon, a large plateau historically dominated by the Fulbe, that 
set the region and its population apart from the rest of Guinea and, Touré claimed, against the 
tides of change in an emerging post-colonial world.  
 The narrative presented above, however, stands in opposition to more favorable 
characterizations of the PDG-led Guinean nation put forward shortly after independence and, for 
some PDG supporters, still today. According to these accounts, during the 1950s, the PDG 
ushered in a broad-based, multi-ethnic anti-colonial movement that held the promise of fostering 
a strong national and pan-African identity.2 Guineans’ emphatic “non” in September 1958 and 
the country’s formal proclamation of independence five days later signaled Africa’s continued 
rejection of colonialism and the dawn of a new era. The Guinean state and economy was beset by 
crises almost immediately after the former colony’s contentious divorce from the former French 
metropole. Yet well into the 1960s – and for some, even after the purges began – the dream of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 For early examples of this characterization of the regime, see Guinée, prelude à l’indépendance 
(Paris: Présence Africaine, 1958); Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (New York: Grove 
Press 1963 [1961]), 227-235. For other studies written by those sympathetic to the PDG since, 
see Sidiki Kobélé Keïta, Ahmed Sékou Touré: L’homme et son combat anti-colonial, 1922-1958 
(Conakry: Editions SKK, 1998); Sidiki Kobélé Keita, Ahmed Sékou Touré, l’homme du 28 
Septembre 1958 (Conakry: INRDG, Bibliothèque Nationale, 1977); Sidiki Kobélé Keita, P.D.G., 





Guinean nationalism was kept alive, a beacon of light in an otherwise dimmed West Africa, 
particularly after the unceremonious removals of Kwame Nkrumah in 1966 and Modibo Keïta in 
1968 through military coup d’état.  
 How does one, therefore, square these two moments in post-colonial Guinean history that 
seem so out of plumb? Attempting to bring the Guineas of 1958 to 1976 into one conceptual and 
narrative framework brings to the fore more fundamental questions about twentieth-century 
Guinean history. How did individuals and groups in Guinea think of themselves and others as 
parts of political communities and state structures? And how did politicians, political parties, and 
activists seek to build durable and effective political movements in times of rapid change? The 
partial answers offered in the following pages shed light on a more particular question that has 
continued to shape Guinea’s politics to the present: how did the Fulbe, constituting some 40% of 
Guinea’s total population, come to be characterized as the anti-national “other” in a nation 
supposedly founded on a broad-based, anti-ethnic nationalism? 
Themes and Arguments 
This dissertation argues that the production of the “Particular Situation” was the result of 
historical trajectories tied to the articulation of the Futa Jallon as a cohesive political, social, and 
cultural field associated with diverging views of “Fulbeness.” As a political unit, the Futa has 
ranged from an independent state to administratively not existing at all. Yet the Futa Jallon as an 
imaginary whole – as conceptualized both by those who lived there, and those who characterize 
the Fulbe-dominated region from the outside – has largely remained intact since c. 1726, when a 
jihad established a pre-colonial Islamic state in the region. This primary argument is comprised 
of two interlocking parts, roughly coterminous with the imagined boundaries of “the Fulbe,” that 




characteristics tied to the Fulbe and Futa Jallon, and the interaction between the two. 
From within, the Futa has historically been structured by a set of social hierarchies that 
differentiated between persons of (formerly) free and non-free status. These hierarchies were at 
the center of elite privilege in the pre-colonial Futa Jallon state. They were transformed by 
colonial rule, in ways both intended and not, opening spaces of maneuver of persons of slave 
status but also ensuring the short-term political power of elites. During decolonization, 
hierarchies became a tool upon which Fulbe politicians drew in order to build political coalitions. 
And under the post-colonial state, they became the focus of intense reforms initiated by the First 
Republic government, which meant to erase elite and ethnic identification in order to make a 
uniform national political space but ironically opened up new pathways for persons of non-free 
status to adopt the markers of “Fulbeness.” The stiffness of social hierarchies within the Futa 
Jallon decreased over time – but they did not disappear. People with ties to the Futa Jallon might 
not have spoken (at least outwardly) of slaves and masters, free and non-free in the 1970s, nor 
did the Fulbe politicians of the 1950s openly style themselves as the representatives of the 
region’s elite alone. Yet, both in practice and discourse, social hierarchies were the structure 
through or against which individuals and groups in the Futa thought of and did politics. 
From without, social hierarchies came to be closely associated with characterizations of 
the “Fulbe character,” ones that marked at first the region’s elite and later on the Fulbe as a 
whole as conservative, exploitative, and resistant to change. French colonial administrators at 
different times sought to co-opt and deconstruct elite Fulbe privilege within the Futa Jallon, and 
their first sustained contact with the region’s elites during the period of the protectorate proved to 
be an important stage in the formation of images of the Fulbe as a whole. Social hierarchies in 




decolonization, dominating other French-oriented anti-colonial discourses as the greatest social 
and political hurdle that Guinea had to overcome in order to leave behind its colonial past. After 
independence, when the PDG enacted an ambitious set of reforms in order to make the new 
nation-state “modern,” political leaders identified the Futa Jallon as the area most resistant to 
change, and therefore the most deserving of repression. Over the course of the twentieth century, 
social hierarchies – or, to use the political language of its critics, the “feudal structure” of the 
Futa Jallon – came to be associated with progressively larger portions of those who self-
identified as Fulbe, until 1976, when Sékou Touré linked these ills with the Fulbe as a whole. 
Thus, the Futa Jallon as a region – as both the “homeland” of the Fulbe and as the fount 
from which sprang Fulbe characterizations – marked the Fulbe as divergent from the rest of 
Guinea. The articulation of Fulbe difference, both from within and without, relied upon a series 
of historical developments across the twentieth century: the marking of the Futa Jallon as a 
distinct region; the association of the Futa Jallon with ethnic Fulbe, and in particular images of 
Fulbe elites; the uneasy and incomplete insertion of the Futa Jallon and Fulbe within an 
emerging Guinean nation; and the development of trans-national networks of Fulbe traders and 
migrants over the course of the twentieth century. It is within these four conceptual areas – the 
region, ethnicity, the nation, and trans-national networks – that this dissertation seeks to make 
broader interventions. 
The Region3 
The Futa Jallon is a plateau of around 1000 meters altitude comprising some 70,000 km2 
in total territory ringed by imposing escarpments (see Figure 1). As a “citadel” partially sheltered 
from the disruptions of the Atlantic slave trade, and a region in which Fulbe elites were able to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 Unless otherwise stated, the “region” in this dissertation denotes sub-national units rather than 




consolidate control both in the years preceding and following colonial conquest, the Futa’s 
conterminous geographical and cultural boundaries have reinforced its status as a distinct 
historical and political unit. Other administrative and/or ethno-cultural units may have been 
constructed due to the practice and ideology of colonial rule. The high plateau’s historical 
rootedness and continuity, however, sets it apart from many other more recently constituted 
territories in Africa, a fact that Fulbe intellectuals and politicians have often been eager to point 
to as a sign of inherent superiority.  
The Futa Jallon is also one of the four what is often called “natural” regions of Guinea. It 
and the other three regions – the Basse Côte, Haute Guinée, and Région Forestière – trace their 
roots to 1920s colonial policy that wed geographic and climactic features with ethnic, linguistic, 
and cultural markers in order to divide Guinea into four administrative units.4 While Touré’s 
post-colonial government divided the regions into smaller federations, state-sponsored cultural 
production still imagined a Guinea comprised of four distinct cultural sources from which a 
national identity could be forged.5 In the years since the PDG’s fall in 1984, popular political 
discourse in Guinea has accorded a timeless, “natural” quality to the four regions, with many 
people pointing to this ahistorical division within Guinea’s political structure as the root of an 
ethnicized national politics. In sum, over the course of the twentieth century, one sees a 
calcification of the division of Guinea into four distinct political communities based upon the 
paradigm of the ethno-region. For those scholars and activists hoping to counter the growing 
association of Guinean political parties with particular ethnicities, a trend that has, some believe, 
only accelerated since the country reestablished free and (somewhat) fair national elections in 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 Odile Goerg, “Couper la Guinée en quatre ou comment la colonisation a imaginé l’Afrique,” 
Vingtième Siècle. Révue d’Histoire 111 (2011), 73-88. 
 




2010, regionalism has reified divisive political, cultural, or social cohesion where no such 
phenomena existed previously. Pointing out the regions’ historical construction, therefore, is an 
attempt to remove or at least reduce the prominence of ethnic identification as the prime form of 
political mobilization.  
Such a narrative of colonial invention, however, only presents a partial history of 
Guinean regionalism, and does not apply uniformly to all four regions. Given its demographic 
importance and centrality in shaping both colonial and post-colonial policy, the Futa Jallon 
remains an important exception. Similar to other regions in Guinea, the linguistic, cultural, and 
ethnic terrain of the Futa has never been uniform, and the region still today is home to several 
enclaves of ethnic Djallonke, Coniagui, and Maninka. Unlike other regions, however, the Futa 
Jallon’s elite almost uniformly self-identified as Fulbe. They all spoke Pular. And they practiced 
a specifically Fulbe form of Islamic religiosity that was used to justify their authority. 
Furthermore, the Futa was not cobbled together by the colonial state, but rather incorporated as a 
whole into the French empire in 1897 by a treaty of protectorate. Regionalism tied to ethnic 
identification did become more prevalent within Guinean political culture over the course of the 
twentieth century – although it is important to note the ebbs and flows of such a form of political 
community, especially after African political parties emerged in the wake of post-WWII reforms. 
In imagining four distinct ethno-regions that together constituted a unified Guinean territory, 
colonial administrators shaped how early politicians and political organizations in Guinea 
organized and expressed themselves, which until 1947 was predominantly through the paradigm 
of ethno-regional political organizations. And yet, in constructing the ideology and structure of 
their movements, regional parties drew upon intellectual and strategic sources that either 




More broadly, scholars have often characterized regionalism as a derivative or irredentist 
barrier to the formation of what became the dominant nationalist forms.6 Such an approach – 
which tends to both flatten and simplify the historical and ideological causes of regionalism 
while failing to recognize the range of political formations imagined by African politicians and 
parties during the post-Second World War period of imperial reform – fails to account for the 
relevance and durability of regionalist movements throughout the twentieth century. Discourses 
and practices connected to the region remained important both before and after independence, 
and in the case of Guinea and several other nation-states, continued to shape the trajectories of 
African states and societies long after the end of colonial rule. This dissertation takes one such 
regionalist movement for what it was: a fully-formed reflection of how individuals and groups 
both inside and outside the Futa Jallon imagined the division of political space within Guinea 
and attempted to shape effective political organizations. Furthermore, the history of political 
thought and strategy in the Futa Jallon demonstrates that not all regionalist movements took up 
the language of nationalism. Rather, Fulbe elites put forward an alternative idea of political 
community, one that was rooted both in pre-colonial legacies, the colonial politics of difference, 
and the particularities of Guinean decolonization, but one that at the same time resisted the 
dominant model of a uniform nation-state. 
Ethnicity 
Fulbe identification and identity in Guinea took on a specifically territorialized 
connotation over the course of the twentieth century. Historians and social scientists have 
considered more generally the foundation and development of social difference in Africa, most 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 For critiques of such an approach, see Jean Allman, The Quills of the Porcupine: Asante 
Nationalism in an Emergent Ghana (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1993), 4; and Jean 
Sebastian Lecocq, Disputed Deserts: Decolonisation, Competing Nationalisms and Taureg 




commonly through the idiom of ethnicity.7 Starting in the 1970s, interpretations focused on the 
role colonial institutions and rule played in the emergence and codification of ethnicity.8 
Subsequent studies, in particular focusing on the Great Lakes region, emphasized colonial 
legacies in post-colonial forms of rule, highlighting the agency of the colonial state in shaping 
ethnic identities and constructing hierarchies between ethnicities.9 Mamdani points to the role 
colonial legal systems –in particular customary law – and a broader rule of difference played in 
creating structures of political identities based upon vertically ranked “races” and horizontally 
distinct “ethnicities.”10 Other scholars have examined the ways in which communities and 
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individuals have used ethnic identification to their own ends, arguing that ethnicity can constitute 
and structure a moral community11 in which individuals and groups produce their own ideas of 
custom and tradition and are the “brokers” or co-producers of their own history.12 In these 
studies, both the “external” and “internal” influences on the formation of ethnic identity and 
identification are rarely incorporated into one analytical framework.13 
Furthermore, studies that focus explicitly on the agency of the colonial state often fall 
prey to pared down or underdeveloped narratives, at times neglecting ideas and practices with 
roots in the pre-colonial past and/or arguing that ethnic or racial thought was fully cured, like 
concrete, sometime in the 1930s or ‘40s.14 In the last decade, a group of scholars have produced 
more explicitly historical studies of the development of racial and ethnic thought.15 While rooted 
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in their particular historical cases, these researchers have identified similar processes: 
intellectuals and politicians of different kinds drew from multiple sources – local and global, 
before, during, and after colonial rule – in order to shape and contest ideas about belonging tied 
to race, ethnicity, and nation. In doing so, these historians have demonstrated that racial and 
ethnic thought was the result of processes – described as a modified circularity for some, or 
overlapping for others16 – that were not the deterministic result of colonial law or determined 
wholly by forms of colonial rule, but were still shaped by the circulation of texts and ideas 
situated within imperial frames. Lastly, these recent studies have shifted attention away from 
interwar “high colonialism” to later post-war imperial reform, decolonization, and early post-
colonial consolidation, a period that is often neglected in studies that emphasize the agency of 
European administrators. Due to both evidentiary and historical determinants, this dissertation 
focuses on the brokers – meaning those who sought to mediate and construct their own historical 
narratives – of ethnic ideas, the central argument stands: histories of political and social 
difference must utilize dynamic models that recognize intellectual diversity. 
According the colonial state a hegemonic role in the production of Fulbe identity and 
identification, the latter’s association with social hierarchies, and eventually the politicization of 
ethno-regionalism is unsustainable. The structure, images, and practices of rule in the colonial 
Futa Jallon grew as much from local, pre-colonial precedents as they did forms of decentralized 
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despotism.17 And while the colonial administration’s (sometimes halfhearted) attempts at reform 
in the Futa Jallon opened spaces for maneuver – as well new mechanisms for exploitation – for 
persons and communities of non-free status, these herders, women, and former slaves often 
moved at cross-purposes to the desires of the colonial administration and Fulbe chiefs. Finally, 
while 1940s colonial repression pushed Africans to create publically non-political organizations, 
often constructing them along the lines of regional and/or ethnic identification, the ways in 
which politicians and activists went about forming these nascent political parties and articulating 
political positions went beyond simply cribbing colonial ideology and tactics. 
This is not to argue that the colonial state had no role at all in producing the “particular 
situation.” In fact, while conducting research in colonial archives I was often struck by the 
resonances between the anti-Fulbe language deployed by the colonial administration and later 
PDG officials. Rather, I argue, an explicitly historical approach to the development of Fulbe 
identity and identification demonstrates that the establishment of the Futa Jallon protectorate was 
a break, but not a rupture. As such, ideas and practices connected to the articulation of ethnicity 
and political community resulted from a process of entanglement rather than, as has been 
characterized before, French action, Fulbe reaction, and the eventual disintegration of pre-
colonial systems.18 During and after French rule, a wide range of actors, both African and French 
alike, drew from a variety of sources, including ones with roots in pre-colonial Futa society, to 
construct ideas of political community and ethnic identification. Lastly, it was not the interwar 
“high-noon” of French colonialism that welded political community and ethnicity in Guinea, but 
rather the post-war period of imperial reform marked by at times violent contestation between 
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rival sets of African political parties. Therefore, a host of factors including the emergence of 
multi-party politics, rather than simply the colonial system itself, produced the “particular 
situation” in the Futa Jallon. 
The Nation 
The other main contribution of these recent historical works on racial and ethnic thought 
is their contention that articulations of social difference based upon race, ethnicity, and nation 
emerge from similar processes and ultimately reflect a human predisposition for categorization. 
To cite Glassman’s argument: “There is no firm line between national thought and racial 
thought, and a racial paradigm of exclusion and dehumanization is implicit in virtually all 
nationalist projects, even the most liberal.”19 If, as Glassman does, one considers racial and 
ethnic thought to be a question of degree rather than type, it would follow that ethnic and 
nationalist forms of identity and identification spring from the same discursive well, are 
deployed in similar ways, and often inhabit, either in overlapping or oppositional relationships, 
the same political terrain. 
 Previous generations of scholars interested forms of political community in Africa, on the 
other hand, theorized a starkly different relationship between the two phenomena, often 
characterizing ethnicity and nationalism as inherently different, if not antithetical forms of 
political thought and mobilization. Some have argued that, being the result of particularly 
European historical development, nationalism in Africa (and indeed in the larger colonial world) 
is a political interloper, a “derivative discourse” and ultimately doomed to internal fragmentation 
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or eventual failure.20 Another line of argumentation contends that “fixed” forms of ethnic 
identity with roots in colonial rule prevented the development of functional nationalist 
movements in Africa, or at least ones that incorporated widespread consent and a vibrant civil 
society.21 As both Young and Glassman have argued, though, such a characterization of the 
(dysfunctional) relationship between ethnicity and the nation simply recreates the conceptual 
framework deployed by the first generation of African nationalist leaders, men like Sékou Touré 
whose political programs drew heavily from the modernization paradigm. As such, politicians 
and scholars alike have conceptualized ethnicity as pre-modern, retrograde, and likely doomed to 
dissolution within the emerging nation, the latter which was seen to be the paragon of 
modernity.22  
Post-war Guinean history demonstrates that if post-colonial nationalism is based upon the 
articulation of difference,23 then post-colonial nation-builders’ most forceful and visible “other” 
were often supposed “fifth column” groups like the Fulbe, products not only of colonial 
corruption but also of the failure to adapt or erase “handicapping” social structures to a “modern” 
state. Sékou Touré and other leaders within the PDG often chalked up their various domestic 
failures and international conflicts to the pernicious forces of neo-colonialism. In mobilizing 
evidence to support their claims, however, they often pointed first to internal traitors and 
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eventually to the stubborn irredentism of Fulbe “racism.” It was against these anti-popular forces 
that Touré and the PDG most clearly articulated their vision of the Guinean people and national 
identity.24 Mobilizations of Fulbe political identities have since seized upon perceived 
victimhood, which remains a key component of Guinean political culture to the present.25 In this 
manner, rather than being antithetical formations, I argue that Guinean nationalism as shaped by 
the PDG and Fulbe deviation therein are in fact mutually constitutive. One did not develop 
without the other.  
Trans-national Networks  
Additional, larger contexts structured by trans-national networks also shaped the 
formation of the ideas about citizenship, belonging, and ethnic identification in twentieth-century 
Africa. Scholars have undertaken significant work on the development of ideas about citizenship 
within the framework of empire.26 Far from developing into hermetically sealed national debates, 
though, debates over what it meant to be a citizen in a post-colonial nation-state continued to be 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24 Such an oppositional definition of ideology and identity is common to populist movements, 
including those rooted in both the political right and left.  See Ernesto Laclau, On Populist 
Reason (New York: Verso, 2005). 
 
25 Alexis Arieff and Mike McGovern, “’History is Stubborn’: Talk about Truth, Justice, and 
National Reconciliation in the Republic of Guinea,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 
55, no. 1 (2013), 198-225. 
 
26 Much of the literature on ideas of citizenship in West Africa has focused on Senegal’s Four 
Communes. See G. Wesley Johnson, The Emergence of Black Politics in Senegal: The Struggle 
for Power in the Four Communes, 1900-1920 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971); 
Mamadou Diouf, “Assimilation coloniale et identités religieuses de la civilité des originaires des 
Quatre Communes (Senegal),” Canadian Journal of African Studies / Revue Canadienne des 
Études Africaines 34, no. 3, (2000), 565-87; Rebecca Shereikis, “From Law to Custom: The 
Shifting Legal Status of Muslim Originaires in Kayes and Médine, 1903-1913,” Journal of 
African History 42 (2001), 261-283. Frederick Cooper has examined arguments about citizenship 
in the broader post-WWII French Empire (then Union and later Community) in Africa. See 
Citizenship between Empire and Nation: Remaking France and French Africa, 1945-1960 




informed by larger contexts after independence.  
In Guinea, these larger contexts took several forms. One was the larger Cold War 
conflict, and Sékou Touré’s attempts to navigate – and by doing so both profit and remain 
independent – between the East and the West.27 Touré was also popularly known as a pan-
Africanist theorist, and his vision of a unified and strong Africa informed both the PDG’s foreign 
policy and the party’s conceptualizations of political community. Less attention, however, has 
been paid to the role trans-national networks of migrants and exiles with roots in the Futa Jallon 
played in discourses of citizenship and belonging during the First Republic. These networks and 
flows have deep historical precedents,28 but their growth in both flows and public prominence 
shifted their position within political discourses following independence. As the flow of Fulbe 
emigration increased rapidly during the 1960s, due primarily to a combination of economic 
malaise and political repression, PDG leaders began to mark the Futa Jallon as a region defined 
in part by trans-national connections. Networks of Futa Fulbe communities in Dakar, Abidjan, 
Paris, and further afield acted as a resource for both communities in the Futa Jallon who felt the 
brunt of periodic economic crises as well as political exiles who sought to secure their position in 
sometimes-ambiguous settings abroad. But the Fulbe trans-national community also served as a 
liability, with, as previously mentioned, Touré claiming that the Fulbe were more interested in 
making money abroad than staying home and building their country. Furthermore, the Guinean 
leader argued that Fulbe exiles were stooges of neo-colonial forces, and directors of a broader 
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Fulbe disloyalty. Either as a resource or a mark of treason, networks of Fulbe migrants and exiles 
played a central role in the PDG’s articulation of the Fulbe as Guinea’s anti-citizens.  
 In emphasizing the broader context of Fulbe communities as composed first and foremost 
by networks, and arguing that historians should focus on the structure and practice of particular 
networks in order to write broader histories, I diverge from previous scholarly approaches to the 
study of “the Fulbe” in West Africa. Scholars have often described the geography of Fulbe 
settlement in West Africa as an “archipelago” of communities spanning from southern 
Mauritania to northern Cameroon.29 The Fulbe – also known as the “Peuhl” or “Fulani” – are, at 
their most basic level, a group of Pular-speakers who posses a connection with cattle and semi-
nomadic herding. Early sources, most notably the Timbuktu chronicles, refer to the Fulbe as 
“pagan” raiders that harassed sedentary communities and larger Islamic states.30 Groups of Fulbe 
eventually began to settle near – and intermarry with – settled communities. Most notably in the 
region that would eventually become Senegal’s Futa Toro, after raids that developed into wars of 
conquest, Fulbe elites found themselves as leaders of states. Eventually, as was common in pre-
colonial West Africa, these leaders converted to Islam.31 Sedentary, Muslim Fulbe, in turn, 
migrated to other regions of West Africa, eventually creating their own Islamic states. Over time, 
then, the Fulbe connection to their cattle and to a nomadic lifestyle became more imaginary than 
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real. Along with the relative latecomer of Islam, though, they constitute what Fulbe have often 
considered as the core of their states and societies. Similar historical trajectories played out 
variety of regions, first in the Futa Jallon, and then later in the Futa Toro, Maacina in Mali, and 
Sokoto in Northern Nigeria (see Figure 2). During the pre-colonial and colonial eras, Fulbe 
communities drew upon their wide geographic spread to build vibrant networks of trade, 
migration, and Islamic learning. However, such a geography of settlement has resulted more 
recently in marginalized communities within West African nation-states.32 
 According to this scholarly analogy of the archipelago, “islands” of peripheral Fulbe 
hegemony, geographically distant and historically distinct yet still supposedly alike in type, are 
commonly surrounded by or in some cases subsumed within the “seas” of larger non-Fulbe 
socio-cultural communities. Such a characterization of Fulbe settlement and culture has lead 
several social scientists to adopt a comparative approach when discussing the past and present of 
Fulbe communities in West Africa.33 This type of work has produced fruitful analysis on shared 
aspects of Fulbe culture on each of the “islands,” the most notable examples being studies on the 
Fulbe concept of pulaaku, whose closest translation in English would be “honor.”34 Nearly all 
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Fulbe cultures in West Africa have some concept of the term, and most agree that it is central to 
Fulbe self-identification and society. Yet even pulaaku as an example of a commonality 
throughout West African Fulbe communities largely fails. As De Bruijn and Breedveld have 
demonstrated, there exists an important divergence in definitions and roles of pulaaku in West 
Africa, and the concept’s mobilization as a sort of “essence” of Fulbe-ness is rooted as much in 
colonial ethnography as in local research.35 
 An alternative approach, one that this dissertation adopts, is to examine the actual links 
that have historically existed between distinct Fulbe communities. Given both the depth and 
breadth of Fulbe flows of people, goods, and ideas – and the cultural, religious, and perhaps 
political imaginary to which they gave rise – an emphasis on networks and linkages might serve 
as the basis for a broader history of the West African Fulbe. It is important to recognize, 
however, that Fulbe communities have interacted frequently with other groups in their immediate 
vicinity. Thus, it is not sufficient to simply acknowledge that there exists a plurality of specific 
but closely related Fulbe cultures; one must, as De Bruijn and Van Dijk have argued, recognize 
that Fulbe identification and identity is the direct product of local historical discourses between 
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the Fulbe “islands” and the surrounding “seas.”36 
Guinea 
Scholarly work on Guinea since 1945 has tended to cluster in three general groups. The 
first seeks to identify the causes and legacies of Guineans’ rejection of the constitution of the 
Fifth French Republic in a 1958 referendum, an event that has loomed large over both academic 
and popular discussions of Guinea’s perceived divergence from other former French colonies in 
West Africa.37 While it is hard to overstate the importance of the referendum, especially within 
current memories of Guinea’s post-colonial past, a singular focus on the September 1958 vote 
has in the past reduced Guinean politics during decolonization to the rise of the PDG. 
Furthermore, the grouping of most narratives into pre-‘58 optimism and post-’58 failure has led 
some to adopt a modern form of political Marcionism, in essence portraying two Sékou Tourés 
and two PDG’s with radically different personalities and ideologies. A second, related body of 
work has focused in particular on the figure of Sékou Touré, drawing a line of influence from the 
party head and president to the PDG, and from the PDG to the post-WWII history of Guinea as a 
whole.38 Both frameworks leave little room for examinations of political movements rooted in 
the Futa Jallon other than as proxies for colonialist forces. 
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A third pair of studies produced by McGovern and Straker examine PDG-led social 
engineering in the post-colonial Forest Region, the former through the lens of the demystification 
campaign and the latter through state-mandated popular theatre.39 Straker argues that the 
relationship between officials in Conakry and communities in Macenta and N’Zérékoré were 
shaped by the peripheral status of the Forest Region in relation to both the capital and other 
regions in Guinea.40 This position on the margins of the Guinean nation marked the Forest 
Region and its inhabitants as prime targets for state-directed transformation. In order to do so, as 
McGovern explains, the Guinean state focused generally on exploiting inter-generational and 
gender conflict and more specifically on breaking power associations and objects in order to 
effect change.41 The result of the Socialist revolution coming to the Forest was a set of 
contradictory political identifications that marked communities in the region as both part of the 
Guinean nation yet at the same time an “other” in opposition to which the rest of Guinea position 
itself. 
In the Futa Jallon, similar reforms enacted by the PDG envisioned the same ends as those 
in the Forest region: the forging of a new Guinean society that left behind what PDG officials 
called the “handicapping practices” of the past. However, the main defining feature of Futa 
society as diagnosed by colonial and PDG officials – namely, the set of social hierarchies that 
established and maintained elite privilege in the region – proved to be stubbornly durable and 
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generative of an elite capable of mounting an organized opposition.42 Thus, the policies enacted 
by the PDG starting with the establishment of the party’s control over internal self-rule in 1957 
sought first and foremost to break these hierarchies and then, as a secondary goal, to transform 
Futa society. The stakes for gaining control over the Futa were different from the rest of Guinea, 
and so, therefore, were both the implementation and results of attempted reform.  
Drawing from recent studies on the history of ethnic and racial thought, I adopt an 
explicitly historical approach that examines how ideas and practices the informed the 
construction of political community in Guinea unfolded and transformed over time. In doing so, I 
characterize this process as one defined by entanglement rather than continuity or colonial 
rupture.43 Such an approach highlights where and when specific lines of argumentation emerged, 
how they were used and transformed by subsequent actors, and how some eventually developed 
into unquestionably accepted “truths.” At the same time, I am also interested in how ideas both 
sprung from and molded forms of political mobilization, ones that often came to shape the 
internal fractures of post-colonial Guinea. Together, I argue, the two conceptual fields – idea and 
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practice, discourse and strategy – resonated and combined with one another in order to produce 
the “particular situation.”  
The heart of the project, though, remains the Futa Jallon. As such, some historical 
background is in order before embarking on the more detailed analyses and arguments presented 
in the following chapters. 
The Futa Jallon 
Ethnic Fulbe dominance in the Futa Jallon can be traced back to c. 1726. In that year, a 
coalition of nine extended families led a jihad against the non-Muslim state on the high plateau, 
hoping to both end the exactions of the ethnic Djallonke ruling elite and to cement Islam as the 
defining religious and political model in the region.44 Historians have disagreed over the causes 
of the Islamic revolution. Barry contends that its leadership was multi-ethnic and acting in 
reaction to the upheaval unleashed by Senegambia’s incorporation into Atlantic trade networks, 
while Robinson emphasizes the rise of a new Muslim Fulbe identity that broke from a nomadic 
and non-Muslim past.45 By the end of the eighteenth century, however, the initial character and 
ethnic composition of the revolution mattered little. The small religious and political elite that 
controlled the state self-identified as Fulbe, and legitimized its rule by displaying their status as 
both Muslims and free Fulbe. While Islamic clerics tied to particular ethnic groups enjoyed a 
privileged status, a combination of religious and Fulbe cultural markers determined one’s 
position within Futa Jallon society. 
Elite Fulbe privilege was propped up by sets of social hierarchies which shaped 
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relationships of reciprocity and domination within the pre-colonial Futa Jallon. Perched atop 
these hierarchies was a group of chiefly Fulbe elites who traced their lineage to – or at least 
imagined a connection with – the nine families who led the early eighteenth-century jihad. Each 
of these families ruled over a diwal, or province, with the ruling of family of the Timbo diwal 
serving as the Almamy, or paramount ruler.46 Overlapping sets of social divisions crisscrossed 
the ruling elite. The first was based upon groups of lenyi, or extended families based upon 
maximal patrilineages. Lenyi were not limited to distinct areas, however there are concentrations 
of families from one lenyol (singular of lenyi) in certain areas of the Futa. However, the pool of 
individuals with legitimate claims to a chieftaincy at both the level of the misside, or village 
group, and the diwal were limited to a single lenyol; for instance, only members the Kalidiabé 
family, whose history is examined in chapter one, could assume the position of lando, or chief, 
of the Labé diwal.47  
The other main system of social organization in the Futa Jallon was connected to the 
practice of alternation of rule between two sets of families within a single lenyol. Following the 
deaths of the first two Almamy of the Futa state - the cleric Karamoko Alfa and the general 
Ibrahima Sori Yero Poore –civil war broke out between the descendents of the two leaders over 
control over the paramount chieftaincy. Around 1790, the chief of the diwal of Fougoumba, 
considered to be the spiritual leader of the Futa, negotiated a truce between the families. The two 
groups would separate into distinct lineages – the descendents of Alfa called the Alfaya, and the 
descendents of Sori known as the Soriya – and the heads of each family would rule in 
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alternation, serving for two years at a time. Informal alternation spread to the provinces, as each 
new Almamy would appoint a new set of diwal chiefs attached to his family, and over time the 
Alfaya/Soriya social organization was formally implemented in the provinces. The system of 
social organization produced a ruling elite that was marked by rivalry and infighting – and 
therefore prone to internal exploitation and external raiding in order to amass resources – but one 
that was still clearly identifiable, largely insular, and mostly able to consolidate when threatened 
by external forces.48  
Free but non-elite Fulbe, or lassilibe, constituted a much larger group than the ruling elite 
Free Fulbe were organized into lenyi, but could not hold positions of authority. Due to their 
descent from families that freely joined the jihad, lassilibe were exempt from any obligation of 
labor and most taxes to the chiefs. The other social groups in the Futa – all of non-free status – 
were defined primarily by economic activity. The Fulbe burure, or bush Fulbe, were herders. 
They too were organized into lenyi, but were subordinate to specific village chiefs, and were 
subject to a group of taxes, including an estate tax called the kummabite. The subjugation non-
free status of the Fulbe burure was justified by the claim that the at the time non-Muslim herders 
had sided with the Jallonke during the jihad.49  
At the bottom of social hierarchies in the Futa Jallon, constituting some 30-50% of the 
state’s total population depending on sub-region, were persons of slave status.50 Included in this 
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broad group were artisans, namely blacksmiths (waylube), leather workers (garankebe), wood 
carvers (lawbe), praise singer or “griots” (awlube), and weavers (sannyobe).51 By far the largest 
group, however, were slaves who worked in the fields of their masters, often referred to as 
maccube.52 Field slaves were further divided between those whose families who had been 
brought to the Futa, either through purchase or slave raids in neighboring non-Muslim 
communities, within the last two generations, and those who claimed descent from the 
“indigenous” Jallonke. While they were not chattel – once established in the Futa, persons of 
slave status could not be sold, and slave families could own property themselves – maccube were 
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required to give significant amounts of their labor and crops to their masters.53  
Social hierarchies in the Futa were structured and reinforced by a set of social, political, 
and economic poles. The first was the elite’s mobilization of a particular form of Islamic 
religiosity. While the initial jihad may not have been explicitly tied to forms of ethnic 
identification, by the nineteenth century, Islam as practiced in the Futa Jallon was tied closely to 
ideas of a specifically elite Fulbe privilege. Fulbe religious and/or political leaders fused Islam 
with markers of Fulbe cultural identity to make claims that they were the region’s anointed 
rulers.54Aspirant chiefs, for instance, commonly took on the title of religious scholar, or cerno, in 
order to bolster their claims to legitimacy.55 Relations between masters and slaves also took on 
religious connotations. Masters in the Futa Jallon – and indeed throughout Islamic Africa – 
argued that through enslavement those captured or bought were being shepherded in the fold of 
Islam.56 These masters justified continued enslavement even after conversion by pointing to the 
supposed “inferior” form of Islam as practiced by slaves. In order to maintain more profound 
religious knowledge, and therefore access to authority, among elites, opportunities for slaves to 
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study the Qur’an and more generally Islamic thought were tightly restricted.57 Furthermore, the 
uneven relationship between masters and slaves was periodically renewed through religious 
ceremony. Futa Islamic ceremonies such as marriages often required the sacrifice of a cow, 
animals that maccube were banned from owning and therefore had to obtain from their masters. 
Furthermore, at a naming ceremony for a maccube child, an occasion that required the sacrifice 
of a goat, only a free Fulbe master could cut the throat of the animal. He, unlike his maccube, 
was “pure” enough to perform religious ceremonies.58 Islamic religiosity in the Futa Jallon, 
therefore, largely supported social hierarchies that perpetuated exploitation. 
Second, and related to the practice of Islam on the plateau, Fulbe ideas about racial 
difference marked persons of free and slave status. Central to this construction of distinction was 
the classification of the maccube as baleebe, or “those who are black,” and therefore fitting of 
slave status. On the other hand, free Fulbe stressed their foreign origins, often claiming ancestry 
with one of the companions of the Prophet and conceived of themselves as being erduube, or 
“red” (see chapter 0ne).59 It is important to note, that baleebe did not necessarily equate to 
having dark skin. It was rather the concept of “blackness,” and the social status associated with 
it, that was the most important factor. In this equation, phenotype was not necessarily the key 
determinate of slave or free status; rather, by stressing their foreign origins, the Fulbe asserted 
their distinctly Islamic heritage, and therefore their status as religious and political leaders. Such 
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racial thought, similar to other ideologies found throughout the Islamic Sahel and West Africa, 
was expressed through the ideology and language of Islam, and stressed descent over visible 
characteristics.60 Thus, social hierarchies and the legitimating discourses and practices that 
supported them were a defining characteristic of the pre-colonial Futa Jallon state and society, 
and would, as subsequent chapters attest, prove to be quite durable. 
The third and most readily apparent structure that supported elite privilege was a system 
of spatial segregation. Each diwal in the Futa Jallon was divided into smaller village groups, or 
missidi (sing. misside). These local political, social, and economic units were structured by a 
central village, also called a misside, and a surrounding group of dependent villages, called 
fulasso when inhabited by free Fulbe and Fulbe burure and dune (sing. runde) when home to 
maccube. Religious and political authority flowed from the misside to the dependent villages; 
local elites lived in the central misside, and only there could one construct a mosque. Misside 
chiefs appointed secondary leaders called Manga – notably, a term of Mande or Susu and not 
Fulbe origin, thus further marking the alterity of slave status – in dependent villages but the latter 
group’s authority had no independent standing, and the chiefs of slave villages were often the 
slaves of the misside chiefs.61 This spatial organization ensured several benefits for elite Fulbe. It 
maintained distinction between social groups, and, given widespread conversion to Islam after 
the jihad, spiritual dependency of peripheral villages. Furthermore, it established villages 
comprised of non-elites as semi-autonomous groupings, ones that were largely self-sustaining 
while passing on any surplus to the misside elites.  
Spatial segregation was one part of a larger pole of elite privilege in the Futa Jallon, 
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namely the economic system shaped by the pre-colonial state. In addition to being separated 
from the elite-controlled misside, dune were also located in the middle of agricultural fields. 
Nearly all land in the Futa functioned as collective property, but misside and diwal chiefs, did not 
accord rights of use to lands. Rather, the senior heads of each of the lenyi decided who worked 
the fields, and the (almost always other) people who benefitted form the fruits of agricultural 
labor. These family heads often gave free but not elite-status Fulbe rights to freehold farms. The 
most widespread form agricultural practiced in the Futa, however, was done by slaves in fields 
planted with fonio (a West African millet species) or rice near the dune. These slaves were 
expected to feed both themselves and their masters, the latter which they did through a 10% tax 
on the yearly harvest called the farilla.  
Animal husbandry functioned in a similar manner. Those Fulbe burure who only 
converted by force after the jihad were forced to transfer ownership of 1/3 of their herds to the 
elite conquerors. The kummabite, or estate tax mentioned above, further ensured that over time 
wealth in cattle was gradually moved up social hierarchies.62 Artisan social groups also 
constituted an important part of the Futa economy. Sannyobe could produce up to 50 meters of 
high-quality indigo-dyed cloth called leppi per day, while the neighboring gold fields of Bambuk 
and Bure supplied the plateau’s jewelers. Waylube, or blacksmiths, produced significant amounts 
of arms, farming tools, and locks, and were looked at warily by elites due to the widespread 
belief that the waylube possessed hidden powers. While an important part of the Futa Jallon 
economy, artisans were still of servile class, and therefore attached to a master family. Unlike the 
maccube, though, they often lived either in the concessions of elite families or in adjacent 
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Finally, there existed vibrant trade networks between the high plateau and surrounding 
areas, as well as more limited commerce within the Futa. As it occupied a watershed between the 
coast and the Niger river basin and served as the source of several regional river systems, the 
plateau was naturally both at the center of extended trade networks and at a crossing point 
between the coastal and savannah systems. Futa elites tightly controlled trade to, from, and 
across the Futa, collecting taxes from, controlling the movement of, and offering protection to a 
dedicated group of ethnic Mande, Soninke, and Diakhanke traders called juula. Over the course 
of the nineteenth century, the stability of the Futa state stimulated increased outside trade, in turn 
further enriching the region’s elites.64 These vibrant external trade flows, though, stood in 
contrast to a limited form of trade on the plateau. Exchanges of goods amongst Fulbe took the 
form of barter or were conducted under the framework of patron/client relationships. Unlike the 
plains to the East and West, little currency such as cowry or iron ingots circulated within the Futa 
Jallon. Finally, the chiefs largely forbade the establishment of spaces dedicated to commerce 
such as markets.65 Overall, the Fulbe elites used the plateau’s imposing cliffs to control the flow 
of merchants and goods in and out of the region, and either co-opted or limited pathways for 
enrichment within the Futa Jallon. When combined with political and spiritual power, the 
material benefits accorded to elites within the Futa economy perpetuated the social hierarchies 
that structured the pre-colonial state. 
While providing an overview of the history of the pre-colonial Futa Jallon that focuses in 
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particular on social hierarchies, the above account falls prey in part to both ahistoricity and 
simplification. The practice of alternation did not emerge until the late eighteenth century, and 
rarely worked as it intended. Furthermore, Islam was not always wielded as a tool of domination; 
reflecting broader trends throughout West Africa, dissident Islamic movements – most notably 
the Hubbu movement of the 1850s and the community surrounding the Wali of Goumba that 
remained intact up to 1912 – attracted large numbers of former slaves and non-elite free Fulbe to 
their cause by promising to renew Islam and put an end to the most flagrant examples of elite 
exploitation.66 These alternative forms of Islamic religiosity would remain a powerful model for 
later movements comprised of marginalized groups throughout West Africa. Yet, in the Futa 
Jallon – and just as importantly for the colonial and post-colonial states intent on reforming the 
region and its inhabitants – spiritual and temporal power was contained in one figure: the chief. 
Islam and elite privilege in the Futa Jallon, therefore, were only separated from one another 
through overwhelming force.  
As the nineteenth century came to a close, the Futa Jallon would become increasingly 
enmeshed within Atlantic economic networks. British and French state agents and merchants 
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began to make their way up to the high plateau in order to establish trade relations with the Futa 
state, and were almost always confronted with an unreceptive and at times hostile ruling elite. 
Starting in the twilight of the nineteenth century, colonial rule would precipitate significant 
changes in the region and Guinea as a whole. In the Futa Jallon, these transformations would 
cluster around the social hierarchies that structured the asymmetrical relationships between the 
various social groups described above. The transformation and durability of social hierarchies on 
the high plateau – and how those hierarchies shaped both outside views of Futa Jallon society 
and Fulbe self-understandings – constitute, in sum, the social and political terrain the dissertation 
sets out to explore. 
Sources  
In order to examine the twentieth-century history of the Futa Fulbe, I consulted a variety 
of source bases. These sources – and the history I hoped they would illuminate – in turn shaped 
the emphases and structure of the dissertation that follows. The characters that populate the 
histories presented in the following chapters are, by and large, elite males, although chapter two 
examines how marginalized groups such as former slaves and women used spaces for maneuver 
opened by colonial rule. This narrative bias is partially due to the sources I was able to consult 
and the people with whom I had the opportunity to speak. I would also suggest that my focus on 
mostly male elites is rooted in historical circumstances. Elite Fulbe in the Futa Jallon became one 
of the main concerns of French colonial administrators wishing to bring the Futa chiefs to heel. 
Elite Fulbe politicians – and their chiefly backers and, overwhelmingly, fathers– largely drove 
politics within the Futa Jallon during decolonization, a power that Sékou Touré and his allies 
both recognized and sought to break. Undermining elite privilege became the central focus of 




announcement of the Fulbe plot that Touré diagnosed the spread of the particular disease named 
“Fulbe racism” to the Fulbe community as a whole. Schmidt has made forceful arguments for the 
importance of women and youth in driving and shaping PDG politics during decolonization.67 
The history of the Fulbe divergence from the rest of Guinea, however, is one driven largely by 
elites, although with important exceptions examined in subsequent chapters. Thus, they are at the 
center of my analysis. 
 For much of the history of discipline of Africa History, scholars have turned to social 
history and more specifically oral sources to uncover these hidden perspectives and histories.68 In 
conducting oral research in Guinea, I was confronted with a series of particular circumstances 
that determined to which oral histories I had access. While there have been times when his 
prominence has waned, political discourse in Guinea today is still in many ways dominated by 
contradictory representations of the First Republic.69 Reflecting the locally produced literature on 
Touré’s regime, public characterizations of the First Republic often rely upon standard 
narratives, ones that I heard repeated nearly verbatim across interviews with several different 
people. While these narratives can illuminate the ways in which current circumstance shades the 
production of particular memories, and in turn how historical narratives can shape current forms 
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of identification,70 they are less helpful for illuminating historical processes.  
I was also confronted with the problem of actually finding people with whom to talk. 
Many people who had not crafted a public persona of being someone with strong opinions about 
the Touré regime did not want to speak about their or their families’ histories during that period. 
Other potential oral sources had passed away. Had I conducted this project a decade earlier, I 
might have been more successful in finding interviewees, but given the passage of time I often 
came up against dead ends. One elderly gentleman with whom I talked simply stated that 
“everyone has died. There is no one left to talk to.”71 I still conducted interviews with both 
former PDG officials and former opposition members, both in Guinea and outside the country, in 
order to gain a more comprehensive picture of the political terrain of the 1950s, ‘60s, and ’70s. I 
also collected family histories of prominent Fulbe politicians in order to better map the web of 
elite allegiances and relationships that shaped politics in the Futa Jallon. These sources were 
valuable for providing information about ideas or events that had been excised from the archival 
record, or had simply never been written down. They could not, however, provide the core 
corpus of sources for this project. 
 Thus, I turned to the familiar colonial archives one finds in Dakar (ANS), Aix-en-
Provence (CAOM), and Pierrefitte-sur-Seine (ANF), ones that have dominated the lion’s share of 
histories of Francophone West Africa. Tracing the passage of colonial reports and 
administrators’ particular perspectives up and down the hierarchical chain of the French colonial 
administration provided a window on how colonial policies towards the Fulbe and the Futa 
Jallon were worked and reworked by figures ranging from local commandants to the advisors of 
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the French Minister of Colonies. Colonial archives outside Guinea were complemented – and 
sometimes contradicted – by a collection of Pular-language poetry, religious tracts, and political 
treatises contained in the Fonds Vieillard at the Institut Fondamental d’Afrique Noire in Dakar.  
 Archival sources in Guinea proved to be especially helpful. Reports of the Guinean 
National Archive’s (ANG) demise have been exaggerated. While there continue to be problems 
associated with the limited amount of resources available to archive’s staff and periodic closures, 
the Conakry archives remain an important source for the local manifestation of colonial policy in 
Guinea. The National Archives also have limited but very historically valuable post-colonial 
holdings. These include security briefings written by the National Gendarmerie and Police 
provided daily to the Office of the President, which provide an important window onto the 
internal logics of the PDG government during the First Republic. Due in part to the National 
Archives being closed for the first two months I was in Guinea, I also made great use of the 
Regional Archives of Labé (ARL). This archive consisted of one windowless, dark room filled 
with six-foot-tall stacks of unorganized documents caked in the red dust that seems to cover 
everything in the Futa Jallon during the dry season. They presented a logistical nightmare, but 
with persistence and a bandana covering my face to combat the dust, provided a wealth of 
material on local forms and contestations of statecraft in both the colonial and post-colonial 
periods. 
 In fact, my use of archival sources in Guinea brought to the fore two interrelated issues 
connected to producing post-colonial histories.72 First, while Guinea has a long history of 
archival mutilation – meaning the destruction of documents through intent or neglect – the 
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former, more methodical elimination of sensitive documents followed pre-existing geographies 
of power. Thus, while coded government cables and security reports may have been destroyed in 
Conakry – although not completely – they were often preserved in local archives. Second, as 
Guinea was a “closed” state under Touré, studies of the First Republic have often relied upon 
outside sources, including reports from foreign embassies and intelligence services, testimony 
from exiles, and Touré’s own voluminous published political treatises.73 While I have made use 
of these familiar sources, they also paint a particular image of the Guinean state and society, one 
that stresses uniform control by and consent for PDG rule. Documents contained in the archives 
in Labé and to a lesser extent in Conakry, however, reflect a different political structure, one that 
includes a state that is aware of the limits of its ability to project power into the interior and is 
often faced with resistance. In sum, the images of the post-colonial state one finds in archives in 
Pierrefitte-sur-Seine and in Labé diverge dramatically. Thus, a certain amount of triangulation is 
required to paint a more complete picture of post-colonial Guinean history. 
While archives in Guinea provided a rich group of previously unexamined documents, 
other sources amenable to writing histories of ideas proved to be few and far between. Glassman 
and Brennan’s studies on the history of race, nation, and ethnicity in Zanzibar and Dar es 
Salaam, respectively, draw from a large corpus of local political writing, most notably 
newspapers published by political parties and organizations as well as more specific political 
tracts.74 Both the number and variety of these types of sources are not available for Guinea. 
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73 This last group of texts is only of limited use for the historian interested in the practice of 
politics during the First Republic due to, as McGovern argues, the glaring “empty speech” of 
much of Touré’s rhetoric. See “Unmasking the State: Developing Modern Political Subjectivities 
in 20th Century Guinea,” (PhD diss., Emory University, 2004), 32-33, 563-578; McGovern, 
Unmasking the State, 210. 
 




1950s political parties often published their own newspapers, but only the PDG’s appeared 
consistently, and many of the newspapers associated with Fulbe-led parties have not been 
preserved. Thus, one is presented with a wealth of material produced by the PDG – perhaps 
explaining in part why politics in Guinea from the Second World War to 1984 has often been 
conflated with the political party – but a lack of alternative viewpoints. In trying to recover 
opposition ideologies and arguments, therefore, I was often forced to infer from actions listed in 
reports of public meeting contained in the archives of the colonial and post-colonial state. These 
source constraints, however, also forced me to focus in particular on the structure and strategies 
of different political parties. The resulting analysis places emphasis on how ideology and 
strategy (and the constraints thereof) both resulted from and shaped one another over the course 
of the twentieth century.  
Ultimately, my use of archives in Labé, Guinea, Senegal, and France both springs from 
and is generative of the multi-scalar approach my dissertation adopts to examine the history of 
the Fulbe within the Futa Jallon, the colonial territory and post-colonial nation of Guinea, and the 
trans-national community that emerged in the 1960s. Such a methodology seeks to identify the 
different articulations of the Fulbe and the Futa Jallon at multiple levels, rather than 
unreflectively adopting the conceptual categories of empire and then post-colonial nation-states. 
Structure 
 The chapters of this dissertation are broken down into two groups, with a pivot chapter in 
between them. The first two chapters examine the transformation of ideas and practices 
connected to chiefly authority and social hierarchy from 1897 to the early 1950s. The first 
chapter argues that the colonial system that developed during the early period of protectorate 




ripples from this period came to shape both the institution of the chieftaincy and popular images 
of the Fulbe well past the deconstruction of the Futa Jallon as a unique political unit in 1905. The 
second chapter explores how colonial rule opened up new opportunities for previously 
marginalized groups such as women and former slaves to reconfigure social hierarchies in the 
Futa, and also opened up new avenues of elite exploitation. Chapter three examines a watershed 
moment in twentieth-century Guinean history, when from the end of the Second World War to 
1961 political contestation was expressed through rival parties. This chapter contends that 
internal competition between Fulbe and PDG politicians and activists marked the Futa Jallon as 
divergent from the rest of Guinea. The last two chapters consider the gradual but still jarring 
sorting out of post-colonial order in both Guinea and further afield. Chapter Four examines how 
both elite and non-elite Fulbe were gradually alienated and marginalized by the PDG leaders, the 
former through a brutal campaign of elimination and the latter as a consequence of a set of 
policies put into place in the Futa and in some cases throughout the nation intended to make 
Guinea “modern.” Chapter Five charts the paths that Fulbe exiles and migrants took after 
independence as well as the growing prominence of Fulbe trans-national networks in Guinean 
discourses of citizenship. Finally, the epilogue asks, through the imagined perspective of a 
returned exile, what sorts of ripples from the Touré regime and the production of the “particular 




“The Enigmatic Alfa Yaya”: Colonial Rule and the Fulbe Chieftaincy in the Futa Jallon 
 
“Alpha Yaya, l’énigmatique Alpha Yaya… [de Sanderval] avait été dès le premier jour fasciné 
par ce garcon ascétique et sombre, qui mangeait peu, parlait peu, se montrait peu en public, 
descendait rarement de cheval et se contentait pour tout repas d’une poignée de fonio ou de trois 
oranges. Un beau garcon mince, élancé, vigoureux, athlétique, intelligent, pragmatique et attaché 
aux ambitions utiles! L’allié ideal, quoi, déterminé, difficile à vivre mais agreeable en affairs! Le 
genre d’ennemi à redouter, aussi! Solitaire et distant, il détestait les effusions et les familiarités. 
Le roi-né, en somme: cynique et calculateur, ne s’encombrant ni de scruples ne de bons 
sentiments. Il voyait la vie exactement comme Olivier de Sanderval voyait le jeu d’échecs: la 
faute ne pardonne pas; quand un pion te gêne, tu le manges sans te poser des questions.” 
Tierno Monenembo, Le Roi de Kahel, 211-212 
 
 The subject of this chapter is the French conquest of the Futa Jallon in 1896 and the 
transformation of political structures over the course of the slightly more than six decades of 
colonial rule that followed. Immediately, though, some qualifications are in order. French forces 
never “conquered” the Futa Jallon. Rather, using a civil war between factions of the Futa elite, 
representatives of the French state, whose influence had previously been limited to the coast, 
were able to negotiate the status of a French protectorate in 1897 by way of a treaty with the 
remaining Futa leaders.1 The Futa was not unique in being incorporated into the French empire 
through treaty; similar arrangements emerged in what became the colony of Senegal, to name the 
most prominent example.2 However, nearly all of the protectorates outside of Guinea were based 
upon starkly asymmetrical relations of power at the moment of signing, most having taken place 
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1 Suret-Canale uses “occupation” while Derman describes the 1897 treaty as a “conquest.” As I 
will explain below, I am less convinced of the strength of the French government’s position 
during the treaty negotiations, and more importantly of their ability to effect change at least up to 
1905. See Jean Suret-Canale, “La Fin de la Chefferie en Guinée,” Journal of African History, 7, 
no. 3 (1966), 465; William Derman, Serfs, Peasants, and Socialists: A Formers Serf Village in 
the Republic of Guinea (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), 44. 
 
2 For Senegal, see Martin A. Klein, Islam and Imperialism in Senegal: Sine-Saloum, 1847-1914 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968), 138-142; H. O. Idowu, “The Establishment of 
Protectorate Administration in Senegal, 1890-1904,” Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria 
4, no. 2 (June 1968), 247-267. 
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after battles between French and African forces in which the new colonial power was victorious. 
This was not the case in the Futa Jallon. Significant numbers of French troops never occupied the 
plateau, while numbers of administrators were low and changes light up to the Second World 
War. Indeed, the small cadre of French administrators posted to the Futa meant that African 
chiefs and auxiliaries undertook much of the daily work of colonial rule.3 The force of the 
colonial state may have later had the power to radically change African societies – although there 
were limits to transformation even at the height of the colonial project4 – but during the early 
years following the Futa Jallon’s incorporation into the empire, there was neither a widespread 
will nor ability to precipitate significant transformations. 
 An earlier generation of scholars thought of colonial conquest with the conceptual 
framework of collaboration or resistance, and its historical fellow traveler continuity and 
rupture.5 Previous studies of the French “conquest” of the Futa have adopted a similar analytical 
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3 Henri Brunschwig, Noirs et Blancs dans l’Afrique Noire Française, ou comment le colonisé 
devient colonisateur (1870-1914) (Paris: Flammarion, 1983), 209-213. 
 
4 See Thomas Spear, “Neo-traditionalism and the Limits of Invention in British Colonial Africa, 
“Journal of African History 44, no. 1 (2003), 3-27. Although French administrators considered 
the French rule’s ability to transform more powerful, there were still very visible limits to even 
“direct rule,” even where such a system it could be indentified in French colonial Africa. 
  
5 On the literature of resistance and rupture, and subsequent critiques, see Frederick Cooper, 
“Conflict and Connection: Rethinking Colonial African History,” The American Historical 
Review 99, no. 5 (1994), 1516-1545. On the historiography of collaboration, see Benjamin N. 
Lawrence, Emily Lynn Osborn, and Richard L. Roberts, “Introduction: African Intermediaries 
and the ‘Bargain’ of Collaboration,” in Intermediaries, Interpreters, and Clerks: African 
employees in the making of colonial Africa, edited by Benjamin N. Lawrence, Emily Lynn 
Osborn, and Richard L. Roberts, (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2006), 3-34. The 
seminal essay on continuity is J. F. Ade Ajayi’s “Colonialism: An Episode in African History,” 
reprinted in Tradition and Change in Africa: The Essays of J. F. Ade Ajayi, edited by Toyin 
Falola (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2000), 165-174. Subsequent scholars have taken, if not 
explicitly then in spirit, one of Ajayi’s main interventions – that histories of Africa should not be 
dominated by European frameworks, or based solely upon colonial sources that silence the 
voices and perspectives of African – to present studies of Africa that do not use colonial 
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approach, stressing French action, Fulbe reaction, and the latter group’s eventual resignation.6 
Robinson, working on interactions between religious leaders and the colonial administration 
directly to the North of the Futa Jallon in Senegal, argues for a relationship based on 
“accommodation” between the colonizer and particular figures among the colonized. Yet the 
autonomous spaces necessary to maintain such a framework were not possible in the Futa Jallon; 
French and Fulbe actors alike saw themselves as occupying the same political, social, and 
economic terrain.7  
 Rather, this chapter argues, both how authority was defined and power was practiced in 
the early colonial Futa Jallon is more aptly described as “entanglement.”8 Fulbe elites and French 
administrators imperfectly forged a system that drew from colonial and historically deep local 
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intervention as their sole conceptual and temporal framework. See Steven Feierman, 
“Colonizers, Scholars, and the Creation of Invisible Histories,” in Beyond the Cultural Turn: 
New Directions in the Study of Society and Culture, edited by Victoria E. Bonnell, Lynn Hunt, 
and Richard Biernacki (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 182-216; Neil Kodesh, 
Beyond the Royal Gaze: Clanship and Public Healing in Buganda (Charlottesville: University of 
Virginia Press, 2010), 192-193; and Sean Hanretta, Islam and Social Change in French West 
Africa (London: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 4-11. 
 
6 In particular, Ismaël Barry, Le Fuuta-Jaloo face à la colonisation, 2 vols. (Paris: L’Harmattan, 
1997). 
 
7 David Robinson, “Beyond Resistance and Collaboration: Amadu Bamba and the Murids of 
Senegal,” Journal of Religion in Africa 21, no. 2 (1991), 149-171; David Robinson, Paths of 
Accommodation: Muslim Societies and French Colonial Authorities in Senegal and Mauritania, 
1880-1920 (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2000). 
 
8 Lynn M. Thomas, The Politics of the Womb: Women, Reproduction, and the State in Kenya 
(Berkeley: U of California Press, 2005), 17-20; and Julie Livingston, Debility and Moral 
Imagination in Botswana (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005), 5. Compare with the 
idea of “dismantling,” which has been the dominant conceptual framework commonly used 
when analyzing transformations connected to colonial rule in the Futa Jallon. See Thierno Diallo, 
“La Stratification des Structures Politico-Sociales de la Société Traditionelle au Fuuta Jaloo: 
Évolution et Transformation,” in Pastoralists under Pressure? Fulbe Societies Confronting 
Change in West Africa, edited by Victor Azarya, Anneke Breedveld, Mirjam de Bruijn, Han van 
Dijk (Boston: Brill, 1999), 113-135; and Barry, Fuuta-Jaloo.  
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sources, building fractured, constantly shifting hierarchies that reflected what Achille Mbembe 
has argued is a “interlocking of pasts, presents, and futures, each age bearing, altering, and 
maintaining the previous ones.”9 Relations of power between the colonizers and the colonized 
were asymmetric; yet, when attempting to carry out the basic functions of colonial statehood – in 
particular, conducting censuses, collecting taxes, and maintaining a suitable level of exploitation 
– French administrators found themselves not only relying upon Fulbe chiefs, but also freely 
using and thereby transforming the signs and practices of authority that had existed before the 
creation of the protectorate. For their part, chiefs in the Futa Jallon used the backing of the 
French state – most notably through the veneer of colonial administration and troops – to 
maintain exploitation of dependent populations, even more so when the changes unleashed by 
emancipation undermined their authority. Ultimately, the chimeric system that emerged from the 
disruption of colonization reflected the unique “colonial situation” of protectorate Futa Jallon, 
neither an imposition from Paris nor a clear continuation of the pre-colonial Islamic state, but 
drawing upon the pasts, presents, and future imaginings of both domains. The embodiment of 
these transformations, I argue, became the “Last Almamy of Labé,” or the “enigmatic” Alfa 
Yaya, a man of elite heritage but one especially adept at adapting to changing situations and 
taking on new signs and practices of authority.  
 This chapter also argues that the regularization of disorder was the central strategy 
shaping the establishment of colonial rule during the protectorate. Due to a combination of a 
thinly spread colonial administration and most likely willful negligence, French rule in the Futa 
Jallon protectorate relied upon ad hoc negotiations between administrators and Fulbe elites. 
These arrangements were exploitative and violent, and while specific practices may have been 
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9 Achille Mbembe, On the Postcolony (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 16. 
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new, the existence of violent coercion was not.10 And even when stripped of its most excessive 
elements, the basic system of ruling through notable personages or families continued to 
structure the institution of the chieftaincy in the Futa well past the supposed “rationalization” of 
local administration during the early 1910s. For the period of the protectorate, and indeed up to 
post-WWII imperial reforms, the main standard practice of colonial governance was the 
maintenance of authority through the exercise of a particularly “hard” form of power. The 
French colonial state was, at certain times, defined by administrative or juridical systems that 
sought to impose order over a highly fractured and uneven terrain.11 Yet, as the history of the 
early twentieth-century Futa Jallon demonstrates, these attempts to create uniformity often gave 
way to more pressing concerns of budget and commandement. 
 Lastly, this chapter argues that the practice and perception of the colonial chieftaincy in 
the Futa Jallon had their roots in the period of the protectorate. First, The fall of Alfa Yaya and 
the end of the protectorate in 1905 might have brought an end to the “pioneer” period of Guinean 
history, yet the model of grands commandements, which was reliant on elite families with ties to 
the pre-colonial Islamic state, remained a pole of administrative organization up to 
independence. Periods of reform and standardization might have swept across the region, but the 
chieftaincy continued to oscillate back to the system of large provinces administered by 
hierarchies of Fulbe chiefs. Second, the period of the protectorate proved to be important in the 
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10 Cf. Suret-Canale’s contention that colonial conquest was the prime cause of chiefly 
exploitation. Jean Suret-Canale, French Colonialism in Topical Africa, 1900-1945 (New York: 
Pica Press, 1971 [1964]), 79-83. 
 
11 Such a framework for understanding the structure of rule, as Gregory Mann argues, fails to 
account for the indigénat – and associated violence – which covered the vast majority of colonial 
subjects under French rule and constituted “the very core of the exercise of colonial power.” See 
“What Was the Indigénat? The ‘Empire of Law’ in French West Africa,” Journal of African 
History 50 (2009), 331-353. 
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shaping of French descriptions of the “Fulbe character.” Starting with early missions to establish 
diplomatic ties to the Futa Jallon state, French explorers, administrators, and later ethnographers 
found resonances of their own racial hierarchies within Fulbe self-imaginings, giving rise to a set 
of supposed traits that grew out of the excesses and exploitation tied to the Futa Jallon elite. 
These discourses would prove to be an important source of post-WWII debates about the 
chieftaincy and “modern” reforms to local administration, ones that would eventually bring an 
end to the chieftaincy in 1957 and contribute to marking the Futa Jallon as divergent from the 
rest of Guinea. 
 Ripples from the era of the protectorate continued to be felt in the Futa Jallon and in 
Guinea for decades afterwards. In considering the practices and ideas that emerged from this 
chaotic but influential period, this chapter examines a watershed moment in the development of 
exploitative authority in the Futa Jallon, a historical trajectory that would later come to be closely 
associated with the Fulbe as a whole.  
Alfa Yaya: the rise of a quintessential Fulbe chief 
This chapter opens with a recent, although not necessarily historically unrepresentative 
description of one of the most influential chiefs in Guinea’s history: Alfa Yaya. Images of the 
Fulbe chief have ranged widely. French colonial administrators portrayed Yaya as an ingenious 
but dangerous man, the perfect epitome of the conservative, fanatical, and reactionary 
components of “Fulbe character.” Guinea’s first president, Sékou Touré, propped him up after 
independence as one of the great resistors to colonial conquest, a problematic role, as we will 
see, given Yaya’s collaboration with the French in bringing about the protectorate. Through the 
eyes of French explorer and self-made “King of Kahel” Olivier de Sanderval, Tierno 
Monénembo casts Yaya as the epitome of long-standing French ideas about the “noble” and 
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“refined” nature of the Fulbe and other supposedly Semitic ethnic groups in Africa.12 As such, 
Alfa Yaya has lived several fictive lives, none of which – as is often the case – have 
corresponded too closely with reality. 
  Despite being re-imagined in successive decades, Alfa Yaya’s life reflected and indeed 
was generative of larger transformations within the Futa Jallon chieftaincy. Yaya was born in 
1850 in Labé, the capital of the eponymous diwal, or province, which was the largest of its kind 
in the pre-colonial Futa Jallon.13 His family was part of the elite Kalidiabe lenyol, or maximal 
lineage, whose members traced their descent from one of the first family heads to join the 
eighteenth-century jihad. Kalidaibé members alone had the right to be named the lando, loosely 
translated as “chief,” of Labé diwal.14 In fact, Yaya’s father, Alfa Ibrahima, was the lando of 
Labé, and his mother, Kumanco, was part of the ruling family of the kingdom of Ngaabu, which 
had rivaled the Futa for power in the early nineteenth century but at the time was a vassal of the 
Fulbe state.15 In other words, Yaya was as highborn as one could be within Labé. 
 Yaya was born just before the territorial apogee of the Futa Jallon state. Since the 1726 
jihad that founded what eventually became a Fulbe-dominated Islamic state, the boundaries of 
Fulbe hegemony had steadily increased through a series of raids and conquests. The largest 
expansion occurred to the North and West of Labé. As newly conquered lands were connected to 
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12 On French imaginings of the Fulbe, see also Anna Pondopoulo, Les Français et les Peuls: 
Histoire d’une relation privilégiée (Paris: Indes Savantes, 2008); and Thierno Monénembo’s 
novel, Le Rio de Kahel (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 2008). 
 
13 “Alfa” is an honorific title usually adopted when one rose to the position of diwal chief. Before 
becoming an Alfa, Yaya held the title of a “Modi,” signifying one who had assumed a level of 
Islamic scholarship. The term was also used in conversation as a term of respect. 
 
14 The title denotes both temporal and religious authority. See Derman, Serfs, 19-25. 
 
15 For a Fulbe account of the conquest of Ngaabu, see Amadou Oury Diallo, Épopée du Foûta-
Djalon La Chute du Gâbou (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2009). 
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the closest diwal, Labé had by the 1850s become the largest and richest province in the Futa, 
constituting nearly half of the total land in the Futa Jallon state, as well as accruing large 
numbers of slaves and agricultural lands in the Kadé region, which were under the direct control 
of Alfa Yaya’s family. The wealth under the control of the Labé Kalidiabe afforded the ruling 
family considerable room for maneuver vis à vis Timbo, the capital of pre-colonial Futa Jallon 
state and the seat of the region’s paramount ruler, or Almamy. While the title of Almamy came 
with a mix of prestige and material benefit, it did not enjoy unchecked – or even substantial – 
control over the Futa Jallon as a whole. Provincial chiefs pledged fealty and paid tribute to 
Timbo, but they also enjoyed control over local affairs and relations with neighboring states.16 
 Local politics in the Futa were marked by conflict and instability. The system of 
alternation rarely worked as intended (see “Introduction”), with scheduled regime changes often 
followed by infighting and eventually either death of one party or a hastily organized truce. As 
such, the practice of espionage, political intrigue, and assassination was an integral part of Fulbe 
political culture by the time Alfa Yaya was born. Conflict was not limited to rival families; even 
within one family or between brothers, the cream was thought to rise to the top, partially through 
the process of elimination by assassination. Late colonial and post-colonial commentators were 
partially correct to point to “democratic” aspects of the Futa Jallon state, including the use of 
councils. But decision-making was limited to a group of prominent extended families, excluding 
both non-elite free Fulbe and the large portion (in Labé, around 1/3) of the Futa’s population that 
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16 Thierno Diallo, Les Institutions Politiques de Fouta Dyalon au XIXe Siècle (Dakar: IFAN, 
1972), 128-137; Derman, Serfs, 12-15; Barry, Fuuta-Jaloo, v. 1, 66-68. 
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was of servile status.17 Thus, the system of governance that emerged in the pre-colonial Futa 
Jallon was, through the initial jihad, external raids, internal fighting, or the enslavement of nearly 
200,000 persons, both founded upon and maintained by violence.  
 It comes as little surprise, then, that Alfa Yaya’s rise to power would eventually mark the 
future chief as possessing a certain stoic ruthlessness. According to historical accounts, Alfa 
Yaya was an exceptional young man. After excelling at Islamic study and growing to a height 
and size that far surpassed his age mates, Yaya and his brothers were given sub-provinces, or 
missidi, to govern, the idea being that the most capable would eventually be named Alfa 
Ibrahima’s successor. Yaya was effective leading raids against neighboring non-Muslim 
communities, and ruled his missidi without substantial problems.18 Despite the youngest son’s 
rapid rise, though, one of Yaya’s older brothers was eventually named the successor to Alfa 
Ibrahima. Yaya was ordered to remain in the misside he governed, Kadé, and to under no 
circumstances set foot in Labe. For a while Yaya stewed in semi-exile. However, European 
incursions into the Futa gave rise to sense of uncertainty amongst the Futa elite, opening a space 
that allowed Yaya to rise to the top of the hierarchy in Labé. In 1890, Yaya ordered two 
subordinates to kill his brother and lando of Labé, Alfa Aguibou. According to accounts, the two 
assassins shot the lando while he was exiting the Labé mosque after prayers. Later that same 
year, Yaya killed another brother and pretender to the throne, Alfa Mamadou Saliou. After 
waiting for the Alfaya representative Modi Gaasimu to serve out his term, Yaya assumed the title 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 J. Richard-Mollard, “Démographie et Structure des Sociétés Negro-Peul Parmi les Hommes 
Libres et les ‘Serfs’ du Fouta-Dialon,” La Revue de Géographie Humaine et d’Ethnologie no. 4 
(1948-1949), 47. 
 
18 Jean Suret-Canale, “The Fouta-Djallon Chieftaincy,” in West African Chiefs: Their Changing 
Status under Colonial Rule and Independence, edited by Michael Crowder and Obaro Ikime 
(New York: Africana Publishing Corporation, 1970), 80-81; and Barry, Le Fuuta-Jaloo, 90. 
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of lando of Labé. After two years, Yaya did not want to hand over power, so he did as he had 
done before, having both Modi Gaasimu and his son assassinated in order to maintain his 
position.19  
 Alfa Yaya soon found an opportunity to extend his power further. Allying himself with a 
French colonial state, whose influence had previously been limited along the coast but was at the 
time eager to secure control over the Futa’s economy, Yaya intervened in a civil war between the 
Almamy Bokar Biro and the disgruntled lando of the Fougoumba diwal, eventually using the 
backing of French forces to hunt down and kill Biro 1896. The following year, the French 
government and its allies on the high plateau met to negotiate a new relationship between the 
Futa and the French state agents in Conakry. The Fulbe lambe (plural of lando) would be 
incorporated into the colonial administration as village, canton, and cercle chiefs, from the most 
local to highest positions. Provincial chiefs were given virtual autonomy from Timbo and at first 
a large amounts of control over their internal affairs. Yaya was promised complete autonomy 
from Timbo, and assumed the title of the Almamy of Labé. In exchange, the Futa Jallon became 
an official protectorate of the French government, the Futa chiefs were placed under the 
authority of a French resident, and the French government gained control over the Futa’s foreign 
affairs, including a monopoly over trade to and from the region.20 
 The run-up to and negotiation of the treaty would come to shape many characteristics of 
the protectorate period, and eventually sow the seeds of its demise. Conflict and violence among 
Fulbe lambe had been one of the constants of the Futa Jallon state’s history. The fact that the 
French had gained control over the region by exploiting a civil war shaded the new colonial 
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19 For a brief but thorough (although somewhat hagiographic) biography of Alfa Yaya, see 
Thierno Diallo, Alfa Yaya, roi du Labé (Fouta-Djallon) (Paris: Editions ABC, 1976). 
 
20 Barry, Fuuta-Jaloo, 202-209. 
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conquerors’ views of the region and the Fulbe elite in particular. Furthermore, the fact that Alfa 
Yaya – perhaps the greatest beneficiary of the conquest – had risen to his position through a 
series of assassinations and betrayals played heavily into French portrayals of the Fulbe as being 
both cunning and untrustworthy. Finally, there existed a fundamental misunderstanding between 
the two sides. While the Futa chiefs believed that they had simply traded one Almamy for 
another, French commanders and eventually colonial administrators saw their hold over the 
region as more complete. Over the next 15 years, these rival visions of the Futa Jallon’s place 
within the French empire would struggle for supremacy with long-standing effects on both 
popular portrayals of the Fulbe and how the Futa Jallon would later articulate itself in relation to 
other centralized, “foreign” powers. 
Taxation and Exodus in the Futa Jallon 
 The treaty of protectorate accorded the French state a monopoly on trade to and from the 
Futa, and administrators within the French colonial office expected to gain some financial 
windfall from taking control over the region. Potential profit had, in large part, justified the 
extension of French control over the high plateau. The economic reality they encountered after 
the treaty, however, quickly disabused the colonial administration of their hopes. The Futa Jallon 
lacked many of the important resources that its neighboring regions and territories enjoyed. 
Unlike Senegal’s Peanut Basin or Côte d’Ivoire’s cocoa plantations, poor soil from erosion 
precluded the development of cash crop agriculture. The grassy highlands were conducive to 
animal husbandry, but the large amounts of value and prestige attached to livestock – and 
especially cattle – by Fulbe society meant that families would only sell if they found themselves 
in dire straights. For the first decade after the treaty, the French state focused on rubber 
extraction. However, the boom and bust cycle of overexploitation, adulteration, and a 1913 price 
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crash made the raw product only a short-term revenue source.21  
 The one resource the Futa Jallon did enjoy was a high population density relative to 
neighboring regions within Guinea and other colonial territories, and higher population meant 
greater income from annual taxes.22 The tax system in Guinea was based upon a hut tax, meaning 
that the head of each continuously inhabited house paid an annual sum, around 10 francs in 
1900.23 Based primarily upon these yearly collections, the Futa Jallon and its inhabitants became 
integral to the balancing of the colonial administration’s budget, eventually contributing more 
than 50% of the total tax receipts for the entire territory.24 Furthermore, the system had two main 
benefits, at least according to French officials: it pushed the rural peasantry out of low-yield 
farming in order to find capital while also paying for the lion’s share of administrative costs, as 
chiefs’ salaries taken as a percentage of the taxes collected. As long as local revenue streams 
were strong, the colony could be largely self-sustaining, or so higher up administrators in Paris 
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believed. 
Yet hut taxes never fully covered the colonial state’s budget in Guinea, a significant 
problem given the Financial Law of 13 April 1900, which required colonies to cover their own 
cost of administration.25 In response, French agents pushed local chiefs to increase their annual 
tax hauls. If the territory experienced a jump in revenue, these administrators would notify their 
superiors of the profitable turn of events, perhaps hoping for a promotion out of the undesirable 
Guinean colony. Local chiefs also had an incentive to extract as much money in the form of 
taxes out of the population as possible, as their salaries were directly linked to annual tax income 
(they kept around 25-30% of the total).26 The primary means through which chiefs inflated their 
share of taxes was through manipulation of hut censuses. Taxes were based upon the numbers of 
huts owned by a family head. Increasing the numbers of “continuously inhabited shelters,” 
therefore, would result in a financial windfall. To do so, chiefs counted seasonal huts – meaning 
those near fields used for three months during the growing season, or those used as informal 
hunting shelters – as full-time habitations, pocketing a larger share of tax income as a result. 
French administrators, for their part, either turned a blind eye or simply did not care about 
increased exploitation as long as more money was being collected. Other colonial officials were 
often complicit in the inflation of census totals. In a report from 1902, the commandant of Timbi 
Madina remarked that he had counted some 12,000 huts in his canton. The total was more than 
double from the previous year, resulting in 66,000 francs of additional tax income. The local 
chief, who had previously conducted the censuses, could have been undercounting due either to 
negligence, underreporting and pocketing the difference in taxes, or more optimistically wishing 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25 Suret-Canale, French Colonialism, 87. 
 
26 Barry, Fuuta-Jaloo, 237. 
! 53 
to lower the tax burden of those under his command. In any case, de Mauduit declined to 
reprimand the chief, remarking only that he was “happy to have gotten such a result.”27  
Local officials did not see inflated censuses as a problem until 1904. That year, several 
administrators notice large numbers of individuals and families in the Futa fleeing the region. 
Administrator Ernest Noirot, at the time head of Bureau of Native Affairs, noted that the 
countryside had seemingly fallen into a “malaise,” with large parts of the population – and 
especially youths – removing themselves from the productive economy, refusing to pay taxes, 
and rejecting state-mandated corvée labor. He acknowledged that the excessive tax burden, 
which he speculated was the cause of the difficulties, was most likely due to over-counting of 
huts in order to inflate annual receipts.28 Reports from the interior around the same time mention 
an exodus of rural farmers from many parts of the Futa Jallon. The causes of the mass flight were 
myriad. In 1905, the French government enacted de jure emancipation, expanding its previous 
ban on the slave trade to outlaw the institution altogether. Despite some chiefs using a 
combination of persuasion and force to stop the exodus, thousands of former slaves, and 
especially those taken during Fulbe raids during previous decades, either returned to their 
homelands or sought better conditions elsewhere.29  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27 De Mauduit to LG Guinée, “Recensement du Diwal de Timbi-Médineh [sic],” 17 July 1902, 
ANS 2G2; Barry, Fuuta-Jaloo, 230-232. 
 
28 Ernest Noirot, “Situation Politique de la Guinée au mois de Décembre,” 6 February 1905, 
ANS 2G4/1. 
 
29 Legal emancipation only intensified the already existing movement of large populations of 
former slaves out of the Futa. See Colonie de la Guinée Française, Rapport Politique, February 
1903, ANS 2G3/1; Colonie de la Guinée Française, Rapport Politique, September 1903, ANS 
2G3/1; Colonie de la Guinée Française, Cercle de Touba, Rapport Politique no. 215, March 
1905, ANS 7G60; Colonie de la Guinée Française, Cercle de Labé, Rapport Politique, no. 32, 
March 1905, ANS 7G60; Affaires Politiques (Guinée) to GG AOF, “La Situation du Fouta,” 10 
July 1905, ANG 2D101. 
! 54 
The main reason that pushed rural farmers to depart was the continued levying by chiefs 
of “traditional” taxes like farilla, zakkat, and kummabite on top of the hut tax. All forms of 
“customary” taxation with roots in the pre-colonial Futa state had been forbidden in the 1897 
protectorate treaty, but they continued in large part due to French non-enforcement of the ban. In 
fact, French administrators remarked almost immediately after the treaty was signed that chiefs 
continued to collect the farilla, zakka, and kummabite despite being banned, a refrain that was 
echoed again and again in reports until the twilight of French rule in the 1950s.30 
In fact, the system of taxation as a whole – including legal and illicit forms – worked as 
French administrators and their African counterparts intended. Both groups wished to extract as 
much money as possible from the Futa Jallon with the least amount of labor. The reliance on 
local chiefs stemmed from a philosophical orientation held by prominent administrators like 
Noirot that advocated for the use of the established chieftaincy as proxies. Perhaps more 
importantly, the low numbers of French administrators present in the Futa Jallon relative to the 
region’s large size and population made direct intervention and administration untenable. For 
their part, chiefs seized upon the removal of many of pre-colonial practices that had acted as a 
check on their power – notably the practice of alternation and presence of councils of notables – 
in order to more brazenly exploit local rural communities. No longer able to raid neighboring 
regions for booty, the chiefs instead turned on their own subjects in order to fund their extended 
networks of clients.  
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Excess and Exploitation in the Protectorate 
 The exploitative system of legal and “traditional” taxation emerged from the articulation 
and practice of authority in the post-conquest Futa Jallon. Unchecked abuse of power and 
discordant, personal regimes of rule were the norm during the Futa protectorate rather than an 
aberration caused by excess.  
 The French administrator who shaped much of French rule in the Futa Jallon was Ernest 
Noirot, at first the region’s Resident and later named the head of Native Affairs in Conakry. 
Noirot had experience negotiating with Fulbe elites, having joined the French army after a brief 
theatre career and participated in the 1880-1881 Bayol mission that passed through the Futa 
Jallon. The former soldier returned to the Futa in 1897 to direct the negotiations of the treaty of 
protectorate following the defeat of Bokar Biro. After strong-arming the chiefs into accepting a 
series of provisions that checked their power, including limits on the slave trade, Noirot set about 
fashioning an administrative system that would best facilitate the collection of taxes and, some 
claimed at the time, his personal enrichment.31 
The newly appointed French Resident’s first goal was to undermine the authority of the 
new Futa Almamy, whose predecessor had dared to resist French incursion into the region. Noirot 
made two moves to do so. First, he limited the scope of the Almamy’s authority to two diwe (pl. 
diwal) immediately surrounding Timbo, a reduction from the pre-conquest 9 provinces over 
which the Futa sovereign had previously claimed nominal control.32 Therefore, Alfa Yaya in 
Labé was released from any oversight by Timbo, as were the chiefs of the Middle Futa. The 
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Almamy of Timbo would continue to claim spiritual authority over the Futa as a whole. His 
administrative reach, however, would be progressively whittled down as French rule continued. 
Second, Noirot made sure that Baba Alimou, a young, pliable candidate with a weak claim to the 
vacated position, was named the new Almamy. Alimou hailed from a minor wing of the Timbo 
Soriya, but was from a family that could not be named to the Almamate in the pre-colonial Futa 
Jallon. Thus, the new Almamy could conceivably lay claim to some sort of “traditional” 
authority, yet he was also seen as illegitimate by large sections of the Futa aristocracy.33 Alimou 
was, in Noirot’s mind, the perfect figurehead: able to lend the veneer of legitimacy to the 
administrator’s actions, but not independent enough to survive without the backing of the French 
colonial administration. 
 Noirot realized that the new Almamy was in a precarious situation and in 1898 provided 
Baba Alimou a group of African soldiers to serve as a personal guard. The decision would 
eventually prove disastrous. At the outset, Alimou’s guards belonged to the French military and 
were paid out of French coffers. In 1900, however, the guards stopped being paid regular salaries 
but were never officially discharged from the colonial army. Instead, the men assumed a role 
similar to the sofas, or men at arms, of the pre-colonial Futa chiefs. Tasked with providing for 
themselves and their superiors, the soldiers pillaged the countryside just as their pre-colonial 
counterparts had before. According to a French investigation, the soldiers were often ordered to 
round up chickens, eggs, or butter to feed the Almamy and French administrators, traveling 
around the countryside, stopping in villages, and seizing the goods without paying.34 Such 
behavior might have been tacitly accepted during the period of military control in other parts of 
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French West Africa (AOF), but once civilians took over administration it represented a visible 
regularization of violence. Clothed in French army uniforms, armed with French guns, and 
armored with the backing of French administrators while at the same time practicing the well-
established practice of aristocratic pillaging, the Almamy’s personal troops represented the new, 
hybrid system of authority and power in the Futa.  
 French administrators also took advantage of lax oversight. The most vivid example of a 
French official running amuck under the cover of superiors’ plausible deniability was the man 
who replaced Noirot as the resident and head administrators in the Futa Jallon, H. Hubert, who 
constructed what later investigators called a virtual “satrapy” in the middle of the colonial 
territory.35 Hubert became famous for his combination of excess, dim-wittedness, and being the 
beneficiary of nepotism. The nephew of Louis Gustave Binger, a famous French explorer and 
later Governor of Côte d’Ivoire, Hubert rose from the position of an unremarkable lower-level 
clerk to the commandant of the cercle of Timbis in the central Futa. A protégé of Noirot, Hubert 
was named the Futa Jallon resident after the former moved to Conakry to head up Guinea’s 
Bureau of Native Affairs. Just as many French colonial administrators who came before and 
after, Hubert used lax oversight in order to enrich himself and his followers. Hubert, however, 
also created a personal fiefdom seemingly drawn from French exoticist fever dreams. Aside from 
using Baba Alimou’s troops to enact personal vendettas – for example, Hubert once ordered 
them to murder an unarmed Chief of Fougoumba along with two of his sons36 – the resident was 
also famous for traveling around the Futa with an outsized cortege. One French teacher posted in 
Ditinn described Hubert’s arrival to his town: 
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When a very fast courier announced the arrival of the M. le Commandant of the 
Futa Jallon region… in Ditinn, the post took on an unusual energy. There was an 
extraordinary coming and going of soldiers, natives, and women. We were taken 
quite a distance to go and meet the “Grand Commandant,” almost to the border of 
the cercle itself. All of the Chiefs in the area were also taken along. About an hour 
after being told what was happening, there appeared M. Hubert, perched atop his 
tall horse. To his side, naturally, was the Commandant of Ditinn, M. Bastié, who 
always went to greet Hubert [when he came to Ditinn]. Behind them were a series 
of native notables, the village chiefs, flanked by their flag bearers, griots, 
militiamen, the most bizarre musical instruments, and finally the general 
population… A couple hundred meters behind them there advanced majestically 
two very comfortable hammocks guarded by soldiers armed to the teeth and 
wearing first-class golden lace. These “brave” soldiers escorted the three wives of 
M. le Commandant de Région; the two smallest shared one hammock and the 
largest had the second to herself. With no added malice, [a bystander told me] 
“those two foula-soussous [of both Fulbe and Susu ancestry] have the same 
mother, they are two sisters.”37 
 
To this Frenchman, Hubert had long crossed several bright lines of proper conduct for a colonial 
administrator. Not only had he installed himself as a sort of king, complete with a personal army 
and parade of musicians, vassals, and praise singers, the French head of the Futa Jallon had also 
married three local wives, two of whom were siblings. While colonial administrators’ 
relationships with African women, both consenting and forced, were certainly not exceptional, 
that Hubert had seemingly raised the women to the level of being wives offended the sensibility 
of the French school teacher. Neither was Hubert’s parade reflective of Fulbe custom; pre-
colonial chiefs often traveled only with their soldiers, and were known for their reserved nature. 
Rather, Hubert’s tour of the countryside reflected a healthy mix of French and Fulbe markers of 
authority, combined with exoticist fantasies of pre-colonial rule in Africa and a simple case of 
falling prey to the temptations of excess. 
 Hubert was only the most ostentatious example of French excess during the era of the 
protectorate. Noirot, the architect of the ad hoc colonial system himself, also created state within 
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a state in the Futa Jallon. Osborn provides an insightful window into how Noirot’s interpreter, a 
former slave named Boubou Penda, was able to leverage his position as an intermediary within 
the colonial administration in order to enrich himself and his patron, often through flouting both 
French and Fulbe rules of propriety and demanding bribes from Fulbe chiefs. Osborn also places 
the two closely linked men at the center of a 1905 scandal that precipitated Noirot’s fall. Word of 
what was going on the Futa Jallon eventually made its way to the French press, and laid bare the 
Metropolitan fiction of a colonial rule in Africa defined by the mission civilisatrice. The moral 
failings of French administrators reflected, some argued, the failure of the colonial project itself. 
Indeed, most press coverage of the affair in Paris centered on perceived violations of the 
assumed colonial racial code, especially the more salacious details of Hubert’s personal 
entourage mentioned above.38  
 Perhaps the most important effect of the Noirot-Hubert-Boubou affair, though, was the 
arrest and eventual exile of Alfa Yaya. The Labé chief had been an early ally of Noirot during 
the 1897 protectorate treaty negotiations, agreeing to use his influence to bring the other Futa 
chiefs in line in exchange for autonomy. In the intervening years, the two had developed a close 
relationship, often exchanging gifts as a sign of respect. The Labé chief often sent sheep to the 
Noirot via Boubou and the French administrator reciprocating with printed cloth.39 The two even 
shared a battlefield at one point; when the chief of N’Dama, a region outside of Labé, refused to 
pay taxes, the two men and their personal guards confronted (and eventually turned tail and fled 
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from) the usurper and his thousand-strong army.40 
 At its core, Noirot and Yaya’s relationship was mutually beneficial. Noirot tacitly 
approved and even sometimes covered up Yaya’s pillaging of the Labé countryside. In one 
especially egregious case, the Labé chief stole a herd of cattle from a local notable named 
Ibrahima Sy and then intimidated the man into not reporting it to local colonial administrators.41 
Unfortunately for Yaya, Sy was either literate in French or had access to someone who could 
write, and proceeded to send a series of complaints to the AOF Governor General on Gorée. The 
theft first came to the attention of the Guinea colonial administration in 1901, but was 
supposedly buried by Noirot and his French allies in the Futa. When in 1903 the AOF 
administration ordered that the cows be returned, it turned out that the livestock had been 
incorporated into Alfa Yaya’s herds “for safe keeping” shortly after their “disappearance,” and in 
the intervening years 2 had died and 7 had been stolen. Thus, of the original 11 taken from Sy, 
only 2 were actually returned. When Yaya was ordered to pay Sy for the cattle that were lost, the 
Labé chief imprisoned the notable for a month. Sy was eventually released with his 
compensation of 1125 francs and allowed to return home, but while on the road was robbed by a 
“bandit,” who coincidentally ended up being a local militiaman under the control of the French 
commandant of Labé. Noirot claimed that Sy had stolen the money himself in order to collect 
twice; the administration in Conakry did not agree, and ordered the Commandant of Labé to 
arrest the militiaman. The latter would never have his day in court. While the accused thief was 
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cell, a subsequent report found, a guard locked the militiaman in the armory. Witnesses heard a 
shot ring out shortly thereafter, and the militiaman was found dead with a supposedly self-
inflicted gunshot wound in the chest from a long-barreled rifle, escaping a lengthy prison 
sentence and somehow defying the laws of physics.42 That local French administrators and Yaya 
believed that they could cover up the multiple instances of obvious theft, kidnapping, and murder 
– a well justified belief, as neither the administration in Conakry or Gorée punished the 
conspirators – only reflects the brazenness with which those in power in the Futa Jallon acted 
during the protectorate. 
  Yaya’s theft of cows by proxy from those less powerful would have fit well within the 
range of accepted practices in the pre-colonial Futa Jallon. That it continued after French 
conquest with implicit permission of Noirot was part and parcel of a more general short-term 
policy of using the political authority and tactics of the pre-colonial chiefs in order to secure the 
legitimacy and profitability of the nascent French rule in the Futa. Noirot stated as much during a 
tour of the Northern Futa in 1902, remarking that the Commandant of Labé has been able to 
achieve many of the administration’s goals due to Alfa Yaya’s strong and active position in the 
region, while the regions of the Timbis floundered because its chief did not exercise enough 
authority. For the long-term economic development of the Futa Jallon, Noirot argued, stability in 
the short-term was essential.43 
  Yet the Yaya’s rule was not wholly free from criticism. As early as 1902, French 
administrators – especially those at the AOF level and in the metropole – started to raise 
concerns about what they considered to be the dangerous growth of Yaya’s power within the 
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new colonial system.44 The commandant of Labé worried in 1903 that the Labé chief was 
directing all of the French cercle commandants in the region; in response, he ordered all French 
administrators to cease direct contact with Yaya.45 A 1902 report from Kadé, the region over 
which Yaya first ruled as misside chief during the 1870s, remarked that the Fulbe in the area did 
not want to work, refused to recognize the authority of the French, “only follow their ‘king’ 
Yaya,” and either refused or fled when ordered to pay taxes and provide corvée labor.46 Alarms 
raised by other administrators contained the same refrain. While Yaya’s rise had served French 
interests immediately after Bokar Biro’s fall, in the time since he had used the small number of 
French administrators on the ground combined with the end of oversight from Timbo in order to 
create his own shadow state comprised of loyal chiefs and collaborationist French administrators. 
Without more direct intervention, they argued, the French government ran the risk of losing 
control of the Northern Futa Jallon, the demographic and economic heart of the colony.47 
 The appointment of a new Governor in late 1904 signaled a sea change in policy towards 
the Futa chiefs. Antoine Marie Frézouls arrived in Guinea determined to reform what he 
considered to be an undisciplined frontier of the French empire. The new Governor was 
concerned himself primarily with regularizing and professionalizing the administration of 
Guinea, and in particular putting an end to various personalized jurisdictions that had grown 
during the period of protectorate. These states within a state ranged from small and informal to 
large and integral to the functioning of French rule in Guinea. An example of the former was 
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used in debate in the French National Assembly as an example of the misgovernment of Guinea 
before Frézouls arrived. Early into his tenure, the new governor discovered that two men, one a 
former scribe in the Conakry courts, had set up a kangaroo court in Coyah, a town only 20 km 
from Conakry, and set about judging locals based upon their “code of laws,” which happened to 
be a dated copy of a Hachette almanac. The two men’s ad hoc legal system was the only 
representation of the French colonial “state” in the area, and for a period of time ran the town as 
their own personal domain. The two renegade “judges” were sentenced to forced labor, although 
both fell ill with beriberi and died shortly after being imprisoned in Conakry.48 
 On the other end of the spectrum was Alfa Yaya’s control over the upper half of the Futa 
Jallon. Frézouls argued in a report to Gorée that his hand had been forced. Noirot, Hubert, and 
Boubou, with the approval of Alfa Yaya and Baba Alimou, the governor claimed, had been 
making moves to restore the Futa Jallon as a unified administrative unit similar to what had 
existed before the treaty, with Noirot at its head and Hubert as his second in command. Frézoul’s 
identification of a Noirot-led conspiracy was within the realm of possibility; in later testimony, 
Baba Alimou would claim that Noirot had told him that, “you will be the last Almamy of the 
Futa Jallon. If you do what you are supposed to do, I will not remove you. But after you, it is me 
who will take the title of Almamy of the Futa Jallon.”49  The governor’s accusation that Yaya 
was collaborating with Noirot in this grand project made less sense, as the Labé chief had turned 
against the Almamy in 1896 specifically to separate his territory from Timbo’s control and, if 
anything, Noirot represented both a more forceful and demanding paramount ruler than what had 
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previously exited. Nevertheless, Frézouls argued that any such consolidation in the Futa by 
Noirot, Huber, and Yaya would cause a “profound division amongst the races” in Guinea at a 
time when the colonial administration should be working towards integrating the different 
regions and ethno-linguistic groups into a cohesive whole.50 Noirot’s supposed plan soon fell 
apart. Frézouls sent the influential administrator into the literal wilderness – namely, the 
borderlands between Guinea and Liberia – officially to delineate the border between the two 
territories but in practice to remove the administrator from any center of influence.51 Frézouls 
then turned to Noirot’s translator, accusing Boubou of sowing discontent amongst the Futa chiefs 
by claiming that the new Governor was dedicated to the abolition of slavery, intended to place a 
tax of livestock, was going to expand demands for corvée labor, and would soon replace gold 
coins with paper currency; in sum, charges that were especially effective due to their plausibility. 
Boubou also supposedly told Yaya that the Governor planned on sending him and his son 
Aguibou to Gabon and planned on naming Yaya’s Alfaya rival, Oumarou Bademba – whose 
father Yaya had killed – as chief of Labé. Frézouls had Boubou arrested, and the influential 
translator died in November from a case of beriberi.52 Hubert was suspended from the colonial 
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administration while on vacation in France and would never return to Guinea. Noirot joined him 
shortly after.53 Thus, the administrative cogs of the exploitative mini-state in the Futa 
protectorate had been removed form the scene. 
 The Labé chief proved slightly more difficult to bring to heel. Frézouls moved to limit 
Yaya’s proceeds from taxes, and reported in early 1905 that he had succeeded in reducing 
Yaya’s portion of yearly proceeds by 1/3.54 The new governor also began to intervene in the 
internal functioning of the “traditional” administration of Labé. A conflict over the succession to 
the deceased Chief of Yambering, a region on the periphery of Labé nominally under Yaya’s 
control, emerged between rival candidates supported by Yaya and Frézouls. Yaya was initially 
able to install his choice, but the new chief was removed and replaced by another candidate more 
in line with Conarky’s interests. Yaya sent his militia to reverse the change, but colonial forces 
stopped his troops before they reached Yambering.55  
The final straw seemed to have been a dispute over territories under Yaya’s control. At 
the time, French and Portuguese officials were engaged in negotiations over the border between 
their respective Guinean colonies. In part to undermine Yaya’s fertile and profitable holdings in 
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Kadé, the French government agreed to cede large portions of land to the Portuguese.56 Yaya 
interpreted the governor’s moves as a direct assault on the chief’s authority. The Labé chief’s 
suspicions were largely correct, as Frézouls had already started grooming one of Alfa Yaya’s 
advisors, Modi Alimou, as a possible successor as chief of Labé.57 In doing so, Frézouls would 
pass over Yaya’s own son, Aguibou, who was supposedly cut from the same cloth as his father; 
the chief’s son was infamous for his exploitation of villagers, had killed one of his own brothers, 
and was prone to violent outbursts.58 According to Governor, the only question that remained 
was how to dispatch of Yaya. One option was to deal with the chief through “extinction,” 
meaning waiting for Yaya to die while making clear that Aguibou would not take over. The other 
path forward was to force Yaya to hand over his territory to the French. Due to an agreement 
signed with Yaya in 1897, however, the colonial administration would have to compensate Yaya 
for his (substantial) holdings. Frézouls made clear that the latter route was not possible, yet at the 
same time declared that by 1907 the position of chief of Labé should be abolished and only the 
individual canton chiefs in the Northern Futa would remain.59 Frézoul’s two stated policies 
seemed to be at odds. He did not want to come to agreement with Yaya, whereby the chief would 
give up his power in exchange for compensation, as such an arrangement ran the risk of Yaya 
still controlling the region’s administration behind the scenes. A better solution would be the 
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chief’s disappearance from the region, but death by natural causes did not fit in with the 
proposed schedule for reform, as Yaya was in good health. Ultimately, the governor lucked upon  
– or, some speculated, manufactured – a third course of action that would remove Yaya in short 
order: rebellion followed by exile. 
 The official narrative presented by Frézouls relied heavily upon tropes associated with 
the “Fulbe character” and the Labé chief in particular. In a report to the AOF Governor General, 
Frézouls laid out Yaya’s by now familiar list of crimes. At first the Labé chief had been loyal to 
the French, siding with them against Bokar Biro, and Yaya had been rewarded in the 1897 treaty 
that gave him a certain amount of autonomy and ended the practice of alternation in Labé. Yet 
Yaya had soon become drunk with power. Backed by Noirot and buttressed by tax revenue, the 
self-styled “Almamy of Labé” murdered his political rivals, established a personal army 
comprised of “Senegalese mercenaries,” and extended the illegal collection of kummabite and 
farilla. Yaya’s goal, Frézouls claimed, was nothing less than gaining control of the Futa Jallon as 
a whole and eventually expelling the French from the high plateau. In response to the new 
Governor’s obvious attempts to undermine his authority, the Labé chief supposedly decided to 
move against the French. According to Frézouls, Yaya stalled by refusing to obey French orders 
to return to Labé, all the while marshalling his forces in Kadé. After the series of confrontations 
over the nomination of Canton chiefs and tax revenues, Yaya made the final preparations for 
war. He sent his women, children, and herds to Portuguese Guinea for protection and sent 
emissaries “throughout Guinea” to foment unrest. The Governor of Guinea quickly 
outmaneuvered the Labé chief. Frézouls ordered that only part of the 1905 Tax revenue due to 
Yaya be paid, and that the Labé chief would have to travel to Conakry to confer with the colonial 
administration about the rest. Wary of an uprising, the Governor also ordered troops to move to 
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Kadé and for all the Europeans in the Northern Futa to amass in Labé. Upon his arrival in 
Conakry, Yaya was detained by French guards and sent to Dakar. Yaya’s son, Aguibou, was 
arrested after he supposedly drew a sword on the Commandant of Labé, and was brought to 
Kouroussa under guard. The Labé chief was soon thereafter sentenced to five years of exile in 
Dahomey, to be accompanied by a small retinue, for attempted rebellion against the French 
colonial administration.60 
 Yaya’s perception of the events leading to his exile diverged drastically form the 
Governor’s. In a deposition after his arrest, the Labé chief maintained his innocence and loyalty 
to the French government. He had always tried to further French goals and had helped Noirot 
whenever the French administrator needed. He had actively fought against those chiefs below 
him who exploited communities under their control and had neither bribed French officials nor 
stolen from others while chief of Labé. He had even donated generously to a monument in honor 
of a French administrator who had died while serving in Guinea.61 In other words, Yaya had 
been a model chief: powerful enough to advance French interests in the Northern Futa, but still 
recognizant of the fact that authority ultimately rested in the hands of the Europeans.  
 In the end, the conflict between Yaya and Frézouls came down to a clash of opposing 
administrative approaches. During the period of protectorate from 1897 to 1905 – more than a 
decade before Lord Lugard would arrive in Nigeria – an improvised system of indirect rule had 
been developed through a collaboration of Yaya, the chief of Labé, and Noirot, the French 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
60 Frézouls (LG Guinée) to Roume (GG AOF), “Rapport politique trimestrielle,” no. 34, 8 
January 1906, ANS 2G5/1; Frézouls (LG Guinée) to Roume (GG AOF), “Affaire Alpha Yaya,” 
no. 1235, 10 Nov 1905, ANS 7G96. Aguibou would join his father in Dahomey in 1907, after the 
Governor of Guinea voiced concerns that prisoner was secretly directing allies in the Futa Jallon 
from his cell through intermediaries. LG Guinée to GG AOF, “A.S. d’Aguibou, fils d’Alfa 
Yaya,” no. 164, 20 February 1907, ANS 7G96. 
 
61 Deposition d’Alpha Yaya, 7 November 1905, ANS 7G96. 
! 69 
administrator. Their system was based in part on the treaty of protectorate itself, which 
established French dominance yet also promised that the new rulers would “respect local 
custom.” The treaty allowed both sides to imagine a new state that suited them the best. The 
French gained a new revenue stream, control over trade to and from the Futa, and, they believed, 
an opportunity to enact social, political, and economic reforms to “civilize” the Futa and its 
inhabitants. The Fulbe chiefs and Yaya in particular saw the French administrators as a slightly 
more hands-on version of the Timbo Almamys, semi-absent sovereigns who demanded tribute 
and labor but for the most part representatives of a distant federal power who did not meddle in 
local affairs. The arrival of a Governor who pursued consistency and rational administration 
eventually forced the two sides to reconcile their divergent ideas of the protectorate, eventually 
leading to Yaya’s exile and the temporary end of the large, personalized jurisdictions in Guinea.  
 While the imaginary of colonial rule by Fulbe and French leaders diverged during the 
period of protectorate, its practice did not. French administrators, Hubert and Noirot included, 
borrowed freely from Fulbe symbols and practices of authority, the former more liberally and 
absurdly than the latter. In turn, chiefs like Yaya used the existence of French guns and troops to 
undergird their own authority during a time of rapid change, especially after important pre-
colonial institutions like councils of notables and alternation were thrust to the wayside. Both 
sides converged on a model that, unfortunately for the vast majority of the Futa’s inhabitants, 
emphasized excess, exploitation, and violence. Yet the system forged by French and Fulbe 
notables during the protectorate was not sustainable, due primarily to its reliance on stripping the 
region of wealth and on exporting difficult to replace goods such as rubber and cattle. Interested 
parties were able to cover up the slow disintegration of the protectorate for its first decade, 
primarily due to Guinea’s peripheral position within a large and complex French empire. After 
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reports of colonial administrators’ excesses in the Futa were leaked to the French press in 1907, 
the system became impossible to sustain publically. Although he was able to partially enact his 
reforms, Frézouls did not emerge from the Noirot-Hubert-Yaya scandal unscathed. The 
crusading Governor would be removed from his post in 1906 – retribution, he claimed, for 
attacking the well-connected Hubert– and would later recant his accusations against the two 
disgraced administrators in an attempt to fall back into the good graces of the colonial 
administration and to avoid a libel lawsuit. The were few winners in the Huber-Noirot-Yaya-
Frézouls affair, not least of which were the Futa communities which had suffered under the 
demands of parasitical French and Fulbe elites.  
Making the Chieftaincy “Rational” 
 The debate about the benefits and dangers of Alfa Yaya’s influence set the tone for the 
colonial administration’s approach to the Fulbe chiefs up to the Second World War. For much of 
the next 40 years, colonial policy regarding the chieftaincy would swing between two poles, one 
arguing that administrators must rely upon “traditional” proxies and respect local custom to 
effectively govern such a large territory, the other arguing that the chiefs should be integrated 
into more “rational” administrative structures and treated as civil servants. In sum, the 
ideological battles of Noirot and Frézouls continued long after the two men were forced to leave 
Guinea. 
 Government attention in the aftermath of Yaya’s exile turned to rooting out what many 
administrators believed to be a far-ranging plot to overthrow French rule in the Futa Jallon. 
According to Frézouls’ reports, Yaya had been at the head of a large cabal of Fulbe chiefs and 
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religious leaders whose goal was to foment popular revolt against the colonial state.62 The 1909 
murder of M. Bastié, the commandant of the Timbis cercle (about 40 km south of Labé) only 
stoked lingering French fears. The administrator had been a close colleague of Hubert’s before 
the 1905 scandal broke – he was the local administrator who accompanied Hubert’s cortege 
described above – and even molded himself after the excessive and violent head administrator of 
the Futa Jallon. According to local villagers, for example, Bastié kept a caged leopard on his 
residence’s verandah, and eventually shot the animal 18 times late one night in a drunken 
stupor.63 It is not hard to imagine, therefore, that he was widely despised by those under his 
charge, and that his murder by a group of marauders was due to pent up anger rather than a vast 
conspiracy. 
Finding the latter explanation of the murder more compelling, the colonial 
administration’s reaction to the murder was both quick and severe. Believing the attack was 
religiously motivated, French investigators linked Bastié’s killers with “religious fanaticism” 
amongst the Fulbe as a whole. Despite the surviving interpreter pointing to the commandant’s 
near constant harassment of the local population, local administrators’ gazes quickly turned to a 
charismatic but elderly religious leader named Tcherno Aliou, also known as the “Wali of 
Goumba.” The Wali led a semi-autonomous community in a Susu-dominated area adjacent to the 
Futa plateau. The religious movement Aliou headed was based upon what he believed was the 
need for reform in Islam as practiced in the Futa Jallon. Similar to earlier and more violent socio-
religious movements like the Hubbu, the community welcomed persons of non-elite due to their 
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articulation of the egalitarian aspects of Islam. As such, Aliou’s movement was antithetical to the 
Fulbe elite’s claims of social superiority based upon their more perfect practice of Islam. 
Nevertheless, French administrators linked Bastié’s killers with the Wali of Goumba, and from 
then with a wide-ranging conspiracy amongst much of the Futa Jallon chieftaincy. The 
conspiracy’s goal, according to investigators, was nothing less than precipitating the arrival of a 
“Mahdi,” or a “redeemer of Islam” who would rule before the end times, to liberate them from 
Christian rule.64  
Combined with the colonial administration’s failure to transform the Futa Jallon’s social 
hierarchies and bring the region’s elites under control, as well as mass exoduses from the high 
plateau of those recently enslaved during the Samori Touré wars, the murder of Bastié only 
reinforced a general sense amongst French administrators that their grip on the Futa Jallon was 
slipping. Klein speculates that the deteriorating situation in Guinea pushed William Ponty, the 
Governor General of the AOF, to enact an important change to the structure of federation-wide 
local administration in 1909.65 Called the “politique des races,” Ponty’s vision of a reformed 
chieftaincy sought to chart a middle path between the models Noirot and Frézouls had previously 
advocated. The Governor General argued that each ethnic or “racial” community had the right to 
be ruled by one of its own. Such a system precluded the existence large, multi-ethnic 
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administrative units – or grands commandements – such as Labé under Alfa Yaya.66 As such, the 
new orientation of native administration represented an important change in colonial policy in 
the Futa, which was emerging from a period of protectorate that explicitly protected 
administrative boundaries based upon the pre-colonial diwe, as well as the larger than life chiefs 
who often ruled them. 
Several colonial administrators in Guinea were in favor of dismantling of the Futa Jallon 
state. Local officials also looked at the Futa Jallon through the lens of the “tribe,” whether as a 
reflection of socio-political realities or distorted through the lens of misguided social theory 
based upon supposed “racial” characteristics (see below). And many administrators were 
partially right to point to the “Muslim” exploitation of “non-Muslim” populations; one of 
supporting pillars of social hierarchies in the Futa Jallon state, after all, was based upon the belief 
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that elite Fulbe leaders were the original Muslim conquerors, and that those of non-free status, 
either Fulbe herders or Mande and Djallonke slaves, assumed their lower position because of 
supposed past refusal to convert, incomplete conversion, or present unbelief. If the Futa Jallon 
indeed precipitated Ponty’s reforms, it would make sense that the social harms he sought to 
redress were so present in the first decade of French rule on the high plateau. 
Yet, as was both clear at the time and since, Ponty’s politique des races served first and 
foremost one end: control.67 Great chiefs like Alfa Yaya and to a lesser extent the Almamys of 
Timbo had at times actively or passively undermined French rule. Territorial governors needed 
to find a way to make the Futa chiefs wholly dependent upon the colonial state. One of the most 
effective tactics was undermining the economic independence of chiefs while at the same time 
deconstructing existing political structures.  
The former diwal of Labé provides an example of how the Ponty’s reforms played out in 
a local setting. For four years after Yaya’s exile, one of the former advisors to the erstwhile head 
of Labé, Alfa (formerly Modi) Alimou, served as the chief of Labé. Alimou’s position was 
tendentious – he was not a Kalidiabe, and thus had no local claims to the throne – and therefore 
relied upon strong support from the French to be a viable leader. In order to shore up his material 
and spiritual support from Labé notables, the Labé chief tuned to local religious leaders, 
commonly referred to as marabouts, in order to offer protection and legitimize his rule. At one 
point, Alimou was said to wear nearly 50 pounds of items that ensured religious protection and 
power on his person at all times. The appeal to religious power, though, was largely ineffective. 
Alimou became progressively exploitative in order to raise more funds to pay clients, and French 
administrators began to receive more and more complaints from local communities. Alimou’s 
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end came when the Labé chief was implicated in the Bastié murder. The Lieutenant Governor of 
Guinea used the supposed connection to remove an unpopular and ineffective chief, eventually 
arranging for Alimou to be convicted of slave trading – one amongst a bevy of other potential 
charges, the report mentions – and the chief was sentenced to three years in prison.68 Alimou 
invoked the right of kummabite in his defense, saying that he only enslaved children from 
families who could not pay their legal and “customary” taxes, but his pleas fell upon deaf ears.69 
One administrator was clear about the motivation behind Alimou’s removal: “to best understand 
the reasons and consequences behind the arrest of Alfa Alimou, you have to go back to the 
deposing of Alfa Yaya in November 1905. That step was not especially motivated by Alfa 
Yaya’s personality, but rather by the necessity to break the feudal organization that was the 
accidental representative [of French rule in the Futa Jallon] and impeded our actions.”70 
Alfa Alimou would be the last person to serve as the chief of the greater Labé region, an 
administrative unit that was the successor to the pre-colonial diwal and had encompassed nearly 
one half of the Futa Jallon’s total territory and population. In the wake of the Bastié murder, 
Alimou’s arrest, and Ponty’s reforms, the former diwal of Labé was progressively broken down 
into smaller units. The same plan of decentralization was put into place in the rest of the Futa 
Jallon’s eight other former diwe, and in 1912, the title of Almamy of Timbo was erased. A limit 
of 25,000 persons in any once canton was enacted the following year.71 The process of breaking 
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down large jurisdictions into smaller units also served the second goal of Ponty’s reforms, 
namely that ethnic communities be administered by one of their own. Pockets of ethnic minority 
villages in the Futa Jallon, mostly ethnic Jallonke and Maninka, had been under the control of 
Fulbe chiefs dating to before French rule. These communities often bore the brunt of exploitation 
and enslavement, a burden that only grew following the 1897 treaty of protectorate. Allowing 
these types of villages, including communities populated by former slaves called, to have their 
own chief would deny chiefs the ability to demand illicit payments such as kummabite and 
farilla. In turn, administrators hoped, autonomy would staunch the exodus from the Futa 
countryside to neighboring areas while undermining the existing “feudal” social hierarchies.72  
Combined with a new push to prosecute flagrant examples of exploitation and an influx 
of French troops into the region, the politique des races as applied in the Futa signaled what the 
Lieutenant Governor of Guinea in 1910 described as France’s dedication to “finish the conquest” 
that was, due to the lack of open conflict between French forces and the Fulbe elite in 1897, only 
partially completed with the establishment of the protectorate.73 
Revisiting the Grands Commandements  
It took less than a decade for the French administration to recognize significant flaws in 
its plan to better control the Fulbe chiefs in the Futa Jallon. The system had encouraged loyalty 
amongst the Futa chiefs – the most important trait of all, one 1917 report remarked, meaning that 
the “rational” system had in a sense been effective. Yet changes in administrative units and a 
shift towards naming chiefs from families who had spurious “traditional” claims to the position 
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had translated into an overall erosion of chiefly authority. Furthermore, the frequent revocation 
of chiefs and their replacement by family members had encouraged intrigue within ruling 
families, promoting instability and frequent claims of extortion in order to unseat chiefs.74 
 The answer to the post-reform crisis of authority was clear, at least to Abel Thoreau 
Levaré, who was the commandant of Labé in 1918: the colonial administration should move 
back to the grands commandements, reattaching a group of independent districts back to Labé 
cercle that had “long been integral parts” of the former diwal.75 The next year signaled a formal 
shift towards consolidation. The number of cantons in the Labé cercle was reduced from 23 to 9 
in order to “simplify” the region’s administration.76 In the rest of the Futa Jallon, colonial 
administrators used the deaths or revocations of chiefs in order to break apart their cantons and 
attach them to neighboring ones.77 At the same time, the Guinean administration did not abandon 
the founding tenet of Ponty’s politique des races that required ethnic communities to be ruled by 
one of their own. Rather, independent villages populated by the same ethnicity were grouped 
together, despite the fact that they were often not contiguous. In 1937, one French administrator 
in the Mali cercle described the rationale behind maintaining the policy by paraphrasing a Fulbe 
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proverb: “the goats [lie with] the goats, the sheep with the sheep.”78 Colonial subjects used the 
policy for their own benefit. In many cases, minority communities – Jallonke and Maninka 
within the Futa Jallon as well as Fulbe in Haute Guinée or Basse Côte – only gained autonomy 
after petitioning administrators to create independent cantons or, in some cases, separate chiefs 
for all of the minority subjects in one region.79 
 Policies regarding the appointment of canton chiefs shifted along with the move towards 
reconstituting the grands commandements. Following the exile of Alfa Yaya and the end of the 
protectorate, local French administrators had largely picked chiefs at will. Many who were 
chosen had legitimate claims to the position in the pre-colonial Futa state. However, following 
the turmoil of the end of the Futa protectorate and later on during the First World War, 
legitimacy took second billing to loyalty. This often meant identifying individuals with close ties 
to the French state – in particular veterans or those from lesser elite families – who could only 
rule with the backing of the French.80 Such chiefs were often not considered legitimate by local 
notables, who were still important figures in Fulbe society. In response to a crisis of chiefly 
authority, starting in 1918 local administrators were instructed to “consult” with local notables 
when naming chiefs. Informal councils quickly transformed into organized elections, wherein 
notables would chose from a list of candidates put forward by the Commandant de cercle. 
Commandants were not bound by the election’s results and were free to choose the candidate 
they thought would most “reinforce French authority.” Yet, the Lieutenant Governor of Guinée 
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remarked in 1931, given two equal candidates, one should always select the prospective chief 
with the most legitimate “traditional” claims.81 In order to develop chiefs who were at the same 
time loyal, knowledgeable of French administration, and hailed from the Futa’s elite, the colonial 
administration in Guinea decided to more strictly enforce a 1924 decree that required chiefs to 
send their sons to French schools. By 1936, some 628 students were enrolled in the school, an 
increased from 29 total between 1927-1930. One report still remarked that the numbers form the 
Futa Jallon were significantly lower than other regions of Guinea in proportion to population.82 
Yet the colonial administration had made the first moves towards molding the “traditional” elites 
in the Futa into effective colonial agents.  
The shift back towards the grands commandements also revived the model of Fulbe 
chiefs whose influence extended beyond their administrative borders. The clearest successor to 
Alfa Yaya’s legacy, the colonial chief Ibrahima Sory Dara Barry, hailed from the Alfaya line of 
Timbo, one of the two families with a claim to the title of Almamy in the Futa Jallon in the pre-
colonial state. In fact, Sory Dara was the nephew of Almamy Ibrahima Bademba of Timbo, the 
last of the Alfaya heads and rival to the usurper Soriya head, Baba Alimou. Born near Timbo in 
1887, Sory Dara attended a Catholic primary school in Conakry and supposedly had “a spirit 
open to every modern innovation… read[ing] all the French publications he can find.” By 1912, 
he had been named the Chief of Téliko canton, about 100km southeast of Labé, and was 
considered by the colonial administration as an example of the new generation of Fulbe chiefs 
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who would help reform the Futa.83  
In 1926, Sory Dara Barry was named the chief of the Timbo canton following the death 
of his father.84 The territory over which he ruled had changed drastically since its time as the 
paramount seat of the pre-colonial Futa Jallon state. The diwal of Timbo had been broken into 
six smaller cantons in 1911 when the region’s Soriya chief and the brother of the deceased 
Almamy Baba Alimou, Bokar Biro, was deposed due to a variety of issues. Biro was named the 
chief of a small, peripheral canton of Téré in the Kankan region, and an Alfaya family member 
named the chief of the new, smaller Timbo canton.85 The Timbo Soriya were not content with 
their drastically lowered position, and after years of general insubordination and complaint were 
eventually reassigned to a new post: the canton Chief of Dabola, a region in Haute Guinée split 
between ethnic Fulbe and Maninka communities.86 The Timbo Alfaya, on the other hand, were 
handed control of both the canton of Timbo and of Mamou, a rapidly growing city along the new 
Conakry-Niger railroad line that served as one of the most important economic crossroads in 
Guinea.87 Therefore, while Sory Dara Barry did not enjoy influence over the whole of the Futa 
Jallon like his nineteenth-century predecessors, he was well positioned at the center of both the 
“modern” and “traditional” axes of power within the Futa. This fortuitous location, unlikely 
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arranged by happenstance, offered Barry a significant advantage over other Fulbe chiefs wanting 
to retake, if only in spirit, the mantle of paramount chief of the Futa Jallon. 
And take advantage of the situation he did. When the chief of Mamou, “Almamy” Mody 
Abdoulaye – the title had lost by this point any official capacity, but still held social significance 
in the Futa – died in 1934, Sory Dara Barry took over the title of chief of Mamou and the 
designation as the Almamy of the Futa Fulbe.88 Barry responded to French calls for increased 
production and recruitment for the army during the Second World War and, according to reports, 
was able to mobilize all of the Futa chiefs for the war effort. In 1943, Barry was also able to 
recruit some 20,000 navétanes, or seasonal agricultural workers, to engage in the “peanut battle” 
in Senegal.89  
The colonial administration rewarded Barry for his contributions. In 1943, he was named 
chef supérieur of the combined province of Mamou and Timbo, the first chief in Guinean named 
to the title that elevated him above all other canton chiefs. A dramatic increase in salary 
accompanied his improvement in status; Barry was paid 20,000 francs/year, well above the 
normal pay for a canton chief. Shortly thereafter, he was named a Knight in the colonial Order of 
Nicham-el-Anouar, and was sent on hajj as both a reward and to increase his prestige within the 
Futa Jallon. Thus, 38 years after Alfa Yaya’s removal and exile, colonial administrators had 
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found their reliable, consistent ally in the Futa Jallon. Sory Dara Barry possessed all of the 
desirable and none of the dangerous traits associated with “the Fulbe”: “intelligent and 
handsome,” one report raved, he displayed a “great piousness devoid of all pettiness and 
fanaticism.”90 Barry maintained his political and social influence well into the 1950s. The Chief 
served as one of Guinea’s representatives to the Grand Conseil of the AOF, an advisory group to 
the French Governor General, and was the main benefactor of a generation of Guinean Fulbe 
politicians – notably Yacine Diallo, Ibrahima Barry “Barry III,” and Barry Diawadou – who 
would come to constitute the major opposition to Sékou Touré’s Parti Démocratique de Guinée 
during the 1950s. Sory Dara Barry was removed from his position as canton chief only when the 
Touré-led territorial government eliminated the positions of all chiefs above the village level in 
1957. 
Despite his prominent position in both the colonial administration and Futa society, Sory 
Dara Barry was still not immune to many of the charges directed at other Futa chiefs. Following 
his revocation as canton chief of Timbo, Barry’s brother, Mody Sidy Barry, accused the chef 
supérieur of agitating within the colonial administration for his removal in favor of Sory Dara 
Barry’s son.91 Furthermore, the PDG party newspaper Coup de Bambou – a publication whose 
main editorial focus was the undermining of the Futa chieftaincy – frequently attacked “HIS 
MAJESTY EL HADJ ALMAMY IBRAHIMA SORY DARA BARRY… ‘Father of the Fulbe 
faithful’… and Commander of the Legion of Honor” for protecting Fulbe chiefs accused of 
extortion and abuse of power when, according to the PDG leaders, the Fulbe leader should have 
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been working to reform the “exploitative Fulbe feudalism” present in the Futa Jallon.92 The long 
and somewhat inflated list of titles that the Fulbe chief had accrued only further demonstrated the 
former’s complicity within the exploitative colonial system, at least the article’s authors implied. 
Nor was Sory Dara the only Fulbe chief to rise to prominence. Sory Dara Barry’s Soriya rival in 
Dabola, Aguibou Barry, as well as the canton Chief of Dalaba Thierno Oumar Bah, would 
eventually rise to the rank of chef supérieur.93 Despite critics and potential rivals, Sory Dara 
Barry still commanded significant influence within both the colonial administration and Futa 
Jallon society. He had become, some 40 years into French rule, the personification of the 
chimeric system of authority and rule initiated by the establishment of the protectorate, although 
stripped of its more obviously exploitative tendencies.  
Starting with Lieutenant Governor Frézouls, many Frenchmen believed they could drag 
the Futa Jallon into “civilization” and later “modernity” through sheer force of will. That 
experiment largely failed, a reality embraced by the colonial administration in Guinea shortly 
after the end of the First World War. What emerged afterwards was a familiar system of local 
administration based upon personality and personal ability. Those chiefs such as Sory Dara Barry 
who proved themselves to be loyal and useful servants to the French colonial state saw their 
territory and wealth increased. Those who did not provide enough raw resources and taxes, or 
those who pillaged too excessively, saw themselves thrown out of office usually to be replaced 
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by a close family member. The system was “rational” in that it provided a clear set of upper and 
lower limits for the size of a canton and general guidelines for how those cantons should be 
organized. In the end, however, the administrative boundaries of the Futa Jallon were determined 
by the desire to maintain authority through the legitimacy of chiefs. That desire for effective 
stability ultimately drove the policies and decisions of the colonial state in Guinea more than 
republican impulses towards rationalism. 
An Exercise in Consistency: French policy towards village chiefs 
 Village chiefs were the most ubiquitous representatives of French colonialism in Guinea. 
Their functions were smaller-scale versions of their canton counterparts: namely, providing 
bodies (as troops and laborers) and collecting taxes. As the tip of the spear of French extraction 
of resources from Africa societies, the village chiefs were often the most obvious manifestation 
of exploitation. Several scholars, however, have portrayed the village chief as a tragic figure, 
caught between the demands of the Commandant and communities that increasingly resented 
growing demands on their resources and labor. Threatened with removal and imprisonment, 
these chiefs used all means at their disposal in order to meet tax goals based on faulty census 
numbers. Most village chiefs were eventually unable to meet their French superiors’ demands, 
leading several village council of notables to appoint their own “straw chiefs” who were 
protected from revocation but retained “traditional” authority.94 The experience of village chiefs 
in the colonial Futa demonstrates that, while at the level of the individual frequent revocation 
may have been devastating, French policy towards naming chiefs meant that the position of 
privileged extended families and the social group of local elites as a whole were maintained 
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under colonial rule. 
The French administration’s management of village chiefs in the Futa Jallon both 
diverged from and mirrored its approach to the more senior rungs of the chieftaincy. Unlike their 
cantonal counterparts, village chiefs were often revoked, most commonly due to incapacity from 
old age, incompetence, or flagrant abuse of power. The experience of each village was 
idiosyncratic; an especially effective chief could serve for several decades, while another village 
might see a succession of chiefs serve only two years at a time. A mixture of the two was more 
common, though, with a chief serving for an extended period before stepping down or dying, 
followed by a series of shorter appointments until the French administration settled on a longer-
term solution. Examples of numerous revocations may give credence to scholars’ arguments 
about the precarious position of local chiefs. After all, rare was the chief who vacated a seat of 
his own accord. Focusing on the individual experience of chiefs, however, ignores the social 
networks in which they were embedded. Chiefs are some of the most visible figures in the 
colonial archives, underscoring their importance within colonial systems in French West Africa. 
Yet their authority and legitimacy ultimately relied upon the extended relations of family and 
clan, ones that are only noted in brief statements or marginalia. These social connections, 
however, constituted in large part the nebulous concept of “authority.”  
As stability was the main goal of colonial administration in the Futa, French officials 
began to recognize the importance of keeping chiefly authority within established social groups. 
After what one French administrator called the “slaughter” of local chiefs before 1913, due 
largely to mass revocations tied to exploitation, commandants were content to turn a blind eye to 
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“customary” forms of exploitation like kummabite and farilla.95 Even when chiefly demands 
were so excessive that administrators were forced to act, the most severe sentence handed down 
was revocation with no further punishment. The only crime that merited imprisonment was 
engaging in the slave trade – and not, significantly, actually having slaves, as informational 
reports on chiefs included sections on “servants” well into the 1920s. The most common 
punishment for the trade was two years in prison. Given the poor conditions of colonial jails, it 
was certainly a significant sentence. Yet French administrators rarely handed down punishments 
for slave trading, and when they did it was only when other circumstances – for instance, failure 
to collect taxes or meet quotas for military recruits – required that a chief be removed.96 
 Perhaps most importantly, a close look at the relationships between successive village 
chiefs shows how even a large number of revocations did not significantly undermine pre-
existing social hierarchies. For example, take the village of Sérima, located about 30 km east of 
the town of Labé. Due to its proximity to the regional capital, the elites of Sérima for a long time 
had a close relationship with the lenyol of the lambe of the diwal, the Kalidiabe, of which Alfa 
Yaya had been the head until his death in 1912. In fact, at the time of the treaty of protectorate, 
the family that had ruled Sérima since at least the early 19th century were Kalidaibé’s 
themselves, and many of the family heads had served as close lieutenants of the Chief of Labé. 
The imposition of French rule displaced the reigning family – although, as we’ll see, only 
temporarily – but kept the position of chief within the control of a handful of influential families 
in the Sérima. Modi Abdoulaye, son of a local notable named Modi Mamadou Dian, served as 
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chief of Sérima for the first 17 years of French rule.97 He was revoked in 1914 for 
“complacency,” having supposedly neglected local affairs after abandoning the village for his 
house in Labé. For his replacement, the local administrator consulted the village notables, who 
chose one of their own, a man named Modi Ayouba, as the new chief. The relationship between 
Ayouba and Abdoualye is not clear; what is evident, however, was that Ayouba hailed from the 
region’s elite, as he had been one of the canton chief’s main advisors before being named chief.98 
Modi Ayouba resigned in 1927 due to ill health, and was replaced by his cousin Modi Téli. Téli 
died in office one year later, and was replaced by Modi Ayouba’s brother, Ibrahima Diallo.99 
Ibrahima Diallo served one year before being removed due to his participation in a cattle theft. 
He was not punished beyond revocation. The former chief’s replacement was Abdoulaye Diallo, 
whose father had served as village chief two times during the 19th century, and who himself was 
a Kalidiabe.100 Abdoualye Diallo served until 1931, when he was removed due to 
“incompetence.” He was replaced by another village notable, Mamadou Dian, who would serve 
for 18 years before being revoked, this time without documentary explanation.101 It took until 
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1950 for the French administration to find its ideal chief in Sérima: Ibrahima Diogo Diallo. The 
new chief was a veteran of the French army and knew how to speak and write both French and 
Arabic. Most importantly, he was also a Kalidiabe and part of the family that had founded the 
village centuries before.102  
Most villages in the Labé region had between 5 and 10 chiefs during the sixty years the 
colonial institution existed from 1897 to 1957. An exceptional village might have been 
administered by only two chiefs, most often a father and a son. Yet even in a village like Sérima 
that fell on the more tumultuous side of the spectrum, the title of chief still remained, at most, 
within two of the village’s elite families. Furthermore, given the social interconnectedness 
through marriage of elites in the Futa Jallon, those two families were most likely related to one 
another. What emerges in Sérima and in other villages in the Futa Jallon is a picture of social 
continuity, with individual chiefs often falling to the wayside but with families and social classes 
retaining their grip on political power. In a few cases, French administrators experimented with 
naming a village chief from a family of former slave status. These chiefs were almost 
unanimously rejected by local notables, and were eventually removed because they could not 
effectively implement French policies.103 
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Fulbe Images 
 Relationships between French administrators and Fulbe chiefs were based first and 
foremost on the timely collection and taxes and the maintenance of authority. Yet policy and 
daily interactions alike were also shaded by a set of ideas drawn from both French and Fulbe 
sources about the character of the Futa Jallon elite and Fulbe society as a whole. This section 
examines the production of these ideas during and immediately after the protectorate, their 
transformation over time, and their lasting legacy in public discourses in Guinea.  
Sustained contact between the French and the Fulbe – at first infrequent and distant, but 
after conquest sustained and intimate – produced a set of images of “the Fulbe” as a “race” with 
a particular history and group of characteristics. Previous conflict between the French officials 
and Pular-speaking communities had instilled in the former a set of ideas about the “Fulbe 
character.” In particular, the colonial administration’s contentious relationship with El-Hadj 
Umar Tal and the Torodbe community in the Senegal River Valley had cast the Fulbe as 
religious fanatics, arrogant and prone to violence.104 Twentieth-century French administrators in 
Guinea, therefore, had several sources upon which to draw in order to “understand” the Fulbe, 
and pre-conceptions were further fortified by both experiences with the Fulbe chiefs as well as 
the exoticist imaginings of men like Hubert.  
By the interwar years, images of the Fulbe had divided into two main groups: one 
dedicated to at first building and then tearing down supposed Fulbe superiority; and another 
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rooted in the more ethnographic pursuits of colonial administrators like Noirot and later Gilbert 
Vieillard. Both camps, however, concerned themselves with three primary aspects of Fulbe 
history and culture: origins and character.  
On Fulbe Origins 
  A nomadic past has been integral to both Fulbe self-imaginings and outside portrayals of 
the Fulbe. All sources – Fulbe, colonial, historical – agree that the Futa Jallon Fulbe came to the 
high plateau sometime in the two centuries before they established Futa theocracy in 1726. Local 
sources, both oral and written, stress the external roots of the Futa Jallon Fulbe. Pular-language 
chronicles collected by Vieillard in the 1930s point to a variety of origins. One such history, 
entitled the “Tarickh [sic][history] of the Fulbe,” recounts the tale of two men from Arab 
families, Seydi and Séri, who fled “Fas” (perhaps Fez?) due to political “troubles” in the their 
homeland. They came to settle in the Futa Jallon after the Maninka “patriarch” El Hadj Salimou 
Souaré told them to go to the plateau. The two would come to found the lenyol of the 
Seydiyanke, to which Alfaya and Soriya lineages of Timbo belong, and the Sériyanke, which 
became the religious leaders of the Futa based in Fougoumba, constituting the political and 
religious poles of power on the high plateau. Conflict between the “pagan” rulers of the Futa and 
the Muslim descendents of the two Fulbe brothers broke out when Almamy Sori of the Sériyanke 
cut the skin of a large drum around which the “pagans” were dancing. Along with the help of the 
leader of the Seydiyanke, Karamoko Alfa, the Muslim Fulbe were able to established to Futa 
Jallon theocracy.105   
Another history traces the origin of the Fulbe back to a companion of the Prophet 
Mohammad, Umar ben el Khattab (Umar bin al-Khat’tab). While serving as the second caliph in 
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the mid-seventh century Hijaz, el Khattab sent one of his generals, Umar bun el Asi (‘Amr ibn 
al-‘As) to conquer Egypt by boat. El Khattab’s instructions, according to the account, were to 
disembark after sailing for two months and install themselves in the territory. If the inhabitants 
were Muslim, they were to teach them the Koran; if they were not, el Asi and his men were 
instructed to “take them for Islam,” make them pay tribute, and if they refused to convert to 
conquer them. El Asi eventually made his way to Maasina (today in Niger delta of Mali) and 
converted the King of the territory as well as “the majority of the people.” Although the King of 
Maasina pleaded for el Asi to stay and not abandon them in “ignorance,” the general yearned to 
return to Medina. However, el Asi left behind one a religious teacher, Uqubata bun Yasiri (Ugu 
Battu bin Yasir), who eventually married the King’s daughter and had four sons. Those four sons 
came to found the four yettore, or family names, of the Fulbe – Barry, Diallo, Sow, and Bah – 
when their descendents moved to the “country of the Blacks” to the South and West. Some of the 
Fulbe forgot their own language and began to speak the language of the people where they 
migrated; they became the Wassoulou. Others made their way to the Futa Jallon, where they 
found and defeated the Diallonke. The Fulbe conquerors, however, fell away from Islam. It was 
only when a later wave of “saintly and savant” Muslims from Maacina came to Futa Jallon that 
the jihad overthrew the “pagan” Fulbe leader Jan Yero Hore Tene, establishing the Futa 
theocracy.106 
As Derman argues, the two stories stress different components of Fulbe political 
structures and authority in the pre-colonial Futa Jallon. The first story of the two men from Fas 
supports the claims two most important lenyol of the pre-colonial state: the Fougoumba 
Sériyanke and the Timbo Seydiyanke, or the religious and political pillars of the theocracy. The 
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second puts forward the theory of a multi-wave Fulbe settlement, explains the emergence of the 
four Fulbe yettore, and provides a common ancestry for all Fulbe. The common thread that 
connects the two was that the Fulbe arrived in the Futa from outside origins, either North Africa 
or the Hijaz, (eventually) bringing with them a devotion to Islam and a desire to build a 
theocratic state. As the basis for authority of the ruling class in the pre-colonial was in the 
combined political and religious power of the Fulbe elite, the foreign origins of the Muslim 
rulers were integral to building histories that proved the Fulbe elites superior religiosity and 
ultimately provided legitimacy for social hierarchies on the plateau. The Fulbe rulers came from 
elsewhere and brought Islam with them. They alone, therefore, had the right to rule in the pre-
colonial Islamic state. 
Given that external origins were seemingly integral to elite Fulbe self-constructions of 
privilege, it comes as little surprise that European travelers who passed through the Futa included 
versions of these origin histories in their travel accounts. Most repeat some version of one of the 
stories above. In his account of the Bayol mission, Noirot wrote that his interlocutor told him that 
the Fulbe came from fudnaanke, or “the East,” and arrived in the Futa in search of better pasture 
for the cattle, while Lambert repeated the story of Seydi and Séri from Fas.107 In both histories, 
peaceful but failed attempts at conversion turned to war, with the Fulbe victory establishing their 
rule over the Diallonke. Some have argued that European travelers invented Semitic origins of 
the “noble” “races” (including the Fulbe or Fulani), which in turn entrenched ethnic division and 
hierarchies. European accounts of the Futa Jallon, however, track closely – although often in 
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mediated language – with Fulbe self-imaginings of their roots.108 Vieillard collected his 
manuscripts and Pular-language accounts in the 1930s, and Derman did not conduct fieldwork 
until the 1960s. Therefore, it is conceivable that by that point contact with colonial modes of 
racial thought may have “invented” external Fulbe roots, specifically ones that make a distinction 
between the conquering Fulbe as “white” or “red” and the vanquished Diallonke as “black.”  
As I’ve argued above, though, to do so would greatly overestimate the French 
administration’s – or even more implausibly, infrequent European travelers’ – ability to shape 
Fulbe art forms and historical discourses. Furthermore, similar modes of racial thought and self-
constructed histories are widespread across both West Africa and the greater Sahel.109 The scale 
of invention would have had to have been massive and pressure persistently applied. A more 
likely scenario is that Europeans travelers and administrators, confronted with a seemingly 
organized and culturally rich state, found resonances of their own racial thought within Fulbe use 
of external origins as legitimization of political and religious domination. What came later, 
though, did not simply wash away what had existed before. Rather, French and Fulbe theories of 
external roots became increasingly entangled, reinforcing and transforming one another over 
time.  
In fact, even if the influence of colonial administrators and ethnographers had greatly 
outstripped their numerical paucity, widespread French theories about the origins of the Futa 
Jallon Fulbe in reality sought to undermine elite claims to superiority through external roots. 
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Current or former colonial administrators wrote the early “scientific” works on the Futa Fulbe, 
beginning with Paul Guebhard’s 1909 study on the history and culture of the Fulbe. Guebhard 
had been a close confident of the dismissed Futa Jallon administrator Hubert and was accused of 
stealing supplies from a Mamou schoolhouse, but had largely escaped any punishment.110 After 
his service in the Futa Jallon, he had an especially dim opinion of the Fulbe character. His 
account of the period leading up to the jihad is familiar, and based upon multiple waves of 
immigration, starting with the “fetishist” “Poulli” or Fulbe burure and followed by Muslim 
“Peuhl” or settled Fulbe from Maasina. The distinction he makes between the two is important, 
however. According to Guebhard, only the Fulbe burure were “true” Fulbe, in the sense that of 
possessing “pure” Fulbe blood and associated traits. The settled Fulbe, on the other hand, had, 
per the administrator, intermarried with Mande communities while living in Maasina to the point 
where “their Fulbe origin is questionable.”111 Due to the “intermixing” of blood, the settled Fulbe 
had taken the worst traits from both races, Guebhard argued. From the Mande, the Fulbe had 
taken up a warrior’s spirit, eager and capable of conquering. From the Fulbe character, the settled 
“Peuhl” had taken the predilection for mysticism and propensity for laziness. When “mixed 
disastrously” with Islam, it had produced a Fulbe majority in the Futa Jallon that was “more 
motivated by speculative things than real ones, letting [their] mind[s] wander while living in 
laziness and idleness.”112 Pre-colonial state-building in the Futa Jallon, Guebhard argued, was 
due to Mande influence; after years of contact with the “Moors” and “Arabs,” the latter had 
learned the ways of “civilization” and had passed it on to the settled Fulbe offspring. Thus, he 
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claimed, the Fulbe were an unpredictable mixture; intelligent and cunning, they were also prone 
to violence when not idly pondering the more esoteric aspects of Islam. 
André Arcin, another colonial administrator, had a more favorable view of the Fulbe, 
their culture, and their history. Arcin traced the roots of the Fulbe back to ancient Egypt, arguing 
that the were the descendents of the biblical figure “Phout” (Phut or Put), one of Ham’s sons, 
who were chased out of the Nile valley during a civil war. In their westward travels to Morocco, 
the sons of Phout, or the “Foula,” had intermarried with “Black” populations, but had kept their 
nomadic ways before settling down and playing an integral role in the formation of the city of 
Walata. These herders, Arcin argued along the same lines as Guebhard, were the “true” Fulbe, 
and the majority of “Fulbe” in West Africa were in fact métis (a term he uses), the sons of Mande 
and Fulbe parents. The métis Fulbe were empire-makers, establishing states in the Futa Toro, 
Maacina, and eventually and further west, moving en mass and with sufficient wealth in cattle to 
the point that their troops “drained the rivers of all their water.”113 The fire, intelligence, and 
stubbornness of the Fulbe combined with the “civilizing” aspects of Mande culture, Arcin 
argued, to make many of the great pre-colonial states in West Africa.  
Yet another administrator who had been posted in the Futa Jallon, Louis Tauxier, 
borrowed heavily from Arcin in his own study of the Fulbe, although with more emphasis on 
phrenology and seemingly arbitrary percentages of which “blood” – Arab, “Red,” or Black – 
coursed through Fulbe veins. Tauxier went further to explain differences among the Soriya and 
Alfaya branches of the Timbo elites, arguing that the former are “red skinned” and of almost full 
Fulbe blood, while the latter are “the sons and grandsons of Diallonke,” a distinction that is often 
repeated within family histories in the Futa today. Tauxier is clear to restate what previous 
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studies had already claimed: the Fulbe ruling elite as, by and large, the product of generations of 
intermarriage, and hardly “pure” at all.114  
The outlines of the three “studies” of the Fulbe share two fundamental aspects. First, the 
“pure” Fulbe at one time hailed from the Egypt via North Africa, although the European authors 
reject Fulbe claims of descent from a companion of the Prophet, relying instead on biblical 
accounts. They share with the Fulbe the belief that due to outside influences, the Fulbe had 
initiated a period of strong state building in West Africa. European racialists found resonances of 
their own pre-set ideologies within Fulbe accounts, adding further viability to their theories of 
Fulbe foreignness. Second, the European authors are clear to point out that the ruling class of the 
Futa Jallon, counter to their own claims, are not “pure” Fulbe but rather partially the descendents 
of Mande. In my interviews with descendents of the ruling families, not much was made of Fulbe 
“purity” and people were often very open about having Mande ancestors – usually mothers – in 
their family trees. One living descendents of the Soriya family that eventually ended up in 
Dabola was quite open about his family’s being “at least half Maninka.” It was that mixture, he 
argued, that gave them legitimacy while ruling as the chiefs of the half-Maninka and half-Fulbe 
region. It was something of which he was proud.115 His recounting of his family’s ancestry was 
certainly inflected by his great-grandfather and grandfather’s role as colonial chiefs, as well as 
his family’s suffering at the hands of Sékou Touré’s regime. Even for one of the two most 
traditionally prominent families in the Futa Jallon, métissage was resource upon which to draw. 
 Claims by European studies of Fulbe métissage, on the other hand, were clearly meant to 
undermined Fulbe claims to the right of rule in the Futa by blurring borders between the Fulbe 
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and “others.” Fulbe self-imaginings and the theories put forward by the Europeans employ 
different vocabularies and logics – Fulbe elites made claims to superiority vis à vis their social 
inferiors and other ethnic groups in Guinea on the basis of culture and, most important, 
religiosity, while European administrators cum ethnographers employed biological 
understandings of race. The borders one side sought to maintain and another sought to 
undermine, however, were the same, just approached from different directions. Thus, while the 
language of “native” and “settler” may in other parts of Africa have roots in the colonial project, 
in the Futa Jallon the express goal of the colonial administration was to blur the distinction 
between the two, and therefore undermine the “traditional” claims to authority of the Fulbe elite. 
On Fulbe Character 
 It is difficult to ascertain whether the ideological bent of the studies by Guebhard, Arcin, 
and Tauxier were determined by their own experiences in Guinea, or if their remembrances of 
Fulbe actions and culture were shaded by pre-conceived racial hierarchies (it was probably a bit 
of both). What is clear, however, is that these former administrators influenced perceptions of 
Fulbe by rank-and-file administrators in Guinea. For example, I found Guebhard’s article on the 
Fulbe in a file along with the Stahl report on the Hubert, Noirot, and Yaya investigation. Indeed, 
there were often references within political reports to certain actions by Fulbe elites being rooted 
in large part in the Fulbe character. 
  Disputes between colonial administrators and Fulbe chiefs often revolved around the 
latter’s inability (or unwillingness) to provide required corvée labor or army recruits. Many 
frustrated administrators invoked the trope of Fulbe “mysticism” mentioned above, claiming that 
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the Fulbe were too devoted to their “supernatural beliefs” in order to farm.116 Others blamed 
Fulbe non-participation in colonial projects on pure stubbornness, claiming that although the 
Fulbe have access to plow technology they have no will to adapt to French practices.117 Some 
administrators who were more forgiving of the Fulbe argued that the ethnic group was “less 
robust” than their Maninka counterparts and were therefore not equipped to do manual labor.118  
 Yet most administrators in Guinea remained critical of Fulbe society and culture. Camille 
Guy, Governor of Guinea from 1910 to 1912, detailed how aspects of the “Fulbe character” were 
systematically undermining French rule in a report to the AOF Governor General in 1911.119 
After trotting out familiar statements on Fulbe religiosity and aversion for labor, Guy turns to 
explaining how Fulbe social structure and history have led to a fundamentally conservative 
society in the Futa Jallon. A distant history of nomadism, Guy claimed, had instilled hierarchies 
of power centered on familial ties rather than territory, a perspective born out in part by the 
importance of lenyol in elite Fulbe social structures. As such, French rule could only be mediated 
through central individuals, namely the pre-colonial chiefs, who had a vested interest in 
preserving the existing order. Furthermore, Guy argued, attempts to effect change would fail 
because the past was integral Fulbe self-understandings:  
One sees [in the figure of the chief] the primordial concern of the Fulbe, 
extremely jealous of his traditions and preoccupied, above all, with safeguarding 
the personality of his race. The past is where [personality] is affirmed, haloed, for 
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him, in a real glory of which he finds confirmation in books such as those of El 
Hadj Omar and Usman dan Fodio.120 The history of their conquest of lands is 
presented as the essence of the Fulbe. The organization that followed remains 
intact in memory of [the conquerors] and still enjoys the same prestige. [The 
Fulbe] seem, above all, rebels to progress such as the one the administration 
wishes, because they hold in their minds a completely different ideal, for which 
their past furnishes the [main] elements, and that the arrival of the Mahdi will, one 
day or another, allow them to realize it.  
 
The chiefs were not as “superstitious” as their adepts, Guy argues, but serve as distilled versions 
of their exploitative nature: 
 They show the same ardent and insatiable desire for enriching themselves in any 
other way than work. Their extortions are measured only by their degree of 
authority… their habit of lying is equally characteristic. One can rarely count on 
them for accurate reports. The accounts of their history that have remained the 
most popular are those that show their slyness and trickery.  
 
But with work the Fulbe aristocracy could be bent to the French will: 
The same passion for preeminence that characterizes the Fulbe aristocracy gives 
us a means to control them. The chiefs would rather rule for us than not rule at all. 
The most intelligent among them now make the necessary concessions to gain our 
support. The Fulbe race as a whole brings together faults and qualities that make 
it difficult to handle [them], but they also permit one to visualize that a 
progressive improvement of relations with us will come about. Our task is to 
develop those qualities while still taking into consideration local necessities.  
 
Thus, in Guy’s treatise on the problems his administration had encountered while attempting to 
bring the Fulbe elites and general population to heel, we find the fundamental parts of the “Fulbe 
character” that would later constitute an integral part of Sékou Touré’s articulation of a 
“particular situation.” They were mired in what they see as a glorious history, whether or not said 
past was grounded in reality. Because of their backwards orientation, the Fulbe and their leaders 
were resistant to change, preferring rigid social hierarchies to social, political, and economic 
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transformation. And above all, they were all too willing to employ treachery and duplicity to 
secure their vision of Futa culture and society.  
Guy’s description of the Fulbe was rooted in certain amount of racist thought, French 
fetishization of the Fulbe as a semi-civilized colonial “other,” and no doubt also in a large bit of 
bitterness. Yet, his views and those of other French administrators and ethnographers found 
enough resonances in Fulbe-produced histories and self-imaginings to produce the sense of a 
locally confirmed “truth.” Skull measurements and origin tales provided the building blocks of 
legitimacy in the accounts of French administrators. Their time in the Futa, and most importantly 
the colonial state they constructed along with and sometimes in opposition to Fulbe elites, 
provided the strong cement of lived experience that set popular understandings of the Fulbe 
“essence.” These ideas, in turn, shaded how French administrators both portrayed and 
approached the Fulbe chiefs. One chief in particular found himself, yet again, both at the center 
and ultimately on the wrong side of French ideas about “Fulbe character.” 
The End of the Great Fulbe Chiefs? 
 In French administrators’ debates over the policy towards the chieftaincy in the 1910s – 
and therefore on the character of the Fulbe chiefs themselves – Alfa Yaya continued to be a key 
referent, even though he had been stripped of his official title in 1905. After five years in exile, 
the former chief was allowed to return to Guinea.121 On December 4, 1910, both the Governor 
General of the AOF and the Governor of Guinea received Yaya in Conakry, welcoming him 
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back to his homeland with a set of restrictions: he would never visit the Kadé region, formerly 
his base of operations; he would not exert any sort of contract upon his former servants; and he 
would never leave the colony of Guinea. In return, Yaya was to be paid 25,000 Francs a year, 
roughly what a mid-level canton chief could expect from tax receipts. Yaya swore upon the 
Koran that he would never again commit treason against the French.122 He would remain free 
man for slightly more than three months. 
 According to administrators in Guinea, trouble started almost immediately after Yaya’s 
return. One commandant in the Futa reported that the “native population became restless,” 
rumors circulated that Yaya would be restored as the Almamy of Labé, and letters from Yaya to 
religious leaders in Sierra Leone claiming that he had been given back all of his former powers 
were supposedly intercepted by the administration. According to one French official, the Fulbe 
had never stopped thinking of Yaya as the Almamy of Labé, and thanks to the leader’s still 
strong Baraka (roughly translated as spiritual power) his followers would become “champions of 
Islam” and overthrow the Christian rulers.123 Alfa Yaya, his son Aguibou, and his advisor 
Oumarou Coumba were arrested on February 9, 1911, in Conakry. By order of the President of 
the Republic, Yaya and Aguibou were sentenced to exile in perpetuity in Gabon, on the same 
island where Samori Touré, a late nineteenth-century political leader who had led a protracted 
Guerilla war against French forces before being captured in 1898, had died in 1900, and where 
Cheikh Amadou Bamba, the leader of the Muridiyya Sufi brotherhood, had been exiled from 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
122 Politique Indigène, Colonie de la Guinée to Direction des Affaires Politiques et 
Administratives, Sous-direction de l’Afrique, Paris, “A.S. d’Alpha Yahia,” 7 April 1912, no. 





1895 to 1902.124 Alfa Yaya died from ill health on October 10, 1912. One administrator in Labé 
remarked that the population was “stunned,” as the chief did not seem to have been bent low by 
age, but only his fellow Kalidiabe showed any discontent.125 Similar to what Diouf has argued 
about Lat Dior in Senegal, Alfa Yaya hailed from and represented the interests of the Futa Jallon 
aristocracy. His rise to power reflected his own elite heritage and innate cunning, yet at the same 
time was only possible within the context of French colonialism.126 And just as quickly as he 
came to power, Yaya became obsolete within a rapidly changing political structure. 
 Although by the end of 1912 Alfa Yaya would be dead, his memories would live on in 
the imaginations of French Administrators for decades to come. Chiefs who either were seen to 
be too devoted to Islam or started to push back against French policies would often be 
retroactively associated with the Yaya’s various plots and supposed collaboration with the Wali 
of Goumba.127 In 1936, administrators still looked at Yaya’s second exile and the Goumba 
affaire as a time of particular trouble, when the Fulbe rose up to overthrow the French. Only the 
administration’s ability to effectively control the population through being “respectful of 
tradition, understand[ing] the native, and striv[ing] to enact impartial justice,” they argued, had 
spared the territory from subsequent revolts.128 
Alfa Yaya also came to represent both the promise and danger of investing too much 
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independence and power in the Futa chiefs. In 1918, the commandant of Labé, Thoreau-Levaré, 
proposed recreating the same administrative system that had existed under Alfa Yaya’s rule, as it 
was a more efficient means to maintain authority and collect taxes.129 Just three year later, 
however, a French colonist Camille Julian complained that the chief of Labé, Modi Tanou, had 
been keeping servants as slaves, collecting kummabite, forcing villagers to work on his farm, and 
had stolen cattle from a French colonist. In other words, as Julian was quick to point out, the 
chief had been acting just as Alfa Yaya had during the latter’s prime. The overzealous chief, he 
argued, should be dealt with likewise.130 
As reform spread throughout the French Empire following the end of the Second World 
War, African politicians, activists, and eventually the general public began to debate what form 
the now territory of Guinea would take. In particular, former colonial subjects in Guinea 
articulated their visions of what a “modern” post-colonial society might look like. In doing so, 
these groups – ranging from Fulbe cultural societies in the Futa Jallon to an insurgent Sékou 
Touré-led political party – pointed in particular to the institution of the chieftaincy as either the 
avenue or impediment to enacting their vision of into what Guinea – or a part therein – should 
transform.  
 In order to make their arguments, these individuals and groups drew upon a set of sources 
that were shaped in large part by Guinea’s most visible and, some argued, strongest chieftaincy, 
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namely that in the Futa Jallon. The images of Fulbe chiefs and of the Fulbe in general that were 
deployed by Guinean politicians and activists were shaped during the period of protectorate and 
the see-saw between respect of “tradition” and radical reform that followed. The protectorate 
represented a distilled version of the plan based upon extraction and authority put forward by 
French and African elites alike. In creating a practice and ideology of rule based upon the 
systematization of exploitation and violence, the two groups were especially effective at 
achieving their goal of enriching themselves or their superiors, or more generally securing their 
continued importance within the colonial administration. They were also especially effective at 
creating images of Fulbe elites as ruthless and corrupt.  
 Therefore, while the chimeric practice of colonial rule in the Futa Jallon ensured the 
short-term position of Fulbe elites, it undermined the long-term prospects of the chiefly 
institution as a whole. Examples of exploitation and excess opened the chiefs up to criticism, and 
ultimately either allowed or pushed non-elite or outsider groups to actively resist the social 
hierarchies that defined what popularly came to be known as the “feudal” Futa Jallon society. 
This chapter has focused in particular on the construction and images of authority in the colonial 
Futa Jallon. Yet such a system, although especially repressive, was not hegemonic. If social 
hierarchies based upon economic, political, and religious power were the means through which 
elite Fulbe controlled non-elite and non-free inhabitants of the Futa Jallon, those very hierarchies 
became increasingly unstable as French rule unfolded in the Futa and Guinea as a whole, as 
transformation that the next chapter will take up. 
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Chapter Two 
Social Change in the Colonial Futa Jallon, 1897-1958 
“Mo kala hokkitaama gebal mun.” 
To each went his share.1 
“Huwoobe e rimbe yo danbido fow / nde’e tanpere maunde e dandinagol” 
Servants and the free, may they escape together / this great suffering that they have shared.2 
Pular-language histories and poetry produced during the colonial era often employed the 
language of “sharing” in Fulbe remembrances (or imaginings) of the past. The most common 
narrative was as follows. Under the pre-colonial Futa Jallon Islamic state, each person – slave, 
artisan, herder, free, or elite – had his or her role. The fruits of Fulbe labor in the Futa might have 
been apportioned unevenly due to social status, but together all prospered. The first quotation 
above – “to each went his share” – was invoked each time a new Almamy was crowned, pointing 
to a supposedly common political, social, and economic system that stretched back to the 1726 
jihad, a state and society that the paramount leader was tasked with protecting. The arrival of 
French rule, however, had disrupted – if not destroyed – that system and the social hierarchies 
that structured it. Colonialism had brought about new taxes, demands for corvée labor, and 
opportunities for previously oppressed groups like persons of slave status and women to 
reconfigure asymmetrical relationships. It had unraveled the bonds between former slaves and 
masters, and between chiefs and the communities under their protection. Colonialism had, in 
other words, created a new order in which free Fulbe saw few if any prospects for improvement. 
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It is of little surprise, then, that the same individuals who had benefitted from pre-colonial 
hierarchies, free men like the author of the second epigraph, saw themselves as sharing “this 
great suffering” that, by most historical accounts, had previously been limited to non-free groups.  
 This chapter examines how social hierarchies within Futa Jallon Fulbe society were both 
reconfigured and re-imagined during colonial rule. In the Futa Jallon, the pre-colonial 
asymmetrical bonds that tied together different social groups proved to be durable and adaptable, 
continuing both through and beyond colonial rule. However, the colonial system offered new 
possibilities for marginalized groups such as former slaves and women. The integration of the 
Futa Jallon into colonial economies and administrative structures opened up spaces for 
maneuver, in which individuals and groups sought to improve their economic, social, and/or 
political positions. At times, people were able to convert a specific form of capital into another, 
for instance using newfound wealth to buy honorific titles, and in doing so taking up the markers 
of elite “Fulbeness.” Just as often, though, persons of low social status found themselves 
frustrated in their attempts to reconfigure exploitative social hierarchies. This chapter seeks to 
explore the wide range paths open to some individual and groups, the numerous barriers to social 
mobility that were either continued or newly erected during colonial rule, and how Fulbe of 
different social status thought about those changes and continuities.  
 Not all social groups in the Futa Jallon saw colonial transformations as opening up new 
opportunities. Fulbe of free but not chiefly status, such as the authors invoked above, saw 
themselves as losing social position – as well as their livelihoods – under colonial rule. While 
chiefs amassed the region’s resources through the backing of the colonial state, and persons of 
slave status and women seized upon French attempts at reform to either assert independence or 
negotiate more favorable conditions, free men pined in poetry for an imagined pre-colonial past, 
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a time when slaves and women obeyed, the chiefs and their followers were not scavengers, and a 
specifically Islamic Fulbe culture was shared by all. This middle group, in turn, would later 
assume an important role in the production of the Fulbe fragment by refusing to participate in 
many of the late colonial Guinean political parties and increasingly withdrawing from 
engagement with the state after independence. It is to this social group comprised of 
colonialism’s self-perceived losers that this chapter first turns, using poetry composed by Islamic 
scholars and awlube (sing. gawlo), a social group of bards, that reflected on and proposed 
solutions for the anxieties felt by free Fulbe during the interwar period. 
The remainder of the chapter is structured by the spaces either modified or created by 
colonial rule: the dune, or slave-status villages, now inhabited by emancipated slaves; the burure, 
or countryside, where Fulbe herders traveled with their cattle; the peanut fields of Senegal, to 
which thousands of laborers from the Futa Jallon migrated annually; the battlefield, where 
generations of young men from the Futa Jallon fought in the French Army as tirailleurs 
Sénégalais; the market, where women and former slaves turned to support their families and 
raise their status; the city, where Fulbe migrants built new communities and engaged in debates 
about belonging and custom; and the family, where colonial rule opened up spaces of maneuver 
for certain groups of Fulbe women. By placing emphasis on colonial spaces, such an approach 
runs the risk of, as Hanretta has argued, rendering “invisible… the possibility of African 
inventions in social technology, political rhetoric, and self-fashioning that took place during the 
‘colonial era’ but which owes little to colonial institutions, discourses, or projects.”3 Unlike the 
history of the Yacoubist religious movement Hanretta presents, however, the Futa Jallon, as a 
political, social, and economic space, was perhaps the prime focus of the colonial officials in 
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Community (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 10-11. 
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Guinea up to the 1950s. Constituting nearly one half of the colony’s total population, and thus 
the lion’s share of its tax revenues and labor supply, the high plateau and more specifically social 
hierarchies within Fulbe society became closely tied to the ideology and practice of colonial rule 
in Guinea. Yet, even as the primary focus of the colonial administration, the region’s 
transformations under colonial rule were largely unanticipated. Individuals and groups used 
colonial policies and spaces for their own ends, ones that often worked at cross-purposes to both 
colonial and elite Fulbe intentions.  
In charting both changing structures and divergent trajectories, this chapter argues that 
the unequal distribution of opportunities under the colonial state created fissures within the 
“shared” structure of social hierarchies in the Futa Jallon, gaps that political parties after the 
Second World War would either exploit or ignore at their own peril. As part of an already thin 
literature on colonial Guinea, the period between the implementation of colonial administration 
and the post-1945 period of imperial reform has received little attention from historians. The 
histories presented below represent a first gesture towards highlighting this important episode of 
twentieth-century Guinean history, one that bridges the relatively more unsettled periods that 
preceded and followed it. 
A Fulbe Lament 
Perhaps even more so than the chiefs and former slaves – both groups who were of 
primary concern to French administrators in the Futa Jallon – the middle group of free but not 
elite status Fulbe are often absent from colonial political reports and the records of 
investigations. Their daily lives had not undergone the same amount of change as the groups 
below and above them within the Futa social hierarchy and thus did not catch the eye of 
administrators. By the late 1930s, however, many free Fulbe had become disillusioned with 
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colonial rule and the transformations the arrival of the French had brought to the high plateau.  
 While free but not elite Fulbe might not have figured prominently in colonial reports, 
other documents – in particular religious and political poetry – give insight into their 
understandings and characterizations of social change under colonial rule. The archives of the 
Institut Fondamental d’Afrique Noire (IFAN) in Dakar contain an extensive collection of early 
twentieth-century Pular-language poetry from the Futa Jallon. The original documents were 
collected, transliterated from Ajami to Latin script, and in some cases translated into French by 
Gilbert Vieillard, a colonial administrator cum ethnographer who had spent significant time both 
posted an on missions in the Futa, to the extent that Fulbe religious and political leaders called 
him the Pullo timmudo, or “the whole Fulbe.”4 After Vieillard’s 1939 death in France while 
serving in the French army, his papers were donated to Dakar’s IFAN. They would sit there until 
the 1960s, when two young scholars – one, Thierno Diallo, the son of one of the Futa’s most 
prominent post-war politicians, the other, Boubacar Barry, one of the most prominent historians 
of pre-colonial West Africa and the Futa Jallon – catalogued the holding, including the numerous 
poems Vieillard had collected during the 1930s as a research project.5 
As a colonial official and ethnographer familiar with Fulbe culture, Vieillard was well 
positioned to both hear and understand the complaints of religious leaders, local notables, and 
freehold farmers who lived in the Futa, and the poems Vieillard gathered point to widespread 
discontent. The targets of Fulbe ire reflected what Fulbe of free but not chiefly status thought 
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4 Mamadou Bah, “Notre Ami Vieillard,” Notes Africaines, bulletin d'information et de 
correspondance de l'IFAN no. 19, July 1943, 1-2; cited in Claude Malon, “Gilbert Vieillard, 
administrateur et ethnologue en Afrique Occidentale (1926-1939),” Cahiers de sociologie 
économique et culturelle, ethnopsychologie no. 33 (2000), 107-131.!
 
5 On the Fonds Vieillard's contents and history, see Thierno Diallo, Catalogue des manuscrits de 
l'I.F.A.N. : Fonds Vieillard, Gaden, Brevié, Figaret, Shaykh Mousa Kamara et Cremer en 
langues arabe, peule et voltaïques (Dakar: IFAN, 1966).  
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was a squeezing effect due to colonial transformation: from below, persons of slave status and 
women; and from above, chiefs and the new class of African civil servants. Believing that they 
were rapidly losing economic, social, and political status, many of the poems specifically faulted 
French rule for a degradation of “traditional” Fulbe society. 
In a poem entitled Ittamen Porto e Fuuta Dyaloo (“Chase the French out of the Futa 
Jallon”), an anonymous author lamented what he saw as the religious and social downfall of 
Fulbe society. “Allow us to keep our slaves,” the author pleads to Allah, “make them return, so 
that they can return to their work… permit us to recover our dune [maccube villages], our herds, 
and our women,” or, the three poles of the pre-colonial economic system that had supported elite 
prosperity. The author also turns his eye to those colonial spaces that had facilitated the region’s 
integration into the colonial economy: “erase all idols from the Futa Jallon, and the markets and 
merchants, O all powerful… rid the Futa of the railroad, and of the work on the roads.” In the 
preceding verse, the author begins with a seeming devolution of Islam in the region to point 
shortly thereafter at those colonial practices and spaces – namely, the opening of markets that 
had not previously existed (see below), as well as the free and coerced shift of labor towards 
infrastructure projects – that had undermined faith and wealth, both markers of Fulbe elite 
identity. Above all, the author prayed for the end of French rule, asking that God “exterminate 
the Europeans in all of the Futa… [and] clean the Futa of all Europeans.” He or (much less 
likely) she envisioned a “return” to a past where Fulbe social groups would return to their 
“natural” places: “Ourourbé, Dayébé [two of the four yettore, or family names, in the Futa] may 
each get their due; Dialloubé, Férobé [the other two] throughout the Fouta!”6 In the past, all four 
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6 “Ittamen Porto e Fuuta Dyaloo/Seigneur, chasse-nous les Français”, FV, cahier no. 58, poem 
no. 4; also published in Gilbert Vieillard, “Poèmes Peuls du Fouta Djallon,” Bulletin du Comité 
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yettore knew their places and roles, an arrangement that had benefitted the region’s free and 
chiefly social groups. Although such a system was inherently unequal, it was one that was shared 
throughout the region and, more importantly, was comprehensible for free Fulbe. 
 Other authors turned their gaze towards the greater mobility and positions of women. One 
poem, translated by Vieillard as a “satire on the prostituted” but seemingly more a tirade, places 
specific blame on Fulbe women wearing an ndoola, or a beaded belt worn underneath clothing 
that is associated with feminine charm and meant for only a husband to see.7 After expounding 
on women’s loose sexual mores in the years following the battle of Porédaka, the poem identifies 
which practices in particular have turned women into “prostitutes”: “they speak the white’s 
language without knowing it, just to imitate the tirailleurs’ talk so that they can solicit… they put 
on the belt [ndoola] and voila they leave their house to go the markets, to Kindia, to Mamou, 
[they are] the women who wear ndoola.” The author is clear throughout the text that what the 
women were selling was their own bodies, and the process through which they were doing it, 
namely incomprehensible spoken enchantments and objects imbued with special powers to 
seduce. Another layer of interpretation, though, points to women who sought economic gain – 
including sex workers themselves – by entering colonial spaces like the tirailleurs camps, the 
markets, and the colonial cities. Furthermore, the visibility of ndoola has often been associated 
with slave status, as these women either left their torsos exposed or the beads were worn outside 
clothing. Thus, the increasingly ndoola cited by author reflected the increased visibility of 
women of slave status in colonial spaces, and more specifically the power over free men it 
represented. Whether armed with “smelly powdered drugs” to seduce or some of the scarce 
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d’Études Historiques et Scientifiques de l’Afrique Occidentale Française 20, no. 1-2 (1937), 
240-247. 
7 Mido yetta innudo lan aliyyu mo faaliluyaa mo mangaraa yenni ndoola/ Satire contre les 
prostituées,” Fonds Vieillard, IFAN (Dakar), cahier no. 58, poem no. 5. 
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currency needed to pay taxes, the author explicitly links colonial rule with the growing exposure 
and influence of women, and especially women of slave status. 
 The social and economic mobility of women and persons of slave status was not the only 
subject of ire for Fulbe poets. Closely tied to the despised transformations cause by French 
conquest were those African chiefs and agents empowered by colonial rule. Complaints focused 
in particular on French consumption of taxes, Fulbe collaboration in their collection, and their 
combined damnation: 
Therefore let us give [the French] the taxes, so that they can eat it! And us others, 
let us observe our religion; Allah will pay us back with food from the next world! 
/ But those who eat the taxes along with [the French], they will certainly go with 
[the French] in the hellfire of the next world! / Just as they shared with the tax-
eaters in this lowly world, they will also share the eternal flames of the next 
world!8 
 
The chiefs’ complicity with French administrators, as well as their own exploitation of 
communities under the guise of “traditional” taxes, led to widespread abuses and, it would seem, 
damnation. The author’s emphasis on the material benefits of tax proceeds – of eating and a full 
belly, as it were – serve to also drive a wedge between those who kept alive the spiritual core of 
the Futa, and those, like the chiefs and their followers, who had fallen prey to foreign temptation. 
Another poem makes clear that many Fulbe saw both the chiefs and the African civil 
servants as the most local and visible manifestations of an extractive system: 
The clerks and the chiefs are fingers of the same hand / their colors will look the 
same on judgment day! / The clerks put down their books and no longer serve / 
they obey the chiefs in the pursuit of wealth / like when the lion is on the hunt in 
the brush / the dirty little hyenas follow it to poach away some small bones.9 
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8 “Mido yetta jooman tawnudon e jamaanu han gelinoobe dun torino yo nattire laakhira / “Sur 
les împots,” Fonds Vieillard, IFAN (Dakar), cahier on. 61, poem no. 32; Gilbert Vieillard, 
“Poèmes Peuls du Fouta Djallon,” 248-257. The discourse of “tax-eating” reflects what Bayart 
calls the “politics of the belly” in Africa. See Jean-Francois Bayart, The State in Africa: the 
politics of the belly (New York: Longman, 1993).  
9 Moodibe e lambe no sindindira/“Les clercs d’aujourd’hui et les Chefs,” FV, cahier no. 61. 
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In these verses, the author is highlighting the loss of Islamic knowledge amongst the clerks in 
particular, and in the pursuit for carrion – one would assume from the metaphorical corpse of the 
free Fulbe themselves – the ceding of their ability to check chiefly power. That poacher of kills, 
the hyena, appears often in poems decrying the economic straits caused by colonial rule. In 
another poem, the author described bride’s families, who, spoiled by consumer goods, demanded 
higher bride wealth, as “like hyenas surrounding a piece of meat who bite at one another, like 
vultures on a carcass.”10 The men who composed these poems mourned the “death” of their 
society. Their only hope, the poems argue, was to await the arrival of the Mahdi and the Yawm 
ad-Din, or the end of times, when, as in the other Abrahamic religions, the dead will at last rise 
from the grave. 
 Other poems counseled either submission or adaptation. In “Let us Accept the French,” 
the author, Cerno Mamadu Luudaajo Dalaba, reminded the Fulbe that it was their duty to accept 
the will of Allah, which at this point was to let the French rule. It was not the fault of the French 
that they commanded the Futa, nor that they made demands upon the Fulbe; the French were 
simply playing the part of a ruler under attack – a reference to the World Wars and the demands 
of labor and goods that followed – in this transient “lesser” world: “This world is a camp, and a 
camp is not a home / many others who camped here before the French have gone… [now] their 
enemies attacked [the French], which forced us to furnish them with soldiers, but that was not the 
desire of the French.”11 Furthermore, the author argued, one should not blame the chiefs for their 
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10 Cerno Lugumaana Jaraban Koyin, “Les femmes d’aujourd’hui,” FV, cahier no. 61, poem no. 
29. 
11 Cerno Mamadu Luudaajo Dalabaa, mi yetii yetteedo e kullu haalin o tawniilan zamaanu jeyal 
faransi/“Acceptons les Français,” FV, cahier no. 62, poem no. 38.  
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demands on the population. “If the chiefs endure some sort of difficulty,” he argued, “that will 
heat things up for the subjects also / if everything goes well for them, we will not be troubled by 
the French.” 
Another poem by the same author counseled a more proactive approach. In “On the 
merits associated with agriculture,” Dalaba warns that, “so your slaves will not surpass you,” the 
free Fulbe must take up the hoe or plow “in obedience of God.” He also attached spiritual reward 
for labor, claiming that “when you start work on your fields, God says to angels: register their 
thousands merits for what they do.” In the end, Dalaba argued, the free Fulbe should hold 
themselves to the same standards they held their former slaves: “And who loves, O believers, a 
slave who does not work, who eats his portion and who wastes seed without shame! And you? 
You do not love, you say, a slave who does not work. So why would the One who commands all 
of creation love the person who does not work?”12 
 In the poems Vieillard collected, one sees a variety of reactions to colonialism: 
frustration, a wish for violent revenge, condemnation, resignation, and finally proactive 
acceptance. What is clear in the collected poems is that free Fulbe, the former small-scale 
masters and freeholders within the Futa, saw themselves as getting short shrift under French rule. 
This middle group, caught between the increasingly exploitative chiefs and newly empowered 
social groups, would play an important role in the twilight of the colonial rule and the dawn of 
the post-colonial state. While Fulbe politicians would court the elite and the Touré-led PDG 
would attract former slaves and women into the party through promises of further reform, the 
free Fulbe largely sat out the political battles of decolonization. Free Fulbe did not vote in the 
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12 Cerno Mamadu Luudaajo Dalabaa, Mido yetta huwudo ngoo tageefo ko hattataa woni 
huuwanaydo ngo pooma abadaa haabataa/“Sur les mérites attachés à la culture des champs,” 
FV, cahier no. 66, poem no. 74. 
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1958 referendum. They eventually turned their attention to migration and trade, and would later 
flout economic and border controls enacted by Conakry following independence. And due in part 
to their perception of marginalization under colonial and post-colonial rule, this social group 
would come to constitute the center of the Fulbe fragment of the Guinean nation. 
The Dune 
In lamenting the loss of control over “their” dune, free Fulbe focused in particular on the 
increased room for maneuver available to individuals and communities of slave status. This 
section examines the transformations to the practice and structure of slavery that took place 
under colonial rule in the Futa Jallon, and how persons of slave status sought to renegotiate or 
even sever relationships with the former masters. 
Shortly after the establishment of the protectorate, the dune attracted the attention of the 
French colonial administration, which intended to at first reform and then eventually eliminate 
the practice of slavery in the Futa Jallon. Following a congress of Futa chiefs and French 
officials held at Timbo in 1897 – and after a considerable amount of pressure placed on the Futa 
elite by the highest ranking French administrator in the region, Ernest Noirot – the slave trade 
had, along with corporal punishment and the collection of “traditional” taxes, been outlawed in 
the region.13 The juridical status of “slave,” however, persisted, and Noirot and the Lieutenant 
Governor of Guinea, Tautin, placed limits on the proposed transformations to the institution.14 
Noirot remarked in 1900 that to free the slave would to be to unmoor her or him, as she or he 
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gained all social meaning from being attached to the master’s family.15 Additionally, the 
Governor wrote in a letter to Paris that “certain promises had been made” to “respect the 
customs” of the Fulbe.16 As such, the Guinean administration’s dedication to ending the slave 
trade and the practice of slavery was ambivalent at best.17 For example, while the colonial 
administration established so-called “liberty villages” to host former slaves in parts of West 
Africa, in Guinea they were restricted to the Haute Guinée region.18 Furthermore, formal 
declarations of emancipation called “certificates of liberty” issued in neighboring colonies were 
rarely recognized by administrators in Guinea, who hardly ever handed out the certificates 
themselves.19 As long as overly exploitative practices were kept to a minimum, most French 
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16 Tautin, LG Guinée to Département (Paris), no. 373, 24 September 1902, ANS K28. 
 
17 See most notably Martin Klein, Slavery and Colonial Rule in French West Africa (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), 141-158. See also Klein, “Slave Resistance and Slave 
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(1995), 311-330. For Senegal/Soudan, see Klein, Slavery and Colonial Rule, 85-88. 
 
19 French administrators often argued that slaves would simply cross the border into a 
neighboring colony and declare their freedom without compensating their now former masters. 
In one case, two former slaves from the Touba region of the Futa returned after a brief period in 
the Casamance region of Senegal with certificates, demanding that they be released of any 
obligations to their master. The two men then stole merchandise from the master – perhaps 
reasoning that they were owed for past work – and began participating in slave trading, capturing 
or buying individuals in the Casamance or in Portuguese Guinea and selling in the Futa. See 
Colonie de la Guinée, Cercle de Touba, Rapport Politique no. 7, mois de Juillet 1905, 18 August 
1905, ANS 7G60.  
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administrators were content to let the system function as it had before  
 In fact, the French were not very successful at achieving the one reform upon which they 
hung their emancipationist and civilizing credentials: ending the slave trade. By their own 
admission, the colonial administration in Guinea did not enact any policies to stem the flow of 
slaves to, from, and within the Futa until 1902, five years after the practice was outlawed. Only 
in 1903 did they establish checkpoints along the major trade routes to stop slave caravans and 
starve clandestine slave markets.20 And even when put into place, the initiatives did little end the 
trade.21 Again, as long a slave traders were not obvious while undertaking the trade, French 
officials were content to turn a blind eye to the practice. 
The protectorate status of the Futa Jallon came to a close following the exile of Alfa Yaya 
in 1905, and with it legal status of “slave” came to an end. The practice of slavery continued, 
however, often with the support of the colonial administration. Several administrators warned 
that, stripped of hierarchies, the region would fall into a deep economic malaise as the Fulbe 
masters refused to work.22 Furthermore, even after the French Minister of Colonies mandated 
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20 Bouchez, Commandant la Région de Labé, “L’État de Captivité dans la région du Labé et les 
mesures prises pour arriver à sa disparition,” 29 February 1904, ANS K20; Directeur des 
Affaires Indigènes (Guinée), Rapport Politique, June 1903, ANS 2G3/1.  
 
21 For example, in 1904, the British Governor of Sierra Leone sent a letter to his French 
counterpart in Guinea complaining of a flood of British subjects being taken to the Futa Jallon as 
slaves. The Leonean Governor’s letter pushed the French administration to increase punishment 
for those caught participating in the slave trade, and some 22 persons were in fact arrested and 
sentenced to terms ranging from 6 months to 5 years during the last three months of 1904 alone. 
Yet only recognition by a colonial rival that the slave trade continued spurred French 
administrators into action, and their zeal for reform often faded as the colony of Guinea receded 
into background. King Harman, Governor of Sierra Leone to LG Guinée, 19 May 1904, ANS 
K28. 
 
22 Bouchez, Commandant la Région de Labé, “L’État de Captivité dans la région du Labé et les 
mesures prises pour arriver à sa disparition,” 29 February 1904, ANS K20; Ernest Noirot, 
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that the AOF administration finally suppress the practice of domestic slavery in 1908,23 
administrators in Guinea still worked within a pre-emancipation framework. For example, in 
1911, the Governor in Guinea was admonished by his AOF superior in Dakar for continuing to 
require cercle commandants to list the “number of servants” held by political and religious 
leaders on intelligence reports when both the status and practice had supposedly already ended.24   
 Faced with a colonial administration ambivalent or even resistant to the end of slavery, 
many persons of slave status chose to self-emancipate.25 For the first decade and a half of their 
rule in Guinea, French administrators faced mass exoduses of former slaves from the Futa Jallon. 
The majority of those who chose to leave were first generation slaves, particularly those who had 
been brought to the Futa as a result of the wars connected to Samori Touré’s state in the Kankan 
region. Aside from shallow roots in the region, the choice to leave was also motivated primarily 
by the application of officially banned “traditional” taxes like kummabite, zakka, and farilla. In 
areas where the local canton or village chief was particularly exploitative, French administrators 
reported that large swathes of the countryside were empty.26 
 Most former slaves, though, chose to stay in the Futa Jallon, often in the same runde 
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Banamba area of Soudan. See Richard Roberts and Martin Klein, “The Banamba Slave Exodus 
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26 See Chapter 1. 
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(plural of dune) and in modified but still asymmetrical relationships with their former masters. 
Spatial segregation helped maintain social hierarchies in the Futa, but other ties linked former 
masters and slaves. By the 1900s it had become difficult to discern which proportion of former 
slaves could trace their ancestry back to ethnic Jallonke, the “original,” pre-jihad inhabitants and 
rulers of the Futa. Nevertheless, the concept of indigeneity had significant purchase within slave 
communities. While the pejorative term maccube was often used by free Fulbe to describe 
persons of slave status as a whole, it also carried a more particular meaning that ranged from 
“slaves who work in the fields” to, most importantly, “first generation enslaved.”27 After a few 
generations of living in the Futa, inhabitants of the dune called themselves ndimaaybe, meaning 
“those who are indigenous,” establishing a link with the soil and the pre-Fulbe past. Furthermore, 
former slaves had close ties with both their former masters and Fulbe culture as a whole. Slaves 
in runde villages assumed the lineage of their masters, and regardless of origin, nearly all slaves 
in the Futa spoke Pular.28 As important ceremonies connected to birth, death, and circumcision 
required the participation and blessing of the master, former masters also held significant 
religious power over former slaves.29 Finally, the two social groups were linked by blood, as free 
Fulbe men often took women of slave status as wives and concubines.30 
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 Just as importantly, many slaves realized that they held greater power over their former 
masters after the imposition of French rule and (partial) reforms. Before the 1897 treaty, families 
from the two social groups had constituted an unevenly reciprocal relationship. Masters gave 
slaves access to land to which the latter held rights of use, and in return the slaves turned over 
farilla, or 10% of the harvest, and worked the masters’ own fields during the morning for five 
days of the week.31 The expectation from both groups was that under French rule masters would 
pay the hut tax for their slaves. Steadily increasing taxes and inflated censuses made such an 
arrangement financially untenable. Combined with increased demands of “gifts” from newly 
emboldened colonial canton and village chiefs, former masters found themselves unable to 
satisfy their material obligations to former slaves.32  
Relationships between former masters and slaves did not disintegrate over night, as the 
two groups were connected through social and religious ties and by the fact that former slaves 
continued to work land that the French recognized as being owned by former masters. However, 
colonial rule did reconfigure the demands former masters could ask of their dependents, and in 
particular put an end to restrictions on former slaves’ mobility. Largely free to move where they 
wanted, former slaves were able to find a new master or patron if theirs proved too burdensome. 
And many did just that. Even before the formal elimination of the legal status of “slave,” one 
runde inhabitant made clear to a French administrator that space for physical and social 
maneuver had opened following the imposition of French rule, warning that “if someone makes 
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me work, I will escape.”33 
 The colonial administration attempted to stabilize the volatile situation by instituting a 
new labor system based upon sharecropping (French métayage), a policy that unfolded 
throughout the AOF at the same time.34 Despite expectations that the former slaves would 
“constitute a new social class, that of the free worker,” the attempted shift to sharecropping 
largely failed, as both former masters and slaves were generally not interested in negotiating 
legal agreements.35 Similar efforts in the 1910s would fall short, as the meager rights and 
guarantees afforded under the contracts did not justify the bureaucratic hassle and, perhaps more 
importantly, the meddling participation of a colonial administrator.36 
While economic obligations between the two groups shifted as tax regimes changed, 
social and religious ties proved more durable. The markers of slave status, former or not, 
reflected durable social hierarchies in the Futa Jallon that persisted well into the twilight of 
colonial and beyond.37 Relationships between former slaves and masters during colonial rule, 
however, were not simply continuations of pre-colonial practice, as the unstable situation in the 
two decades following the imposition of French rule afforded former slaves standing upon which 
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to make demands. As such, the Futa Jallon’s incorporation into the French colonial state opened 
up several new opportunities for former slaves to raise their economic condition. Space for 
maneuver might have been tight and the surrounding social atmosphere viscous. But it existed, 
and was expanding in new and unanticipated directions. 
The Burure 
The inhabitants of dune comprised the most prominent segment of persons of non-free 
status in the pre-colonial and colonial Futa Jallon. The second largest group in this broader 
category was semi-nomadic herders referred to as Fulbe burure or Poulli. Similar to persons of 
slave status in the dune, Fulbe burure found more room to renegotiate relationships with their 
chiefly patrons, although colonial rule also brought about more uncertainty and, to an extent, 
danger. 
Burure translates to the bush or countryside, and indeed, herders and their families spent 
much of the year guiding cattle from pasture to pasture along seasonal migration routes. In the 
imaginations of both colonial administrators and Fulbe elites, this “untamed” or “natural” 
condition marked the Fulbe burure as “noble savages” or “pagans,” respectively, unfit for 
“civilized” life. The practice of Fulbe burure transhumance, though, did not fit completely 
within colonial stereotypes of unmoored nomads wandering the countryside. Unlike persons of 
slave status, Fulbe burure were organized into lenyi (plural of lenyol), or maximal lineages, like 
free and elite Fulbe. Furthermore, while groups of herders traveled extensively both on the 
plateau and in the surrounding plains, they were tied to misside from which they supposedly 
hailed. Fulbe burure often kept huts in foulasso, or villages of free Fulbe, in their “home” 
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misside, and would periodically reside in these permanent residences.38 The most important ties 
to these villages were herders’ subordinate relationships with chiefly lenyi. Like maccube, Fulbe 
burure were obligated to pay the kummabite. As the families of herders often grew small crops, 
they were also subject to farilla and, especially during times of war, seizure of portions of their 
herds. In return, the Fulbe burure received protection from demands while traveling with their 
cattle, trading the payment of “customary” taxes for a mobile security.39  
By the 1930s, however, disruptions to the pre-colonial relationships between herders and 
chiefs had led to what colonial administrators called a “mass exodus” of Fulbe burure from the 
Futa Jallon into neighboring colonies. The movement of cattle and their keepers was not new; 
most herds and the families that tended them migrated along a North-South axis, bisecting 
several ecological and climactic zones during their rainy and dry season travels. Neither was the 
departure of cattle from Guinea especially novel, even during the colonial period, as Guinean 
herders had since the protectorate era exploited greater demand in neighboring (British) Sierra 
Leone and Portuguese Guinea to get higher prices for their livestock. French administrators at 
first were not explicitly opposed to the Fulbe burure crossing imperial borders, as they believed 
the supply of cattle could eventually be funneled towards the growing port of Conakry.40 
However, the basic factors that caused herders to take their livestock and families to Portuguese 
and British territories – namely high taxes and lower prices for meat in Guinea –did not change, 
and neither did migration patterns. The French administration responded with greater restrictions 
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on movement, either through attempted prevention of departures or intensified policing along the 
border. They were often frustrated in their attempts to staunch the flow of cattle and families to 
neighboring colonies. In 1909, for instance, the village chief of Daralabé, 130 km East of Labé, 
left with his family and cattle for Satadougou in Southern Senegal. The chief was sent back to 
Guinea, sentenced to 15 days in jail, and warned that any future attempts at flight would be dealt 
with sternly. The chief responded by forthrightly telling the local commandant that once he was 
released he would travel to Satadougou once again. As long as taxes, labor demands, and 
population density in the Futa Jallon was high while available pasture was scarce, the chief 
argued that herders like him would continue to leave.41  
Most conflicts between Fulbe herders and the colonial state, however, occurred along 
imperial borders. Ordered by the administration in Conakry to more strictly enforce tariffs and 
stem emigration, border guards often overzealously interpreted their powers. In one incident in 
1911, a group of Fulbe and their cattle were suspected of planning to cross into Portuguese 
Guinea by circumventing a border station in the Kadé region. Hearing rumors of an impeding 
departure, border guards traveled some 10 km into the Guinean interior – well past their 
jurisdiction, which was limited to the immediate vicinity (about 1 km) of the border – to stop the 
family. In the ensuing confrontation, one guard was killed and the Fulbe herders crossed the 
border as they had intended.42 Following the incident, the administration ordered guards to not be 
overly strict in their application of border restrictions, and the steady trickle of Fulbe burure and 
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their cattle leaving Guinea continued into the 1920s.43  
Increased emigration during the early 1930s forced the Guinean administration to change 
course. The “push” factors of Fulbe burure migration were now combined with a strong “pull” 
from outside territories, especially Sierra Leone. One Guinean administrator remarked that the 
British colony had not weathered the early years of the global depression any better than its 
French neighbor to the north, and therefore economic activity was not any livelier in the British 
colony. Rather, British officials had attracted groups of herders by waiving tariffs and yearly 
head taxes to those who migrated to Sierra Leone, with the amount of relief based upon the 
number of cattle each group brought with them.44 A suggestion from Guinea’s Director of 
Political Affairs to waive excise taxes for those herders who wanted to return was quickly 
dismissed by the Director of Economic Services and Taxes, as it would require a special 
exception to established rules.45 French colonial administrators had diagnosed a potentially 
crippling economic problem, as cattle were integral to the Futa Jallon’s economy. At this point, 
though, they offered few ideas on how to entice Fulbe burure to stay in the colony.  
Another incident in 1936 precipitated a more comprehensive inquiry into the exodus of 
herders. Frustrated with increased policing along the Sierra Leone border and numerous 
instances of guards demanding bribes, a group of Fulbe burure attacked a local border post, 
burning down its buildings and attempting to chase the colonial officials away. Guards opened 
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fire on the marauders, killing four and wounding several others.46 In response, the AOF 
Governor General sent Gilbert Vieillard, a colonial administrator and early ethnographer who 
had spent considerable time researching the Fulbe burure, to look into the causes and possible 
policy changes that would keep herders in Guinea and prevent more incidents like ones that had 
occurred in 1911 and 1936. Vieillard pointed to a series of colonial policies that had applied 
pressure on Fulbe burure. Restrictions on intentional brush fires – which allowed new, nutrient-
rich grass to grow during the long dry season – reduced the size of herds. Chiefs and 
administrators also frequently forced herders to sell what cattle remained at lower than market 
price. Finally, taxes had grown overly burdensome for Fulbe burure, who looked to the south 
and saw a less onerous tax regime. These policies reflected a general disregard for Fulbe herders, 
who must have felt as though a thousand leaches were sucking them dry. 
However, the most important set of factors pushing Fulbe burure to leave, Vieillard 
argued, was connected to the administrative parceling of Guinean space under the colonial state, 
and to a connected fraying of social hierarchies. As with former slaves, the imposition of 
colonial rule altered the relationship between patrons and clients. While the colonial state chose 
their village chiefs from families who had reigned in the pre-colonial missidi, administrative 
boundaries often shifted, altering the geography of social connections in the Futa. The missidi 
continued to serve as religious and social hubs, but the pre-colonial administrative units ceded 
their political importance to the newly appointed canton centers. In creating localized chains of 
political hierarchies, which extended from villages/missidi, to cantons, to cercles, and finally to 
regions and the colony as a whole, the colonial government had broken the relationships between 
the migratory Fulbe burure and their connected missidi chiefs, sets of obligations that had 
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traveled along with the herds. Ultimately, Vieillard remarked, the Fulbe burure now “see 
themselves cut off from their former masters, and the security that allowed them to range about 
on their journeys through [ethnic] Susu country.” Due to high population densities on the 
plateau, the Fulbe burure had already moved to the periphery of the Futa Jallon in order to find 
pasture by the time the French arrived. The changes put into place by colonial rule, he argued, 
had simply provided the final push into Portuguese Guinea and Sierra Leone.47  
Vieillard proposed a series of reforms to help alleviate the problems herders faced under 
the new colonial system. Limited brush fires would be allowed and taxes lowered. Herders 
would no longer be forced to feed what the Fulbe burure called the “eaters of beef,” or local 
administrators and chiefs who forced the sale of cattle and demanded bribes for protection.48 
Vieillard’s most innovative solution was to recreate the political hierarchies that had marked 
herder/elite Fulbe relations under the pre-colonial Futa state. Called “mobile subdivisions,” he 
imagined a de-territorialized administrative unit sitting astride the Mamou and Kindia cercles 
that would be populated by the Fulbe burure. The subdivision would be assigned its own 
colonial administrator, who would travel with the herds and arrange for health and education 
services along the route. Most importantly, the Fulbe burure would be responsible to that 
administrator alone rather than having to negotiate with – or more commonly give into the 
demands of – colonial chiefs through whose cantons the herds passed. Although more 
conservative reforms such as lowering taxes in border regions were enacted, the AOF Governor 
General rejected the mobile subdivision, arguing that it would prove too complicated to fit within 
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established administrative chains.49  
As cattle moved to the periphery of the Futa Jallon and Guinean economy, colonial 
administrators gave less attention to the plight of the Fulbe burure. Nevertheless, the basic 
conditions that had pushed the herders to range progressively farther from the high plateau 
continued. Colonial reforms had created a rift between the Fulbe burure and their chiefly 
superiors, while several factors had made life in the Futa more difficult. British and Portuguese 
incentives simply provided an opportunity for the herders to improve their situations, if only 
temporarily. Finally, a shift towards a market economy and the regular sale of livestock 
prioritized those buyers who could pay the best prices, and they were rarely found in Conakry. 
The Fulbe burure did not represent the same demographic force as their maccube counterparts, 
and therefore did not play a central role in Guinean politics during the rise of electoral politics 
following the Second World War. Their changing relationships with the now colonial chiefs, 
however, provide vivid examples of the transformations and new opportunities initiated, often 
unintentionally, by colonial rule.  
The Peanut Fields 
The Futa Jallon’s integration into the French imperial economy opened up new 
opportunities for young, mostly male Fulbe, especially those who were of slave status. By the 
interwar period, the most significant area of economic expansion, at least according to numbers 
of participants, was the practice of seasonal farming in Senegal’s peanut fields. Known as 
navétanes, thousands of young men would depart from the Futa in the months before the start of 
rains in May, work in the peanut fields for the duration of the growing season, and return home 
with some money and/or commercial goods at the onset of the dry season in August or 
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September. In the currency-starved Futa Jallon, seasonal agricultural migration became an 
integral part families' economic strategy. Reflecting its importance in the AOF’s colonial 
economy, the colonial administration attempted to shape its flows and practice, although their 
dedication to control did know its bounds, most notably in the 1952 Code de Travail. As with 
other transformations, seasonal labor in Senegal’s peanuts fields also perpetuated exploitative 
practices – ones that were near carbon copies of those between masters and slaves before 
emancipation – now covered under the guise of “traditional labor” and thus outside the gaze of 
the colonial state. 
Seasonal agricultural workers from the colonial Futa Jallon engaged in a form of labor 
migration with roots to at least the mid-nineteenth century.50 Wide scale peanut cultivation 
emerged along the Gambia River during the 1830s, due in part to increased demand for the 
product in the United States. Following modifications to French duties in 1840, cash-crop 
cultivation of the groundnut spread first along the Senegalese coast and then quickly into the 
interior. A combination of growing demand and favorable policy led to rapidly increasing 
exports, and by the 1870s peanuts had displaced gum arabic as Senegal’s largest agricultural 
export.51 The growing importance of peanut crops, in turn, contributed to the French colonial 
state’s spread into the Senegalese interior, which was later solidified by the construction of 
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As Manchuelle argued, the relationship between slavery and seasonal agricultural labor in 
West Africa was complicated. While some historians have argued that temporary labor migration 
did not emerge as a common practice until the twentieth century, Manchuelle demonstrated that 
seasonal labor tied to cash crop cultivation and more specifically to peanuts was fully developed 
by at least the 1880s.53 Resonances with pre-colonial practices went beyond patterns of mobility. 
The practice of seasonal labor migration in peanut fields was very close to what one would have 
found in the dune of the Futa Jallon both before and after emancipation. Migrant laborers agreed 
to work the fields of landowners for two to four days a week, sometimes receiving up to 10% of 
the total crop. In return, they were provided with food and lodging, and were given smaller plots 
of land to work, the proceeds from which they would keep for themselves.54 Although lacking 
the religious and social links that bound former slaves and masters, the basic system of 
obligations that structured the navétanes’ relationship with landowners was close to forms that 
were common in the pre-colonial Futa Jallon. 
For the first two decades of the twentieth century, navétanes were drawn primarily from 
the large labor pool of the French colony of Soudan. Large-scale migration from Guinea to 
Senegal did not emerge until the interwar period. Once work in Senegal’s peanut fields became 
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common, rates of migration expanded rapidly. Numbers of navétanes from Guinea, almost all 
Fulbe, grew from a few thousand in the 1920s to between 15,000 and 20,000 during the early 
1930s, with a peak of about 30,000 during the 1936 and 1937 growing seasons.55 The steady 
increase during the 1930s might have grown from a new AOF policy meant to both encourage 
and control the navétanat enacted in 1934.56 Known simply as “the trade, ” peanut exports, and 
by necessity the laborers upon which production depended, were at the heart of the colonial 
economy in Senegal; one colonial administrator claimed that, “all of Senegalese life revolves 
around the peanut trade.”57 In order to stimulate the flow of cheap labor into the fields, French 
officials instituted a series of incentives tied to a laissez-passer (also known as a “navétane 
card”) given to each navétane. Over time, the card offered a range of benefits, including reduced 
and then free fare on the Dakar-Niger railroad, 1 kg of rice, a meal in Tambacounda and 
Kaolack, main transports centers in Senegal, and a cloth ration.58  
These incentives, though, do not explain the rapid emergence of Guinean navétanes 
during the 1930s, as according to colonial administrators the vast majority of migrations from 
Guinea did not register and chose to travel north on foot.59 One colonial administrator in Labé 
remarked that due to colonial chiefs reassuming the role of conducting censuses during the early 
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1930s – a practice that had been discontinued in the 1910s due to abuse – instances of exactions 
through the form of over-onerous taxes grew steadily, pushing more inhabitants to flee the 
region.60 Others pointed to the poor quality of soil in the Futa, which restricted opportunities for 
cash-crop cultivation in home communities.61 Finally, recovering prices for peanuts on the world 
market during the 1930s meant that young men could gain more money abroad than working in 
the Futa.62 The steadily increasing numbers over time also point to the role of migrant networks 
played in both spreading information about opportunities in the Peanut and funneling migrants 
from the Futa Jallon northward.63 What began with perhaps a few young men working in Gambia 
and then Senegal in the late nineteenth century grew to a steady stream, one with enough force 
by the 1950s to displace Soudan as providing Senegal the plurality of its navétanes.  
Whatever the cause for migration, the navétanat had significant effects on home, transit, 
and host communities. Colonial administrators in the Labé region noted a 17% population 
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decrease in the northern Futa during the 1930s, due in part to an outbreak of sleeping sickness, 
but also to seasonal and increasingly semi-permanent migration.64 One French ethnographer 
remarked that in the Labé region there were 1,266 women for every 1,000 men, a gender 
disparity due almost wholly to labor migration.65 Another colonial study reported that at any 
given point of the year around 12% of the Futa’s population was absent from the region, and that 
men constituted only 40.8% of the population between the ages of 15 and 59. Numbers of men 
relative to women were low in other regions of Guinea, also due to migration – the study 
estimated that 77,000 Guineans worked outside the colony – but gender discrepancies and 
therefore rates of migration were the highest in the Futa Jallon.66 Navétanes also caused 
problems when they returned. Flush with cash, they often bought all of the fonio, a couscous-like 
grain, and rice in their home communities. As much of the available labor left the village during 
the growing season, local communities in the Futa struggled to keep up with the increased 
demand for staple foods. One such feedback loop resulted in a 1932 famine in the Sangalan 
canton of Labé that killed 37.67 Thus, while injecting the currency necessary to pay taxes into the 
Futa, navétanes also severely disrupted local practices of subsistence farming and in some 
communities caused acute food insecurity. 
Transit communities also struggled to cope with the semiannual influx of migrants. In 
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addition to driving up the local price of food, navétanes were also possible carriers of disease.68 
Colonial officials in Senegal were particularly concerned with smallpox, and considered the 
labor migrants as prime vectors. In response, the Senegalese administration established a series 
of vaccination centers and cordons sanitaires at major points of transport in order to prevent 
outbreaks and the spread of infectious disease along migration pathways. The AOF 
administration also required that all navétanes be vaccinated either before departure or in 
transit.69 Colonial attempts to both stimulate and control the navétanat, however, were 
underfunded and understaffed. At the “navétane depot” in Tambacounda, where food, cloth, 
meals, and vaccinations were distributed, a staff of only 18 French and African officials was 
tasked with inspecting and serving tens of thousands of migrants. 70 As such, officials in transit 
hubs like Tambacounda were underequipped to corral what one colonial administrator called, 
with some hyperbole, “a swarm of locusts, eating nearly everything available and leaving only 
refuse in their wake.”71 
The colonial administration’s benign – or so it thought – neglect of the navétanat was 
partially by design. Colonial administrators in host communities in Senegal often raised alarms 
about exploitation by landowners, who often overworked, underfed, and/or bilked navétanes of 
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their portion of the harvest at the end of the growing season. The Senegalese administration 
enacted half measures to stop the worst of abuses, reducing the days each laborer worked in the 
fields of the landowner from four to three.72 Officials also attempted to tie working conditions to 
credits meant to stimulate the production of peanuts that were given to landowners.73 A 
combination of understaffing of inspectors and ambivalence towards intervening in the realm of 
“traditional” labor, however, made enforcement of the new regulations on the workweek nearly 
impossible. Most tellingly, “customary workers” like the navétanes were exempted from the 
1952 Code de Travail, a law that was meant to “modernize” labor in the colonies by regulating, 
among other practices, wages and hours.74 At the behest of Leopold Sedar Senghor, at the time a 
delegate from and future president of Senegal, the National Assembly adopted a definition of 
labor tied primarily to cash remuneration, which exempted seasonal agricultural workers.75 Due 
to French administrators’ recognition that they lacked the basic means to regulate navétanes, as 
well as reticence to disrupt a system from which both African elites and the colonial state 
profited, the practice of seasonal labor migration remained intact, exploitation and all, up to and 
in some cases past independence. 
Thus, while the Guinean Fulbe navétane had more room for maneuver, both literally and 
economically  – one could conceivably choose to enter into a relationship with another 
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landowner the next year, or even leave mid-season – he was still vulnerable to many of the same 
forms of exploitation that existed in the Futa Jallon. The navétanat was significant in that it 
represented a first step towards the reconfiguration of the social hierarchies that dominated the 
high plateau. If the harvest was especially bountiful one year, seasonal migrants could return 
home with some extra currency and perhaps improve the economic situation of their families. As 
migrants from the Futa began to move and work in Senegalese cities and spend longer periods of 
time abroad following the Second World War (see chapter 5), opportunities to amass resources 
grew. Yet, on the whole, rags to riches cases were few and far between. The peanut fields of 
Senegal provided an important safety valve to check high population densities and incidences of 
illegal demands by elites. But all too often young men who left the Futa found themselves in 
exploitative relationships, just with some different scenery.   
The Battlefield 
The navétanes were not the only group of migrants to depart from the Futa Jallon. From 
1897 to 1958, thousands of young men, most of slave status, joined a separate part of the French 
army comprised of soldiers from West Africa called the Tirailleurs Sénégalais. Service in the 
French army opened new avenues for social mobility. Soldiers and veterans from the Futa 
attempted to use links with French administrative structures – as well as the economic windfall 
associated with pensions payments – to improve their status or subvert elite exploitation. These 
veterans and soldiers would become an important force – although, as Gregory Mann argues, far 
from monolithic and uniformly anti-colonial76 – in Guinean parties during decolonization. They 
would also constitute a core cadre of Fulbe opposition members in exile after independence. 
Their trajectories from the dune, fulasso, and missidi of the Futa to Dakar, Paris, and beyond 
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reflected the widening horizons of Fulbe networks. Similar to the histories presented above, 
enlistment and its aftereffects also had the effect of strengthening the two poles of social 
hierarchies in the Futa, namely former slaves and ruling families, while unraveling some of the 
social and economic ties that connected former slaves and masters. 
 The history of West African soldiers serving in the French army has been closely tied to 
the practice of slavery and enslavement. Early “companies of color,” to use the language of the 
French administration, were comprised almost wholly of slaves purchased from their former 
masters and subjected to a period of indentured servitude within the army. The French army 
transitioned towards a volunteer force over the course of the second half of the nineteenth 
century, but the practice of paying the enlistment bonuses of persons of slave status to their 
former masters persisted well into the twentieth century. The system of recruitment became more 
problematic in 1912, when the French colonial administration instituted conscription. Each 
cercle had a quota of young men whom local communities were required to provide as recruits.77 
As the colonial administration in Guinea was understaffed and spread thin, the responsibility of 
pressing the requisite number into service commonly fell upon the colonial chiefs.78 
Unsurprisingly, the system rarely worked as intended, especially in the Futa Jallon. Almost 
immediately following the implementation of conscription, local administrators complained that 
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they were having problems filling their quotas.79 Insufficient numbers freely joined the army, 
and chiefs turned to choosing who would enlist in the army. Those marked for service most 
commonly were in precarious social positions: either one of their parents had died, or they were 
the son of a third or fourth wife. Most commonly, though, chiefs thrust enlistment upon persons 
of slave status.80 Therefore, although the practice of recruitment had moved away from explicit 
forms of enslavement by the 1910s, its social effects largely had not. 
Over the next decade, other administrators would put forward a variety of explanations as 
to why the Futa, the most populous region in Guinea, saw some of the lowest numbers of yearly 
recruits. Writing in 1917, the Lieutenant Governor of Guinea, Georges Poiret, expressed 
sympathy for Guinean communities, remarking that the region had been “ravaged” by war and 
the slave trade for decades, and that by the third year of the Great War, with its attendant 
demands of goods and labor by the colonial state, the colony had been tapped dry for recruits. 
“At the moment when we ask the natives to contribute, to the limit of their economic capabilities, 
to shoulder the tremendous burdens that press upon the allies,” Poiret asked, “are we going to ask 
them yet again to sacrifice to us the best of their young men?”81 Writing the next year, the 
Lieutenant Governor warned that the non-payment of allowances to soldiers’ families threatened 
to severely hamper efforts at enlistment. In response, the administration could force young men 
to join – which, despite a lack of recognition from Guinea’s top official, it did – but to do so 
would carry the taint of slavery. A better path forward, he argued, would be to convince the 
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population that serving in the army was a “collective tax,” with the hope that young men would 
willingly present themselves before their elders for service.82 Such high hopes were never 
fulfilled, especially after an outbreak of strikes and soldier revolts rolled through the colony 1918 
and 1919.83 While the language of a “blood tax” was often evoked in veterans’ claims of a 
French “debt” in the aftermath of the war,84 it had limited purchase in the Futa Jallon – and 
especially in communities of free status – when the period of enlistment arrived.  
 More fundamentally, a system of recruitment reliant upon the full participation of 
colonial chiefs was flawed by default. Chiefs relied upon the labor of the same young men who 
would conceivably serve in the army, either to fulfill other quotas for corvée labor or, due to the 
persistence “traditional” practices that supposedly had been banned, to work their fields during 
the growing season. Therefore, chiefs were reluctant to pressure communities under their control 
to provide recruits, not primarily out of care for their communities’ well being, but rather due to 
their own self interest.85 In fact, despite several warning from colonial officials, several chiefs 
were removed from their positions during and in the aftermath of the war for not meeting the 
quotas.86 Combined with the widespread practice of young men fleeing into the bush during 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
82 Poiret, LG Guinée, Rapport Politique, 1er Trimestre 1918, ANS 2G18/4. The Lieutenant 
Governor also seemed to forget (or not recognize) that under his watch the labor used to 
construct the Conakry-Niger was far from “free,” even after reforms initiated after reported 
abuses. See Babacar Fall, Le Travail Forcé en Afrique-Occidentale Française, 1900-1946 (Paris: 
Éditions Karthala, 1993), 104-125. 
  
83 Summers and Johnson, “World War I Conscription,” 30-33; Marc Michel, Les Africains et la 
Grande Guerre: l’appel à l’Afrique, 1914-1918 (Paris: Karthala, 2003), 203. 
 
84 See Mann, Native Sons, 66-78. 
 
85 Ibid. 26-27.  
 
86 See ANG 2E/27, Chefferie traditionelle dans le cercle de Dabola; and ANG 1D/132, Chefferie 
Traditionelle, Cercle de Labé, Canton de Oure-Komba, 1872-1948. 
! 140 
recruitment, the ambivalence of the chieftaincy resulted in the Futa never coming close to 
fulfilling expected rates of enrollment, and those who did enlist were from specific social groups 
present in the region, namely those of slave status.87 As such, the obligation Poiret envisioned 
was far from collective, falling instead only on those who either could not flee or whose 
conditions were so limited that risking death for potential social, economic, and political upward 
mobility later on made sense. 
 Whether or not they joined willingly, several soldiers from the Futa took advantage of 
their enlistment in the French army. Incorporation into the ranks meant that soldiers of former 
slave status had access to colonial networks that previously could be entered only through the 
mediation of a colonial chief or African functionary, both groups prone to demands for what they 
euphemistically called “gifts.” Soldiers and Veterans used these new connections to make 
claims, most commonly to gain a family member’s or their own freedom, or to attempt to join 
the ranks of the colonial chieftaincy. Although often thwarted, the very act of joining up, as well 
as the pensions they would receive after finishing their service, allowed former slaves to both 
subvert and reconfigure social hierarchies in the Futa Jallon.  
 Soldiers and veterans often used their position in order to challenge the authority of their 
supposed social betters, either within colonial or local systems.88 In a 1921 letter to his superiors, 
Sergeant Samba-Massaré of the 21st battalion of tirailleurs Sénégalais stationed in Morocco laid 
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bare the continued existence of slavery in the Futa Jallon. Claiming that four of his younger 
brothers were being held in a state of captivity in Sauoroya village in the Cercle of Timbo by two 
men named Yanéko Diali Boubou and Diara Boubou, Samba-Massaré requested that officials in 
Guinea investigate and report back on the boys’ condition. When questioned by the Minister of 
Colonies and the AOF Governor General, local administrators in Timbo put forward an 
alternative story, saying that the four “brothers,” whose supposed relation to the Sergeant was 
called into question, had been “enticed” by “their uncle” to travel to Sierra Leone, but did not 
want to leave Guinea. Furthermore, the Lieutenant Governor of Guinea remarked, “it seems 
impossible” that anyone could be held against their will in the Timbo region, as local “natives” 
knew well the various trails that allowed one to escape to Sierra Leone or elsewhere during tax 
or recruitment time. In any manner, local officials claimed, the village of Sauoroya did not 
exist.89 The Guinean administration was dedicated to eliminating any official trace of 
enslavement in their colony, whether or not the practice itself continued. This effort often led to 
the stonewalling of colonial subjects who now had access to higher ups in Gorée and Paris. Yet, 
that the Sergeant’s request ran up to the Minister of Colonies, back down to the Commandant of 
Timbo through the AOF and Conakry administration, and then back up to the Minister, shows 
that the colonial administration heard and pursued the complaints of soldiers from Guinea.  
 Other soldiers chose to air their grievances more openly. In a report warning about 
French overdependence on colonial chiefs due to understaffing, which would supposedly bring 
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about imminent demise of the mission civilisatrice, one administrator in Guinea remarked that 
the veterans who returned home in the wake of the First World War were exerting greater 
influence on local populations, to the detriment of both administrators and chiefs.90 Writing nine 
years later, another local official warned that there was a growing conflict between veterans and 
chiefs in the Futa Jallon. The former, “released from the mental bonds of servitude,” were 
rejecting demands for “traditional gifts” from the chiefs.91 A more innovative administration 
might have used veterans to check chiefly power. For a colonial apparatus concerned first and 
foremost with stability and authority, however, veterans represented a threat to the colonial 
project as a whole. As such, they had to be quieted and brought under control. 
One soldier, Sergeant Seydou Camara of Kénéné in the Ditinn region of the Futa, pushed 
back against his local chiefly family’s attempt to thwart the marriages the soldier had negotiated 
thanks to his salary and pension. His “former master” had brought Camara from the neighboring 
colony of Soudan to the Ditinn subdivision in the Futa during the soldier’s childhood. After his 
master’s death, Camara joined the army and, he claimed, married one woman and was promised 
another, both of whom were of slave status. The local village chief disputed the proposed 
marriage, saying that the latter fiancée was only 7 at the time of her supposed engagement to 
Camara and, furthermore, that the soldier had never paid the customary dowry of “two cows, 
three horses, and a sum of 200 francs.” The young girl had been living in the concession of the 
village chief, Alfa Bakar, for three years, and Camara had no claim to her, which the girl’s 
parents supposedly confirmed. The latter also established that they were “entirely free to take 
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back their child if they desired to do so,” thereby “eliminating” any suspicions of forced 
servitude. To add insult to injury, Alfa Bakar’s son, Alfa Amadou, had supposedly been courting 
Camara’s first (and according to the local official, only) wife, Sira Hadi, by giving her a pair of 
sandals and some cloth as gifts. The conflict was resolved by the rejection of the soldier’s claims 
to the second wife and by telling the chief’s son to stay away from the soldier’s first wife.92 As 
before, French administrators often protected local chiefs, yet complaints about the latter group’s 
misconduct only reinforced the common perception that the Fulbe ruling class was by nature 
exploitative.  
 Other soldiers sought to carve out their own space within the colonial chieftaincy, either 
through official connections or newfound wealth. For a period after the First World War, 
veterans without “traditional” claims petitioned local colonial administrators in the Futa Jallon 
and elsewhere in the AOF to become chiefs. In some cases, they were successful.93 Conversant 
in French and visible examples of the “liberation” of former slaves, these soldier-chiefs 
represented the supposed “modernization” of the institution, a transformation that many colonial 
administrators advocated. However, these chiefs often encountered vehement opposition from 
village and canton notables, free Fulbe who resented former maccube for taking what was at the 
time a rather influential and potentially lucrative position within the colonial administration. As 
such, French commandants often noted that veterans of former slave status serving as chiefs 
were almost uniformly ineffective, unable to accomplish the basic functions of ensuring order 
and collecting taxes. The era of naming veterans as chiefs proved to be brief, lasting about 3 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
92 L’Administrateur adjoint des colonies, Chef de la Subdivision de Ditinn to Monsieur 
l’Administrateur Commandant le Cercle de Mamou, “A/S. Réclamation sergent de Tirailleurs 
Sénégalais Seydou Camara,” 20 November 1927, ANS 2G20/8 
 
93 Mann, Native Sons, 41-48, 89-91. 
 
! 144 
years after the end of the war. In subsequent debates over nominations, colonial administrators 
often justified their rejection of numerous requests to join the chieftaincy by qualified veterans 
by using the refrain that a potential chief of former slave status could never rule without 
“traditional authority.”94 
 One veteran of former slave status from the Ore Djima canton north of Labé sought to 
circumvent many of the barriers to non-elites being named as chiefs by attempting to convert 
newfound economic power into higher social status. Preferring to hold wealth in the form of 
cattle and resistant to engaging in trade during the first decades of French rule, Fulbe elites often 
did not have ready access to currency. Only those with connections to navétanes or trade held 
francs, and even then most families chose to deal with currency in amounts that only covered 
yearly taxes. Thus, with their pensions paid in francs by the French state, veterans were in a 
unique position to acquire both goods and influence. After a failed 1936 nomination, when the 
local commandant chose a former interpreter with only tangential claims to the Ore Djima canton 
chieftaincy and then shortly thereafter removed him due to local resistance, the administration in 
Conakry decided to go against the wishes of the local commandant and undertake another 
consultation of the area’s notables through a non-binding vote. Of the seven candidates “worth 
consideration,” according to a local administrator, most were either former chiefs or the sons of 
former chiefs. Some had experience working within the colonial system either as teachers or 
soldiers, while others had served as Arabic language clerks of former chiefs.  
One name stood out amongst the others, however. Aldiouma Diallo boasted a 
distinguished career as a soldier, rising to the rank of Adjutant-chef (or Chief Warrant Officer, a 
senior non-commissioned officer) and having been decorated with several medals, including the 
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Criox de Guerre. Diallo claimed that he was a free Fulbe of the Lalyabé lenyol, a lineage with 
claims to the chieftaincy of Pellal and Bondéya missidi in the Mali region.95 The administrator 
tasked with sorting out the messy succession, though, remarked that Diallo only “called himself 
Fulbe,” but was in fact a Jallonke and of slave status. Hoping to establish himself as one of the 
region’s elites, the veteran had paid the former chief 300 francs in order to take the title of Alfa, 
which denoted both elite lineage and Islamic learning. Diallo’s gambit, though, had failed; the 
inspector remarked the upstart had little chance of being elected, let along being respected by 
local notables. Although in demeanor and ability Diallo was thought to be an ideal chief, his 
candidacy was dismissed out of hand.96  
Similar to thousands of his fellow brothers in arms, service in the French army had 
provided Diallo an opportunity through a corrupt chief to use economic power for prospective 
social gain. Joining the Futa’s elite, however, proved to be more difficult than anticipated. The 
social memory of slavery was nearly impossible to erase.97 Furthermore, the window of 
opportunity for soldiers’ and veterans’ social mobility would closed rapidly, as the sons of 
established chiefs soon realized that their chances of being chosen as successors above their 
brothers were greatly enhanced by service in the French army.98 Still, the space opened up by the 
tirailleurs Sénégalais allowed soldiers to envision a future in which social hierarchies were 
either transformed, or one in which they were amongst its top echelons. During the interwar 
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period, their dreams were nearly always deferred. But the opening of African party politics 
following the Second World War offered them the opportunity to maneuver once again, this time 
as a politically active force. 
The Market 
During the decades following the Futa Jallon’s incorporation into the French empire, 
colonial administrators on the plateau and officials in Conakry sought to integrate the region into 
a specifically colonial economy. The establishment of marketplaces, networks of roads and 
railroads, and a mode of exchange based on currency – all previously absent in the Futa – 
became the means through which the colonial administration sought to bend trade towards its 
capital on the coast, Conakry. These initiatives also opened spaces for non-elite Fulbe to 
participate in and sometimes profit from an economic sector that chiefs and “proper” Fulbe 
shunned.  
Many regions in Guinea had several markets established well before the formal 
imposition of colonial rule, the most notable being a series of entrepôts along the coast, and 
Kankan in the savannah northeast. However, the Futa Jallon did not have a history of markets or 
trading conducted by ethnic Fulbe (see Introduction). The high plateau was enmeshed within 
networks of trade and Islamic learning, and was therefore not isolated. Economic activity tied to 
exchange, however, was cordoned off to specific portions of Futa Jallon society, which were 
often closed to Fulbe, either of free or slave status.  
 French control over the Futa Jallon brought about significant changes to the region’s 
economy. As one of the main justifications for colonization was the opening up of the region to 
French commercial interests, the colonial administration in Conakry sought immediately to 
circumvent the series of intermediary markets and merchants who had before moved goods from 
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the Futa Jallon to the coast. Their strategy of channeling trade from the Futa towards Conakry 
without mediation was comprised of two initiatives. The first was the establishment of transport 
routes into the interior, the most ambitious of which was the construction of the Conakry-Niger 
railroad. Designed to circumvent established populations centers in order to avoid negotiating 
with local authorities, the railroad, when combined with an expanding road network, served to 
funnel exports – most importantly rubber harvested on the plateau – to the growing port of 
Conakry.99 Tracks reached Kindia in 1904 and the Futa Jallon by 1908, where the French 
established the new, planned town of Mamou along the line to serve as a center of trade and 
administration. Only 50 km from Timbo, the capital of the pre-colonial Futa Jallon state and seat 
of the paramount Almamy, Mamou was meant as an alternative pole of power for the new 
colonial state, and shortly after its establishment administrative capital of the cercle was 
transferred from Timbo to the new colonial town. As trade goods flowed on the railroad through 
the new center, Mamou’s population grew from 1500 in 1909 to 2000 in 1912.100 Located at the 
crossroads of both transportation routes and administrative structures, Mamou came to represent 
for French administrators the potential for transformation within the Futa, a “modern” city for a 
civilizing mission. 
 Although hailed as the means through which “economic liberty” would be introduced to 
the interior, new transport routes in fact perpetuated many of the exploitative practices that the 
more idealistic administrators supposedly sought to eradicate. The construction of the railroad 
and roads required labor. Writing to Dakar in 1904, the Lieutenant Governor of Guinea argued 
that this new type of wage labor to build infrastructure could be a tool for emancipation, giving 
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newly liberated slaves an occupation and breaking bonds with their former masters.101 In reality, 
the wages offered for labor were too low to attract sufficient numbers of working-age men. 
French administrators responded by turning to chiefs along the major transportation routes to 
provide labor, either willingly or not, from their villages.102 Chiefly demands predictably fell 
upon persons of slave status, and just as they had reacted to similar requisitions from the colonial 
chiefs, former slaves subject to corvée labor fled. By 1909, administrators in the newly 
established cercle of Mamou reported that the area around the railroad was nearly deserted.103 
Furthermore, far from displacing ”that last vestige of servitude” constituted by the network of 
porters who had previously carried export goods like rubber to the coast, halting delays in 
construction due to the lack of labor did little to put an end to the exploitative practice.104 
Colonial administrators would continue to promise well into the 1930s that new reforms or the 
construction of yet more roads would once and for all eliminate demands for porters and forced 
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labor.105 Their echoed guarantees reflected the same reality that gave rise to multiple 
“eradications” of slavery in the AOF up to independence. Repeated forecasts of future change, 
after all, often meant that there had to the present been little at all.  
 The second initiative focused on establishing markets in all of the Futa Jallon’s major 
towns, which was meant to stimulate economic exchange and facilitate the installation of 
European commercial firms in the region. The construction of markets took on the language of 
development through private commerce rather than state investment, as supposedly financially 
self-sufficient colonies had few funds to allocate for ambitious projects. Shortly after arriving in 
Labé in May 1902, Pierre Francon, the chief administrator in the cercle, set about making the 
regional capital into a sanitary and modern city. Part of his plan of development included 
cleaning up the stream in between the center of the city and the new administrative post in order 
to supply cleaner water for the growing city. He also ordered the re-roofing of both his residence 
and the local administrative center, giving the buildings, “when the sun shines, the appearance of 
stylish and cheerful cleanliness.” Finally, Francon went about “completely rebuilding” the 
“badly dilapidated” local market, “where some shacks were nothing but ruins.” Ordering the 
construction of twenty new huts “entirely closed and covered with care,” complete with a new 
road running on the market’s perimeter allowing one to “see all the beautiful cows and 
merchandise” for sale, the new administrator had, he hoped, breathed life into local commerce.106 
 Similar market projects unfolded in other administrative centers in the Futa. By 1907, 
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most large towns on the plateau had established markets and were waiting for the arrival of the 
railroad and roads to be fully integrated into the colony’s economy, or so French administrators 
speculated.107 For the most part, however, markets’ power of transformation was limited. Fulbe 
continued to shun participation in commerce, with an influx of Susu traders from the coast 
joining the established “Fulbe-ized” dioulas in the new markets.108 Furthermore, markets in rural 
portions of the Futa were much slower to develop. According to Derman, weekly market days 
were not a common practice until the 1930s, and even then only adopted by local Fulbe 
communities with colonial pressure. He recounts one story of a canton chief in Popodara, where 
the first rural market was established in 1937, sending out armed men to force inhabitants to 
bring goods to sell at the behest of the local French administrator.109 Once markets were 
established, though, they grew steadily and offered some opportunities to previously 
marginalized social groups. Women in particular benefited; the gardens they traditionally tended 
were an important nutritional source on the soil-poor plateau, and any surplus they grew could be 
sold at market for their own benefit.110 Although profit margins were commonly very small, as 
economic crisis gripped the Futa during the 1930s and later during the 1960s, women’s income 
from market sales became an important part of a typical Fulbe family’s livelihood. 
 Fulbe participation in large-scale commerce was also slow to develop. Increased 
integration of the Futa into colonial and international trade networks during the 1910s was 
accompanied by the appearance of European and Lebanese firms on the high plateau. The 
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former, enticed by the booming rubber trade that peaked in the early 1910s, established outposts 
in the major cities of the Futa Jallon, at the time one of the largest producers of the raw product 
in the colony.111 The latter, content to engage in an economic activity with a smaller profit 
margin, brought commercial products and staple foods and resold the goods on the plateau.112 
Charged with transporting and selling these goods in rural locales, local Fulbe representatives of 
Lebanese merchants gradually became involved in trading.113 Yet their ability to engage in large-
scale trading and commerce was constrained by European and Lebanese dominance of the 
wholesale market. Combined with the social stigma attached to merchants in Fulbe culture, there 
were several hurdles to Fulbe participation in trade in the Futa.  
 Outside of the Futa Jallon, however, Fulbe of both free and former slave status were able 
to find more opportunities to enter into commerce. Migration of Fulbe towards the coast had 
steadily increased during the last decades of the nineteenth century, and several Fulbe 
communities were already established in the Basse Côte region by the interwar period. Searching 
for new ways to make a living, many of these Fulbe migrants gravitated towards the new 
markets. The recent arrival of Fulbe merchants into regional networks of trade relative to their 
Maninka and Susu counterparts also made the former better suited for a rapidly changing 
colonial economy. Without established practices trading certain goods along established routes, 
Fulbe merchants instead sought out any commerce that would produce a profit. As such, they 
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gradually came to dominate the local sale of goods imported from European sources. One study 
noted that by 1962, Fulbe merchants made up some 90% of small shop owners and 85% of cloth 
sellers in Basse Côte markets. Susu merchants may have dominated the sale of “traditional” 
goods like salt, kola, smoked fish, and onions, but Fulbe traders relied upon familial relations 
stretching from Conakry to the Futa Jallon in order to build profitable economic networks.114 
Other Fulbe struck out to Haute Guinée, Sierra Leone, and Côte d’Ivoire in the east and south in 
order to capture the kola nut trade to the Futa Jallon. Having slowly acquired both capital as well 
as trust with outside sellers, Fulbe kola traders found both demand and profit margins high.115 
Once word of the lucrative trade practices spread, other Fulbe were quick to form their own 
enterprises, giving rise to expanded Fulbe networks that eventually spanned from Dakar in the 
north to Abidjan in the south. 
 The introduction of a cash economy in the Futa Jallon and the expansion of Fulbe 
communities into neighboring areas in the wake of colonial rule had several important social 
ramifications. When combined with the slow disintegration of subsistence agriculture based upon 
unraveling slave/master relations, the rise of wage labor and commerce offered opportunities for 
previously marginalized groups to accumulate economic power. These new activities were 
partially removed from the system of social hierarchies that dominated the region. New 
occupations arose, ones that were not explicitly tied to a certain social class like they had in the 
pre-colonial Futa or, in some cases, were openly shunned by elite Fulbe. For example, Derman 
describes how the most prosperous butcher in Popodara was of former slave status. The 
occupation had no predecessor before the emergence of cattle selling after the imposition of 
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colonial taxes, and no elite Fulbe would have even considered such a profession. Therefore, a 
former slave filled the demand and in the process became rich. Furthermore, accumulation of 
capital sometimes became a means for social mobility. Based upon a pre-colonial ceremony 
called rimdingol (translated literally as “making [a person] free”), it was possible for slaves to 
purchase their own freedom from their masters. While the colonial experiment of “certificates of 
liberty” proved short-lived, persons of slave status who found profitable niches within the 
colonial economy could conceivably join the ranks of the Free Fulbe.116 Like the story of the 
soldier who bought himself a title, though, the social stigma of slave status often lingered. 
 It is important to note, however, that few former slaves became rich under colonial rule, 
and even fewer decided to transfer their newly acquired capital to their former masters by 
purchasing their freedom. Furthermore, the market did not have the magically liberating effect 
that the more idealistic French administrators predicted. The infrastructure required to integrate 
Futa Jallon into the colonial economy necessitated the mass exploitation of African labor. As it 
had before, the burden of providing that labor fell disproportionately upon former slaves. The 
arrival of the market – as both a place of commerce and an international economic system – did, 
however, allow for more space for maneuver. Thus, as with the colonial spaces discussed above, 
colonial rule was paradoxical, both opening new avenues and introducing new forms of 
oppression, and rarely in the ways intended either by French administrators or the Fulbe elite. 
The City 
One space opened by colonial rule tied together many of the trajectories discussed above: 
the city. While population densities in the Futa Jallon were high compared to other regions, most 
Fulbe lived in smaller settlements spread evenly throughout the countryside. When concentrated 
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population centers did emerge, they functioned more as large conglomerations of separate 
villages than unique urban settings. Integration into the colonial administration and economy 
gave rise to new, rapidly growing towns and eventually cities. In turn, migrants from the 
countryside flocked to colonial cities such as Mamou, and from the plateau down to the new 
capital, Conakry. In these towns and cities, migrants from the Futa made and remade versions of 
Fulbe society, negotiating the meaning of social hierarchies within their communities while at 
the same time contesting political control with local “autochthones.”  
 Along what would become the colony of Guinea’s coast, a series of entrepôts had 
developed by the latter half of the nineteenth century. Small towns like Rio Pongo emerged as 
the Upper Guinea coast was integrated into the Atlantic trade system, and were intended both as 
areas of exchange between European merchants and African traders with connections in the 
interior and as defensive positions controlling strategic waterways, which constituted the main 
means of transportation past the coast.117 Before 1897, some traders with roots in the Futa Jallon 
made their way to these coastal towns with caravans of export goods and slaves. As most Fulbe 
shunned active participation in trade, however, these early merchants tended to be Mande 
speakers.118 
Starting in the 1880s, the French state dedicated itself to consolidating control over what 
the early colonial administrative unit called the Rivières du Sud, or the coastal area that today 
corresponds with the borders of Guinea. In order to serve as both the administrative and 
economic center of the expanding colony, in 1885 the French colonial administration established 
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a new city named Conakry on Tumbo Island, which was separated at the time by a narrow, 
shallow strait from the tip of the five-kilometer long Kaloum peninsula. Although several local 
communities occupied the island, French officials approached the space as a tabula rasa on 
which they initiated an ambitious plan for a “model city” constituted of plots outlined by 
perpendicular roads.119 A group of settlement laws were enacted from 1901-1905 to control 
development. While these restrictions were supposedly based upon cultural characteristics and 
levels of cost of living rather than race, in practice they divided the city into European, African, 
and intermediary zones of habitation.120  
 During these first decades, the first migrants to the African zones of Tumbo were 
primarily from Senegal or Sierra Leone, or if from Guinea were ethnic Susu. The rapidly 
growing city did attract migrants from the Futa Jallon, who decided to settle farther inland along 
the peninsula in a neighborhood that would come to be called Dixinn-Foulah (Foulah being a 
synonym for the Fulbe). French administrators took a hands-off approach to regulating villages 
outside of Tumbo. Over the course of the first decade of the 20th century, administrators began to 
officially recognize village chiefs who acted as intermediaries. By 1908, Mamadou Thiam, who 
had previously served as an interpreter in the colonial civil service, had been named the Chief of 
Dixinn-Foulah, due in large part to his good relations with local Baga villages. Thiam also hailed 
from a torodo family of religious leaders who had been allied with the pre-colonial Futa Jallon 
Almamys. Following the 1897 defeat of the Almamy Bokar Biro, Thiam’s father, Mamadou 
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Seydou Sy, had been forced to move to Conakry along with 50 family members and around 100 
slaves. The village that they established eventually developed in the Dixinn-Foulah 
neighborhood, an island of Fulbe settlement in the surrounding sea of Susu and Baga 
communities.121 In an effort to subvert the local ethnic Susu Soumah family, who made claims to 
authority connected to their leadership of the pre-colonial Dubreka kingdom that controlled the 
peninsula, Mamadou Thiam was named the “canton chief of Conakry” in 1914 and placed over 
the control of all suburban neighborhoods, included areas that were not populated primarily by 
Fulbe.122 Thiam’s elevation to paramount chief of the suburbs, in direct opposition to more 
legitimate claims of autochthony by rival groups, depended heavily upon colonial arguments that 
the Fulbe were “more civilized” than their Susu and Baga counterparts, who were in contrast 
“drunkards” and not suited to ruling.123 
 Thiam would continue to serve as canton chief until his death in 1926. Based in part on 
AOF General Governor William Ponty’s 1908 articulation of a “politique des races” – or the 
idea that ethnic groups should be ruled by one of their own – a member of the Soumah family 
that had been displaced by Thiam was named the canton chief of Conakry in 1927. Furthermore, 
the colonial administration reasoned, Thiam’s long reign had undermined any autonomous claim 
by the Susu family to authority. Thus, Kerfalla Soumah, apparently neither qualified nor well 
suited to administration, was named canton chief without major objections from local Baga and 
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Fulbe communities.124  
 Soumah served as the canton chief of Conakry until the institution’s abolition in 1957 by 
the Sékou Touré-led territorial government. His reign, though, would not go without challenge 
from the Fulbe communities under his control. Due in part to the global depression and the 
inability of many Futa Jallon inhabitants to gather enough capital to pay taxes, Fulbe migration 
to Conakry had increased steadily during the 1930s.125 The colonial administration had attempted 
to stem the tide of mostly poor and rural migrants from the interior to the city by enacting 
policies that banned urban inhabitants who had not by one year after their arrival established 
recognized residency and employment in the city. While the regulation had temporarily shifted 
the flow of migrants to neighboring Portuguese and British colonies, it had not significantly 
changed the economic calculus that drew migrants from the densely populated Futa Jallon to the 
coast and eventually Conakry.126  
 By the 1940s, the growing community of Fulbe living in the Conakry’s suburbs had 
begun to chafe under the rule of Soumah. In an apparent attempt to re-organize the Dixinn 
neighborhood, the chief administrator of Conakry ordered the resettlement of a group of local 
families to the Cameroun neighborhood farther up the peninsula. Tasked with executing the 
order, canton Chief Soumah supposedly chose only Fulbe landowners to be evicted in an 
apparent attempt to undermine what he considered to be a rebellious community and, some 
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argued, as a naked grab for Fulbe land. After Abdoulaye Diallo, the president of a Fulbe cultural 
and political organization called the Amicale Gilbert Vieillard, intervened on the behalf of the 
dispossessed Fulbe, rifts both within the colonial administration and between Susu, Baga, and 
Fulbe notables in Conakry’s suburbs were thrust to the surface. In a particularly testy exchange, 
the Governor of Guinea, taking the side of the Fulbe, and the newly installed civil servant Mayor 
of Conakry, supporting the claims of Soumah and the Susu notables, disagreed over both the 
execution of “native” authority and the degree to which the incident reflected deeper tensions 
between the “recent” Fulbe migrants and the autochthonous Susu and Baga communities. The 
former worried that tensions could develop into a larger Fulbe rebellion in Conakry, while the 
latter chalked the uproar up to petty elite politics.127 The stakes of the disagreement were 
important. To recognize that the Fulbe constituted a unique – and uniquely dispossessed – 
population would require the colonial administration to wade into the messy politics of 
overlapping and contradictory ideas of custom and culture in the growing city. While the 
governor sought to minimize conflict, the Mayor of Conakry, who was, after all, most directly 
responsible for the day to day running of the city, advocated for continuing to conceive of the 
identification of authority and the application of custom as a primarily political tool, thereby 
circumventing more complex issues to customary rights. 
 This administrative skirting of questions about custom and authority, though, would not 
last long. Open conflict between Fulbe and Susu notables did not erupt until a disagreement 
emerged over a widow’s right to her departed husband’s estate. Tierno Siré Diallo, a longtime 
Fulbe resident of the Conakry suburbs, died sometime in early 1946, leaving behind a small herd 
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of livestock, a house in Dixinn-Foulah, and, most importantly, no will. Having no children of his 
own, the responsibility of executing Siré Diallo’s estate fell to the departed’s nephew from Labé, 
Mamadou Saliou Diallo. Arguing that Siré Diallo was Fulbe and therefore that his property 
should be divided based upon Fulbe “custom,” Saliou Diallo stipulated that Siré Diallo’s widow, 
Koumba Diallo, was owed only 1/8th of the estate, which translated into five cows and five goats 
and, notably, did not include the house in which Koumba and Tierno had lived for the past three 
decades.  
Understandably dissatisfied with the arrangement, Koumba Diallo appealed to the 
suburban Conakry Customary Court, which was charged with settling civil disputes based upon a 
nebulous and contested conception of “tradition” and was headed by the canton chief Kerfalla 
Soumah. Deciding that Siré Diallo’s estate was in fact subject to Susu and Baga custom, as the 
two ethnic communities were “native” to the area and therefore had stronger claims to authority, 
Soumah stipulated that the widow would retain temporary rights to the house and property until 
her death, at which time ownership would transfer to the nephew. As an added display of Baga 
and Susu authority, or so local Fulbe notables argued, Soumah had drums played throughout the 
day following the decision in order to “correct the Fulbe” for their impunity. The playing of 
drums was considered by the conservative Muslim Fulbe as an affront to Islam.128 Therefore, 
Soumah’s choice to display his authority through drums – although he claimed he was simply 
calling a community meeting – was interpreted by the Fulbe as a provocation. In fact, a meeting 
was held, or at least scheduled. Once Kerfalla Soumah began to address the local crowd, an 
incensed Mamadou Saliou Diallo arrived to confront the canton chief. A scuffle ensued, with 
Soumah violently grabbing Diallo by his boubou and Diallo responding by taking a swing at the 
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chief. Both Fulbe notables and the chief’s guard joined the fracas, leading to a community brawl 
that was eventually broken up by the police.129 
As the local mayor had argued, the incident between the canton chief and the departed’s 
nephew did not portend larger scale ethnic violence between the Fulbe, Baga, and Susu 
communities in Conakry’s suburbs. However, the entanglement of disputes over both property 
rights and the jurisdiction of custom did reflect an unsettled political and social terrain, one 
where the hierarchical relations of first comers and latecomers were hotly contested.130 The 
emergence of fault lines based upon nascent African political parties was also implicit in many 
of the communications between colonial administrators. Abdoulaye Diallo, the president of the 
AGV, had intervened in part as a show for support for other Fulbe and as a means to build a 
constituency in the capital. Abdoulaye Diallo was also at the time linked to one of Guinea’s 
leading politicians, a Fulbe named Yacine Diallo, who in turn was allied with the French 
Socialist Party (SFIO) and several prominent chiefs in the Futa Jallon. Kerfalla Soumah, on the 
other hand, had recently been named as a “counselor” on the board of a newly created union for 
African postal workers. The organization’s secretary general was a prominent union leader and 
rising politician named Sékou Touré.131 Thus, even before political organizations with explicit 
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ideologies and strategies emerged, Guinean politicians were beginning the important work of 
building coalitions, often along the lines of ethnic community. These early divides in Conakry’s 
suburbs would continue. As the close of Second World War was followed by an opening of 
African politics in Guinea, the 1950s would see a series of conflicts between political parties 
turned into ethnic riots, as well as continued disputes over “custom” as the colonial 
administration sought to apply private property rights to the Conakry suburbs.132 
Furthermore, the emphasis on the Fulbe/Susu/Baga divides within Conakry demonstrated 
the changing important of ethnic identification in relation to social hierarchies. In contrast to 
colonial administrators who feared that African migration to cities would dissolve their 
“traditional” ethnic bonds, the presence of Fulbe in Conakry made imminently visible perceived 
differences between “native” and “settler” communities in the capital.133 Inter-ethnic conflict, in 
turn, gave rise to coalitions between social groups within ethnic communities, leading to a 
situation where, for instance, the elite Abdoulaye Diallo came to the support of dispossessed 
Fulbe of a variety of social classes. As such, ambiguity over who had claims to political authority 
in a new urban space, as well as conflict over opposing views of cultural tradition, played an 
important role in welding ethnic identification to political community. Put simply, for those 
living in Dixinn-Foulah, being Fulbe was just as if not more important than being of slave or free 
status. This is not to say that the social hierarchies disappeared; rather, they became one of a 
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series of organizing structures in the rapidly changing capital.134  
Finally, the rapidly changing urban space represented by Conakry’s suburbs could have 
allowed for reconfigurations between Fulbe social groups. There is no indication in the archives 
of whether or not the evicted Fulbe property owners, or for that matter Siré Diallo, his wife, and 
his nephew were former slaves or not. It is not inconceivable, however, that the landowners 
could have risen from a state of servitude to own significant resources in the growing capital. 
The original Fulbe inhabitants of Dixinn-Foulah were socially heterogeneous, comprised of both 
elites and former slaves. New professions in the capital, whether inside the market or not, 
afforded former slaves the opportunity to improve their economic (if not always their social) 
position. Lastly, the opening of African politics in Guinea and elsewhere in the AOF following 
the Second World War gave economically powerful but socially marginalized former slaves 
influence within emerging urban politics. The African Franchise was still tightly restricted 
during the late 1940s, but urban denizens were more likely to have their names listed on voter 
rolls. With a limited number of voters – only 9420 in a 1946 election for Guinea’s representative 
to the French National Assembly – any person eligible to vote, whether elite or not, was a 
valuable asset for an aspiring politician.135 Former slaves living in Conakry’s suburbs, therefore, 
might have been able to assert their identity as constituents and demand attention from their 
prospective representatives. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
134 Carola Lentz describes a similar connection between migration and the construction of ethnic 
identifications, although she emphasizes the benefits ethnicity offered to migrants with rural 
roots living in the city rather than competition between different ethnic communities. In the case 
of the Fulbe in Guinea, it would seem as though conflict became a way to reinforce ethnic 
solidarity, which in turn offered those in specific communities both protection – from conflict of 
both the violent and customary sort – and forms of mutual aid. See Carola Lentz, Ethnicity and 
the Making of History in Northern Ghana (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006).   
 
135 Cercle de Conakry, Revue Trimestrielle, Quatrième Trimestre 1946, ANG 2D321. 
! 163 
It is important not to overstate the transformative powers of the city, or the colonial 
administration’s will in creating any space for maneuver for Fulbe former slaves. French 
officials’ support for the incompetent and seemingly violent canton chief Kerfalla Soumah 
proved that most French mayors of Conakry were more interested in the stability offered by 
claims of autochthony than effective administration. Colonial urban spaces like the peninsula, 
however, were new social, economic, and political terrains for Fulbe inhabitants. This novelty, in 
turn, afforded former slaves the room to assert new claims, gain economic power, and ultimately 
reconfigure social hierarchies that had been only imperfectly imported from the high plateau. 
“The man will order outside, but will obey inside the house”: Reconfiguring Gender 
Relations in the Futa Jallon 
Along with persons of slave status, women were perhaps the most significant group in the 
Futa Jallon to use the social, political, and economic changes under colonial rule to reconfigure 
asymmetrical relationships. As with the other groups and places examined above, however, 
colonial rule was not simply tied with liberation, but rather the opening of new opportunities for 
specific groups as well as the calcification of other exploitative practices. Women pushed back 
against both French and Fulbe male ideas of “proper” gender roles, using education, connections 
to colonial networks, and economic opportunities to inhabit public spaces and to push back 
against the wills of their fathers and husbands – or, indeed, to choose not to have husbands at all. 
Opportunities for maneuver, however, were still closely tied to social status. 
Perspectives of Fulbe women during the colonial period are hard to come by. Almost all 
portrayals of Fulbe women during colonial rule come from male French administrators. Even 
then, women appear only briefly and in little detail in colonial documents, at most figuring as 
one or two sentences in much longer reports on administrative and economic affairs focused 
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primarily on abstract social groups such as former slaves or elites. When Fulbe women were 
mentioned in official reports, administrators almost uniformly emphasized their cloistered lives 
in the Futa Jallon. Writing in 1902, Ernest Noirot, then Guinea’s head of Native Affairs, 
remarked that he rarely saw women when passing through villages during periodic tours of the 
countryside.136 A 1909 report from the Lieutenant Governor of Guinea filed after a tour in Pita 
commented that for the first time the head administrator saw women and children coming out to 
greet him.137 One year later, the French commandant of the cercle of Mamou reported that 
women walked through the new railroad town’s streets, but that they covered their hair, were 
silent, and averted their eyes when passing a man.138 These types of reports tended to reinforce 
French perceptions of Fulbe culture as strictly separated by gender and dominated by a 
conservative version of Islam. In the opinions of French administrators, women’s confinement to 
private spaces as well as their reserved nature in public were symptoms of a larger trend of Fulbe 
resistance to the “civilizing” aspects of French rule. 
One exception to the near invisibility of women in colonial documents was a 1916 report 
on “politeness amongst the Fulbe” written by a French administrator posted to the Futa Jallon 
named Dupuch. In theory, the document was meant as a tutorial on how to navigate Fulbe culture 
for colonial administrators. In practice, the administrator’s report reflected a superficial 
understanding of gender in the Futa Jallon and relied only upon male informants. The document 
does, though, contain some useful information on the significant demands on Fulbe women’s 
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labor. After spending several pages on Fulbe women’s propensity to show their limbs, and the 
administrator open titillation from seeing exposed skin, Dupuch turns to one male informant to 
describe the work most women were required to complete each day. Young girls were often 
tasked with the most demanding household chores, including cleaning, cooking, and drawing 
water from the well. Once in adolescence, they were married young and without any consultation 
as to the choice of their partner. While married, their primary task was to serve their husbandly 
“master,” were barred from eating with him, and were subject to domestic abuse.139 As with 
previous reports, Dupuch’s treatise on Fulbe culture reflected French colonial stereotypes, which 
viewed Fulbe culture in the Futa Jallon as both prone to intemperate passion and at the same time 
violent repression. Dupuch also had an incentive to emphasize the more “backward” elements of 
Fulbe society, as the “liberation” of groups perceived to be exploited was an important 
legitimizing claim of French rule in West Africa. Yet, even when read through the lens colonial 
ideology and rhetoric, one sees a picture of Fulbe society in which relations between men and 
women were largely asymmetrical. Fulbe women often found room for maneuver and ways to 
assert power within certain circumstances, but even after the post-independence First Republic 
social reforms in the Futa (see chapter 4), Fulbe women still derived their status either through 
their husbands or male children.140 
 By the 1930s, however, many of the same transformation precipitated by colonial rule 
described above had reconfigured some gender relations on the high plateau. These indications 
of change were contained in a groundbreaking colonial report. Researched and written by Denise 
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Moran Savineau, the wife of a colonial administrator, a social reformer, and early critic of 
French rule in Africa, what came to be known as the “Savineau Report” was the result of the 
French Popular Front’s concern with the practice of colonialism and its effects on women 
subjects in the AOF.141 In interviews with both high and low status Fulbe women and men, 
Savineau shed light on Fulbe perceptions of pre-colonial “traditions” and their transformation or 
unraveling under colonial rule. One male Fulbe teacher in Dalaba reported that according to 
“former custom,” meaning before the arrival of the French, all women in the Futa Jallon were 
kept form public before marriage, closely watched by their mothers, and “held captive by fear“ 
by their fathers. Once married, women exercised some authority in the family, managing the 
running of the household and “jealously spying on [their] husband[s].” Even after divorce from 
or death of a spouse, though, women were required to maintain status through men, and after a 
short period of time were pushed to remarry. If they did not, “paradise would, for them, remain 
closed.”142 
 Colonial rule had, according to the teacher, destabilized previous practices: “The whites 
came and, soon enough, erased slavery,” impoverishing former masters and allowing women to 
“depart from their idleness.” Women’s tastes in expensive French-imported commercial goods 
such as cloth outpaced the financial means of their husbands. The economic crisis of the 1930s 
lowered the status of men even further: “while men who grew for export were ruined, the 
women, who worked for local sale, lost almost nothing.” Newfound economic resources shifted 
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the balance of power within families, with women “feeding their humiliated men” and spending 
their currency on goods for themselves. Taking advantage of opportunities in newly opened 
markets, women “adopted the verbal exuberance and libertine/casual nature of the Susu, and the 
spirit of commerce and liberty of the Malinké [Maninka].” Women began to move to colonial 
centers – Mamou, then Kindia, Conakry, and Dakar – and to settle near camps of tirailleurs, 
eventually abandoning their Fulbe husbands who stayed behind in the Futa. These women would 
return, “covered in jewels,” enticing even more women to seek fortune outside of the Futa. As a 
last effort to save marriage on the high plateau, the teacher proposed a division of marital 
responsibilities: “The man will order outside, but will obey inside the house.”143 His concerns 
might have been hyperbolic. Yet it is clear that he and other men in his position were wary, to 
say the least, of the opportunities opened to women by colonial rule. 
 Other interviews conducted by Savineau reflect women’s changing self-understandings 
and self-positioning within a society in flux. Passing through the towns of Timbi Touni and 
Timbi Madina (40 km southwest of Labé), Savineau found that several women had attended to 
the local French school, although, she remarks, “their ‘housekeeping education’ consisted of 
sweeping the classroom floors.” One woman with whom Savineau spoke, however, used her 
education to subvert expectations for her life trajectory. The daughter of a village chief, 
Aminatou Serif Bah had attended a local school for five years. After leaving the school, Bah 
worked for her mother and balanced the books for her father. Even though she was well past the 
age at which Fulbe women were expected to marry, Bah had been able to push back against 
proposed betrothals arranged by her parents. In fact, Bah had run away from home for eight days 
to elope (fr. convoler) with a small shop owner in Pita. When asked whether she obeyed the shop 
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owner’s two older wives, Bah demonstrated the continued importance of social status: “it was [I] 
who ordered. They did not dare say anything, because [I] was the daughter of a chief.” Bah, 
therefore, used her social status to her own ends. When asked whether or not she was going to 
(re) marry, the young woman replied, “no, no,” and when asked whom she would like to marry 
said, “no one.” Bah’s ability to push back against “traditional” gender expectations was aided by 
her status as a chief’s daughter.144 She was also able to parlay education into seizing control, at 
least in part, of her father’s finances, and was able to use the presence of a small merchant in 
nearby Pita to delay marriage. Both domains, precipitated by French rule, served a function for 
Bah that was far from the colonial ideal. Yet they both provided the young woman a certain 
amount of liberty.  
 Another elite Fulbe woman used migration within colonial systems in order to gain some 
independence. Diara Diallo, the wife of the Chief of Maci, Tierno Oumani Ba, was the daughter 
of a religious leader, or “marabout,” and had received only limited instruction at a Koranic 
school. Diallo, however, soon became the “woman of a white person” – French administrators 
often entered into romantic and/or strategic relationships with African women – and through that 
connection had learned French. Her husband, a former warrant officer, had married Diallo while 
he was in the military, and both had lived in Conakry and Dakar. Savineau’s description of Diara 
Diallo runs counter to earlier depictions of the cloistered and silent Fulbe woman: “she was not a 
figurante [“bit player,” literally a ballerina who does not perform solos or an actor who does not 
have any lines], but a person who looks, laughs, speaks and when required leads.” Diallo was 
also barren, which would commonly lower the family’s status and sometimes led to divorce. Yet 
she alone lived with her husband, while the chief had two other wives who lived in separate 
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compounds because, he claimed, “being a chief requires a lot of cooking and feeding of visitors.” 
Diallo also felt free to contradict her husband. When Savineau asked the couple about the state of 
women, the chief replied, “they are happy.” Once her husband began to answer, Diallo was quick 
to interject with a correction: “the rich women are happy. But there are a lot of poor households, 
whose harvest is just enough to pay their taxes, who have barely enough to eat.”145 
 Diara Diallo’s comment was an insightful reflection on the fortunes of Fulbe women 
under colonial rule. Elite women – the wives or daughters of chiefs or civil servants – had access 
to education or the material benefits of working within the colonial administration. They learned 
French, an increasingly important tool for moving between local and colonial spheres, and were 
at times able to negotiate more equitable relations of power with men. On the other end of the 
spectrum, Fulbe women who engaged in trade, largely out of a need to replace the lost revenue 
that their husbands had previously gained from agriculture. Eventually, these women attempted 
to translate their newfound economic power into authority within the household. Social status, 
therefore, determined in part which opportunities were open to which women. Those of high 
status moved within both elite Fulbe and French realms, using both to solidify their position. 
Those of low status cared more about feeding their families than elite Fulbe ideas of proper 
behavior, and were therefore able to seize the opportunities opened through integration into the 
colonial economy. Schmidt has demonstrated that after the Second World War the Sékou Touré-
led Parti Démocratique de Guinée (PDG) provided and opportunity for women to participate in 
politics, and in turn women’s cadres became integral to the party’s meteoric rise.146 The 
Savineau report – as well as the complaints of Fulbe men – demonstrate that women had begun 
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the work of gaining the social and economic influence that would ensure their central position in 
post-war Guinean politics well before political parties were able to use their newfound freedom. 
Conclusion 
Social hierarchies still carried significant weight in the Futa Jallon well into the postwar 
period. As a generation of Fulbe politicians emerged – all either the sons of chiefs or from noble 
families – it was difficult for former slaves and non-elite to ignore that even in the new period of 
African politics, social status still determined who claimed the mantle of the Futa Jallon’s leader. 
Furthermore, while free Fulbe may have lamented what they perceived to be a slipping grip on 
groups previously kept under their thumb, it was still clear that persons of free status continued 
to benefit from the political, economic, and social structure in place in the Futa Jallon, even after 
the French disrupted what had, for them, been an “ideal” shared pre-colonial system. 
 The spaces opened up by colonial rule – and more importantly, former slaves and 
women’s use of those spaces to attempt to reconfigure social hierarchies – did have important 
effects. As maccube accrued currency but almost always were unable to convert it into social 
capital, fissures between former slaves and masters became increasingly pronounced. 
Furthermore, as women, and especially women of former slave status, reconfigured 
asymmetrical gender relations and enjoyed newfound economic power within families, free and 
elite Fulbe political discourses built upon ideas of return to or preservation of “tradition” became 
increasingly unattractive. In the coming years, Sékou Touré’s PDG, a new political organization 
with roots in the Conakry trade unions would use these growing gaps in order to partially break 
the hold of Fulbe elites over the Futa Jallon. 
 The next chapter explores how new political parties grappled with these transformed 
social hierarchies while attempting to mobilize sections of Futa Jallon society, most notably the 
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elite and persons of slave status. These parties, however, failed to capture the power of those 
Fulbe in the “middle,” caught between a group making more claims to power and another 
enjoying the privileges of state-endorsed exploitation. Their laments and prayers examined at the 




Storming the Citadel: Political Parties, Ethno-regionalism, and Decolonization, 1945-1961 
 
The moment of independence looms large in Guinea’s history. Guineans’ dramatic “non” 
in the September 28, 1958 referendum on the constitution of the French Fifth Republic reflected 
a unique political culture that set the territory apart from its counterparts in Senegal, Soudan 
(Mali), and Côte d’Ivoire, or so it is often argued. Furthermore, The French government’s 
vindictive reaction to the vote heavily influenced Guinea’s decision to not only adopt a position 
of non-alignment during the Cold War but also court potential donors from the Eastern and 
Western blocs. Lastly, for many both inside and outside the nation, Guinea’s rejection of thinly 
veiled colonialism announced the arrival of African nationalism in the former French colonies 
and, for some, the potential of a pan-Africanist imaginary. Reflecting it’s historical importance, 
September 28th, as both watershed moment and political symbol, has come to represent both the 
promise and peril of Guinean nationalism in the decades since 1958.1 
This chapter argues for a more drawn-out process of imperial reform followed by 
decolonization. In particular, I locate an additional watershed in Guinea’s transformation into a 
post-colonial state and society: the 1957 election for the newly created Guinean assembly, after 
which Guinea became a semi-autonomous territory within what was then the French Union, with 
control of the majority of territorial administration now in the hands of African political rather 
than French colonial administrators. This alternative moment represented the peak of a crescendo 
of political activity that began shortly after the close of the Second World War. During the 
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1950s, political parties in Guinea attempted to build constituencies and mobilize voters within 
the context of a rapidly growing franchise. These parties fell into two types, one comprised of the 
Fulbe-led Bloc Africain de Guinée (BAG) and Démocratie Socialiste de Guinée (DSG), focused 
on building territory-wide coalitions through ethno-regional political organizations, and the other 
by the Sékou Touré-led Parti Démocratique de Guinée (PDG), which sought to build a territory-
wide party with a uniform organization. While by 1957 Touré’s PDG had ridden a wave of rural 
discontent to solidify its control over most of the Guinean territory, one region – the Fulbe-
dominated Futa Jallon – resisted the party’s spread. Both Fulbe politicians and the PDG 
leadership soon recognized that the Futa Jallon was the key to either continued viability of a 
party or political hold over the territory as a whole. 
What unfolded afterwards was an at times violent contestation over rival visions of the 
boundaries and content of emerging post-colonial political communities. Both the PDG and 
Fulbe-led parties engaged in a debate over the legacy of social hierarchies in the Futa Jallon, the 
authority of the ‘traditional’ chieftaincy, and the position of Futa Jallon society within a 
‘modern’ Guinea. This symbolic struggle was complimented by the parties’ different strategies 
for building political solidarities, the PDG’s animated by territory-wide aspirations and a 
uniform conception of political space, the BAG and DSG’s rooted in local dynamics and a 
colonial politics of difference.2 By the time the PDG successfully “stormed the citadel” of the 
Futa Jallon and rode to a sweeping victory in the 1957 territorial elections, the fractures that 
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would mark post-colonial politics in Guinea had already been set: from both an internal and 
external perspective, the Fulbe and Futa Jallon were divergent from the rest of Guinea, a 
fragment in the making. The PDG’s consolidation of control between the 1957 territorial election 
and the 1961 presidential elections only further cemented internal divisions that marginalized 
Fulbe politicians and marked the Futa Jallon as fundamentally different form the rest of Guinea. 
The opening and closing of multi-party politics in Guinea between 1945 to 1961 points to two 
key trajectories in mid-century Guinean political history: first, the welding of ethnicity and 
political community, a key aspect of contemporary Guinean politics, developed in relation to 
contestation between rival sets of political parties; and second, that that conceptual articulation of 
Fulbe difference – what would later be described by Touré as the “particular situation” – was the 
result of the PDG’s anti-colonial politics and more broadly of multi-party politics. As the 
crucible in which both developments were forged, therefore, the 1957 election becomes an 
important watershed in Guinea’s history, along with its more widely known counterpart in 1958.  
Due to its divergence from other French territories in Africa leading up to and following 
the 1958 referendum, the political history of late colonial Guinea has been the subject of a series 
of studies. Early characterizations of decolonization in Guinea cast Sékou Touré as the 
triumphant leader of Guinean anti-colonialism, especially those studies that relied upon PDG 
self-imaginings.3 Subsequent historical studies by Schmidt have added needed nuance, extending 
the scope of activity beyond the figure of Touré and pointing to the integral role previously 
marginalized groups – notably women, students, and the ‘rural peasantry’ – played in the PDG’s 
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rise.4 Yet Schmidt’s approach, which privileges PDG narratives and identifies the rise of a broad-
based anti-colonial nationalism as the prime force driving political activity during the period of 
imperial reform, gives a distant second billing to alternative political movements. As such, 
political skirmishes in the Futa Jallon between Fulbe elites and the PDG were only relevant 
insomuch as they were proxies for larger struggles against colonialism. Shading political 
contestation between African parties as only part of a larger struggle against colonialism became 
integral to post-colonial PDG recastings of the past, ones that would undergird the party’s claims 
to legitimacy following independence. Such a narrative, though, does not reflect the diversity of 
ideas and practices mobilized by rival political movements, ones that would come to shape many 
of the internal fault lines of the Guinean postcolony. 
Instead of focusing on teleological narratives tied to the rise of anti-colonial nationalism, 
this chapter will examine the legacy of competition between rival political movements during 
Guinea’s winding transition from colony to nation-state from 1945 to 1961. Examining the 
history of alternative political movements takes on added importance when one recognizes that 
decolonization in Guinea and elsewhere in Africa was not only about throwing off the colonial 
state. Rather, African parties, politicians, and activists also thought about what a post-colonial 
future might look like and engaged in intellectual and strategic struggles to make sure their 
vision won out. The work of imagining political communities and constructing political 
movements, although taking place throughout the continent and within the context of imperial 
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reform, were embedded within local contexts and histories, which in turn shaped the trajectories 
of decolonization in particular African territories. The subject of this chapter was no different. 
Although Guinea is best known as occupying the vanguard of anti-colonial African nationalism, 
opposition to the PDG by Fulbe politicians did not take the form of a competing nationalism, as 
it did for the Asante of Ghana and the Kel Tamasheq of the Malian Sahara, but rather as an 
ethno-regionalism with roots in forms of pre-colonial and colonial rule.5 And while Guinea’s 
recent colonial past loomed large over the tactics and ideology of competing movements, 
politicians and activists also grappled with much longer histories of social hierarchies, much like 
the competing political movements in mid-twentieth-century Zanzibar.6 Ultimately, Fulbe and 
PDG leaders and activists faced fundamental questions about the nature of authority, the place of 
‘tradition’ in a ‘modern’ society, and the boundaries and content of post-colonial political 
communities. Formal independence might often receive first billing in histories of decolonization 
in Guinea. However, the unsatisfying and partial answers that emerged from the PDG conquest 
of the Futa Jallon played the central role in shaping internal fractures in post-colonial Guinea.  
I divide this chapter into three periods. The first, from 1945 to 1954, was marked by the 
dominance of regional/ethnic parties and debate among Fulbe politicians over ideas of 
“tradition” and “modernity” in the Futa. The second began with the contested partial election of 
1954 that marked the end of explicit PDG repression by the colonial administration and 
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continued up to the PDG sweep of the 1957 Territorial Assembly elections. This period that was 
defined by at times violent competition between rival political parties centered in particular on 
the Futa Jallon region. Furthermore, struggles over ideas about “Futa society” shifted, focusing 
primarily on the institution of the colonial chieftaincy. The last period, from 1957 to the first 
presidential election in 1961, saw the partial consolidation of the PDG’s hold over the Futa and 
the party’s first attempts to drastically reform the region’s society. Taken together, the three 
periods reflect a political structure that moved from a limited electorate dominated by elite-led 
regional parties, to a period of multi-party mass politics, to finally a state controlled by a single 
party. The trajectory mirrors that of other AOF territories, but due to the particularity of the 
political competition during decolonization and the history of social hierarchies in the Futa, the 
timing was accelerated and the emphasis on political consolidation more acute.  
The question of Guinea’s position in international law may have been settled by the end 
of 1958, and the internal hegemony of the country’s only post-colonial party consolidated by 
1961. Debate about the Futa’s “particular situation” and the legacy of struggle over control of the 
region, however, would continue to dominate Guinean politics well into the 1960’s and ’70s.  
“So that they may live once again”: Yacine Diallo, the AGV, and debating “modernity” in 
the Futa Jallon 
Early postwar politics in the Futa Jallon reflected the policy of asymmetrical cooperation 
that drove colonial rule on the plateau since the 1897 treaty of protectorate. The rise of Futa’s 
first notable politician, Yacine Diallo, resulted from an attempt by colonial chiefs and 
administrators to find a suitably malleable response to the challenges of electoral politics. 
Diallo’s family hailed from the aristocracy of Labé, the Futa Jallon’s largest region. His father, 
though, was a new arrival to the chiefly class, having been named a village chief by Alpha Yaya 
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after serving as the Labé chief’s advisor. Part of a generation of chiefs’ sons with grounding in 
both local and colonial political structures, Yacine Diallo completed his studies at the École 
William Ponty on Gorée in 1917, and served in Pita, Kissidougou, Fotoba, Coyah, Kindia, 
Guéckédou and finally Conakry as a teacher.  
Diallo’s makeover from schoolteacher to Assemblyman resulted from a push for 
transformation within the French Empire following the Second World War. During the last years 
of the war, calls for reform were spurred on by the widespread recognition that promises that 
colonial subjects would be able to gain citizenship during the French Third Republic were mostly 
hollow.7 After fighting came to an end, French-educated West African elites pushed for colonial 
representation within the body charged with defining what the post-Vichy French Republic and 
Empire would look like, while unrest in Algeria and an independence movement in Indochina in 
1945 pushed the French government to begin the work of forming a new imperial community 
that would stress inclusion for colonial subjects.8 Work soon began on a new constitution for 
what would become the Fourth French Republic, which together with the former colonies and 
associated territories would constitute the French Union.  
A series of government committees tasked with writing the new constitution grappled 
with the proposed voting rights of 15 million colonial subjects in Africa, with one camp 
advocating for full and equal representation while another argued that it was at the moment 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 Frederick Cooper, Citizenship between Empire and Nation: Remaking France and French 
Africa, 1945-1960 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), 28-29. 
 
8 The level of inclusion for subjects, and their status as possible citizens within the community, 
was subject to diverging opinions, ranging from plans that stressed the continued and 
unquestioned sovereignty of France, to those who sought to eliminate the category of subject 
altogether. The French government was also motivated to transform colonial into territories by 
fears that the United Nations (as well as the United States) would intervene. See Cooper, 
Citizenship between Empire and Nation, 31-39. 
! 179 
impractical to extend universal suffrage to the former colonies. In the end, a compromise was 
made. French West Africa (AOF) was assigned ten deputies for the Assemblée Nationale 
Constituante, which was tasked with drafting the new constitution, to be chosen by two separate 
electorates or colleges: four would be elected by the small number of French citizens living in 
the colonies while the remaining six spots would be chosen by the much larger group of non-
citizens allowed to vote at the time, which in Guinea was still just 1% of the total population.9 
These elections, in which for the first time significant (although still limited) numbers of 
Africans voted, ushered in a new era of politics within the AOF. 
On October 22, 1945, Diallo became Guinea’s first representative to the French 
Constituent Assembly, elected through the non-citizen second college. According to widely held 
rumor both at the time and since, a group of prominent Futa chiefs and French colonial 
administrators chose Yacine as a Guinean representative.10 One account I was told contends that 
a French colonial administrator approached Almamy Aguibou Barry, chief of the canton of 
Dabola and head of the Soriya family, and asked him to take the seat in the Assembly. Not 
knowing French and wary of the metropole’s climate, Aguibou declined. Having just graduated 
from William Ponty, his son, Barry Diawadou, was too young. Aguibou therefore consulted with 
his rival in Mamou and head of the Alfaya family, Almamy Ibrahima Sory Dara Barry, to find a 
suitable and temporary alternative.  The two settled upon Yacine Diallo, who had roots in the 
Basse Côte (his mother was Susu) and, given his family’s minor position in the Futa aristocracy, 
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was someone the chiefs thought could be controlled.11  
A first draft of the new French constitution was rejected, due primarily to opposition 
from the French right, although a series of laws abolishing forced labor, extended citizenship to 
former subjects, and ending the colonial subject penal code, or indigénat, had been passed by the 
delegates of the first Assembly.12 Diallo again won a seat in the Second Constituent Assembly, 
which produced a revised constitution draft that was eventually voted into law. But many of the 
more drastic reforms of the first draft, including language that described the French Union as a 
political community “freely entered upon” – thus opening up the possibility of free departure – 
were stripped from the final document, although it did still recognize the plurality of nations that 
composed the French Union.13  
With the establishment of the French Fourth Republic, new elections were held for 
Guinea’s two representatives to the French National Assembly, in which Yacine Diallo’s Liste 
d’Union Socialiste et Progressiste de Guinée received the largest number of votes.14 As an 
assemblyman, Diallo supported a series of laws intended to shore up support amongst the Futa’s 
elite. In 1946, he sponsored a bill that extended voting rights to a larger population, most notably 
those literate in Arabic. Given widespread Islamic education among Futa Jallon elites, the 
change in the electoral code widened voting rights to a group disposed to vote for an 
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establishment candidate.15 In 1947, Diallo introduced legislation to “clarify” the role of chiefs 
from a “material, moral, and statutory point of view.” The proposal outlined a set of clear 
sanctions that could be used to combat chiefly excess. It also markedly increased the pay of 
chiefs, especially those with large and influential jurisdictions – a group that notably included his 
political patron, Almamy Sory Dara Barry.16  
Despite his attempts to ensure their position within the colonial administration, Yacine 
Diallo’s relationship with the Almamy of Mamou and the majority of the Futa chiefs quickly 
deteriorated. Diallo’s proposed law reforming the chieftaincy never made much progress in the 
Union Assembly, stalling before coming to a vote. By 1947, many of the Futa chiefs had decided 
that the Guinean representative had not done enough to support their authority, and began to 
complain.17 In response, Diallo started to move more away from his regional base of power, and 
later that year he created the Association Franco-Guinéenne (later Union Franco-Guinéenne 
(UFG)), a group defined by its a pro-French stance and affiliation with the metropole SFIO 
party.18 Starting in 1947, he also attempted to forge alliances with prominent politicians from 
Haute Guinée and the Forest Region, and in 1948 toured the area around Kankan (in Haute 
Guinée), the first time a Guinean politician had significantly campaigned outside of his region of 
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By the time the 1951 Assembly elections arrived, Diallo’s support amongst the Futa 
chiefs degraded to the point where an older and more experienced Barry Diawadou mounted a 
serious challenge to the incumbent. A late push by Yacine in the Futa before the elections shored 
up his support in the region, but French observers warned that Diallo’s public persona was “too 
French” for many within the “conservative” Futa.20 His critics, including Barry Diawadou, often 
claimed that he had converted to Christianity, supposedly a religious reflection of his close 
relationship with French politicians.21 Yet Diallo continued to make gestures towards the 
“tradition” of the Futa Jallon and underscored his Islamic faith.22 Yacine stood with a foot in 
each domain – in Paris and the Futa– but was never able to gain a solid footing in either. 
Other groups of political active Fulbe in the Futa Jallon also grappled with merging 
French and Fulbe influences. During and immediately after the Second World War, the majority 
of African-led organizations in the AOF were not outwardly political, as before 1945 and 
especially under the wartime Vichy regime, explicit political activity by Africans was banned 
and subject to punishment. Instead, elites formed cultural and ethnic associations, which often 
functioned as fora for semi-private political discussions and early organizing. These groups 
ranged widely, from Art et Travail, a fine arts group with connections to the French Communist 
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Party, and in which future President of Mali Modibo Keïta was a key figure, to Quatrième 
République (or “Fourth Republic”), a Gaullist “patriotic association” formed in 1945 by a group 
of mostly Senegalese civil servants posted in Kankan who were eager to show their dedication to 
rebuilding “the great civilizing nation that is France.”23 Other organizations represented the 
interests of particular groups, be they ethnic, like the Groupement des Fons d’Abomey, which 
later became the Union Progressiste Dahoméenne, one of Dahomey’s first political parties, or 
organized along class and profession, such as the Syndicat Agricole Africain of Côte d’Ivoire, 
which was established in 1944 by future president Félix Houpouët-Boigny and in 1946 
transformed into the Parti Démocratique de Côte d’Ivoire.24 These early associations, therefore, 
served as both the incubators of a new generation of African politicians and the early 
organizational foundations for subsequent political parties. 
The first such association established by Guineans was the Amicale Gilbert Vieillard 
(AGV).25 Established in 1943 by a group of Futa Jallon Fulbe students at the prestigious École 
William Ponty in Dakar, the AGV as an explicitly ethnic organization, meant to “bring 
together… [and] stimulate the political, social, and cultural evolution of Futa Jallon people.” At 
first, like most of the other amicales, the AGV placed emphasis on cultural activities; members 
produced “modern” histories of the Futa Jallon, staged plays, and wrote poetry extolling the 
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virtues of Futa Fulbe society.26 As the social composition of the group was homogenous, the 
members of the group had a vested interest in “preserving” Futa Jallon culture and society. Most 
AGV members were from the Futa Jallon elite, the sons of chiefs and hailing from some of the 
most prestigious families in the region.27 Thus, as both “Pontins” and “traditional” elites, AGV 
members embodied the dual impulses of respecting the region’s elite history while at the same 
time seeking to express this heritage within the idioms of metropolitan respectability. 
Following the Second World War, the AGV engaged in a more explicitly political 
mission. In August 1946, the organization’s leadership established a permanent headquarters in 
Conakry, while sympathizers established satellite branches in the regional capitals. One of the 
early leaders of the AGV branch in Labé was Ceerno Abdourahmane Bah, an Islamic scholar, 
cleric, and poet. Ceerno Bah fused the AGV’s cultural origins with its new political goals, 
undertaking frequent tours in the Northern Futa Jallon that included poetry readings and political 
meetings. One of Bah’s poems composed in 1945, “Amicale ko fâbo,” or “In support of the 
Amicale,” lamented that the Fulbe had been ignored by the political establishment – both local 
chiefs and the colonial administration – for too long, “taken to be stupid” and used as pawns in 
political intrigue. He beseeched a new generation of leaders to “rescue” their brothers in the 
Futa, “so that they may live once again.”28 Thus, the AGV considered itself a means of uplift for 
the Futa Jallon society, a gradual program of political and social reform that would slowly 
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incorporate new political ideas into established hierarchies. That Ceerno Bah was both a 
reformer and hailed from a long line of religious and political elites in the Labé region reflected 
again the dual impulses of the organization. 
While being the first and perhaps most well connected of the nascent parties established 
in Guinea, the AGV was just one of several regional organizations active in territorial politics 
following the end of the War. Each of the four regions in Guinea – the Susu-dominated Basse 
Côte, the Fulbe-dominated Futa, the Maninka-dominated Haute Guinée, and the diverse Forest 
region – hosted its own organization.29 Some of these organizations, such as the AGV and the 
Haute-Guinée-based Union de Mandé, combined regionalism and ethnic identification as a basis 
for solidarity. Others, like the Union Forestière in the Forest Region and to a lesser extent two 
organizations based in the Basse Côte, sought to group together a number of smaller ethnic 
communities into a political party that could compete with the Fulbe and Maninka, the two 
largest ethno-linguistic groups in Guinea. The first half-decade of Guinean politics was 
dominated by groups like the AGV, and the two main territory-wide parties that would emerge in 
the 1950s were at first formed by coalitions between the regionalist associations. The other three 
regional associations’ membership also mirrored the basic internal conflicts found in the AGV; 
comprised of a transitional elite with foots in the “traditional” and “modern” domains, the 
associations struggled to advocate for reform while still relying upon regional social hierarchies 
whose most visible representations were the colonial institution of the chieftaincy.  
Indeed, what to do with the chieftaincy became an important question for the AGV’s 
members. Opposition to the excesses of the Futa chieftaincy became a key component of the 
organization’s political platform. From August 1946 to July 1947, AGV representatives sent a 
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series of letters to the Governor of Guinea condemning the chief of Dalaba, Thierno Oumarou 
Bah, calling for his censure and removal. The AGV letters presented a familiar list of chiefly 
crimes, from demands for illicit payments and attempted nepotism to applying pressure on 
colonial administrators to transfer bothersome African civil servants stationed in Dalaba.30 The 
AGV leadership’s opinion on who should be the errant chief’s replacement, however, was 
unclear. While advocating for a vote to choose the next chief, members also argued for the return 
of the Dalaba chieftaincy to those who had “legitimate rights” to the position.31 Above all, the 
AGV was against any choice that would, somewhat paradoxically, “violate custom and 
democratic principles.” The crux of the contradiction between “legitimate rights” and 
“democratic principles” revolved around who exactly would be allowed to vote. For the two 
positions to be harmonious, the AGV leadership either counted on the general population 
supporting the “traditional” choice for chief, and thus reinforcing the chieftaincy while providing 
a new source of legitimacy, or advocated for the restriction of the franchise to the notables of the 
region, who were nearly unanimously aligned against Bah and his sons. The two impulses to 
reform the institution – one adapting it to a growing electorate, the other harkening back to 
idealized interpretations of the “democratic” pre-colonial Futa state based upon tightly curated 
local councils of nobles – presented competing versions of change for the Futa Jallon 
chieftaincy. More generally, they also reflected more “progressive” and “traditional” lines of 
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political thought within the organization, and indeed amongst Futa elites as a whole. 
AGV members’ attempts to imagine a reformed Futa moved beyond adapting the 
chieftaincy to a new political landscape. In a meeting in April 1945, Chaikhou Baldé, an early 
AGV leader in Labé, argued that the development of an African elite was necessary for the 
political evolution of Guinea. Yet Baldé rejected the familiar trope of the African évolué, most 
notably endorsed by Yacine Diallo and his UFG: 
The necktie billowing in the wind, handsome patent leather shoes, well-tailored 
suits, glasses, the smoke of perfumed cigarettes filling the atmosphere of dapper 
salons with a pungent and sweet odor, the powdered faces of grands enfants and 
grandes filles at dances filled with the sound of the rhythmic jazz of rumbas; if 
those are the gaudy manifestations of Western Civilization, they are neither a 
foundation, nor nourishment [aliment], nor an end and for us must not define the 
word “elite.”32 
 
Baldé went on to contend that neither Western intellectuals nor Africans, due in large part to a 
lack of training, knew much about developing Guinean society, and that the key to betterment 
was the education of a new Futa elite. Yet exactly what form such an educated group should take 
– Would it remain loyal to the deeply Islamic history of the Futa? How would it both take 
advantage of the French education system and remain specifically Fulbe? Which cultural and 
intellectual sources would it draw upon to form a new Futa politics? – remained ambiguous. It 
was clear, however, that many of the arguments put forward by young Fulbe elites confounded 
the “conservative” orientation assigned to the region by many within Guinea, including the 
colonial administrators and chiefs who counted on the young men’s allegiance. 
The AGV’s political affiliations were similarly muddled. The organization sent 
representatives to the October 1946 congress that gave birth to the AOF-wide Rassemblement 
Démocratique Africaine (RDA), but mutual distrust prevented any substantive alliance between 
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the two groups.33  Shortly thereafter, a group of AGV members split off to join Yacine Diallo’s 
UFG, while others backed Barry Diawadou in an unsuccessful conservative coup of the 
organization’s bureau.34 By 1949, infighting had paralyzed the organization, and during the April 
congress the AGV members voted to remove the organization from party politics.35 The AGV’s 
political retirement was brief. Later that year the organization joined the Comité d’Entente 
Guinéenne (CEG), an umbrella party that brought together the regional and/or ethnic 
organizations to provide a territory-wide alternative to the Guinean RDA.36 Yet the AGV’s 
influence would never reach the heights of 1946-1949. However, while internal discord had 
relegated the AGV to Guinea’s political shadows, the central debates that the organization had 
attempted to grapple with – most notably reforming the chieftaincy – would continue to 
dominate Futa and Guinean politics over the coming decade. 
The period from 1945 to 1954 was marked by an elite-driven politics and the central role 
chiefs played in selecting and supporting candidates. During this early era of Guinean politics, 
nearly 75% of all delegates in the Guinean Territorial Assembly hailed from chiefly families, a 
number that along with Niger far outstripped the chief’s representations in all other AOF 
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territories.37 The political dominance of the chieftaincy, however, in part sowed the seeds of its 
own destruction. So many sons and brothers of chiefs in the Territorial assembly thrust the 
much-maligned colonial institution to the forefront of the political stage, a visibility that would 
later prove to be a liability.  
Marshalling the Troops: The 1954 special Election and early skirmishes in 1956 
Early in the morning of April 14, 1954, Yacine Diallo died while preparing for an 
upcoming session of the Guinean Territorial Assembly, the result of a brain hemorrhage.38 The 
French government hastily organized a special election to fill the departed assemblyman’s 
vacated seat in the National Assembly. Metropolitan SFIO leaders, scrambling to find a 
replacement for their man in Guinea, dispatched Ibrahima Barry, the son of a Futa chief who was 
studying law in France at the time, back to Guinea to run in the elections. “Barry III,” as he was 
popularly known, would later rise to prominence in the Futa, but for the moment lacked the 
political connections and grassroots organization to mount an effective campaign.39 Two viable 
candidates for the Union Assembly seat quickly emerged. The first was Sékou Touré, the head of 
a the Guinean RDA branch, the Parti Démocratique de Guinée, who enjoyed widespread support 
within the labor movement and among civil servants in Conakry and the major towns in the 
interior.40 The PDG had faced systematic repression by the French administration since its 
inception due to ties with the metropolitan communist party, and many of its civil servant 
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members were transferred to far-flung corners of the AOF.41 A series of strikes in 1951 and 
1953, though, revived the party while raising Sékou Touré’s profile, and by 1954 the party had 
used momentum started in Conakry to establish branches in the major towns of the interior.42 
The second was Barry Diawadou, the clearest successor to Yacine Diallo as spokesman 
for the Futa elites. To consolidate his support amongst the Futa chieftaincy, Diawadou and his 
Soriya-head father undertook a trip to Mamou to meet with Almamy Sory Dara Barry before 
starting to campaign in earnest. The head of the Alfaya reluctantly pledged his support to 
Diawadou, and the candidate sewed up endorsements from the main ethnic and/or regional 
parties, although due more to shared animosity towards Sékou Touré and the PDG than a display 
of a shared purpose. Abdoulaye Diallo, a former president of the AGV, made a late entry into the 
race and campaigned on an anti-chief platform while attempting to mobilize communities 
comprised of persons of former slave status, especially in the Labé region. Diallo only succeeded 
in pushing the Labé chiefs to Diawadou’s side – they had held out pledging support as a show of 
opposition to Sory Dara Barry – thus securing the Soriya scion’s position as the Futa’s 
representative in territorial politics.43 With the support of the conservative forces in most of the 
four regions, and most importantly the backing of the Futa chiefs, Diawadou formed an ad hoc 
coalition called the Union Française pour une Action Sociale and put himself forward as its 
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candidate.44 
 Barry Diawadou won the election with 145,497 votes (59.2%), Sékou Touré followed 
with 85,808 (34.9%), and a group of non-aligned and Socialist Party candidates together did not 
break 20,000 votes.45 Immediately after the results were announced, PDG leaders alleged that the 
administration had secured Barry Diawadou’s victory through a series of fraudulent actions both 
before and on the day of the election. The PDG leadership claimed that chiefs forced those under 
their supervision to vote for Diawadou, that the Governor of Guinea had told administrators to 
exert pro-Diawadou pressure, that people running the polling places were illiterate, allowing for 
local administrators to falsify results, and finally that pro-Diawadou activists falsely registered 
voters, allowing some to vote more than once.46 Diawadou, on the other hand, decried meddling 
by outside RDA activists, including Ouezzin Coulibaly and Madeira Keita.47 The majority of 
Guineans – including supporters of Diawadou – found the PDG’s version of events more 
plausible, believing that the administration and the Futa chiefs had chosen Diawadou as the 
winner and rigged the results to make it so.48 
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  PDG-led protests erupted in Conakry. Confrontations between PDG and Diawadou 
supporters soon broke out in Coyah and Kindia, two towns in the Basse Côte, and eventually 
widened to smaller villages along the coast. Most clashes took place in public spaces – roads, 
markets, and cinemas in particular – following public rallies or protests.49 As 1954 wore on, 
protests transformed into a more general indictment of the chieftaincy. PDG supporters in 
villages, mostly in the Basse Côte, confronted their chiefs, at times running the village and 
canton heads out of town and creating parallel administrative structures.50 The rural battle 
reached its apogee with the February 1955 murder of Camara M’Balia, a pregnant PDG 
supporter, by the chief of the canton of Tondon, David Sylla.51 Camara’s death was the 
culmination of a weeks-long battle between PDG and Sylla partisans, which had escalated when 
a group of PDG-appointed guards, who were part of a larger parallel local administration created 
by local party branches, arrested a Fulbe man supposedly sent by Sylla to murder the head of the 
local PDG section. PDG activists forced the Fulbe man to walk through the village, head shaved, 
declaring his guilt and apologizing for his supposed crimes.52 Thus, in a public ceremony the 
institution of the chieftaincy had been linked to an ethnic interloper, together a reflection of 
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repression and duplicity. 
At their core, these incidents were about establishing domination over public areas for 
rival political parties. Controlling these spaces were displays of parties’ power and influence for 
undecided voters, and in the case of cinemas denied important fora for rival parties’ meetings. In 
some cases political conflicts took on ethnic hues. Chants by PDG activists alluded to 
Diawadou’s ethnic identification, calling him “The Foulah,” and in some cases the throwing of 
stones and burning of buildings broke down along Susu/Fulbe lines in addition to political 
affiliation.53 For a moment, and especially in Basse Côte cities that had experienced an influx of 
Fulbe migrants during colonial rule, political fights often became a more general struggle over 
who belonged, who had the right to rule, and, more materially, who could claim access to land 
and stalls in local markets. 
The PDG’s position had improved considerably after the cycle of elections, protests, and 
conflicts. The rural and urban protests had at times gotten out of hand, but they were a very 
visible sign that the PDG was courting previously ignored portions of the population in neglected 
areas, groups that were taking up more prominent roles in the expanding electorate (see table 1). 
The rapid resurgence of the PDG following the 1954 elections took many conservative forces in 
Guinea by surprise, including Barry Diawadou and the Futa chiefs. Realizing that much of their 
rival party’s strength came from its ability to organize a territory-wide grassroots campaign, 
Diawadou and his supporters along with allies within the colonial administration created a new 
political party named the Bloc Africain de Guinée (BAG) intended to serve as a conservative 
doppelganger to the PDG. The party mimicked many of the more successful PDG strategies, 
focusing on organizing women’s branches and sections in rural areas while mobilizing 
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supporters in the major cities. Representatives from the regional parties named as president 
Koumandian Keïta, the head of the Guinean teacher’s union and a Malinké from Haute Guinée, 
as a riposte to Sékou Touré (himself Malinké and a union leader).54 The party also enjoyed the 
support of several prominent chiefs, including Almamy Ibrahima Sory Dara Barry.55 
 The conservative party was a near complete failure. Barry Diawadou was in France for 
much of early 1955, and while briefly in Guinea he was more concerned with shoring up his 
fragile base among the Futa elite than playing a substantive role in the BAG.56 The new party 
didn’t hold its first official congress until August 1955, and undertook little to no local 
organizing.57 The party also failed to outline a notable platform. The delegates to the BAG’s first 
congress adopted policies that their PDG rivals had claimed years before, calling for the 
application of the 1952 Code de Travail, the reform of the French Union, increased primary 
education and health services, and the creation of a party newspaper called La République to 
advertise the party to the small but influential class of literate civil servants and small 
businessmen.58 Finally, and most importantly, many of the regional organizations – notably the 
Union Mandé – resisted ceding control to the territorial party. Members of the Union saw 
themselves first and foremost as Maninka from Haute Guinée, and BAG supporters as a distant 
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second.59 A weak central bureau meant that the party could not coordinate recruitment activities 
in the countryside and interior cities. It also meant that any attempt to present the BAG as a 
unified alternative to the PDG was readily undermined. Ultimately, the party had decided to live 
– and, indeed, die – by the regionalist model, which had a deep and strong position within 
Guinean political culture but severely hampered territory-wide initiatives. 
 Hammering out the BAG position on the chieftaincy proved to be even more problematic. 
Canton chiefs were the main material and spiritual backers of the party, yet the colonial 
institution was increasingly unpopular. Thus, the BAG had to chart a course between riding the 
wave of popular discontent against the chieftaincy and being seen as the stooges of the 
aristocracy, all the while avoiding offending the party’s benefactors. The congress delegates 
attempted to do just that, advocating for the “evolution” of the Chieftaincy while “taking into 
consideration the desire of the population” when designating chiefs.60 Despite adopting what was 
a fairly conservative position, the party leaders still upset the chiefs; when Koumandian Keïta 
remarked at a congress meeting that he would “throw into prison any chief who stole the chicken 
of a poor man,” all of the chiefs in attendance left the room in protest.61  
 Scholars have argued that the BAG represented the interests of elites in Guinea, casting 
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its rivalry with the PDG as a proxy for bourgeoisie and proletariat (or rural mass) competition.62 
Such an explanation accounts for a part of the ideological and strategic differences between the 
two parties. The BAG was unable to extend itself beyond a small group of well-connected and 
relatively wealthy individuals, whether they were commercial planters in the Basse Côte, 
members of prominent families in the Futa, or educated civil servants in Conakry. However, 
while rooted in class difference, diverging ideologies between the two parties extended beyond 
the competing interests of urban workers and elites. The parties also differed in how they 
imagined a future Guinean political space being ordered. While the PDG advocated for a 
uniform, territory-wide idea of political community, the BAG sought to create a territory-wide 
party that was an extension of regions. Regionalism in the Futa Jallon tapped into deeper 
histories of distinctiveness, both self-proclaimed and imposed, that symbolically marked the 
region as different from the rest of Guinea. From language, to religion, to pseudo-scientific 
colonial theories of the Semitic origins of the Fulbe,63 both insiders and outsiders considered the 
Futa and the Fulbe as unique. This body of thought also limited the options of the majority of 
Fulbe politicians, requiring that their most basic political platform be based in regionalism. As 
soon as a politician began to broaden his based outside of the Futa, as Yacine Diallo had, the 
region’s elites balked. Such a project forged coalitions using the politics of difference, both 
colonial and local, in order to create a territory-wide organization. Furthermore, this basic 
strategy forced the BAG to rely upon the parallel structures of the regional “traditional” 
aristocracy. As the chieftaincy became increasingly unpopular, it also doomed the party to the 
political margins. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
62 Schmidt, Mobilizing the Masses, 147-153.  
 
63 See Anna Pondopoulo, Les Français et les Peuls: Histoire d’une relation privilégiée (Paris: 
Indes Savantes, 2008); and Chapter 1. 
! 197 
 Not every regionally based party was beholden to the chieftaincy. Although not explicitly 
rooted in the Futa Jallon, the Démocratie Socialiste de Guinée (DSG) grouped together the 
educated, reformist wing of Fulbe intellectuals along with socialist French civil servants in 
Guinea. The party’s leader was Barry III, the self-styled ideological successor to Yacine Diallo. 
Since the 1954 elections he had charted a middle course between the “conservative” BAG and 
“radical” PDG, a strategy that recognized the cultural underpinnings of regionalism while 
rejecting the social hierarchies represented by the chieftaincy. His party, for instance, published 
propaganda in Pular and in Arabic script, and often underscored its leader’s Islamic religiosity.64  
Barry III’s own biography reflected the fine line his party sought to walk. His father was 
the canton chief of Bantignel, in the Pita region, and he was the only son of his mother, a 
younger wife of his father.65 Barry III studied at Ponty and obtained a law degree from the 
University of Montpellier, where he developed close ties with the SFIO.66 Like Yacine Diallo, he 
hailed from a minor aristocratic family in the Futa and at first was used as a proxy for more 
powerful families. His father was a client of Almamy Sory Dara Barry, and for a time the 
Mamou chief supported Barry III during the elections, although mostly as a check on Barry 
Diawadou’s political ambitions.67 Following the ’54 elections, though, the young politician’s 
relationship with Sory Dara Barry soured. Shortly after creating the DSG in October 1954, Barry 
III signaled a growing rift between his party and the chiefs, claiming at a meeting in Labé that all 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
64 La Démocratie Socialiste en Guinée, “Appel,” March 1955, CAOM 1AFFPOL/2143. 
 
65 Interview with Alpha Barry, Conakry, 14 February 2013. 
 
66 Ibid.; Kéïta, Les Élections, 151.  
 
67 Interview with Alpha Barry, Conakry, 14 February 2013; Henri Bernard, “Note sur l’élection 
partielle à l’Assemblée Nationale…” CAOM 1AFFPOL/2143. 
! 198 
chiefs who support candidates did so out of their own interests and not of Guineans in general.68 
By March 1955, the break was complete. At a DSG rally in Conakry and under the approving 
gaze of Barry III, the head of the local party section claimed that the canton chiefs wanted “the 
return to the former colonialist regime, which favored bullying, extortion, and pillaging.” In 
response, a group of Futa chiefs led by Almamy Sory Dara Barry passed a motion at a meeting in 
Mamou condemning Barry III, while “declining all responsibility” for “reactions by Fulbe 
natives” against Barry III’s acts that “dishonor all of the Futa.”69 
Barry III and the DSG’s hostility towards the chieftaincy echoed many of the same 
critiques that Sékou Touré and the PDG had made in the wake of the ’54 elections. In fact, Barry 
III and the DSG leadership consciously styled themselves after the PDG, claiming in early 
meetings that the two parties’ platforms were the same.70 Barry III also embraced the popularly 
coined nickname of Syli Yoré, or “little elephant,” a reference to the PDG party symbol and 
Touré’s own nickname (syli).71 The main distinction between the DSG and the PDG, perhaps the 
reason why they were two parties instead of one, lay in separate networks. The PDG grew out of 
the union movement based in Conakry, and the party’s rank and file was mostly composed of 
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Malinké and Susu members.72 The DSG, however, styled itself as the “party of intellectuals,” 
and Fulbe teachers, merchants, and mid-level civil servants staffed its regional branches.73 
 Despite PDG attacks against the DSG as a “copycat” party based in regionalism,74 rumors 
spread in September 1956 that the two parties would join forces against the BAG and its chiefly 
supporters.75 The proposed alliance represented a moment of opportunity for both parties. The 
PDG to this point had found few supporters among Fulbe civil servants, relying instead on 
“outsiders” or recent migrants to the Futa’s major cities to create local branches. The DSG, for 
its part, had little appeal outside of the Futa and Conakry, and its campaign against the Futa 
chiefs had made powerful enemies out of influential men like Almamy Sory Dara Barry. A 
fusion between the PDG and DSG would have shored up weaknesses on both sides while 
fulfilling the two parties’ goals of creating a truly territory-wide party.  
 The courtship between the DSG and PDG, though, came to a sudden halt in October 
1956. Incidents between BAG and PDG partisans had become increasingly frequent as the 1956 
rainy season wore on, and sporadic fights between PDG and BAG supporters broke out in 
August.76 On September 5th, the president of the PDG section in the Dixinn-Soussou 
neighborhood of Conakry was the victim of a burglary. When he visited a local religious figure 
to ask for guidance, the latter said that it was 4 inhabitants of Dixinn-Foulah, a neighborhood that 
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was populated by Fulbe who had migrated to the capital during the last four decades, who had 
stolen the president’s property. The accusation lead to reprisals in the Fulbe-dominated 
neighborhood. Later that day in the Niger Market in central Conakry, a group of Fulbe merchants 
assaulted a Susu street vendor following a heated political discussion. In response, a Fulbe 
merchant’s table in the Coronthie market was pillaged while another Fulbe worker was knocked 
unconscious at 11 PM.77 Battles between partisans raged in Conakry and its suburbs for the next 
5 days. Rivals burned down the other side’s market stalls and houses. PDG activists erected 
makeshift roadblocks checking party membership cards, beating those that did not belong to the 
PDG. Two days into the riots, battles became more general conflicts between Susu “natives” and 
Fulbe “foreigners,” and houses were burned regardless of political affiliation. During one 
incident outside of the central Ballay Hospital, Fulbe and Susu groups fought one another 
following the death of a Pullo (sing. of Fulbe) at the hands of a Susu. A crackdown by security 
forces that included liberal use of tear gas and live fire ended most violence by the 9th. Final 
tallies counted 7 dead and 263 injured, including several DSG activists.78 
 Reactions to the incidents were swift. The PDG leadership in Guinea cast blame on the 
French municipal administration in Conakry, claiming that administrators had bribed DSG 
leaders in order to block the unification of the two parties. PDG leaders also claimed that 
“certain people” had incited ethnic conflict in order to stop the party’s spread in the Futa.79 
Koumandian Keïta, the BAG president, cast the conflict in starkly ethnic terms, declaring during 
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one meeting that “we buried eight Fulbe dead and there is no proof that other bodies weren’t 
thrown into the sea.”80 In a meeting held one week later, Keïta argued that “if the whites leave 
there will be a pitched battle between the Fulbe and those who believe that Guinea is Sékou 
Touré.”81 The DSG leadership quickly soured on a possible alliance with the PDG. Le Populaire 
de Guinée, the DSG party newspaper, claimed that PDG partisans had killed five DSG activists, 
all originally from the Futa Jallon, during the week of violence. “Blood thirsty mobs” of PDG 
supporters had fallen prey to anti-Fulbe racism, the newspaper claimed, and to pursue an alliance 
would do disservice to the DSG wounded and dead.82 Several within the party advocated for the 
building of a common front with the BAG against the PDG.83 Barry III, though, opposed any 
affiliation with the BAG, a party he considered to be fundamentally anti-democratic.84 
  The Futa canton chiefs used violence as a rallying cry for ethnic solidarity. Almamy 
Sory Dara Barry traveled to Conakry on Oct. 13th and held a meeting with over 3000 Fulbe in 
Dixinn-Foulah, during which one speaker called for the Fulbe to unite together and put “the 
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bonds of kin before those of politics.”85 In Mamou, a group of local canton chiefs called on 
Fulbe to reinforce their “racial unity” and claimed that Saïfoulaye Diallo, confidant of Sékou 
Touré and the PDG’s secretary general, had declared in a public meeting that “the Fulbe is like a 
tortoise, only sticking out its head when its rear is held to the fire.”86 At the time, the appeal to 
ethno-regionalism made political sense, as voters in the Futa Jallon, although not comprising a 
monolithic group, constituted nearly 46% of voters in the January 1956 election for Guinea’s 
representatives in the National Assembly.87 Perhaps, in stressing ethnic solidarity, leaders within 
the Fulbe community sought to win back some of the Fulbe voters who had started to drift 
towards the PDG. Nevertheless, an appeal based on ethnicity had a limited shelf life. In elections 
for village councils held a in May 1958, voters in the Futa, while still comprising the largest 
regional representation in Guinea, by then were only slightly under 30% of the territorial total 
(see table 2).   
For much of the 1950s, Conakry was the central site of contestation between rival 
political parties and ethnic communities. As casualties and examples of arson mounted, it 
became increasingly impossible for colonial administrators and African politicians alike to 
ignore the increasingly blurred lined between political allegiance and ethnic identification. 
Conakry had become and would continue to be, in effect, the crucible in which both forms of 
marking political community would be forged together. In the run-up to coming elections for the 
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territorial assembly in early 1957, though, the PDG, BAG, and DSG turned their attention to 
consolidating control over what Sékou Touré called the “citadel of reactionary forces” in Guinea: 
the Futa Jallon.88 
Storming the Citadel: the PDG Spread in the Futa and Debating the Colonial Chieftaincy 
 Following the end of administrative repression in 1954, the PDG spread rapidly from its 
urban bases into the interior on the back of its opposition to the chieftaincy. Outside of some 
pockets of BAG and DSG support in Conakry and its suburbs, the Touré-led party quickly 
became the dominant political organization in the Basse Côte. Despite some resistance from the 
Union de Mandé, Sékou Touré and the PDG made considerable ground in Haute Guinée. By 
1956, only in the Futa and the Forest Region had the PDG not fully installed itself. In order to 
take what the PDG newspapers called the “last bastion of feudalism” in Guinea, the party 
leadership organized a two-pronged attack in the Futa. 89 First, the party engaged in a debate over 
social hierarchies and the chieftaincy in order to attract groups that had previously been 
underrepresented in politics, most notably women and communities of former slave status. These 
groups were especially valuable as voters to political parties, as French law progressively 
expanded the franchise from a small group of most elites in the late 1940s to eventually all 
citizens of the French Union in 1956.90 Second, to better organize new groups of voters and 
activists the party threw significant resources into spreading the reach of the party, organizing 
sub-sections in as many villages as possible. The two approaches were complementary, driving 
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wedges within existing divides in Futa social hierarchies while channeling the larger electorate 
into an effective political force.  
 PDG leaders realized early on that criticizing the chieftaincy was an effective strategy for 
turning rural communities against the local elites hostile to the party. The Futa chiefs, supposedly 
the most entrenched and powerful of the “traditional” elites, became the main targets of the new 
PDG policy. If the party was able to undermine them, so PDG leaders reasoned, the chieftaincy 
as an institution stood little chance of surviving. The PDG faced several hurdles before winning 
the hearts and minds of the Futa. Early attacks on the party focused on its leaders purported 
fidelity to communism and anti-religious attitudes. One conservative newspaper claimed that if 
the PDG were to triumph, “our mosques would be transformed into barracks, the reading of the 
Koran would be considered as laziness, and our prayers as useless occupations.”91 In response, 
PDG officials focused on outward displays of religiosity while campaigning in the Futa. While 
passing through Labé, for example, Sékou Touré attended Friday prayers at the central mosque 
and held a rally afterwards, arguing that the faithful “don’t have to believe in the Governor, or 
the Cercle Commandant, or the Commissaire of Police, who didn’t create them.”92  
 Touré and other PDG activists also encountered significant resistance from religious 
elites in the Futa. Reflecting the pre-colonial combination of spiritual and temporal authority, 
many of the Imams of the Futa’s largest and most influential mosques were the brothers or 
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cousins of canton chiefs.93 Placing family members in different “wings” of authority ensured a 
broader base of legitimacy for elite families. An attack on one wing, therefore, was an attack on 
the family as a whole. PDG attempts to drive wedges between both religious leaders and the 
chieftaincy, and between religious leaders and the faithful were only partially successful. Party 
strategy, therefore, turned to undermining the Futa aristocracy as a whole. From 1956 on, the 
main PDG newspaper, La Liberté, focused on exposing cases of canton chiefs and religious 
leaders “pillaging” and exploitation of persons of former servile status, a phenomenon that party 
leaders claimed occurred throughout colonial Guinea. Articles on exploitation in the party 
newspaper, however, provided examples almost exclusively from the Futa.94  
 One of the most effective PDG critics of the Futa chieftaincy, Saïfoulaye Diallo, had an 
intimate knowledge of the region and its aristocracy. Diallo was born in 1923 in a town not far 
from Labé. His father was a canton chief, and his family was part of the noble ngediyanke lenyol 
that had ruled the pre-colonial diwal of Diari. Diallo attended primary school in Labé, studied at 
the École Georges Poiret in Conakry, and graduated from École William Ponty in 1942. From 
1943 to 1947 he was employed as an accountant in the colonial administration in Niamey. While 
in Niger, Diallo broke with his conservative family (his brothers and fathers would eventually 
join the BAG), joined a communist study group, and served as one of the territory’s 
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representatives to the 1946 Bamako conference.95 While serving in Niamey, Diallo also wrote an 
anti-administration article in a pro-RDA newspaper, which led Djibo Bakary, then a key figure 
within Niger’s RDA branch, to write that, referring to the Guinean civil servant, “Black Africa 
should be proud to have produced men such as you.”96 Diallo was found guilty of subversion 
shortly thereafter, and hoping to neutralize the RDA activist by naming him to his sick father’s 
position as canton chief, the AOF administration had him transferred to Guinea in late 1947. His 
refusal to take up that position upon his return home, Keïta writes, represented his “definitive 
rupture with the feudal system.”97 Only 6 months later, Diallo was transferred yet again due to 
his political activity, this time to Haute Volta. In 1950, Diallo returned to Guinea after falling ill, 
left the French administration, and devoted himself full-time to PDG activism. He quickly struck 
up a close relationship with Sékou Touré, the two working and living together in Conakry. 
According to Diallo’s son, the son of a Fulbe chief and the firebrand union leader complemented 
one another, the former an “intellectual” who provided the ideological thrust of the early PDG, 
and the latter a “man of action” who could effectively organize and inspire activists.98 
 Following Diawadou’s pyrrhic victory in the 1954 special election, Touré charged 
Saïfoulaye with “delivering the Futa for the PDG.” Due to his fluency in the cultural and 
religious language of legitimacy in the Futa, Diallo became an effective critic of region’s elites. 
His crucial step was to sever the colonial chieftaincy from its pre-colonial predecessor. In a La 
Liberté article, Saïfoulaye argued that, due to its double role as both religious and civil authority, 
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the pre-colonial chieftaincy integrated Futa society from top to bottom. Furthermore, pre-
colonial chiefs ruled with the advice and consent of councils of notables, making the Futa Jallon 
state an early democratic system. Following French conquest, though, the powerful pre-colonial 
chieftaincy was a threat to the nascent colonial administration. French officials therefore 
dismantled the pre-colonial system, giving chiefs significant administrative powers while 
attempting to strip them of religious and civil authority outside of the colonial system. The 
colonial administration also broke apart ethnically diverse groups of villages while breaking 
apart the Futa specifically and the AOF in general into smaller cantons in order to “divide and 
rule.” Any attempt to reform the colonial chieftaincy would fail, Diallo argued, as the institution 
was corrupt from its roots: 
Our [the PDG] position on the topic [reform of the chieftaincy] here is clear: the 
chieftaincy, degraded by colonial administration, no longer represents that which 
could appropriately be called “traditional authority”… The chiefs betrayed their 
office by making themselves the servile instruments of power against the 
ongoing interests of the population.99 
 
Combined with the steady beat of reports on violence and extortion committed by chiefs, the 
critique proved to be both effective and evocative for the majority non-elite classes in the Futa.  
 Critiques of the chieftaincy by other PDG activists often bled into commentary about 
Futa society as a whole. Writers in La Liberté remarked that the “Fulbe masses” were often 
“behind” their Susu, Malinké, and Forestière counterparts in joining the PDG and turning against 
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the chieftaincy.100 This divergence, they argued, sprung from the particular history of the Futa 
Jallon that supported a strong feudal aristocracy.101 Furthermore, years of repression, political 
manipulation, and dire economic straits caused by colonial rule had pushed the Fulbe to create 
ethnic organizations.102 Nevertheless, the example of the “democratic” pre-colonial chiefs could 
provide a basis for both the reform of the institution and the return of democracy to the region.103 
PDG leaders echoed the emancipatory narrative presented in the pages of La Liberté while 
campaigning in areas with large Fulbe populations. In turn, early signs of support for the party in 
the Futa became proof that even in the most conservative reaches of the territory the progressive 
march of history represented by the PDG-directed anti-colonial movement was unstoppable.104 
 The PDG campaign against the chieftaincy served as a wedge between the aristocracy 
and the majority of Futa society that did not enjoy the prestige and material benefits of elite 
status. The PDG took advantage of the space opened through anti-chief attacks by effectively 
organizing and mobilizing new players in Guinean politics, or the second prong of its attack. The 
PDG divided its efforts into urban and rural strategies. In the cities, the party used groups of 
“outsider” civil servants and their wives to form neighborhood committees. The cabinets of local 
PDG branches in Labe and Pita, for example, contained a minority of persons with Fulbe names, 
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105 and many of the early participants in the party were civil servants from other regions of 
Guinea assigned to Futa towns by the French administration.106 PDG Women’s branches in the 
Futa, integral to the party’s spread throughout Guinea,107 were similarly composed of those 
“outsider” civil servants’ wives and in some cases women of former slave status.108 As a 
consequence, the largely effective strategy discouraged participation by Futa elites, both 
“traditional” and “modern.” In other words, Saïfoulaye Diallo, a Fulbe of pedigree and formal 
training active in the PDG, was an exception rather than the rule.  
 After establishing bases in the cities, PDG activists spread into rural areas by organizing 
in fulassos and dune, or communities populated primarily by persons of non-elite or former slave 
status. According to Tiala Gobaye Mountaye, an early PDG activist, teacher in Labé, and a 
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ethnic Coniagui “outsider,” the PDG policy of organizing the rural areas served a double 
purpose, harnessing the growing electorate and undermining chiefly power at the same time. 
Political organizing in fulassos and dune also had the added benefit of tilling virgin ground; these 
types of communities had been ignored by the Futa-based parties, who were more concerned 
with consolidating their position amongst Futa elites.109  
The PDG’s spread into the Futa countryside also reflected a broader and longer strain of 
political organizing that was one of the few constants in the party’s ideological development. 
The basic outlines of the PDG strategy of developing cells comprised of a core of educated 
activists who would later mobilize the rural masses was lifted point by point from late 1940s 
Groupes d’études communistes (GEC) courses.110 Both Sékou Touré and Saïfoulaye Diallo’s 
early political careers had been shaped by the GECs, small study groups led by the metropolitan 
Communist Party and focused on an emerging urban working class. While the two leaders’ 
adoption of communist ideology through the courses is questionable – Diallo was a moderate and 
Touré was above all an opportunist – the basic tactics and political structures of the PDG owed 
their inspiration to the study groups.  
Most importantly, the PDG offered persons of former slave status an avenue towards 
greater representation within both political and social structures. Fractures between groups of 
free and non-free in the Futa Jallon had grown before the 1950s, with communities of former 
slave status sometimes pushing back against the domination of former masters. New occupations 
tied to the colonial economy had improved the financial position of many former slaves, 
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although associated rises in social status had been hard to secure.111 Thus, when presented with a 
political party that was critical of the chieftaincy and encouraged the participation of persons of 
former slave status in politics, going as far as giving some leadership positions, inhabitants of the 
dune and foulassos joined the PDG en masse.  
The PDG strategy in the Futa soon bore fruit. In the January 1956 elections for the 
Guinean representatives in the French National Assembly, the PDG received more votes in the 
Futa than either the BAG or DSG. In the November 1956 municipal elections, combined BAG 
and DSG candidate lists won a majority in the mixed communes of Labé and Dalaba, but the 
PDG won a majority in Mamou, where Saïfoulaye Diallo was elected mayor.112 Faced with a 
string of PDG victories, some of the Futa elite began to hedge their bets. Although Almamy Sory 
Dara Barry did not break his alliance with Diawadou and the BAG, his son Mody Oury Barry 
resigned from the BAG and joined the PDG because, he claimed, “everyone is RDA now.”113 
 The PDG conquest of the Futa culminated in the March 1957 elections for the Guinean 
Territorial Assembly. The 1956 Loi Cadre established semi-autonomous governments with 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
111 See Chapter 2. 
 
112 Kéïta, Les Élections, 162-169. 
 
113 Some within the PDG speculated that Mody Oury had always been a “progressive,” but had 
stayed with the BAG out of familial loyalty. A second, and in my opinion more likely, theory 
speculated that Almamy Sory Dara was using his son as the beginnings of a rapprochement 
between the Mamou chief and the PDG. Sory Dara was not hesitant to shift his support based 
upon shifting political winds (as well as his own political goals), and by early 1957 it was clear 
that in Mamou at least they had turned against Barry Diawadou and Barry III. See 
“Renseignements a/s vie politique à Mamou,” no. 169 C/PS.2, 5 January 1957, ANS 17G613; 
“Renseignements a/s adhesion au R.D.A. du chef de quartier Barry Mody Oury, fils de l’almamy 
de Mamou,” no. 926 C/PS.2, 9 January 1957, ANS 17G613. 
! 212 
partial control over the budget and internal workings of the overseas territories.114 The stakes of 
the 1957 elections, therefore, were high, awarding the winning party a large amount of control 
over territorial policy. Saïfoulaye Diallo spent the month before the elections traveling 
throughout the Futa, and other PDG leaders organized mass meetings to display the growing 
spread and power of the party in the region. One such public rally held in Timbo, the former seat 
of the pre-colonial Futa Almamys, brought together 1500 PDG members hailing mostly from 
neighboring runde and foulassos.115 The intended symbolism was clear; pre-colonial and colonial 
hierarchies were giving way to the organized might of near universal suffrage. Barry Diawadou 
restricted his campaign to the northern Futa, especially the Labé, Tougué, and Gaoual regions, 
where he still enjoyed widespread support from the chieftaincy.116 Barry III and the DSG 
focused on the Pita region, from which the socialist candidate’s family hailed. Barry III’s home 
region saw some of the worst violence of the campaign. Fights between parties didn’t break 
down along the familiar PDG versus others line, though. When Saïfoulaye Diallo passed through 
town two weeks before the election, DSG and PDG activists joined forces in Pita against the 
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BAG during street fights, leading to six injuries and the destruction of several houses.117  
 Muddled inter-party violence was caused by a lack of intra-party cohesion between many 
Futa branches and their respective parties’ central leadership. Realizing that the DSG was the 
dominant force in Pita, local PDG and BAG branches, whose parties’ platforms were supposedly 
diametrically opposed to one another, composed a combined list of candidates. The PDG central 
bureau distributed a press release claiming that no such alliance had ever existed. Their denials 
were undermined, though, when reports of a pamphlet published by the local PDG branch 
carrying both parties’ insignia emerged.118 Despite open fighting between the two parties just 60 
km down the road in Pita, the BAG and DSG branches in Labé submitted a common candidate 
list, claiming that PDG manipulation of Susu violence against Fulbe in Conakry had pushed the 
two parties into presenting a common Fulbe front.119 
On the eve of the election, the Futa was the only region where the outcome remained in 
question. The election results offered a clear answer. Of the 60 seats up for vote, the PDG won 
56. The DSG won the three seats representing the Pita region, and the BAG won none.120 The 
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PDG took control of the new semi-autonomous Guinean territorial government, and in May the 
PDG-dominated territorial assembly elected Saïfoulaye Diallo as the body’s President and Sékou 
Touré as the Vice-President of the Government Council, effectively the head of government 
business.121 
Bolstered by a landslide victory, the party enacted an ambitious set of reforms. One of the 
first projects taken up by the new government was the complete reorganization of the local 
administrative structure, achieved through the elimination of the canton chieftaincy and the 
selection of village chiefs by popular vote. 122 The move made political sense. Supporters of the 
chieftaincy were few and far between, and the drastic reform or outright elimination of canton 
chiefs had been the lynchpin of the PDG’s rural strategy since 1954. Even before the BAG and 
DSG’s defeat in the 1957 elections, the chiefs had even lost the support of their supposed 
colonial collaborators. During a 1956 meeting of French commandants posted in Guinea, most in 
attendance argued that the institution was ill suited for modern governance and should be phased 
out.123 Despite the long history of collaboration between the Fulbe chiefs, and the fact that the 
commandants’ meeting was held in Mamou, the hometown a chiefly seat of Almamy Sory Dara 
Barry, it was clear that the era of the colonial chieftaincy in Guinea was coming to a close. 
Debates soon shifted to negotiating the timeline for the eradication of the chieftaincy. The 
chiefs’ earlier efforts to organize and assure their position in the colonial administration, it would 
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seem, had failed. Working in tandem with other “traditional” leaders in the AOF, Sory Dara 
Barry had played a role in establishing the Union Fédérale des Syndicats des Chefs Coutumiers 
at a November 1956 meeting in Dakar. The organization sought to both define and confirm the 
generally chiefs’ role within the colonial administration, and more specifically their salaries, 
benefits, and authority to collect taxes.124 As Mann argues, the creation of the union also 
reflected the colonial chiefs’ argument that they were both “traditional” and administrative, in 
effect denying the division that Saïfoulaye Diallo had previously established. The chiefs sought 
to confirm their dual positions in law, although up to 1957 their efforts had failed.125 Men like 
Sory Dara Barry, therefore, faced the prospect of having their positions erased before they were 
ever explicitly defined. 
Realizing that their time was limited, several canton chiefs met from August 25-27 inside 
Almamy Sory Dara Barry’s Mamou compound to discuss a plan of action. A month earlier, the 
Fulbe chief had invoked the 1897 French treaty of protectorate with the pre-colonial Futa Jallon 
state that had promised to ‘respect the customs’ of the Fulbe in order to demand that the French 
government intervene and save the institution of the chieftaincy.126 By the August meeting, 
Barry and the other canton chiefs requested only that the chieftaincy be gradually phased out by 
attrition rather than immediate revocation.127 Their last-ditch pleas fell on deaf ears. On 
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December 26th, decree no. 57-231 reorganized local administration in Guinea, breaking the 
territory down into administrative posts and urban communes, both run by civil servants, and 
villages, the latter and smallest administrative unit to be governed by elected local councils. 
Decree no. 57-233, issued 5 days later, formally eliminated the chieftaincy.128  
Ultimately, the end of the chieftaincy in the Futa and elsewhere in Guinea resulted form a 
wave of popular discontent combined with the chiefs’ inability to adjust to a growing franchise. 
The chiefs had proven that even in the ‘citadel of reactionary forces’ that was the Futa Jallon 
their influence over local communities was eroding, caused in part due to longer-term social and 
economic trends. In a Guinea marked by universal suffrage, they became a progressively 
marginal political force. Just as importantly, though, the chiefs had no place in the ‘modern’ 
administrative system dictated by the PDG, even if they had been retained in a modified 
capacity. The structure put in place by the PDG-dominated territorial assembly was a carbon 
copy of the party’s own uniform and replicable structure, one in direct opposition to the way the 
chiefs conceptualized the organization of political space and the practice of governance. Under 
the colonial state, the Futa chiefs had negotiated ad-hoc administrations along with hierarchies of 
titles and compensation that rewarded those individuals most effective at ensuring the 
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maintenance of order and the timely collection of taxes. The chiefs’ post-war approach to 
electoral politics was essentially the same, cobbling together diverse regional structures to build 
coalitions.  
The chiefs also relied upon two strategies to influence Guinean politics:  religious, social, 
and political authority, which had been in decline since the 1930s; and networks of patronage, 
which during the colonial state were all too often funded by exploitation. In doing so, they 
neglected developing policies that resonated with a growing electorate and ultimately could not 
justify their continued existence. Such a strategy was reflected by the ‘chiefs’ party,’ the BAG, 
which grouped together loosely regional elites but had largely failed in grassroots organizing, 
ignored policy beyond vague references to ‘traditional culture’ until the late 1950s, and failed to 
build any kind of cohesive political movement. These coalitions, and the ordering of political 
space they represented, proved to be both fragile and unable to organize a territory-wide 
campaign. When measured against the PDG’s ‘modern’ form of political mobilization, the chiefs 
approach to marshalling support was found wanting, eventually leading to their demise. 
By the end of 1957, the PDG had eliminated the most visible representations of elite-
based regionalist politics. The 1957 territorial elections, therefore, marked the end of substantive 
competition between multiple political parties initiated in the aftermath of the 1954 special 
election. Yet the results of the PDG’s eventual victory in the Futa Jallon extended beyond the 
elimination of the Fulbe chiefs as administrators of the Futa Jallon. The process through which 
the PDG gained a foothold on the high plateau meant that the ‘modern’ Fulbe elite – namely, 
those who had, like Barry Diawadou and Barry III, been educated in colonial schools but who 
also held socio-cultural cache in the region – were never integrated into the party. Furthermore, 
in addition to casting the Fulbe chiefs as corrupt shadows of their pre-colonial counterparts, PDG 
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rhetoric also characterized Fulbe society as inherently conservative and resistant to the change 
the party sought to enact throughout Guinea. Although the PDG’s victory was clear, the fault 
lines between it and other influential sections of Fulbe society would only harden as Touré and 
other party leaders sought to consolidate their control over territorial politics. 
The PDG Consolidates Control, 1957-1960 
While the March 1957 elections heralded the arrival of PDG dominance in Guinea, the 
remnants of the BAG and DSG did not fade into the background. In February 1958, a group of 
non-RDA parties created the federation-wide Parti du Regroupement African (PRA). Barry 
Diawadou and Barry III soon established the Guinean branch.129 The two Fulbe opposition 
politicians positioned their party as a regionalist revolt against the newly empowered PDG 
government. During a public meeting in Labé, their comments signaled growing discontent with 
Conakry: 
“The Fouta is scorned by the RDA executive who dare to take its resources by 
overwhelmingly taxing [the Futa’s] inhabitants… One says all over that the 
customary chieftaincy was eliminated because it involved excessive salaries. Then 
why allocate a stipend of 125,000 francs to an advisor and 200,000 to a minister? 
They take us for naïfs and dim-witted, but those that pretend to lead us must 
realize that we hicks [rustres] will unite and act if need be.”130 
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Diawadou then claimed that people in the Basse Côte and Haute Guinée had not paid any kind of 
tax for two years and encouraged the Fulbe to refuse to pay taxes until the government reflected 
their will, a tactic that the PDG itself had used not half a decade earlier. As the PRA rhetoric 
became increasingly critical of the Touré government, it attracted other groups to its side, 
notably former PDG activists who had been excluded from their party during the “Mamou 
deviation” and former soldiers upset over a newly imposed 2% tax on their pensions.131   
Diawadou’s attacks at another PRA rally in the Futa tapped into historical narratives of 
external threats to Fulbe sovereignty and culture. Playing upon Sékou Touré’s claim that he was 
the grandson of Samori Touré, the famous resistor to French conquest and for a time enemy of 
the Futa chiefs, the Fulbe politicians claimed that “what the Almamy Samori could not do, his 
grandson will accomplish today if you let yourselves be dominated: to reduce the inhabitants of 
the Futa to a state of slavery.” The PDG also sought to undermine the foundations of Fulbe 
culture by controlling the mosques – “Soon, it will be the minister of the interior that names the 
imams and will make the choice without any consultation” – and banning polygyny – “Those 
among you who have several wives will keep only one and send back all the others.”132 Thus, the 
PDG’s rise had become an existential threat to Fulbe society itself. Forced into a position of 
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weakness, opposition forces lashed back with an explicitly anti-centralization critique of an 
emerging PDG-dominated Guinean political system.  
Renewed conflict between the PDG and its opposition came to a head in April 1958. The 
PRA held a rally at Yacine Diallo’s tomb in early March which 3000 supporters attended, 
followed by a party congress in Conakry. Shortly after, Diawadou undertook a tour of the Fouta 
and Forest region to rally anti-PDG forces. At each stop along the way he was met with 
protesting PDG supporters who, particularly in the Forest, resorted to violence.133 Conflict on the 
campaign trail turned back towards the capital. Sporadic fighting in Conakry between partisans 
of the rival parties on the night of April 29th led to over one week of open warfare, and conflict 
eventually led to arson which, for many in Conakry, looked to be ethnically targeted.134 On May 
4th security forces finally reestablished control, but the capital had suffered significant damage. 
Over the course of 8 days, 22 people were killed, 16 of them Fulbe, and scores of houses and 
market stalls burned.135 
 The PDG government’s reaction during and after the incidents both echoed the French 
administration’s response to the ’56 riots and also presaging post-independence PDG tactics of 
violent repression. On May 4th, Keïta Fodéba, Minister of the Interior and former head of Les 
Ballets Africaines, and Ismaël Touré, half brother of Sékou and Minister of Public Works, 
directed security forces to open fire on protestors if threatened, an order the French-led forces 
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refused, as they thought the order excessive and were not under the two PDG officials’ command 
in any case.136 The two ministers also ordered the arrest of opposition politicians, an order that 
was likewise ignored by the gendarmes. In its own ex post facto report on the incidents, the 
PDG-led government argued that conflict was primarily political in nature and not ethnic.137 Yet 
in its party newspaper, the PDG leadership argued that the PRA had recruited,  “from the gutters, 
disoriented, uprooted, family-less” Fulbe migrants in Conakry to wage a “’Djihad’ (Holy War) 
against the R.D.A., against the Susu, and for the Fouta Djallon!”138 Meanwhile, Saïfoulaye 
Diallo claimed that PRA activists were involved in a counter-revolutionary plot orchestrated by a 
cabal of colonialists, mining companies, and sections of the French military. These same 
colonialist forces were sending agents recruited in Senegal into the Futa with arms to incite a 
rebellion against the PDG government.139 The now PDG-controlled police warned of continued 
violence, reporting that following the incidents the PRA leadership sent a delegation to the Futa 
spreading word of the attacks and “inviting the Fulbe to avenge their dead and wounded by 
killing an equal number of Susu and looting their property.”140 Furthermore, police reports 
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with meat.”141 Whether or not PDG leaders or their PRA rivals had stoked ethnic violence, or if 
Conakry would shortly be bereft of beef, parts of the Fulbe community in the capital decided that 
they were no longer safe in the capital. In the weeks following violence, an estimated 1750 Fulbe 
left to return to the Futa.142 
 Attention in Guinea soon shifted to the metropole. A coup d’état connected to settlers in 
Algeria nearly toppled the French government, creating an existential crisis within the 
Republic.143 An interim government with Gen. Charles de Gaulle at its head scheduled a 
territory-by-territory referendum on a new constitution for Sep. 28th, and the middle months of 
1958 were consumed with shaping the document’s text.144 Sékou Touré, who increasingly saw 
himself as a pan-Africanist leader, hoped to use the new constitution to reconstitute the 
federations that had been dismantled by the Loi Cadre, although it had become clear by August 
that federal structures would not figure in the final draft.145 As final text of the constitution was 
not distributed until weeks before the vote, though, the PDG leadership’s position towards the 
referendum was ambiguous until mid-September. Touré in particular announced that if crucial 
amendments securing the federations were adopted, the party could throw their support behind a 
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“yes” vote.146  
A shift in the PRA’s position towards the referendum would soon put pressure on Touré 
and the PDG. The federal PRA leaders had met with their RDA counterparts to discuss forming a 
common front to advocate for federal structure within the new French Community. At a July 
PRA congress in Cotounou, however, segments of the party had surged ahead, advocating for 
immediate and complete independence. After negotiating with those who advocated for 
territorial membership in federal structure, notably Senegal’s Leopold Sedar Senghor, a 
compromise was struck: the PRA would call for independence, but would expect the new nations 
to join the French community immediately after the referendum.147 As Cooper has demonstrated, 
the mobilization of the word “independence” gave PRA politicians leverage against their RDA 
rivals.148 In Guinea, Barry Diawadou and Barry III used the language of independence as a 
rhetorical cudgel against Touré and the PDG. A writer in La Voix du Peuple, the PRA newspaper 
directed by Barry Diawadou, claimed that the PDG leaders were “a SELLOUT to the Whites, to 
the power of money, [and] to colonialism.”149 The article capped off Barry Diawadou’s dramatic 
(and most likely ideologically insincere) transformation from a Gaullist conservative puppet of 
the Futa chieftaincy to an anti-colonial firebrand. It was a move rivaled only by Touré’s own 
conversion from anti-establishment gadfly to head of government only too willing to use the 
same tools of repression he had previously condemned.  
De Gaulle planned a barnstorming tour through the African territories to whip up support 
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for the constitution. His August visit to Conakry was a well-publicized disaster, complete with 
antagonistic speeches by Touré and de Gaulle, after which the latter made preliminary plans to 
pull out all French presence in the prodigal former colony.150 Articles in the PDG newspaper La 
Liberté began to hint that the PDG leadership would come out in favor of the increasingly 
popular “no” vote, but still allowed room for Touré to tack back and support the constitution.151 
Immediately following the 4th territorial PDG conference held on September 14th, Sékou Touré 
and the rest of the party leadership advocated definitively for the “no.”152 Two days later, Touré 
and Saïfoulaye Diallo met with Barry Diawadou and Barry III to discuss forming a common 
front, and the PRA leaders agreed to join the PDG in campaigning against the constitution.153 
Even Almamy Sory Dara Barry, the champion of French rule and the quintessential colonial 
chief, told “all those who give credit to my voice” to vote “no” in order to “preserve the unity” 
that Guinea had recently enjoyed.154 On September 28th, 94% of Guineans did just that. 
 In order to write a history of Guinea after the Second World War, one is almost obligated 
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to grapple with the causes of 1958’s resounding “no,’ and thus the territory’s temporary 
divergence from every other French territory. Schmidt, among others, has argued that the vote 
reflected the bottom-up influence of previously marginalized groups like women and youth, who 
pressured Sékou Touré towards immediate independence until the PDG leader eventually caved 
mere days before the election.155 Cooper, on the other hand, argues for a more top-down process 
– namely, that Touré had marginalized any possible opponents by the 1957 elections and could 
therefore, like other African party leaders in the former AOF, impose his will form the top. In 
particular, he points to the lopsided results, which were near negative images of results 
throughout French West Africa.156  
If, as Cooper argues, the referendum’s results were reflective of a growing Soviet-style 
electoral control, Touré and the PDG’s grip on Guinea was still both imperfect and uneven, and 
only partial in the Futa Jallon in particular. In only six administrative regions in Guinea did 
support for the ‘yes’ comprise more than 5 per cent of the total votes cast. All six were in the 
Futa Jallon. Those Futa regions also had higher rates of abstention than the rest of the territory. 
For example, in Labé, where ‘yeses’ were 40.1% of the total, 39.6% of registered voters sat out 
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the referendum. Within the Labé region, there was even a significantly higher rate of abstention 
in those polling places that registered larger amounts of ‘yes’ votes.157 The correlation between 
higher percentages of ‘yes’ votes and abstentions in the Futa Jallon can’t be explained by chiefly 
intimidation alone. In the whole of the Futa there was only one complaint of a village chief 
demanding people vote in support of the constitution while standing outside a polling place. That 
location registered zero ‘yes’ votes.158 In fact, the results support Jean Suret-Canale’s argument 
that the power of chiefs to press people into voting a certain way, which had never been 
particularly effective after 1954, had weakened significantly following the elimination of their 
official positions.159 By the time voting started, the only groups supporting continued association 
with the French state were portions of the chieftaincy, specifically in the Futa, and former 
soldiers afraid of losing their French government-paid pensions.160  Those groups were not 
successful at mobilizing people to vote, thus the higher total of abstention in the Futa, a region 
where a larger portion of the population would be more amenable to voting ‘yes.’ The results in 
the Futa also reflected the PDG’s uneven penetration into the region. The political parties, and 
most importantly their youth and women’s wings, were the main groups mobilizing voters for 
the ‘no’ throughout Guinea and in the Futa Jallon.161 In urban centers and runde, their appeals 
were effective. But large swaths of the Futa, especially in Labé region communities comprised of 
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free but not elite status Fulbe, either lacked local PDG structures or ignored activists’ arguments. 
Sékou Touré would later point to the Futa’s higher ‘yes’ vote total as proof of Fulbe partiality 
towards the ‘French colonialists,’ and there were certainly segments of Fulbe society that did not 
want to see the French leave. No longer beholden to the chiefs but at the same time not attracted 
by PDG rhetoric, however, many voters in the Futa simply decided to stay at home or enjoy 
some attaya rather than vote. 
 Following the referendum, the PDG government turned to consolidating its position in a 
newly independent Guinea. De Gaulle made good on his promise that Guinea would enjoy 
independence with “all its consequences,” and by the end of 1958 all official French 
governmental presence in Guinea had ended, including the cadre of civil servants that had run 
much of the territorial administration.162 Many Guinean civil servants working in other French 
territories were faced with the choice of returning to their territory of birth to aid in its transition 
to a post-colonial nation or staying within the French administration (see Chapter Five). Several, 
including Diallo Telli, one of the few Guineans with an advanced degree who would later 
become the first Secretary General of the African Union, came home. Just as many, including 
several Fulbe still serving in the French armed forces, chose to stay abroad. 
 Barry Diawadou and Barry III faced a decision of their own. The September 16th 
agreement between the PRA and PDG had only temporarily suspended competing political 
activity in order to present a common front. The two Fulbe politicians, therefore, had the option 
of restarting the PRA and forming an opposition to the PDG. In fact, a de jure multiparty system 
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was enshrined in the first constitution. However, the two politicians saw the writing on the wall. 
Independence – and more importantly their position advocating for the “no,” as most prominent 
PRA leaders had switched to support the “yes” in the weeks before the referendum – meant that 
they had been severed from their PRA allies in other territories. Their local party had made little 
headway in organizing, and had been defeated in every round of elections since its creation. The 
opposition was effectively dead, a victim of poor planning and the unique circumstances of 
Guinea’s rapid move towards independence. Diawadou eventually joined the government as the 
Minister of National Education, although according to his family he never joined the PDG.163 
Barry III also joined the government as Secretary of State in charge of economic affairs, but 
likewise was not integrated into the party.164 Both would remain at the margins of the 
government and the new Guinean elite through the 1960s.  
In November, Sékou Touré set off for his first visit as a head of state to Liberia and Ghana, the 
former one of the few territories that had remained independent, at least in international status, 
during the colonial period, the latter one of the first independent post-colonial nations in Africa 
and home to the continent’s most prominent pan-Africanist head of state, Kwame Nkrumah. At 
the same time, rumors of resistance to the new government began to circulate. According to 
French intelligence services, the first signs of discontent started in the Futa. Former soldiers in 
Labé protested against the government due to unpaid pensions. Following one policeman’s 
beating of truck driver with an overloaded rig, a mob in Pita attacked the commissariat and 
chased all of the Susu policemen out of town. In December 1959, religious unrest against the 
“communist government” that had started in Kankan soon spread to Mamou. Finally, at the level 
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of the party leadership, a group of “Marxists” and “radicals” in the PDG attempted to overthrow 
Sékou Touré in favor of Saïfoulaye Diallo.165 Challenges to the independent country only grew 
over the course of 1959. The economic situation deteriorated rapidly, not surprising given the 
disruption of divorce with the metropole along with the French government’s attempts at 
destabilization. Meat and fish shortages started to appear in the capital, and Sékou Touré blamed 
manipulation and speculation by businessmen and smugglers.166 The government instituted price 
controls and restrictions on foreign trade, but the initiatives were largely ineffective.167 
 The January 1961 elections for the President of the Republic of Guinea, the first of its 
kind, took place in such an unsettled political and economic climate. The outcome, however, was 
never in doubt. Sékou Touré was the only candidate and there was no organized opposition.168 
Just in case, Touré mobilized all the resources available to ensure his overwhelming victory. The 
election was both a chance for him to consolidate control over a fractured party and an 
opportunity for the party to consolidate control over areas of Guinea that had resisted its spread. 
The PDG branch in Labé exhorted the region’s voters to “repair the shame of its 27,000 ‘yeses’” 
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in the 1958 referendum by voting en masse for the “architect of independence.”169 On January 
15, 1961, Touré was elected, carrying 99.37% of the vote.170 He would be reelected as Guinea’s 
president in 1968, 1975, and 1982, each time with similarly gaudy results. Contestation between 
rival politicians would be pushed to internal PDG putsches or an exiled opposition, but in Guinea 
the first era of multiparty politics had come to a close.  
 The period between the creation of the 1957 Loi Cadre government and the 1961 
presidential election was marked by both contestation and consolidation amongst Guinea’s 
political elite. Opposition to the PDG rooted in the Futa flourished for a brief moment in 1958. 
Yet the rapidly accelerating pace of political change during that year, as well as the PDG’s 
growing control of local and territorial politics, pushed Fulbe politicians like Barry III and Barry 
Diawadou towards negotiating a place, although at the margins, within the emerging post-
colonial order. The September 1958 “no” might have signaled a drastic break from Guinea in the 
realm of international and French post-imperial politics, but in villages in the Futa and many 
neighborhoods in Guinea the ramifications of such a rapidly achieved independence wouldn’t 
start to be felt until well into the following year.  
It’s tempting to cast as both tragic and misguided those sons of Futa chiefs who stood at 
the sea’s shore and told the rising tide to halt. Such an interpretation, however, reflects a 
misunderstanding of this period in Guinean history. PRA leaders realized by June 1958 that 
independence and a drastic reconfiguration of the relationship between the former colony and 
metropole was on the horizon. What shape that relationship would take between Futa society and 
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outside political powers, be they seated in Conakry, Dakar, or Paris, was far from clear, though, 
even after the referendum severed formal ties between Guinea and the French community. Given 
imperfect knowledge of a muddled situation, Fulbe leaders and their followers accepted the 
PDG’s rise and sought to find some sort of accommodation. The 1961 presidential election and 
the political consolidation it reflected did not bring an end to contestation over how that new 
post-colonial situation would shake out. Those debates and battles were simply pushed 
underground, only to bubble back up over the 23 years that Guinea’s First Republic reigned. 
Conclusion 
 A series of elections that featured increasingly wider participation and greater stakes 
structured the first period of multiparty politics in Guinea from 1945 to 1961. Politicians, 
political activists, and the parties they formed engaged in a struggle of ideas and tactics to ensure 
electoral success. At the most practical, these maneuvers were about winning votes and 
strengthening the party. At the most abstract, campaigns and speeches became debates about the 
future of whichever community an individual or group most associated themselves with, be it a 
runde in Labé, the Futa Jallon as a region, or Guinea as a whole, sovereign nation-state or part of 
a reformed French community. The result of this process was that by 1961 a pattern of 
opposition to Conakry in the Futa had taken the form of a regionalist rebuke against outsiders. 
On one level, regionalism among Fulbe elites grew from the same sorts of conversations Fulbe 
exceptionalism that occupied AGV members, Barry Diawadou, Barry III, and Saïfoulaye Diallo, 
a discourse that tapped into a history of social hierarchies, colonial rule, and Fulbe culture 
specific to the region. On another, elite Fulbe opposition grew out of the exigencies of building 
political alliances during this era, which pushed individuals and groups to accentuate affinities 
and difference with segments of Futa society. Lastly, the work required to build stable and strong 
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parties – grassroots organizing in the countryside and city, control of public space through 
sometimes violent means, highlighting wedge issues in newspapers and speeches – welded 
ethnic identification to political community.  
To talk about the particular history of Fulbe society, for both Fulbe and non-Fulbe alike, 
was also to imagine what aspects of ‘tradition’ would continue on in a ‘modern’ Guinea, or more 
generally if there was even a place for the Fulbe in the post-colonial nation at all. These 
conversation – as well as the war of strategy and mobilization waged by rival political parties – 
reached a climax during the run-up and aftermath of the 1957 elections for the territorial 
assembly. Often seen as the birth of the Guinean nation, the PDG’s conquest of the Futa Jallon 
only cauterized ethno-regional division, leaving a mark that would shape internal Guinean 
politics going forward.  
 Starting in 1958 and picking up steam through the ‘60s, the PDG-led government 
expressed its intent to grind smooth those regional and/or ethnic welds through the dual policy of 
sweeping reform and construction of the Guinean nation. The next chapter will examine in part 
whether the post-colonial government’s claim to make Fulbe into Guineans was genuine, if 
possible at all. In this post-colonial period, as we will see, Guineans grappled with two 
competing historical trends: the rise of an anti-colonial nationalism, on the one hand, and the 
growing calcification of the Fulbe fragment therein on the other. The history of the first period of 
multi-party politics in Guinea presented above demonstrates that in the moyen durée history of 
post-WWII Guinean political history, the linking of ethnic identification and political community 
has proved to be just as important as the anti-colonial nationalism that was intended to defeated 
it. “The last bastion of Feudalism’ and ‘we rustres will unite if need be’ might lack a degree of 
certitude and conciseness. The combination of political thought and practice those phrases 
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represented, however, should be included in any vocabulary of Guinean political history, right 




Producing the “Particular Situation”: Reform and Political Conspiracy during the First 
Republic, 1961-1976 
In October 1958, optimism reigned within the sovereign nation-state of Guinea, despite 
what many considered to be a difficult road ahead in the near term. While some Western 
intelligence services worried about possible alignment with the Soviet Union, international praise 
for the first French territory in Africa to gain independence was widespread.1 Along with 
Ghana’s President Kwame Nkrumah, Guinea’s Sékou Touré came to represent a new generation 
of African leaders who articulated a post-colonial pan-Africanist vision of the continent’s future. 
The new president had laid out a path forward that was based upon an anti-ethnic, inclusionary 
nationalist movement. The future was bright. Guinea had a charismatic leader with a clear vision, 
and most importantly a public that was eager to construct their new nation. 
By 1968, the first of a series of political purges was in the works, and years of economic 
hardship due to failed government planning had reduced the vast majority of Guineans to severe 
poverty. The early ‘70s witnessed increasingly violent repression, and with the “Fulbe Plot” of 
1976, previously hidden ethnic conflict not seen since decolonization reemerged into the public 
sphere. The Guinean First Republic would continue until Sékou Touré’s death in 1984. But by 
the late 1970s, even the most strident Touré supporters recognized that the Guinean nation-
building project was at least partially dysfunctional. In this sense, while Guinea may have 
diverged from other former French colonies by opting for the “no” in 1958, in the midterm the 
nation joined a more general trend towards the consolidation of power by single-party regimes 
and the gradual closing of opportunities for opposition. 
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Several scholars have attempted indentify which aspects of the post-colonial state caused 
such a consolidation of power, finding fault either in forms of colonial rule or the unsuitability of 
“Western” state forms – namely, the nation-state – for African societies.2 While these ambitious 
models open a space for comparison within the analytical category of “Africa,” they also neglect 
the historicity of specific political communities. The colonial state or “Western” ideas about 
statehood shaped how Africans interacted with the various governments that developed in the 
wake of independence, and offered ruling parties some – but not all – of the tools to control 
populations. Yet local contingencies of governance rather than state types were the prime force 
shaping Guinea’s post-colonial trajectory. It is that local, internal frame that shapes the historical 
account that follows below. 
This chapter examines local Guinean politics from 1958-1976, and more specifically the 
relationship between Fulbe communities and the post-colonial Sékou Touré-led government. The 
argument presented below has two main components. First, the series of social, political, and 
economic reforms enacted by the PDG-led government following independence engendered an 
atmosphere of mutual distrust between political leaders in Conakry, on the one hand, and large 
segments of the Fulbe community in the Futa Jallon on the other. Resentment from both sides 
eventually unraveled the coalition that had secured the PDG’s “conquest” of the Futa during the 
1950s. Some of these policies grew from the PDG’s ideology of egalitarianism through African 
socialism. Others arose from the practical concerns of building a functioning state in uncertain 
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and at times hostile national, West African, and international contexts. The vast majority of PDG 
initiative, though, sought to impose closer political control over the country as a whole. In the 
Futa Jallon in particular, reforms were meant to undermine the power of both “modern” and 
“traditional” elites, including the Fulbe politicians Barry Diawadou and Ibrahima Barry III, who 
had resisted the PDG’s rise during the 1950s. Counter to portrayals of Sékou Touré as a 
megalomaniac bent upon absolute control starting in the 1950s, or mirror-imaged accounts of the 
Futa elite’s collaboration with foreign intelligence services in order to submit the country to neo-
colonialism, animosity between political leaders in Conakry and the Futa Fulbe accrued in large 
part from a series of smaller decisions and unforeseen consequences. Furthermore, by widening 
access to mosques, fields, and administration buildings, the PDG opened avenues for non-elite 
Fulbe families to gain religious, economic, and political prestige, in effect widening the circle of 
those persons willing to fight for the preservation of an elite version of Fulbe culture and society. 
Ultimately, government-enacted reforms temporarily ensured the PDG’s short-term ascendancy 
in the Futa Jallon but eroded its long-term base of support in the region.  
Second, the chapter argues that the 1968 to 1976 “era of plots” gave rise to a post-
colonial politics where a corpus of “hidden” ethnic characteristics became an explanatory device 
for understanding purported motives and “traitorous” actions during the 1970s.3 Over the course 
of the twentieth century, ethnic communities in Guinea became both standardized (in language, 
culture, religious practice, etc.) and tied with a series of characteristics through a combination of 
colonial ethnography and popular culture. During the first decade of the post-colonial era, 
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ethnically tinged explanations for accused treason or subversive activities were pushed into the 
concealed world of conspiracy and whispered words spoken amongst intimate friends. This 
stifling of “ethnicity talk” was the result of the government’s robust anti-ethnic policy, which 
outlawed any outward manifestation of ethnic allegiance. Punishment for violations of the anti-
ethnic laws increased over time. Up to the 1970s, markers of membership in an ethnic 
community were commonly thought to be the result of historic developments, ones that would 
eventually be overcome by Guinean nationalism. With the era of increased repression that 
culminated in the 1976 “Fulbe plot,” though, the previously hidden world of ethnic 
characteristics burst into the open, and what had before been a result of historical process became 
a fundamental aspect of the Fulbe identity. Thus, accusations about treason and the political 
conflict from which they sprung became conversations about belonging and ethnicity, leading in 
large part to a recent political history that has been defined by the coterminous boundaries of 
ethnic and political community. The PDG government didn’t create the idea that ethnicities had 
certain characteristics; they did, however, make such a mode of thought a central aspect of 
Guinean politics. 
This chapter’s structure mirrors its argument. The first half examines the set of economic, 
political, and social reforms the PDG enacted throughout Guinea. These policies had variable 
effects on Guinea’s different regions, and this chapter considers what resulted in the Futa in 
particular. The second half of the chapter turns to competition within an emerging political elite 
and the age of plots that followed. It charts the process by which Fulbe former opposition 
members were marginalized over the course of the 1960s, and how the age of plots resulted from 
pervasive political instability. This section is capped off by an analysis of Sékou Touré’s August 
1976 speech announcing the “Fulbe Plot,” a public text that drew together and reinforced the 
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historical trajectories turned into social “truths” that produced the “particular situation” in the 
Futa.  
As a whole, the chapter roots the political history of the First Republic in the local and 
daily concerns of the state. Furthermore, it locates the intersection of “hidden” and “visible” 
aspects of Guinean politics – both important parts of political discourse in post-colonial Guinea 
and deserving of equal consideration4 – at the public site of the plot. What results is a more 
complex and locally situated explanation for state repression and ethnic violence than what is 
often advanced in other general studies on the trajectories of the general post-colonial African 
states. 
Controlling the Economy, Sealing the Borders 
Guinea’s post-colonial government faced a host of problems immediately after gaining 
independence, chief of which was stabilizing the nation’s economy. During the previous sixty 
years, the vast majority of Guinea’s exterior trade was oriented towards the French metropole. 
Following the September 1958 referendum, the French withdrew from the former colony, halting 
all material support and refusing to recognize the newly independent state.5 The desire to cut ties 
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was mutual. Following Nasser’s Egypt, Tito’s Yugoslavia, and Nehru’s India, Touré and the 
PDG leadership adopted a policy of “positive neutralism” in relation to Eastern and Western 
Bloc countries, and set about the difficult work untangling Guinea from French economic 
dominance.6 Guinea left the French-run CFA zone in March 1960 and established its own 
currency, allowing for internal control over financial policy but unmooring Guinea’s franc from 
the more stable French franc. Later that year, the government established the state-run Comptoir 
Guinéen du Commerce Extérieur (CGCE) and tasked it with controlling foreign trade, intended 
in part to steer exports and imports away form the former metropole. The organization was given 
a monopoly on business with Eastern Bloc countries and control over percentages ranging from 
30% to 75% of export crops such as coffee, bananas, and palm kernels.7 Combined with a new 
and more volatile currency, the move towards a state-controlled economy led to a flight of 
foreign investment, causing in turn rampant inflation and periodic shortages of basic goods. To 
stabilize Guinea’s domestic economics, the government then established the Comptoir Guinéen 
du Commerce Intérieur (CGCI). The CGCI assumed control of all wholesale transactions and 
transportation, set standard prices for food and consumer goods, and established state-run model 
stores in all cities and villages to ensure a steady flow of merchandise.8 The two were intended to 
work in tandem, organizing internal distribution while at the same time tightly controlling the 
small portal through which goods flowed in and out of the country. 
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Together, the CGCE and CGCI represented an attempt to minimize instability through 
state authority. They were also a means for an emerging post-colonial political elite to exert 
control over independent bases of power, most notably merchants and foreign firms. Both proved 
to be short-lived experiments. The hastily created organizations failed to relieve the dual 
problems of product shortages in the interior and runaway inflation. The CGCE did not stimulate 
international trade and was undermined by smuggling to and from neighboring territories. 
Furthermore, at first meant to reduce the presence of French firms in Conakry, the shift towards 
state control of exports had the primary effect of pushing out mid-sized Lebanese-owned trading 
companies and small-scale African merchants who had previously served many of the rural 
markets and less profitable urban centers in the interior.9 The CGCI performed no better. 
According to officials, more than 120,000 tons of goods sat in government warehouses in 
Conakry, the more perishable foodstuffs spoiled or eaten by vermin while awaiting transport to 
the interior.10 Less than one year after their creation, both organizations were broken apart into 
smaller state-run groups serving specific sectors of the economy.  
The government continued to struggle with developing a coherent economic policy over 
the next three years. Commerce and trade would be opened up to middle- and small-scale 
merchants in order to ensure supply of goods into the interior. When prices invariably rose in 
reaction to pent-up demand, the government would blame merchants for price gouging, limiting 
their numbers, opening up state-run stores, and introducing mandated lower prices. The lower 
prices of goods, restrictions on legal trade, and lack of consumer goods in Guinea encouraged 
illicit exportation of basic agricultural goods such as flour and fruit to neighboring countries. 
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Smugglers would return with hard currency and commercial goods to sell in the interior. State-
run stores were unable to provide for even the most basic goods, driving people to the black 
market to buy things like cooking oil and wheat. The government then opened up trade again to 
ensure supplies, and the cycle would begin again.  
It was in this troubled economic climate that the Guinean government enacted a sweeping 
set of reforms called the Loi-Cadre of 1964. None of the economic policies were new. The 
overall number of merchants was decreased and all private traders were required to reapply for 
work permits. Smuggling and black market trading were, yet again, outlawed. The number of 
frontier guards was doubled to stop smuggling, and state-controlled enterprises would gradually 
take over all importing and exporting.11 The law represented the first time, however, that all of 
the centralized economic reforms were put into place at the same time while also increasing the 
powers of the state to enforce the new laws.  
A second and more important set of reforms enacted by the Loi Cadre applied to 
government appointees. Prominent figures within the government had supposedly grown wealthy 
from running state-owned enterprises while forging alliances with many of Guinea’s leading 
businessmen. The two groups’ combined influence represented a competing pole of influence, 
one that could possibly undermine PDG’s dominant position within Guinea. In order to weaken 
these potential usurpers, the Loi Cadre instituted a Commission on the Verification of Property, a 
body of party activists charged with determining whether or not property held by administrative 
and political appointees since 1958 had been gained honestly. In addition, government workers 
and political leader were banned from participating in private commerce, and all those found to 
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have conducted trade at any time since independence were immediately relieved of their posts.12 
Lastly, the Loi Cadre political reforms reduced the number of comités de base, the often-unruly 
local PDG party sub-branches that had bucked centrally mandated directives the previous year.13 
The new initiatives represented a drastic political consolidation by the President and his close 
allies.14 The PDG leadership’s aim was clear: starve possible rivals, notably merchants and 
politicians, of independent power bases while instituting strict control over activists who had 
since the 1950s leaned towards radical iconoclasm rather than party orthodoxy. 
The 1964 Loi Cadre may have been geared towards controlling the country’s active base 
and leadership, but it also included widespread ramifications for the majority of Guinea’s 
population. Communities in the Futa Jallon felt the full brunt of many of the reforms. Smuggling, 
black-market trade, and illegal emigration had been outlawed since independence, but the Loi 
Cadre signaled a shift towards strict enforcement of the ban. In the aftermath of the economic 
reforms, confidential government security briefings included a steady beat of incidents and 
arrests along the border and in marketplaces, many of them in the Futa Jallon or involving Fulbe. 
In April 1965, border guards and members of the Jeunesse de la Révolution Démocratique 
Africaine (JRDA), the paramilitary youth wing of the PDG, fired on a group of Fulbe attempting 
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to smuggle goods into Portuguese Guinea (Guinea Bissau). The following month, economic 
police seized a herd of cows in the Dalaba region – located in the central Futa and more than 100 
km away from the nearest border – supposedly because the herd’s owners were preparing to 
smuggle their cattle out of the country.15 Merchants and herders in the Futa were quick to 
express their discontent, and in June, Sékou Touré was forced to hold a series of rallies around 
Labé.16 The government’s attempts to allay Guinean’s complaints did not come with a loosening 
of restrictions, though. A fundamental conflict remained; while trying to gain control of the 
national economy, the government was also undercutting the livelihoods of many within the Futa 
and Guinea as a whole. 
Security forces also sought to erect barriers to internal migration. Strict laws attempted to 
stem the flow of migrants to Guinea’s rapidly growing urban centers, as the “rural exodus” 
undermined government attempts to boost agricultural output in the interior. Following the 
implementation of the Loi Cadre, groups of police and JRDA members swept through urban 
centers picking up the “fake unemployed,” primarily recent migrants with no or only part-time 
employment.17 One security briefing reported the arrest of a large group of Fulbe laborers in 
Conakry. Each one was fined 100,000 Guinean francs – equal to the price of over 1400 kg of rice 
or about $3000 2013 US, well above the yearly wages of an average worker18 – for illegally 
moving to an urban center. As the men could not pay the exorbitant fine, they were handed over 
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to local police to be transported back to their home villages.19  
Rural migrants weren’t the only urbanites disgruntled with the Loi Cadre. Even before 
the Loi Cadre, Guineans argued that the post-colonial state was doing no better than the French. 
One garage owner in the capital remarked that the 1958 “non” demanding independence didn’t 
really change anything; yes, Guineans were no longer submitted to foreign repression, but many 
of the restrictions put in place by the government were against PDG ideals and no different from 
its colonial predecessor.20 The laws imposed by the government in 1964 only raised the volume 
of public critique. Government security reports from Pita, a town in the central Futa Jallon, listed 
protests from local townsfolk about the yearly government requisitions of cattle21 while women 
in Conakry complained that rice shortages had paralyzed the city.22 
Security reports depict a tug of war between what had previously been lightly restricted 
migration and trade systems and a government attempting to exert control over its citizens. 
Everyday struggles over the reach of government power occurred throughout Guinea, but Fulbe 
migrants and merchants featured most prominently in reports of seizures and arrests.  Long-term 
social and economic transformations in the Futa had pushed the region’s rural poor to migrate.23 
Migrants from the resource poor Futa believed that opportunity lay in the rapidly growing urban 
centers of Conakry and Dakar, and economic crisis in Guinea only accelerated the trend towards 
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emigration to the capital or abroad. 24 Merchants with roots in the Futa built upon these migrant 
networks to supply a commodity-deficient economy. In turn, the growing mobility of goods and 
persons to and from the Futa marked the Fulbe as rebellious. 
Touré and the PDG-led government may have, in the end, intended the Fulbe migrants 
and merchants in particular to feel the brunt of the Loi Cadre. The 1964 law was primarily a 
means of political consolidation throughout Guinea. The Futa Jallon was the last region to resist 
the PDG’s pre-independence rise to power, and many of the politicians who had opposed the 
PDG during decolonization were from the region. Prominent traders and former chiefs had 
supported Fulbe opposition members, and Touré, nicknamed syli or “the elephant,” didn’t easily 
forget. In a November 18, 1964 speech, the president listed the destructive practices that 
Guineans had said “no” to when they rejected French colonialism in 1958. Touré referred to the 
familiar cast of economic saboteurs such as traffickers, illegal migrants, and corrupt civil 
servants. Notably, he also warned of a “renaissance of racism upon which certain [people] base 
their foolish hopes of political revenge.”25 In revolutionary language, “racism” meant any form 
of ethnic solidarity that hindered the development of the Guinean national consciousness. The 
word had a particular history, however, one that was linked closely with the Futa Jallon’s recent 
past. During the period of intense and sometimes violent competition between Fulbe-led political 
parties and the Touré-led PDG during the 1950s, PDG activists often deployed accusations of 
“racism” as a means to attack Fulbe chiefs. The Futa, they argued, was the “last bastion” of 
feudalism. The Fulbe elite, mired in their own sense of superiority and racist thought, had caused 
the region to diverge from others in Guinea that had adopted the anti-ethnic nationalism 
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championed by the PDG.26 Therefore, when Touré warned that “racism” was holding back the 
economic, social, and political development of the country, Guineans were likely to remember 
the political violence of the 1950s that had hinged upon invocations of Fulbe racism in particular. 
The 1964 Loi Cadre had many of the same results as the previous half-decade of 
experimentation with economic centralization. Guineans today remember the year that followed 
as one of severe economic deprivation and at times starvation. One man recalled there not being 
a pair of shoes in all of Guinea, forcing people to make sandals out of strips of bark from young 
saplings.27 Other accounts mention shortages of basic staple goods like rice and oil.28 The Loi 
Cadre’s aftermath coincided with a drastic fall in agricultural output due to a failed 3-year 
economic plan based on Chinese and the Soviet models, further pressing on the country’s poor.29 
For the time being, though, Guineans would have to sacrifice for their nation. The Loi Cadre 
reforms – and the political consolidation they enabled – would stay. 
Reforming the Futa Jallon 
Struggles over the future of post-colonial Guinea were not restricted to the borders and 
markets. The PDG-led government enacted an ambitious program of social reform in the interior, 
seeking to revolutionize interactions among the nation’s citizens and modernize the relationship 
between the state and the populace. PDG policy, the party’s leaders claimed, grew from 
celebrating those parts of tradition that could act as a resource for the African Socialist state 
while eliminating other practices that hindered political, social, and economic development. 
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Intended or not, the reforms also had wide-ranging effects on social hierarchies and daily life in 
the interior, especially in the Futa Jallon.  
Recent studies of social reform under the First Republic have focused on the “peripheral” 
zone of the Forest Region as a prime terrain for the creation of the modern Guinean state.30 In 
fact, state attempts at modernization sought to transform particular practices found in each of 
Guinea’s four regions. Mamadou Sanassi Keïta, a former government official and current PDG 
activist, had a particular window onto the ideology that informed the First Republic state’s 
attempts at social, economic, and cultural reform. Starting as a teacher in the Forest Region in 
1963, Keïta rose through the ranks of the party, becoming a local Comité de Base and JRDA 
leader. He eventually headed up the regional ”Bureau of Philo-ideo-sociology,” the body charged 
with determining and spreading party ideology, and eventually was named Vice President of the 
National Assembly and a Regional Governor. According to Keïta, each region had its own 
“handicapping practice” that the party was forced to overcome. The Forest Region was host to 
poro societies, which were broken by the demystification campaign initiated shortly after 
independence.31 In Haute Guinea, the government tightly controlled juula traders who threatened 
to undermine economic reform put in place by the ’64 Loi Cadre.32 In the Basse Côte, PDG 
activists forcibly clothed villagers who had previously lived naked, or so Keïta claims. All of 
these “backwards” practices had to be eliminated to ensure Guinea’s march towards modernity.  
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In the Futa Jallon, PDG officials set their sight on the social hierarchies that provided the 
structure of the pre-colonial theocratic Futa state.33 Futa Jallon “feudalism,” using PDG 
terminology, had resulted in the subjugation of hundreds of thousands of persons of slave status 
even after legal emancipation in 1905. Most importantly, Fulbe elites who benefited from social 
hierarchies in the Futa Jallon were arguably the greatest impediment to PDG spread into the 
central plateau during the 1950s. And Fulbe society would prove to be frustratingly resistant to 
post-colonial reform. In order to undermine the social hierarchies that continued to structure Futa 
society, the PDG implemented reforms in four domains: agriculture and livestock; Islam; local 
political administration; and the politics of youth. Before independence, the four had served as 
pillars that supported the privilege of a small aristocracy. Under the post-colonial state they 
would serve as the means to enforce the equality of all Guineans. 
Agriculture and Livestock 
Colonial rule altered the practice of agriculture and animal husbandry that had persisted 
largely intact under the pre-colonial state, but did little to change the inequality such a system 
engendered. Adopting a mixed system, French statutes gave the colonial state control over lands 
not being actively worked (French mise en valeur) while defining already cultivated fields as 
communal property of nearby villages. According to loosely defined “customary law” that 
determined communal land use, misside chiefs assigned the rights to exploit fields within their 
jurisdictions, which they commonly gave to members of their extended families. As the vast 
majority of village chiefs within the Futa hailed from the region’s elite, colonial land reforms – 
including French administrators’ attempts to transform the system of slavery abolished in 1905 
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into sharecropping – perpetuated inequality between former slaves and masters.34  
The PDG government continued colonial statutes based upon mise en valeur, but used it 
instead to nationalize large parcels of land previously managed through customary law. As part 
of economic reforms meant to transform Guinea into an agricultural exporter through the 
harnessing of rural “human power,” the government stipulated that it had sole rights over lands 
within the borders of Guinea. Lands not fully exploited came under the direct control of the 
central state and were often handed over to poorly run cooperatives, while the administration of 
village communal lands was assigned to local political authorities.35 The policy could have been 
used to empower former slaves, who had been alienated from the fruits of their labor under the 
colonial and pre-colonial systems, through the establishment of permanent rights. Instead, 
temporary rights to exploit these lands were assigned to communities of former slave status, but 
actual ownership was never transferred. Thus, as Moustapha Diop argues, the PDG land policy 
was meant more as a means to weaken the land-owning Futa elite or those who had fallen out of 
favor with Conakry rather than as a full-faith effort to correct past injustices.36 In fact, the PDG 
policy severely handicapped former maccube claims over property during the neo-liberal Second 
Republic, as Fulbe elites could produce property records from the colonial period while the 
maccube, empowered after independence, could not. Furthermore, while under the First Republic 
communities of former slaves gained access to lands previously controlled by elites, a 
combination of graft and agricultural quotas stifled local production and funneled agricultural 
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surplus to a new political elite of civil servants.37 
The PDG-led government also turned its eyes towards the Futa’s greatest resource: cattle. 
Initial reforms were not explicitly geared towards undermining the Futa’s elite, but rather were 
meant to supple Guinea’s cities with meat. Poor soil on the high plateau restricted agricultural 
surpluses, but the region’s grasslands were ideal for grazing. Like its colonial predecessor, the 
PDG government sought to tap into one of the few goods the region could export. After the 1964 
Loi Cadre, the large herds of cattle in the Futa became integral to state supplies of meat in 
rapidly growing urban centers, especially Conakry. The government reasoned that the region 
could provide most of Guinea with meat and instituted quotas, around 10% of the total herd per 
annum for each cattle-producing administrative region in the Futa. By 1971, for example, the 
central Futa Pita region was required to provide 3500 head of cattle per year to the state-
controlled cattle trading company, Office Guinéen du Bétail (OBETAIL).38 In line with other 
price controls established for agricultural goods, these state run companies consistently offered 
50% or less of market price for the cattle.39 In response to the government’s demands and low 
prices, Futa herders simply left with their livestock for Senegal or Sierra Leone.40 Those who 
stayed would flee into the countryside when government census takers, vaccination teams, or 
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economic police passed through their villages.41 Both of these tactics were well established by 
the 1960s and ‘70s, as rural communities in the Futa had used similar strategies to escape 
colonial quotas for cattle and labor.42  
OBETAIL also proved to be ineffective at providing sufficient supplies of meat to urban 
centers. Butchers in the capital complained that they made no money by selling meat, as state-
mandated prices on the consumer price of beef meant that money was lost on each kilogram 
sold.43 Many simply decided to stop selling meat altogether. Furthermore, OBETAIL only 
furnished a portion of cattle needed to meet base levels of demand, and local officials often 
parceled out what little meat existed based upon personal or political favor.44 Given the high 
price for meat on the black market, local officials often gave in to the temptation of corruption. 
In Pita, for example, the state-appointed director of the city’s refrigerated warehouse labeled 
large quantities of meat spoiled and then resold the product at much higher prices.45 The state 
responded to the faulty system in 1975 by cracking down on corruption, increasing the amount of 
cattle each region in the Futa had to furnish, and, to deal with the problem of skirting cattle 
censuses, establishing state-run pens in which herders were forced to keep their cattle. The first 
initiative only temporarily reduced graft. The latter two bought about the exodus of whole 
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villages of herders towards Senegal.46 In fact, numerous villages of Futa Fulbe in the Koundara 
border region of Southern Senegal trace their origin to the mid-1970s.   
Combined with the navétanat, a system of seasonal migration of Fulbe to Senegal with 
deep historical roots in the Futa,47 the herders’ flight was proof positive to government officials 
that the Futa Fulbe were more interested in becoming rich aboard than building their own 
country. That the Senegalese government was supposedly at the root of several attempted 
overthrows of the PDG government only confirmed their treason. For their part, Fulbe elites 
harbored little love for a state that had eroded their economic foundation by taking away control 
of agricultural land and giving it to persons of low social status. State policy towards cattle 
alienated the Fulbe burure who, having endured severe exploitation by Fulbe elites during the 
pre-colonial and colonial eras, should have been the natural allies of the reformist PDG. Villages 
of maccube continued to support the PDG government, but for the majority of Fulbe in the Futa 
the state represented a threat to their livelihoods. Distrust between the Conakry government and 
the Futa Fulbe functioned as a feedback loop. For one side, the Futa was a bastion on 
conservative resistance to modernization, stuck in its feudal and colonial practices and in need of 
evermore-drastic reform. For the other, the PDG-led government as simply another power in 
Conakry bent upon extracting resources from the Futa and deserving of either passive or active 
resistance.  
Islam 
 In both the pre-colonial Futa Jallon state and under colonial rule, the Fulbe aristocracy 
legitimized their rule by linking social status and political authority with Islamic religiosity. 
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Fulbe elites were natural leaders, or so religious scholars argued, because they practiced a more 
“ideal” Islam than their slaves.48 Despite the abolition of the juridical status of slave in 1905, 
unequal relationships between former slaves and masters persisted, due in large part to paired 
ideas about religious and political authority.49 Colonial rule partially dissociated temporal power 
from its spiritual counterpart. By the 1930s, collaboration by colonial chiefs prompted criticisms 
of moral bankruptcy even within conservative elements in the Futa,50 and Saïfoulaye Diallo, the 
Fulbe president of the Guinean National Assembly and confident of Sékou Touré, harnessed 
rural discontent with exploitation by arguing that the chiefs in the 1950s were corrupted 
facsimiles of their pre-colonial predecessors. Under colonial rule, the Futa remained a center for 
Islamic scholarship and learning in West Africa, but by independence the combination of 
spiritual and temporal authority at the top of the region’s social pyramid had unwound, a process 
that was accelerated following the demise of the chieftaincy in 1957.  
The link between Islamic religiosity and more general elite privilege, however, remained 
intact in large swaths of the Futa well into the 1960s. This persistence was based in large part on 
the division of social, political, and economic space within the Futa Jallon, a legacy of the pre-
colonial state. Social hierarchies were mapped onto the geography of the Futa through a spatial 
organization structured by a central town, or misside, inhabited by elites and their domestic 
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servants, surrounded by a series of dependent villages populated by communities of slave or non-
elite status called runde and foulasso, respectively.51 The centrality of the misside in the political 
and religious geography of the Futa was underscored by the fact that only in the central elite 
village could one build a mosque. In order to attend Friday prayers at the mosque – an 
increasingly common practice given the spread of Islam under colonial rule52 – persons of former 
servile status were often forced to travel, sometimes at significant distance, to the centers of elite 
privilege and in some missidi (pl. of misside) enter the mosque through separate doors or even 
pray outside.53  
Weekly reminders of social hierarchies during Friday prayers were incompatible with the 
“modern” society the PDG sought to build. After independence, community leaders in former 
runde and foulasso exerted their newly found political independence by demanding that mosques 
be built in their local communities. The inhabitants of Kouraba, a foulasso 60 km east of Labé 
and part of the pre-colonial misside of Daralabé, made plans to build their own mosque just two 
months after independence. Still respectful of local religious practices, the notables of Kouraba 
first asked permission of the former village chief and notables of Daralabé to start construction. 
Once the mosque was complete, though, the chief of Daralabé refused to consecrate the building, 
denying his spiritual authority to the foulasso’s mosque and making it unfit for worship. 
Frustrated with the misside leaders’ obstinacy, the notables of Kouraba requested the head of the 
administrative region of Labé to intercede on their behalf. The Labe governor did just that, 
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reminding the chief and notables of Daralabé that “you must recognize that the liberty of religion 
is granted to everyone.”54 The initial refusal by the heads of Daralabé was most likely rooted in 
their fear of losing religious authority over a community of lower (although now free) social 
status. They also realized that in the post-colonial socialist republic religious power was 
especially valuable, as in the context of waning political and economic influence it was one of 
the few means to enforce authority over villages of former slaves. In effect, the construction of a 
mosque in Kouraba was an indirect declaration of social independence, one that, given the 
foulasso’s size (pop. 2000) would have represented a significant blow to the elite’s influence. 
The Daralabé leaders’ fears were confirmed less than one year later, when the inhabitants of 
Kouraba requested that their village be administratively detached from Daralabé, and along with 
a group of 12 other foulasso and runde constitute an independent village group.55 Using the 
space opened by post-colonial reform, the inhabitants of Kouraba were able to forge their own 
position within rapidly transforming socio-religious hierarchies in the new, “modern” Futa 
Jallon. 
Other conflicts over religious norms took place in established mosques. In Diountou, 20 
km northeast of Labé, each lenyol followed strict rules after arriving at the mosque for prayers. 
The Fatiyanke, the clan of the former village chiefs, entered through the main door and sat at the 
center of the mosque. The Beibeyanke, a clan of artisans, entered through a side door and sat 
along the edge. The Mamadouyanke, most likely a newly established lenyol comprised of former 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
54 Bah Thierno Mamadou, Chef de la Circonscription Aditive Labé, to Monsieur le Chef de 
Village et les Conseillers de Village de Daralabé, no. 90/CL/RG, 19 January 1959, ARL. 
  
55 La Population des Hameux de Kouraba, Fello-Yalalbé, Santamba, Soguiyabé, Sarayabé, 
Holladé, Késsou-Bantanhi, Késsou Morouba, N’Danta Sarayabé, N’Danta Bogoyé, Gada 
Tiaguel, Pellel Féto, and Hansaguéré to M. le Ministre de l’Intérieur et des Collectivités 
Publiques à Conakry, 25 August 1960, ARL. 
! 256 
maccube and Fulbe burure, were barred from entering and forced to pray outside. Once 
government authorities became aware of the mosque’s continued social segregation, the practice 
was put to an end.56 Other conflicts emerged over mosque leadership. In Tougué, another town in 
the Labé region, the head muezzin at the town’s mosque objected to the assistant chosen by the 
mosque’s worshipers, arguing that the latter should not be allowed to conduct the call to prayer 
as he was of slave status.57 Local authorities forced the head muezzin to resign from his post – 
ensuring that the assistant took his place – and write a letter of apology that was transmitted to all 
the villages in the area.58 Notably, these two incidents occurred in 1972, a decade and a half after 
the PDG came to power. While policing by the government ensured that more former slaves 
were active in the religious lives of their communities, allowing some to even hold positions of 
leadership, resistance from elites continued well into era of revolutionary reform. 
The government was not the only group to use religious spaces as a means of critique or 
reform, as Futa elites often used religious language to critique post-colonial reforms. On two 
occasions in 1960, imams at the central mosque of Labé recited prayers asking for the keeping of 
“native” (meaning Fulbe) civil servants in the Labé region and the transfer of all those from 
outside the Futa to other posts.59 Their complaints confirmed a stereotype I often heard while 
conducting research in Guinea: Fulbe only want to be governed by their own, because they think 
they are superior to all other ethnic groups. That political protests that aired in the Futa’s 
mosques were also a powerful reminder for the young government that Islam was closely tied 
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with Fulbe regionalist identity. For those within the Futa Jallon, the transformations taking place 
in places of worship were either a means to gain prestige or a fundamental assault of Fulbe 
culture itself. Both reactions, importantly, ran counter to PDG desires. 
In the end, PDG religious reforms left a sour taste in the mouths of Futa Imams and 
government officials alike. The government’s meddling in local religious affairs both 
undermined the Futa elites’ positions of privilege while confirming their suspicions that Touré 
and the PDG were atheistic Marxists bent upon destroying Islam in the region.60 For government 
leaders, the fact that their attempts to change religious practice in the Futa had proved only 
partially worked, as opposed to the mostly successful demystification campaign in the Forest 
Region, reinforced their belief that the Futa elite was especially resistant to social 
modernization.. For non-elites in the Futa, however, the opening of religious spaces allowed 
marginalized communities to participate in practices of religious prestige, seizing sources of 
legitimacy that had previously been cut off. Their attempts to demonstrate their proper religiosity 
were not unchallenged. After gaining access to the mosque and its leadership, however, these 
communities would be less inclined to buy into the PDG’s program of radical reform.  
Local Political Administration 
First Republic Guinea’s political structure was based upon the central fact that the 
government functioned as a seamless party-state, and local party branches were the most visible 
organizations that enacted government policy and ideology. The most basic acts of local, federal, 
and national governance, therefore, were inseparable from the organization and functioning of 
corresponding party organs. Although there existed parallel political and administrative 
structures, the political wing of the government clearly set policy and dictated Guinea’s political 
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life, from the smallest village council to the National Assembly.61  
The importance of local branches in the day to day functioning of the party had roots in 
political competition during decolonization. The PDG’s spread into the Futa Jallon during the 
1950s focused on mobilizing previously marginalized populations – most notably persons of 
former slave status, women, and youth – and fashioning them into an effective force through 
participation in Comités de Base, or local party branches. Following independence, the basic 
tasks of the Comités du Base, renamed Pouvoirs Révolutionnaire Local  (PRL, or Local 
Revolutionary Authorities) in 1967, were to both govern and educate urban neighborhoods or 
rural villages while disseminating party policy through group meetings and educational 
conferences.62 In the Futa, though, the Comités were also used as a means to undermine the 
power of Fulbe elites. Replacing the colonial system of Councils of Notables, whose members 
were most commonly named by chiefs or colonial administrators and drawn from local elites, 
local representatives to the Comités were chosen by popular vote on a bi-annual basis. 
Membership in the PDG was the sole criteria for candidacy. Distinctions between former masters 
and slaves, therefore, mattered little in the local political process in the Futa, or so the PDG 
theorized.  
The PDG also sought to undermine the power of “traditional” nearly all-male authorities 
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by empowering women in local politics. Women’s branches had been integral to the rise of the 
PDG, both in Conakry and in the rural Futa. In the First Republic, they would serve as a 
vanguard for PDG-mandated social reform on the high plateau. According to national law in the 
1960s at least of the two representatives on each Comité had to be women, breaking down what 
was before a male monopoly on public political activity in the Futa. 63 Women’s participation in 
local administration reflected a broader program aimed at transforming gender relations in the 
post-colonial nation. During the 1960s the PDG enacted a series of sweeping changes to the 
country’s laws regarding marriage.64 A 1962 act mandated that only consenting adults could be 
married, and required that a civil service accompany any religious ceremony. A second 1968 law 
went further, grandfathering in previous polygamous marriages but forbidding any new multiple-
marriage households. The laws may have had little impact on the vast majority of non-civil 
marriages in the Guinean interior, but for the visible Futa elite, both “modern” and “traditional,” 
civil marriages, especially those in which one spouse was of former slave status, represented an 
opportunity to show dedication to the new state, an opening for women to gain status, or for 
some less enamored with the post-colonial state, a threat to the hierarchies at the heart of Futa 
society.65 
Local political reforms stimulated a new set of local conflicts, either between rival 
factions or competing social groups. The PDG leadership intended the Comités to serve, at least 
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in theory, as an outlet for local disagreements and as the beating heart of Guinean democracy. 
PDG activists often told me that, counter to representations of Touré as a despot and the First 
Republic as a totalitarian state, the First Republic was a fully functioning democracy. While 
there was a single party and the PDG’s leadership was never questioned, the will of the people 
was supposedly expressed through local elections for the Comités and passed up the chain of 
authority through a series of elections for higher offices at the regional and federal level.66 If the 
defining characteristic of democracy is reduced to political competition and nominal public 
participation, then internal documents seem to support such an argument. State security reports 
described conflict between competing factions around elections, although this activity seemed 
more to reflect political intrigue amongst a core of activists rather than the will of the people 
winning out.67 Local debate over ideology or policy, though, almost never found its way into 
public accounts. 
Therefore, the PDG leadership did not expect for local Comités in the Futa to become 
spaces for protest against the government’s social, economic, and political reforms. Yet they did 
at a regular frequency. Some local complaints were in reaction to familiar manifestations of daily 
corruption. Local comités were responsible for the distribution of staple foods and most high-
demand consumer goods. Representatives often chose to give these goods to relatives or, in the 
most flagrant cases reminiscent of meat distribution, to take the goods themselves and sell them 
on the black market. In turn, Futa elites were quick to point out the hypocrisy of the PDG’s 
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earlier attacks on the chieftaincy as a corrupt and exploitative institution.68 In the logic of the 
Futa’s “traditional” elites, at least they had long-standing legitimate claims to a community’s 
resources. Corruption in the post-colonial state, on the other hand, represented a naked grab for 
resources. Other comités in the Futa simply ignored party directives. In particular, most Futa 
sections disregarded one 1971 order to arrest all those who practiced seasonal migration to 
Senegal, a not insignificant source of material wealth in the Futa.69  
For other Futa villages, problems within the Comités served as proxies for conflicts over 
changing social hierarchies. One such incident occurred in Korbé, a village about 40 km west of 
Labé. In 1962, village citizens elected a new president for their Comité de Base, but local 
notables – who, the local government’s incident report was careful to note, no longer held any 
formal positions of authority – refused to recognize the new president and actively disobeyed any 
order he gave. Their stated reason was that the new head of the Comité was a “foulah de 
brousse,” or Fulbe burure of low status, and therefore unfit to lead. After hearing of the conflict, 
the local Governor made his frustration with Korbé’s elite clear while also signaling a greater 
concern about intransigence amongst sections o Fulbe society: “the comrades of Korbé [meaning 
the notables] haven’t understood at all and don’t want to understand. They play on hidden racism 
and represent [noble] clans. [The incident] has nothing to do with women or children, but 
everything to do with a group of so-called notables.” 70 Local gendarmes eventually put down the 
notables’ miniature rebellion by occupying the village for two days. Yet for many of the 
“traditional” elites, the comités continued to represent a direct affront to claims of privilege 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
68 Synthèse, SEIS, no. 206/SC, 6 September 1969, ANG 374W/3. 
 
69 Synthèse, SEIS, no. 244/SEIS, 11 August 1971, ANG 374W/10. 
 
70 Rapport mensuel, Poste Administrative de Lélouma, no. 85/PAL/RG, May 1962, ARL.  
! 262 
within the Futa. 
Youth 
Social privilege in the Futa was under attack on several fronts. Faced with age-based 
hierarchies that limited their influence, many young men and women sought to gain immediate 
power through the local sections of the JRDA. The PDG’s focus on developing the “youth” as a 
force for change was not a new development in Guinea politics, although how the state wielded 
that tool shifted dramatically following independence. As Straker argues in Youth, Nationalism, 
and the Guinean Revolution, “youth” as a social category became a central focus of both the 
colonial government and its PDG-led successor. During the 1950s, the colonial government 
focused on developing a cadre of young, educated évolués to counter the dangers of urban “de-
tribalization.” The post-colonial PDG government, though, emphasized rural youth, casting them 
in the role of both revolutionary collective and conduits through which party policy could be 
enacted in the interior.71 Straker’s study examines how the PDG used “youth” in the Forest 
Region, a geographically and conceptually marginal space, to articulate a still ambiguous vision 
of the post-colonial Guinean nation. The role of youth in the Futa Jallon, situated in the 
geographic center of Guinea and squarely within the sights of government policy-makers, grew 
more from the political realities in the post-colonial Futa. In particular, the PDG use youth to 
articulate and enact their vision of a “modern” Futa society. More importantly, though, the 
government wielded the JRDA as a blunt tool to demolish the power of entrenched elites on the 
high plateau.  
JRDA members served as government shock troops in spaces central to revolutionary 
reform. The PDG government faced a shortage of trained security forces following the rapid 
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French retreat in 1958, often turning to the party’s youth wing to fill gaps. When the government 
focused on sealing the Guinea borders, it began by drafting brigades of young men and women 
to patrol with regular border guards. In 1960, a conference of regional government officials 
questioned if youth brigades should be securing the borders, as they were not well trained and, as 
we’ll see, were often prone to excessive use of force.72 The explosion of smuggling and 
migration to and from the Futa into Senegal after independence, though, overrode the officials’ 
concerns, and JRDA sections took up basic policing actions, seizing merchandise and arresting 
clandestine migrants along the border.73 JRDA members also policed local economic activity. In 
one incident in Fafaya, a town about 100 km northwest of Labé, an enraged middle-aged veteran 
lashed out at youth activists who were checking permits for vendors at a weekly market. The 
older man was arrested, taken to the local head administrator, jailed for a week, and eventually 
released only after he was made to stand by the JRDA members at the following market day 
while the administrator gave a speech declaring that protest against government policies would 
be “abolished in this region.”74 The optics of the public demonstration were clear; the 
government planned to forcibly enact new economic practices, and the youth were their means to 
that end. 
Eager to display their newly found position of influence, JRDA members were prone to 
overextending their reach. In one incident in 1963, JRDA members in Labé stood in a local 
butcher’s shop indicating which customers could or could not be served based on their perceived 
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loyalty to the state. The head of the local police warned that the young militants’ actions gave 
rise to rumors that JRDA members were behind the scarcity of merchandise and food in the 
region, and that they ran the risk of undermining the party’s position in general.75 Later that year, 
an officer in the Labé JRDA suspected his wife of committing adultery with a local high school 
student. The officer and a group of other JRDA members dragged the student before the 
principal of the high school and demanded that the accused student be given 50 lashes with a 
bamboo stick. The school head reminded the militants that corporal punishment had been banned 
in independent Guinea, and said that he would take care of the matter. Enraged by the affront to 
their power, the JRDA members ignored the warning, abducting and beating the student the 
following day. The principal complained to local authorities, but the vigilantes were never 
punished.76 Labe’s inhabitants also became more enraged when JRDA members, seemingly of 
their own initiative, conducted sweeps throughout the city arresting anyone engaging in 
gambling or card playing.77  
JRDA members used the ambiguity of state hierarchies in the years following 
independence to display the growing influence of a newly empowered youth. The influence of 
the JRDA, though, should not be overstated. Examples of excess presented above come from 
Labé. Youth wing members might have believed that they could leverage the PDG’s early 
emphasis on reform in urban markets, schools, and shops in order to extend their own power. 
Derman’s ethnographic research during the late 1960s in a rural village in the Futa Jallon, 
however, argues for a more gradual process of accommodation between the JRDA and local age- 
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and status-based hierarchies. Derman describes how in investigations into a series of thefts in a 
Futa Jallon village JRDA members were eventually forced to rely upon village elders to broker 
settlements between the thieves’ and victims’ families. Police involved themselves only if 
restitution was not paid, or if the dispute involved parties from different villages. Thus, while 
JRDA members were expected to police all village youths, they were unable to successfully 
negotiate the frayed family politics caused by theft.78 The mere fact that village elders had to 
negotiate settlements with youth wing militants, many of them from non-noble status, reflected a 
partial reorganization of local social and political hierarchies. Yet, counter to the government’s 
own proclamations that “traditional” elites no longer held any influence, local notables were still 
integral to the daily functioning of justice in post-colonial Futa communities. 
Defining a New Political Elite 
Taken together, the government initiatives described above point to a double motivation 
for local reforms. On one level, widened access to land and mosques combined with participation 
in the local administration of villages and towns reflected a basic PDG ideology, namely that 
modernization of Guinean society required an eradication of troublesome “traditional” practices. 
Despite charges from exiles that Guinea was an autocratic state, some policy makers within the 
government believed that they were building a socialist democracy based upon grassroots 
participation in the political process, and that equal access to public spaces and political 
structures reflected the post-colonial nation’s dedication to democratic principles more than 
multiple parties. However, reforms enacted by the PDG in the Futa also reflected a very practical 
political program. Fulbe elites had represented the last hurdle to Sékou Touré and the PDG’s 
consolidation of power in Guinea, and the Futa was the last region to be brought into the party 
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fold. Even after independence, large segments of Futa society held what could be generously 
described as ambivalent opinions about the new government. Thus, while reforms reflected the 
government’s will to transform Guinean society, they were also rooted in the PDG leadership’s 
desire to once and for all eliminate any possible competitors for the allegiance of Guinean 
citizens in the Futa.  
That interplay between visible and hidden motivations for policies, between public 
pronouncements of “modernization” and the political calculus that undergirded reform, reflected 
similar machinations within an emerging post-colonial political elite in Conakry. During the 
1950s, Fulbe former opposition members had in the run-up to independence galvanized for a 
brief moment Futa discontent with the central government. So what would Sékou Touré and his 
inner circle do with those Fulbe politicians who had previously disparaged the Guinean President 
as an autocrat in the making? For the decade following independence, the answer seemed to be 
an uneasy détente. Opting to forego restarting their struggling opposition party after 
independence, the Fulbe politicians Ibrahima Barry III and Barry Diawadou instead decided to 
join the government. The two politicians soon embarked upon a decade of frequent transfer and 
precarious positions within the government. Barry III served as the Secretary of State at the 
Presidency (Oct. 1958-April 1958), Head of Economic Affairs (April 1959-March 1960), 
Minister of Justice (March 1960-January 1961), Minister of Planning (January 1961-February 
1964) and Minister of Commerce (February 1964-November 1964), before being dismissed from 
the government altogether.79 Diawadou was named Minister of National Education (1958-1961), 
Minister of Finances (1961-1963), the Guinean ambassador based in Cairo (1963-1966), and 
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finally served as head of the state-run Patrice Lumumba Press.80 Their frequent reassignments 
reflected in part the political instability of a young Republic. It was also a means of control by 
Sékou Touré, who made sure that no potential rival was able to build his or her own power base 
in a government ministry. 
Despite the active role played by both Diawadou and Barry III in the post-colonial 
government, rumors of participation in anti-PDG plots followed both men throughout the 
1960s.81 Outside reports, either from French intelligence services or newspapers, commonly 
included their names in lists of leaders of potential coup attempts.82 Diawadou’s brother, Barry 
Bassirou, a former PDG activist and union leader, was arrested in the 1961 Teacher’s plot, only 
adding to suspicion that his family was trying to undermine Touré and his close advisors.83 
Indeed, there might have been a grain of truth in the rumors about Diawadou. His son contends 
that the former opposition leader was approached by French intelligence services in 1959 to 
organize a plot, going as far as coordinating a delivery of trucks and guns at the Senegalese 
border. Diawadou promptly called Keïta Fodéba, then Minister of Defense and Security, and told 
him to send a group of soldiers to pick up the French supplies. Hoping to demonstrate his 
dedication to the Guinean government, Diawadou then wrote French President Charles de Gaulle 
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a public letter, telling him that Guineans would fight against any French invasion.84 
The Fulbe politicians’ future within the PDG was the subject of intense debate within the 
party leadership. Some within the PDG worked to keep Diawadou and Barry III at the margins of 
the new political elite, believing that the two had only joined the government to destroy it from 
within.85 Other leaders, though, sought to more closely integrate the Fulbe politicians in the 
name of reconciliation and national unity. Differences in opinion were often thrust into the open 
during periodic PDG summits. From 1958 to 1964, the PDG leadership convened a series of 
party congresses meant to determine state policy and elect members to the Bureau Politique 
Nationale (BPN), a powerful central governing council modeled after the Soviet Politburo. Party 
statutes required that these congresses be held every 5 years, but in practice Touré convened the 
meetings at unpredictable times and often with little warning, perhaps hoping to push through 
policies by surprise. Mohamed Camara suggests that they were in fact meant as an opportunity 
for Touré to eliminate perceived rivals by pushing them out of the BPN, an argument that is born 
out by the evidence and stories I collected.86 But even Touré’s best-laid plans often went awry, 
as the congresses also served as fora to critique, sometimes vehemently, the actions and policies 
of the central government. As such, the meetings reflected the more general tug of war between a 
center eager to consolidate control and the fractious coalition in the interior it depended upon for 
political and popular support. 
Such a struggle also played out on a local level. For the first six years of independence, 
Touré and his inner circle’s attempts to gain hegemony over the rebellious Comités de Base 
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failed. The central government would send down directives on who should be elected to these 
local councils and what policies they should enact. But every so often the more independent 
groups bucked central commands. In one such case, the central government dismissed all of the 
representatives of the Federation of Conakry, an administrative unit similar in position to the 
colonial cercles, for “political intrigue” and opposing officially sanctioned candidates for local 
union posts.87 Political discontent also extended to the state-run unions. In 1961, teachers 
throughout Guinea, frustrated with Government educational policies and low pay, went on 
strike.88 Students and their parents joined in solidarity, and large protest marches took place in 
Conakry and Labé. The government response was swift and severe. Several union leaders were 
arrested and condemned to death for supposedly plotting to overthrow the government. In Labé, 
troops opened fire on students holding local school officials hostage, killing several.89 Touré 
would later blame the strike on Soviet meddling and expel the country’s ambassador in 
Conakry.90 It was in such an unsettled climate that Touré and the PDG leadership in Conakry 
decided to consolidate their grip on the nation’s political structure by holding a new party 
congress.  
The insurgency from below reached its apogee during a November 1962 planning 
meeting at Foulaya, a small town on the outskirts of the city of Kindia. The Foulaya conference 
brought together delegates from all of Guinea’s federations to prepare for the sixth PDG party 
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congress, to be held the following month in Conakry. Sékou Touré intended to inform the 
delegates which policies they should propose at the upcoming congress and whom they should 
elect to the BPN. The conference delegates thought otherwise. Sitting on the porch of his house 
next to the Labé governor’s residence, one participant and Federation representative, Tiala 
Gobaye Mountaye, recounted to me what he recalled about the meeting: 
We [the delegates] came from every corner of Guinea, but by coincidence we had 
the same ideas. What were those ideas? First… the normalization of relations 
between France and Guinea. Sékou Touré wasn’t happy with that, he didn’t want 
it. [Second], reconsider our relationship with the Soviet Union. They had helped 
Guinea, but they were technologically behind the West… We saw Sékou Touré 
lower his head, he was not happy! [Third], there are too many prisons, you put too 
many people in jail, and they are mistreated – you can’t do that. And then I got up 
and said, “First, you must eradicate the death penalty in Guinea. I saw Sékou 
Touré glaring at me, he was really mad! Two, normalize relations with France. 
Three, apply the clauses of the [1958] Mamou meeting, integrate all the leaders of 
the political parties into the BPN. Eeeeh! [meaning Touré was mad]. 
 
Mountaye’s final demand pushed Touré over the edge. Although Barry Diawadou and 
Barry III had joined the government, neither was incorporated into the BPN, the only group with 
any real political power outside of Touré and his inner circle. Therefore, Mountaye argued, the 
PDG leadership had never fully enacted the 1958 Mamou agreement that had established a unity 
government.91 As long as the two Fulbe leaders remained on the margins of Guinea’s political 
structure, no true reconciliation could be achieved, not between former political rivals and, more 
importantly, not between the segment of Futa Jallon society that had supported the opposition 
and the rest of Guinea. Other participants in the Foulaya conference balked at Touré’s attempted 
consolidation of political and administrative power, as the president served as both president and 
head of the country’s only political party. Some believed that Touré should resign as Secretary 
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General of the PDG and let Saïfoulaye Diallo take his place.92 Believing Foulaya to be a pro 
forma preparation for the upcoming party congress, Touré was faced instead with an internal 
rebellion. Mountaye continued: 
We said all this because [Sékou Touré] had said that this was the conference of 
truth and of militant responsibility. We understood the words “truth” and 
“responsibility.” Therefore, everyone was critical, and that didn’t make Sékou 
Touré happy. So, he stood up, and he told the BPN and his other advisors, “We’re 
going to Kindia [and therefore leaving the conference].” We said, Sékou Touré 
thinks the conference is over, but we didn’t think it was done. So we composed a 
bureau that would direct the conference by ourselves… 
 
We made a list of the candidates for the BPN for the upcoming congress in 
Conakry and we included Barry Diawadou and Barry III as two of the BPN’s 15 
full members. We also included Keïta Fodéba [who Touré demanded be elected to 
the BPN, but was by party statute not eligible]; when he had toured with the 
Ballets Africains he had gotten rich. He helped the PDG materially [before 
independence], so the group named him as part of the BPN. So we made a list of 
all the candidates for the BPN, and all of the recommendations. We then sent a 
representative to Kindia with all the papers outlining the motions, and Sékou 
Touré returned to Foulaya. 
 
He made a four-hour-long closing speech. In his speech, he attacked Houphouët-
Boigny, president of Côte d’Ivoire, he attacked Senghor, president of Senegal, he 
attacked Modibo Keïta, RDA and president of Mali… he attacked them all as 
bourgeois traitors: “He is a traitor and sold to colonialism!” At that point, Sékou 
Touré didn’t even know where he was any longer [Mountaye waves his hand in 
front of his eyes, fixed and staring forward]. So the speech was transmitted on the 
radio without Sékou Touré knowing. Someone told him that the speech could be 
heard in Conakry. He yelled, “Stop! Stop!” And all the leaves on the trees fell 
when he yelled. We said, “eh, eh, eh, he is doing his sorcery.” Many people fled. 
Diawadou then called the radio in Conakry to tell them to stop transmitting the 
speech.  
 
So that’s why some people who don’t understand talk about the “Foulaya plot.” 
There was no plot. But there was this: the truth was spoken, and [the truth] was no 
longer with Sékou Touré. 
 
Sékou Touré was famous for his intense rhetoric, lengthy speeches, and tirades against 
foreign leaders who he claimed were plotting to overthrow Guinea. Observers both at the time 
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and since have put forward several theories as to why Sékou Touré’s comments about foreign 
states and leaders were erratic and prone to frequent changes. Some have argued that the threats 
to Guinea were so numerous that much of the world’s governments were aligned against the 
PDG and Guinea.93 Others have speculated that Touré suffered from schizophrenia, or perhaps 
syphilis-induced paranoia.94 Yet Touré’s public statements and behavior were, as Mountaye 
implies, primarily a means of political control. As such, Houphouët-Boigny, Senghor, and Keïta 
stood in for the dangerous neo-colonial “other” bent on the destruction of Guinea. In populist 
reason, the only response was the unification of the Guinean people in opposition. To survive, 
internal disagreements over policy would have to be put aside in the name of a common front 
against foreign aggression.  
Rumors of Sékou Touré’s “sorcery” also served a clear political logic. It is hard to 
determine whether or not the president knew about or even encouraged commonly held 
suspicions about his secret powers. Archival records demonstrate that he put value in the counsel 
of Islamic religious leaders, at times ordering local administrative posts to sacrifice cattle with 
specific skin patterns followed by detailed descriptions of which prayers should be recited a 
certain number of times in order to ensure favorable results, including in one instance a Guinean 
team’s victory in an international soccer match.95 Touré could have believed the sacrifices gave 
him protection. It could have also been a rumor he played up in order to instill fear in potential 
political rivals. 
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I then asked Mountaye what Saïfoulaye Diallo, then president of the National Assembly, 
did during the Foulaya “rebellion.” Saïfoulaye Diallo was a close confident of Sékou Touré since 
the early 1950s and had played an integral role in the PDG’s installation in the Futa against the 
will of the colonial chiefs. Similar to the Fulbe former opposition members, he was also the son 
of a former chief, was educated at the prestigious École William Ponty, and indeed was a friend 
of Barry Diawadou and Barry III.96 Mountaye said: 
[Saïfoulaye] was there, a member of the BPN, the second highest figure [in the 
country]. But him, being a Peulh [Fulbe], the son of a canton chief, he was very 
intelligent. He didn’t act at all, he didn’t say a word. You couldn’t know what 
Saïfoulaye was thinking about, even if he gave a speech. You could visit with him 
for hours, and wouldn’t know what he wanted, what he thought… always like 
that. That’s what saved him. [Saïfoulaye was one of the few party figures never to 
be imprisoned]. 
 
Mountaye then describes what happened later at the party congress: 
 
At the time Sékou didn’t have control over all of the sections [one level up within 
the political hierarchy from the Comités de Base] of the party. There were 200 
heads of sections. They were free men, he couldn’t order them around. So they 
elected Barry III, Barry Diawadou, and Fodéba as part of the BPN. But when the 
vice president of the National Assembly announced the name of the people 
elected to the BPN, their [the Fulbe politicians’] names were not included. 
Including me, I was elected but left out. [The new list] was the same 15 people 
who had served in the BPN before.  
 
… Everything deplorable about Camp Boiro [an infamous concentration camp for 
political detainees] sprung from that. The non-application of the decision of the 
Mamou conference…  
 
 
Mountaye’s account traces a clear line from the September 1958 Mamou coalition to Camp 
Boiro through Foulaya. It was a line on which many elites in Guinea, especially those from the 
Futa Jallon, found themselves on the wrong side.  
The Foulaya conference and the party congress that followed pushed Sékou Touré to 
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crack down on dissent by implementing a more rigorous party orthodoxy, from local Comités de 
Base to the BPN. The most visible representations of the insurgents’ mutiny were the figures the 
delegates had elected to the BPN against the president’s will, notably Barry Diawadou and Barry 
III. Touré and his advisors pushed the two further to the margins of Guinea’s political elite. 
Diawadou was sent to Cairo as an ambassador in 1963. According to his son, Diawadou did so 
against his will, as he feared that Touré’s power would grow unchecked without counterbalance. 
Barry III was removed altogether from the government following the 1964 Loi Cadre due to his 
connections with foreign firms.97 The Loi Cadre, Touré argued, ushered in a new era in post-
colonial Guinean history, a “radicalization of the revolution,” one that didn’t allow for dissent. 
Prominent Guineans would soon test the new order with fatal results. When Mamady Touré, a 
small merchant also known as “Petit Touré” and a distant relative of the president, filed papers to 
establish an opposition party in October 1965, he was immediately arrested and imprisoned in 
Camp Boiro. PDG leaders claimed that upstart politician was part of a vast plot to overthrow the 
Guinean government.98 The French ambassador was expelled from the country for supposedly 
supporting the plot. Petit Touré was never seen in public again.  
For the four years following the Loi Cadre, Guineans at both the highest rungs of the 
political hierarchy and within local villages in the interior had a general sense that the 
government was moving towards a more repressive form of governance. There were rumors of 
torture, a series of hidden prisons, and whole families swept up by the security forces. But for the 
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time being, the government’s statements that all Guineans were working together to build their 
new nation held sway, at least in public 
Defining a New National Identity 
 When I asked Tiala Gobaye Mountaye why the conference at Foulaya had failed, and 
why Fulbe politicians had not been fully integrated into the party structures of the PDG, he gave 
me an answer that points to the complicated legacy of the First Republic’s approach to ethnicity: 
That was the promise of Mamou. We all go together for the “no” in the 
referendum. After, we sit down again at the table and redistribute the roles and 
responsibilities. It would have started with the inclusion of the leaders of the 
opposition parties in the BPN. It’s just that – excuse me, I’m not racist like he 
jokingly said earlier [a Fulbe friend who has sat down with us and had earlier said 
that Mountaye hated all Fulbe because he was an ethnic Coniagui]. Him [his 
friend] neither – he’s Fulbe, but not racist. But the Malinké [Maninka], they have 
that fault: they are more stubborn than a mule. When the Malinké says no 
[Mountaye throws up his arms]… even until death. Very stubborn. When [a 
Malinké] takes a position, it’s over. He [Touré] had that fault, starting with 
Samori, who was the grandfather of Sékou Touré.” 
 
In Mountaye’s comments, which played between denying racism and using ethnicity/race as an 
explanatory device, we see one of the fundamental contradictions at the heart of the Guinean 
nation-building project during the First Republic. Touré argued that ethnic particularism, or what 
he called “racism,” must be erased for the Guinean nation to exist. Grouped with the other 
“handicapping practices,” ethnic and regional identification served as a hurdle to building a 
“modern” Guinean society and nation. In fact, all acts of propaganda and preference based upon 
ethnicity or region were outlawed shortly after independence and were punishable by two to five 
years imprisonment and a fine of 70,000 to 700,000 francs.99 Thus, Touré theorized, only 
through the eradication of “backwards” practices and identities like ethnicity would Guinea 
achieve its full potential. 
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At the same time, Touré drew upon pan-Africanist ideas that valorized the recovery of 
African “tradition” as a basis of a non-Western social and political formation. As such, state 
texts, plays, and radio addresses sought to rehabilitate figures such as Alfa Yaya, Thierno 
N’Dama, Bokar Biro, and Samori Touré, maligned previously as examples of African 
“backwardness,” into anti-colonial heroes and fathers of the Guinean nation.100 Touré touted 
what he claimed to be his own status as Samori’s grandson in order to demonstrate his anti-
colonial bona fides and Islamic religiosity. The same general process unfolded in the domain of 
local language and performance traditions, where specific histories and cultures were used to 
establish the “authenticity” of the Guinean nation-building project. Yet, these historical figures, 
practices, and languages were and still are situated within local cultures. Samori Touré, for 
example, is subject to both particular and divergent interpretations within the Haute Guinée – 
ones that in some communities run counter to his nationalist portrayal as a unifier and liberator101 
– that are the result of local historical processes. The same could be said for Bokar Biro and the 
Pular language in the Futa Jallon, the former who was and still is seen by Fulbe as the last head 
of a “pure” Fulbe society and the latter which has been tied closely to Fulbe self-identification 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
100 See, for example, L’Empereur Almamy Samori Touré Grand Stratège, (Conakry: Revolution 
Démocratique Africaine (PDG) no. 48, 1972); and Rivière, Mobilization, 90-91. In the case of 
Biro and Yaya, their transformation into national heroes included a good amount of intentional 
forgetting, as both had hailed from the pre-colonial Futa Jallon elite, a group whose prestige and 
wealth was the result of the labor a hundreds of thousands of slaves, and the latter had betrayed 
the former when he allied with the French and welcomed the Futa Jallon’s incorporation into the 
colonial state as a protectorate. See Chapter 1. 
 
101 Brian J. Peterson, “History, Memory and the Legacy of Samori in Southern Mali, c. 1880-
1898,” Journal of African History 49 (2008), 261-279. 
 
! 277 
and understandings of Islamic religiosity.102 Thus, the “traditional” bona fides of the Guinean 
state were built upon regional and/or ethnic cultural markers. The resulting uneasy combination 
of cultural authenticity with political and social reforms resulted in what McGovern has 
described as the “competing cosmopolitanisms” of Marxism and pan-Africanism inherent in 
Touré’s articulation of African Socialism.103 This never fully resolved contradiction was a 
defining principle of the state, and led to a conflicted relationship with ethnic identification and 
regional “tradition.”  
Such a contradiction led to a climate in which Guineans were reticent to talk publically 
about the political implications of ethnicity –above all, no one wanted to be labeled a racist – but 
one where people still made general statements about ethnicity and ethnic characteristics that 
would have been at home in the most strident of colonial ethnographies. In this manner, Malinké 
are “stubborn,” and Fulbe are “racists” and “intelligent.” Perhaps most importantly, ethnic 
descriptors functioned as a means to understand political maneuvering and conflict during a time 
when motives and opinions were best kept secret.104 For much of the First Republic, using ethnic 
background to justify one’s questionable actions was an unfortunate but excusable act. On the 
other hand, willful intent to undermine the government, whether imagined or real, landed many a 
politician in Camp Boiro. Until 1976, as we’ll see, an unconscious “racist” could be forgiven and 
reformed. A traitor could not. 
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The Age of Plots 
According to state arguments, plots to overthrow the PDG-led government had beset 
Guinea starting almost immediately after independence. The PDG leadership saw French actions 
during the latter’s 1958 withdrawal from Guinea for what they were – deliberate attempts to 
sabotage the territory’s incipient economic and political independence. 1960 witnessed the first 
government accusation that men and weapons were amassing along the Guinean border, 
preparing for a French-led and Senegalese-aided invasion to topple the Touré regime. The 
following year, government officials tied the teacher’s strike to meddling by the Soviet Union. 
The 1964 Loi Cadre, according to Sékou Touré, was in response to corrupt civil servants and 
merchants undermining the regime, and the Pétit Touré’s 1965 attempt to start an opposition 
party was a plot by the French government to eliminate Guinea’s one-party state. Thus, “the 
perennial plot,” as the government described the near constant state of alert caused by a series of 
purported coups d’état, had been an integral part of Guinean politics stretching back to 1958, if 
not before.105 The goal of this section is not to evaluate the veracity of supposed plots. There 
already exists an extensive literature that deals with those very questions. The basic battle lines 
of said “exchange” have been the same since the 1970s, and haven’t shown any signs of 
changing in the foreseeable future.106 A more analytically fruitful approach – one I adopt below – 
is to consider the role plots played in the emergence of specific political discourses in post-
colonial Guinea. 
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The set of post-colonial reforms enacted by the PDG did little to improve the economic, 
social, and political problems that beset the country. If anything, the power grab reflected by the 
1964 Loi Cadre exacerbated political division by pushing competing elites to build autonomous 
power bases that rivaled the Touré cabal’s preeminent position within the party. As the 1960s 
wore on and the glow of independence faded, the president and his inner circle faced an unruly 
population and a group of political elites eager to seize more power and influence.107 They 
responded by ushering in what would become a period defined by periodic plots and purges. In 
September 1967, Touré announced a new phase of Guinean politics by naming himself the 
“Supreme Leader of the Revolution” and theorizing a seamless integration of party, state, and 
people. To criticize Touré now was not only to be an enemy of the PDG but also an enemy of the 
Guinean people.108 The next year, the PDG leadership announced the Socialist Cultural 
Revolution (SCR), which drew heavily from a similar program enacted by Mao in China.109 The 
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new phase was meant, at least in part, to integrate urban and rural spaces while undermining a 
burgeoning educated government elite.  
The SCR also represented shift towards violent repression of perceived threats to the 
Touré regime. For much of the ‘60s, government accusations had implicated groups such as 
teachers and merchants, or parts of a growing bourgeoisie, in a series of destabilizing actions. In 
1968, though, Touré and his close advisors turned their sights to figures within the government 
itself. One of the new targets was Fodéba Keïta, a former artist, choreographer, and early PDG 
activist. As Minister of Defense and Security, Keïta controlled Guinea’s powerful and wide-
reaching police, armed forces, and intelligence services. In many ways, he acted as head of a 
semi-autonomous state within a state, complete with networks of spies and informants 
responsible to only him. As Tiala Gobaye Mountaye described, “nothing escaped him. No matter 
where you were in Guinea, even if you scratched yourself, he knew about it. Even if you farted, 
he knew.” Keïta was willing to say as much to his colleagues within the government; when he 
was brought before the National Assembly commission created to verify the personal property of 
all government officials after the 1964 Loi Cadre, the head of security stated in introductory 
remarks that he knew all of the committee members’ secrets and that they should tread 
carefully.110 Even if this anecdote was representational rather than historical, Keïta’s purported 
intransigence reflected a real fear within segments of the PDG’s ruling elite that the security 
head’s reach was far and grip was strong. 
In the end, it was Keïta’s control of the army that eventually caused his downfall. 
Following the military coup d’état that overthrew Kwame Nkrumah, the President of Ghana and 
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close ally of Guinea, Touré and his inner circle sought to gain greater control over the armed 
forces.111 They did so by establishing an independent militia recruited from JRDA members and, 
to the shock of Guinea’s political elite, reassigning Fodéba Keïta as Minister of Rural 
Economy.112 Keïta took up his new position with gusto, organizing a census of land and farming 
equipment while initiating a series of reforms proposed by agricultural engineers. As many of 
Touré’s inner circle and family had benefitted from state-financed agricultural and land reforms 
enacted during the 1960s, including gaining control over new tracts of land and use of state-
bought tractors meant for public use, the ambitious minister continued to be a thorn in the side of 
many influential leaders in the government. Many speculated that it was only a matter of time 
before Keïta was eliminated.113 
Touré and his inner circle found their opportunity in February 1969. The first purge 
within the highest ranks of the political elite began with two army officers in Labé criticizing the 
president during a conversation with acquaintances at a bar and after a couple of beers.114 The 
two men were arrested shortly after and put on a flight bound for Conakry and, more specifically, 
Camp Boiro. Touré’s harsh reaction to the military critiques was most likely due to yet another 
African coup d’état, which had recently overthrown Modibo Keïta, Mali’s first president and 
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sometime Guinean ally, three months before. Touré and his advisors feared a similar military 
coup in Guinea, and sought to eliminate a series of figures who had either built up independent 
bases of power or were rumored to have been involved in earlier plots. Fodéba Keïta fell into the 
former category of suspicious persons, and was arrested along with several army generals for 
participating in a plot that was supposedly supported by the French government and its proxies in 
Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire, and post-coup Mali.115 He would eventually end up in Camp Boiro, the 
same Conakry prison that he had ordered be built in 1960.116  
Using a tendentious set of relations, government officials turned their eyes to Barry 
Diawadou, who had recently left politics to head up the Patrice Lumumba Press in Conakry. 
Barry Diawadou’s son, Thierno Oumar, was with his father the night the former opposition 
member was arrested. Thierno remembers listening to the radio on March 29th, 1969, and hearing 
his father named as a conspirator in what came to be known as the “Kaman-Fodéba Plot.”117 
Diawadou knew that his arrest was imminent, and decided to spend his last night of freedom 
with his children attending a Senegal-Guinea basketball game in downtown Conakry. The family 
arrived back at their home in the Kipé neighborhood around 2 AM that night. Security forces 
were waiting for them, and arrested Diawadou. His family never saw him again. Diawadou and 
Fodéba Keïta were executed without trial two months later. Barry Diawadou was not the only 
member of his family arrested in connection with the plot; several of his brothers were arrested 
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116 “That’s why people say Guineans shouldn’t build prisons,” Tiala Gobaye Mountaye’s Fulbe 
friend (see above) told me when the three of us talked about Fodéba. “The builders will just end 
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117 The other part of the plot’s name belonged to Kaman Diaby, assistant chief of staff of the 
Army. 
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and executed. Most dramatically, Diawadou’s 75 year-old father, Almamy Aguibou Barry, head 
of the Timbo Alfaya family and former Dabola canton Chief, was arrested and released only 
after the execution of his son. The former chief would die one year later.118 
The November 1970 Portuguese-backed invasion of Conakry by mercenaries and anti-
PDG Guinean exiles further radicalized the regime, or so PDG activists argue.119 On the night of 
November 21, 1970, around 400 armed men disembarked from a ship off the coast of Conakry 
and attacked several strategic points in the capital, including one of Sékou Touré’s residences in 
the Belle Vue neighborhood. Motivations behind the assault were murky. The Guinean 
government claimed that the invasion was primarily a Portuguese-led neo-colonialist attempt to 
overthrow the PDG government.120 Guinean exiles abroad maintained in the face of obvious 
contradictory evidence that the Portuguese government did not support the invading forces – 
most likely because the exiles wanted to distance themselves from one of the few imperial 
powers that remained in Africa – and claimed that the invasion represented a popular uprising 
against the PDG.121 The most likely explanation for the attack is that, rather than explicitly 
aiming for a regime change, the Portuguese forces wanted to liberate prisoners taken by the 
Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC) and to assassinate Amílcar 
Cabral, the group’s leader. Guinean exiles hoped to use the chaos unleashed by the invasion to 
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topple the government as a whole. 
Far from destabilizing the Guinean government, the attack solidified the PDG regime’s 
position both domestically and internationally. Touré and his inner circle used the attack to 
eliminate enemies, including Ibrahim Barry “Barry III,” who was arrested along with a slew of 
other government officials shortly after the Portuguese assault was repelled. Saïfoulaye Diallo, 
the other main “progressive” politician to emerge from the Futa during the 1950s, was one of the 
first to witness the aftermath of the purge. According to Diallo’s son, the PDG second in 
command had been a friend of Barry III since the 1950s, as both were sons of colonial chiefs and 
had turned their backs on their conservative families to embrace progressive politics. When in 
Conakry, Saïfoulaye took an early morning walk in the city’s botanical gardens. To get to the 
gardens, which were in Conakry’s suburbs, Diallo would drive from his house in the downtown 
section of the city on the only road that connects the city center, formerly an island, to the rest of 
the peninsula. According to the story, on his way on the morning of January 25, 1971, Saïfoulaye 
Diallo was one of the first people to see Barry III and three “co-conspirators” hanged from a 
highway overpass that serves as a choke point on the isthmus between the peninsula and city 
center.122 Security forces reported that an impromptu celebration, which including dancing and 
singing, formed at the bridge, during which a daughter of one of the executed men declared “you 
are no longer my father, you betrayed your people, and I will have no pity for you.” A 
revolutionary “man on the street” observing the spectacle remarked that “these strangers born in 
Guinea want to strangle the people while killing hundreds of innocents.”123 The execution’s 
location had symbolic importance. The “November 8th” bridge under which the three supposed 
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traitors died was named in honor of the 1964 Loi Cadre. Their hanging represented the bloody 
continuation of the 1964 law’s rasion d’être, namely to eliminate any potential alternative 
sources of power within Guinea. 
Suspicion during the post-invasion crisis hinged upon the government’s claim that a 
“fifth column” of neo-colonialist collaborators, supposedly counting amongst its ranks some of 
the most prominent political figures in the country, was currently attempting to destroy Guinea 
from within. Suspects were identified through a series of forced confessions gained through 
starvation – known as the infamous “dièt noire” – and reportedly torture. These prisoners’ 
statements painted spectacular pictures of a highly organized and far reaching conspiracy 
including former Nazi SS officers, significant sums from foreign intelligence services being 
funneled to fifth-column members, and “long cons” against the PDG dating back to the early 
1950s (Barry Diawadou, for instance, had supposedly been on the payroll of the French 
intelligence services since at least 1954). The narratives weaved together by the “Revolutionary 
Committee” charged with investigating and judging members of the Fifth Column were not just a 
means to implicate Touré and his inner circle’s political rivals or enemies. It was also indicative 
of a broader political climate. Previously secret motivations for actions – those whispered 
justifications for slights or non-sanctioned activity that were not possible in the revolutionary 
state – burst into public and spread to every corner of Guinea through confessions broadcast on 
state radio. As such, the plot served as proof positive that invisible motivations – including those 
informed by ethnicity – were inseparable from visible political action. 
Rumors eventually became justification for arrest and imprisonment. State security 
briefings over the course of 1971 detail a pervasive sense of distrust as well as the settling of 
local scores in the name of defending the revolution. One briefing reported that the head of Fria’s 
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Gendarmes was arrested by the local PDG committee for “grave political acts and for not 
reacting to public security reports in a timely manner.” He was subsequently implicated in a vast 
plot including the managers of the city’s bauxite processing plants. The same briefing described 
how in Labé a network of fifth-column conspirators was uncovered, including several teachers at 
the town’s high school, party leaders, religious leaders, and various relatives of the accused. The 
majority of those detained were charged with aiding mercenaries planning on invading Guinea. 
Other local political activists pointed to signs that proved the dishonesty of civil servants, 
political leaders, and government ministers who were implicated in the attack. These portents 
ranged from not negotiating in good faith with the local union to giving overly long speeches and 
backing rival candidate during local elections for party organisms.124  
Despite the government’s long-standing argument that every person in Guinea was a 
citizen and subject to the same treatment by the government, race and ethnicity soon became a 
way to explain treason against the state. Emile Condé, who had once served as Governor of Labé 
and still lived in the town, was eventually named as a fifth column traitor. Security forces 
justified Condé’s arrest by claiming that, “being métis [mixed race; Condé’s father was French], 
he could never overcome the legacy of his ancestors.”125 Condé had notably attended the 1961 
Foulaya conference and was part of the group that supported Saïfoulaye Diallo for Secretary 
General of the PDG. The Governor of Kindia, Emile Cissé, was also accused of being a member 
of the fifth column the following month. A noted author, Cissé had served as the head of the 
Labé high school and had headed up Kindia’s Revolutionary Committee investigating accused 
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collaborators after the invasion.126 Although he complained that the only reasoning he was being 
detained was because he was a métis, Cissé was arrested for treason by local security forces and 
sent to Conakry’s Camp Boiro. In a rare show of public protest, leaders of Kindia’s women’s 
party branch organized what security forces called an “anti-popular” march in support of their 
detained Governor, claiming that he had kept prices for meat and other goods low and had served 
the people of Kindia well. Their protest was quickly broken up, though, and a counter-protest in 
support of Cissé’s arrest was organized shortly thereafter.127  
In the wake of his arrest, Cissé’s larger network in the Futa was “exposed.” While the ex-
governor had served as a schoolmaster in Labé, he had supposedly used materials and funds 
destined to build a new residential school complex (called the Cité Révolutionnaire Kaledou) to 
support a network of clients, confidents, and most salaciously, concubines. Security reports 
explicitly linked the corruption to the “fifth column,” although exactly how run of the mill 
patronage was co-opted by neo-colonial forces was never explained.128 What emerges instead is 
a picture in the “sinister” profile of Emile Cissé of what a revolutionary Guinean should not be. 
She/he should not have too many close associates, or let “personal” bias trump revolutionary 
dedication. She/he should not place too much importance in education, or be overly educated 
her/himself. She/he should not use the resources of the state for personal benefit. And finally, 
and most importantly, she/he should not have divided loyalties, especially if she/he were a métis. 
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The Final Plot 
It might have been just a coincidence that the two métis men caught up in the fifth 
column plot had close ties with the Futa Jallon and were close associates of several Fulbe civil 
servants. Their alleged character flaws, though, aligned closely with the subtext of characteristic 
markers assigned to ethnic Fulbe by both the public and the Guinean government. With 
announcement of the 1976 “Fulbe Plot,” Sékou Touré made that link explicit.  
The two years that followed the purges of 1971-1972 were relatively quiet, a down swing 
the Guinean plot cycle. In 1975, however, the government signaled a period of renewed activity. 
A set of economic reforms announced that year reflected the leadership’s renewed will to closely 
control the Guinean economy. The May 1975 government creation of public pens in the 
country’s chief cattle raising areas resulted in, according to government estimates, some 20,000 
Guineans from the Futa leaving for Senegal.129 The government also severely restricted private 
commerce. In January 1975, it announced that all private trade was outlawed, and banned weekly 
markets throughout the country, claiming that it would in part put a stop to the ”vagrancy of 
numerous married women... who desert their conjugal home” in order to do commerce.130 In 
May, the government requisitioned all privately owned trucks in order to transport consumer 
goods and food into the interior.131 Furthermore, the government announced that all families in 
the Futa – and the Futa alone – were required to pay their taxes in 1976 in the form of grain (i.e. 
fonio, rice, or corn) to stem private trade and temporary migration to Senegal. Agricultural 
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surpluses were and still are today hard to come by in the soil-poor region, and many families 
only practiced subsistence agriculture. Some attempted to grow food for taxes, spending all day 
and night planting and eventually hand-milling grain. Others turned to the black market, 
scrambling to find someone who would sell them surplus flour. A sizeable number, especially 
youth, decided to simply leave the country.132 
The first rumblings of a new plot emerged in 1975. Security forces reported in August 
that an attempted coup d’état was eminent, warning of a coordinated assault led by disgruntled 
Guinean exiles from Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, and Senegal via the Futa Jallon. Administrators in 
the northern Futa requested that squadrons composed of soldiers “not native to the Futa” be sent 
as reinforcements, supposedly because Fulbe soldiers might support the invading forces.133 
Crimes seemingly unrelated to espionage were swept up in the rapidly developing conspiracy. 
One man who escaped from jail and then tried to murder a woman – most likely a former 
paramour – ended up confessing to being part of the fifth column.134 A Senegalese “spy” was 
arrested in Kankan while traveling to visit his uncle in Conakry.135 One anonymous letter sent to 
the President used the head of the Fria economic police’s predilection for “getting drunk on 
every kind of alcoholic beverage” as proof that the often-inebriated administrator was 
committing the same type of anti-government sabotage “as Emile Cissé did in Kindia and Labé.” 
The President or someone in his office took accusations of implied treason seriously, asking the 
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region’s governor if the named officer did in fact consume alcohol.136 
A report in December 1975 hinted that the conspiracy spread to the highest rungs of the 
government. Police suspected Diallo Telli, a former Secretary General of the Organization of 
African Unity, previously Guinea’s ambassador to the United Nations, and at the time the 
Minister of Justice, of being the mastermind. Although he was not the son of a chief, Diallo was 
from the Futa Jallon and had attended the École Ponty along with Barry Diawadou and Barry 
III.137 Now, reports claimed, Diallo was selling all of his personal belongings in anticipation of 
fleeing the country along with a co-conspirator, Souleymane Sy Savané, a Fulbe civil servant 
assigned to the President’s office.138 That Diallo Telli had long been mentioned alongside Barry 
Diawadou and Barry III amongst anti-PDG Fulbe circles as a possible replacement for the 
President only fueled Sékou Touré’s suspicions.139 Telli Diallo was arrested on July 18, 1976, 
and would die from the forced starvation on March 1, 1977. In the intervening months of 
captivity, his supposed network of conspirators spread to the cover nearly all the Futa Jallon, 
giving rise to what the government would soon call the “Fulbe Plot.” 
The “Particular Situation” in the Futa Jallon 
Shortly after Diallo Telli’s arrest, Sékou Touré delivered a series of speeches on what he 
called the “particular situation in the Futa Jallon,” a set of historical trajectories that had led 
Fulbe within Guinea to actively of passively support neo-colonial plots against the 
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government.140 Touré’s use of this term is a subject of debate today within Guinea. For those 
intellectuals targeted by the “Fulbe plot,” his focus on the Futa Jallon as distinct from the rest of 
Guinea was proof positive of a hidden anti-Fulbe bias Touré harbored since the 1950s. Former 
PDG activists, on the other hand, claim that Touré was simply mirroring a phrase that the Fulbe 
intellectuals used themselves to justify their own racism (i.e., that the Futa was “particular,” in 
that it and its Fulbe inhabitants thought themselves superior to the rest of Guinea). In such a line 
of argumentation, the Fulbe themselves thrust “Fulbe racism” as an analytical device upon the 
president. Touré’s speeches indicate that he did in fact attribute the phrase to Fulbe intellectuals. 
After providing proper citation, however, Touré adopted and transformed the concept to argue 
that the Futa Jallon and most importantly the region’s elite were plagued by racism. The Futa 
was different from the rest of Guinea, he argued, in that it stubbornly resisted the modernization 
that the PDG had enacted in the rest of the nation. In his August 22nd speech, entitled “Bury 
Fulbe Racism,” Touré presents a list of “facts” that had produced the “Particular Situation in the 
Futa Jallon,” culminating in the “Fulbe Plot.” 
1.  The region had fallen into moral decay:  
The list of moral faults in the Futa Jallon was long. Alcoholism: “We [Touré] have 
visited that province far and wide and we have realized that alcoholism [emphasis in original] 
truly threatens the Futa, including Marabouts who fill their tea kettles with beer or wine.” Theft: 
“In Conakry, right now, when ten thieves find themselves before the commissioner or before the 
court, one counts at least eight natives of the Futa Jallon.” And finally, migration: “The 
Navétanat has always been combated by the PDG… We told [the navétanes], ‘Instead of going 
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to Senegal and humiliating the Nation, here is what the People of Guinea have provided you so 
you can work your own soil.’ Despite that, the navétanat hasn’t stopped a bit.” These misguided 
miscreants, though, could be saved by the virtuous People: “You must save the thief, the 
prostitute, the alcoholic, the navétane: it is a duty that will be taken up.” The invocation of 
migrants was by 1976 a familiar tropes, as the figure of the navétane as a type of anti-citizen 
became a key component of the PDG government’s public statements almost immediately after 
independence (see Ch. 5). It was an obvious treason that all in Guinea could easily see. 
2. Colonialists had duped Fulbe intellectuals:  
“They colluded with the white colonizer and prostituted themselves to him. [The 
colonizer] inculcated in the Fulbe the idea that he is not Black, and some of them 
went as far as to search for their origin in Somalia or Ethiopia or some other 
place, and refused to live in their own era, in their own place, and to understand 
their own people.” 
 
Fulbe claims of faraway origins predated sustained contact with the French, at least according to 
local accounts (see Ch. 1). However, Touré points to role of colonial invention in the fashioning 
of Fulbe alterity through non-native status.141 
3. Not only are the Fulbe not from a far away place, they aren’t even the majority of the 
population in the Futa:  
“The vast majority of citizens in the Futa Jallon belong to Diallonké, Sarakolé, 
Tukulor, Bassari, Koniagui, or Diakanké communities. In the whole of the Futa, 
the [last names] Souaré, Tounkara, Diaby, Touré, Sow, Doumbouya and Keïta 
[except for Sow, none of them Fulbe names, and the Sow are commonly of lower 
status] are the most numerous; the Diallo, Barry, and Bah [last names] constitute a 
clear minority. We [Touré used the third person throughout the speech to refer to 
himself] declare this now because this is the social reality of the Futa.”  
 
The non-Fulbe ethnic groups Touré listed were commonly seen as minority communities in the 
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Futa; he’s arguing that they are, in fact, the majority, and that one finds the last names associated 
with those groups more often that the three associated with elite Fulbe. Furthermore, most of 
those who do have Fulbe last names simply changed them after Fulbe Muslims overthrew the 
Jallonke state in the eighteenth century:  
“In the past, when the Fulbe established their power in the Futa, all those who 
belonged to the [existing] intellectual elite, the military elite, the elite of 
whichever domain, or all those who wanted to become so in the feudal system 
[meaning the Fulbe state], were ennobled by changing their names to ones that 
were authentically Fulbe… They insult their own origin.”  
 
Touré continued by claiming that one of the Futa’s most renowned Islamic scholars, Thierno 
Aliou Buuba N’Diyan, was, despite his family’s claims, not Fulbe himself, but rather “[of the 
last name] Doukouré and of the Sarakhollé race.” His argument – that the majority of self-
indentified Fulbe in the Futa Jallon were in reality not Fulbe at all, but rather recent “converts” – 
was similar theories French Ethnographers had put forward during the 1910s when the colonial 
administration were themselves faced with a defiant and rebellious Futa Jallon elite (see Ch. 1). 
Due to the lack of a record on the sources upon which Touré drew to write his speeches and 
political treatises – published accounts of his addresses not surprisingly do not include many 
footnotes – it is impossible to discern whether or not the similarities are examples of echoes, 
resonances, or simply emerged by happenstance. More evident, though, is that the motivations 
behind the colonial and post-colonial statements were the same: to undercut all claims of elite 
legitimacy, specifically those based upon moral and ethnic superiority rooted in the eighteenth-
century jihad.142 
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4. The French only conquered the Futa Jallon with the collaboration of Fulbe elites, and 
the Fulbe elites then exploited the Guinean people during colonialism:  
“Almamy Bokar Biro was the victim of the traitorous defection of the province of 
Labé on the one hand and of the destabilizing actions of an internal Fifth Column 
composed of rivals on the other… And those who betrayed Alpha Yaya,143 [and] 
Gassimou Diallo, [and] those who betrayed Bokar Biro Barry were not able to 
have descendents possessing dignified behavior, if those [descendents] did not 
entrust themselves to the PDG, the revolutionary organization capable of 
extirpating this trait, down to the root and the treachery of their fathers, because 
there is a historical continuity that brands a mark and an indelible stamp on the 
person and life of these individuals.” 
 
In the last sentence, what had before been a historical development transformed into an integral 
trait of the Fulbe elite, inseparable from character and motivation. Suspicion of Fulbe duplicity 
was a common trope in Guinean politics dating back at least to the French conquest, and featured 
heavily in pre-colonial inter-elite intrigue in the Futa Jallon(see Ch. 1). The notion that the Fulbe 
were deceitful gained steam, though, when prominent Fulbe politicians were accused of being 
manipulated behind the scenes by canton chiefs during the 1950s. Touré added: 
“Under the shadow of the occupation forces of colonialism, [the colonial regime] 
allowed the canton chief to exert his power on the peasantry, abuse their 
daughters, expel them from their huts, and assign their wives, cattle, and fields to 
whomever they wanted, and to use the most beautiful of their daughters to pay 
homage to the cercle commandant, whom they venerated as all-powerful.” 
 
This anti-chief argument, and the (mostly correct) narrative of colonial history it built had a 
central part of the PDG’s platform since the early 1950s. It had played a central role in the 
party’s partial “conquest” of the Futa Jallon in the run-up to the 1957 territorial elections (see 
Chapter 3). And by the 1970s, it had become tied intimately to how the Guinean government saw 
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Almamy. See Chapter 1. 
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and dealt with the Fulbe. 
5. Few Fulbe elites joined the PDG during the anti-colonial struggle, and most Fulbe voted 
“yes” in the 1958 referendum:  
“When you consult, from 1947 to 1959, the lists of the leadership of the section 
and sub-sections of the PDG, one comes across only Susu, Malinké, or 
Forestières, or Africans not originally from Guinea. That clearly indicates that 
there was a general resignation of Fulbe members, and those who held positions 
[of leadership] from the start, such as comrade Saïfoulaye Diallo and others, were 
completely isolated [from the Fulbe]…  
 
Also, one must emphasize that in the referendum of September 28, 1958, when all 
of Guinea waved the “no” ballot in support of independence and dignity, it was, 
yet again, the Futa that waved the “yes” to shamefully signify: “we want to stay 
obedient to colonialism!” 
 
Touré’s first claim is mostly correct, although there were other Fulbe politicians, such as Barry 
III, who were alienated from their families due to progressive politics. Due to a series of events, 
chief of which was ethnically tinged political violence during the 1950s, those ideologically like-
minded Fulbe politicians refused to join the PDG. His second claim is at least partially rooted in 
truth, although in no Futa cercle was the “yes” vote a majority. If anything, the Futa results from 
the ’58 referendum reflected a pervasive ambivalence towards both a reformed French 
community and an independent Guinea (see Chapter 3). 
6. After independence, Fulbe elites sought to undermine the government from within and 
favored only other Fulbe:  
“And when Fulbe civil servants are numerous in one administrative office, all of 
the sudden you have complete paralysis… The majority of them [Fulbe civil 
servants] went about [their jobs], in the spirit of disorganization, with destruction, 
with demolition, and with hate towards the other ethnicities, even as far as 
introducing injustice amongst the youth… Certain [Fulbe] professors went as far 
as to refuse, to non-Fulbe students, to loan [them] valuable books which they 
reserved for only for students of their own race.” 
 
Accusations of favoritism were heaped upon Barry Diawadou in particular. Many PDG activists 
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claim that while Minister of Education, the Fulbe politician gave scholarship to study abroad 
only to Fulbe students, forcing their Malinké, Susu, and Forestière counterparts to end their 
academic careers and thus decreasing the number of qualified applicants for civil service 
positions amongst the three ethnic groups.  
For Touré, the road forward was clear:  
“Because it is racism that is used to submit the country to the mercy of neo-
colonialism imperialism, we must do everything to root it out… instead of being 
ashamed, [the Fulbe racists] still want to destroy our independence. That must 
never happen again, and if need be all of Guinea will rise up again, blade, 
hammer, and rifle in their hands, to bury them; Guinea will assume its 
responsibilities. It is a declaration of war! They want a race war? Well, as for us, 
we’re ready; we agree, and we will annihilate them immediately, not through a 
race war, but rather through a war of radical revolution.” 
 
Touré’s speech was more than two hundred years in the making. It constructed a historical 
narrative stretching back to the eighteenth-century Fulbe jihad that explained why, by the 1970s, 
the Fulbe in the Futa Jallon constituted a fragment within the Guinean nation in need of 
seemingly violent rehabilitation. Finally, as a speech given to a crowd, broadcast over the radio, 
and published as part of a book, it brought to the public the accused secret maneuvering of Fulbe 
elites. It broke down the distinction between public fealty and private treason, laying bare the 
history that had produced a set of characteristics (“the brand”, “the indelible stamp”) associated 
with one ethnic group in particular. What had before been the product of a set of unfortunate 
historical developments now became an essential part of the Fulbe identity. These characteristics 
were identical to those of the fifth column. Therefore, the only logical conclusion was that all 
those who identified themselves as “Fulbe” were either denying their true non-Fulbe heritage or 
in truth anti-citizens devoted to the fall of the Guinean government. Finally, and most 
importantly, it created an opening through which talking about ethnic characteristics and linking 
those traits with political action became a public discussion. None of the arguments Touré made 
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were new, in the sense that they had all been part of the Guinean political vocabulary for 
decades. It was, though, the ethnic equivalent of when “…and all the leaves on the trees fell” at 
the Foulaya conference. Suspicions that many within Guinea had long suspected were 
manifested, obviously, for all to witness. 
In the wake of the “Fulbe plot,” the Government moved to weaken Fulbe elites. Fulbe 
civil servants were dismissed from their posts. Fulbe students were denied scholarships to study 
overseas until, Touré demanded, all exiled Fulbe students returned to Guinea.144 Saïfoulaye 
Diallo immediately went on the radio and gave a series of statements denouncing Fulbe racism, 
pledging to root out any of his “brothers” in the service of the Fifth column.145 Tiala Gobaye 
Mountaye claims that there was competition between highly placed Fulbe politicians to 
denounce the Fulbe racists in the most visible manner: 
There was this schmuck [fr. couillon] from Labé, Mouctar Donghol, a member of 
the BPN, Minister of Transportation at the time, I think. He got in his car and 
came to have a meeting in a cinema here in Labé, to talk about the Fulbe and 
Fulbe racism. I was there, and I said, ‘oooohh, he’s forgotten where he’s from. 
He’s lost.’ When he did that, the marabouts took their books, their quills, and their 
water, and cursed him!146 He couldn’t come [to the Futa] any longer. He married a 
Susu woman, and he died and was buried in Conakry. He never again had the 
opportunity to return. All because he came to talk about Fulbe racism right here in 
the Futa! Saïfoulaye, who was smart, talked on the radio in Conakry [and thus 
couldn’t be cursed].147 
 
Thus, while political expediency required demonstrating loyalty to the government, Mountaye 
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144 Touré, “Enterrer,” 202. 
 
145 Lewin, Ahmed Sékou Touré, VI, 248. 
 
146 Koranic schools often teach using a wooden board and a water-soluble ink that can be easily 
washed off using water. Religious scholars and leaders, popularly known as Marabouts, will 
often also write a verse from the Koran on the board, wash it and collect the water, and through 
ingesting or bathing in the water bless (or, in the case above, curse) an individual. 
 
147 Interview with Tiala Gobaye Mountaye. 
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suggests that there was a spiritual price to pay for renouncing one’s roots. 
The Age of Plots would come to a close less only one year later. On August 27th, 1977, 
groups of women and youth in Conakry – who had been integral to the PDG’s rise in Guinea and 
the Futa Jallon during the 1950s – rallied and rioted against what they considered to be arbitrary 
seizures of merchandise by the country’s Economic Police. Shortly thereafter, the PDG 
government opened Guinea up to foreign trade and de-centralized the economy. He reestablished 
diplomatic relations with the French government, and began to more openly welcome outside 
investment outside the closely confined mining sector. The era of social revolution, it seemed, 
came to an end with a relative whimper when compared to the other formative events in its early 
existence: the 1958 referendum and the 1964 Loi Cadre. 
The speech’s effects are murkier than the Guinean government’s hasty 1977 about-face. 
Unlike in Rwanda, where Hutu political leaders and their surrogates may have deployed a more 
radical vocabulary but still employed a similar logic, the ethnic language contained in Touré’s 
speech did not precipitate widespread anti-Fulbe violence. Furthermore, state imprisonment was 
contained to a small cadre of Fulbe elites, whose number in Guinea by 1976 had already been 
drastically culled either due to exile or execution. Perhaps the potential violent ripples that 
emanated from Touré’s announcement of the “Fulbe plot” were blocked by the 1977 protests and 
subsequent reforms. Another possible explanation is that Guineans simply did not pay much 
mind to Touré’s speech, as the president was given to hours-long tirades that often defied both 
structure and logic. After all, the defining characteristic of the PDG regime’s pronouncements 
was, as Mike McGovern argues, “empty speech,” or political rhetoric completely divorced from 
political action or policy. 
Perhaps, then, it is the speech’s meticulous, historically rich, and structured argument that 
! 299 
set it apart from other examples of PDG rhetoric. In articulating the “particular situation,” Touré 
presented his audience with a revisionist history of the Fulbe, the Futa Jallon, and both’s position 
within a first colonial and then post-colonial Guinea. Touré drew from familiar tropes and 
“truths” about the Fulbe to construct a compelling argument for why the Fulbe were a fragment 
of the Guinean nation and in need of either radical reeducation or repression. In other words, and 
in line with many other effective politicians, Touré took what the Guinean people already 
“knew” and bent those ideas to the political ends of the PDG regime. The effect of this type of 
rhetorical and political work was not imminently present, as most Guineans had more pressing 
concerns tied to near famine to worry about. Yet, having presented the corpus of disparaging 
characterizations lobbed against the Fulbe in one nicely packaged narrative, Touré’s speech 
became a resource upon which later generations of Guinean politicians drew in order to construct 
their own narratives of Guinea’s past, which in turn served their present political concerns. 
Perhaps the most important effect of Touré’s 1976 speech has been this longer, subtler 
contribution to Guinea’s political culture. PDG sympathizers and/or Fulbe critics point to “Fulbe 
plot” as proof positive of a wide-ranging ethnic plot to undermine the socialist revolution and 
Guinea’s independence. For their part, the “Fulbe plot” has become an important component of 
Fulbe narratives of particular victimhood during the First Republic. Notably, though, the 1976 
speech was the first time that in public and over the radio, ethnicity erupted into the visible realm 
of politics. Fulbe and PDG politicians of the 1950s danced – with varying degrees of dexterity – 
around the politicization of ethnic identification, especially during moments of violence and 
urban unrest. With the “Fulbe plot” and the “particular situation,” though, that historical 
trajectory had come to fruition. One could no longer deny or ignore the Fulbe fragment of the 
Guinean nation. It was present for all to see. 
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Ethnicity and Conflict in Post-colonial Guinea 
The “Particular situation” and the marriage of politics and ethnic identification from 
which it sprung was the result of a series of events and trajectories, both planned and unexpected, 
that became entangled with one another in the decades before 1976. The PDG-led government 
were faced with a series of severe problems almost immediately after Guinean gained its 
independence, none less important than stabilizing the national economy in the context of 
uncertainty. The 1964 Loi Cadre was the result of a six-year experimentation with policies meant 
to limit inflation and ensure supply chains. Perhaps more importantly, it was also a means of 
political control, as in the nascent First Republic merchants and the wealth they amassed posed a 
real threat to a president who was, by 1960, under siege. Struggles over the form of the Guinea 
post-colony played out throughout he newly independent nation, but were most active – and 
central to the formation of the Guinean state and nation itself – in the “resistant” Futa Jallon.  
The series of PDG reforms enacted in the Futa Jallon had a firm basis in the party’s 
ideology and echoed some of its main demands during decolonization. But the social groups 
mobilized through the party structure – women, youth, former slaves – in crucial socio-economic 
domains in the Futa – Islam, land ownership, and local political administration – were more 
often used as a means to undermine the region’s elite than as an uplifting project in and of itself. 
Thus, it is easy to understand why, by 1977, these crucial groups had become disillusioned with 
the PDG, with women and youth marching on the Presidential Palace and rural communities 
fleeing en masse to neighboring Senegal. The end result of reform was that, by the 1970s, the 
PDG had alienated large portions of Futa Jallon society. Rather than being seen as reformists 
dedicated to improving Guinea’s society and economy, Fulbe in the Futa came to see the post-
colonial government as yet another political structure determined to sap the region’s economic 
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surpluses. That the government outwardly spurned many of the central religious and cultural 
markers of “Fulbeness” – now open to larger portion of Futa society thanks to the PDG’s own 
reforms – further marked the political overlords in Conakry as unwelcome interlopers.  
Mutual distrust between segments of Fulbe society and the PDG government, however, 
was not enough to crystallize the popular connection between ethnic identification and ideas of 
political community. For that to happen, more abstract ideas about who was and was not a 
Guinean citizen had to emerge, and those ideas had to be associated with markers of ethnic 
identification. Such a double process resulted from the “permanent plot” and its culmination with 
the “Fulbe plot” of 1976. Sékou Touré’s key move in announcing the series of plots was to link 
their development with a private world of political maneuvering. Ideas about hidden motives and 
secret practices, especially those associated with the practice of Islam in Guinea, were an 
elemental part of Guinean politics. Guinea, or West Africa in general, isn’t alone in developing 
ideas about a hidden world of politics. In Guinea, though, and especially with regards to the 
Fulbe elite, hidden explanations relied heavily upon purportedly fundamental traits of ethnic 
groups, from pre-colonial ideas about social hierarchies, to French ideas about Alpha Yaya’s 
“revolt” in 1905 and 1911, explanations of political violence in the 1950s, and the seemingly 
pervasive presence of the foreign “fifth column” in the 1960s and ‘70s. Similar to other 
contestations about belonging that unfolded throughout post-colonial Africa,148 Touré was 
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engaging in a public debate which drew upon a variety of sources: local and colonial, new and 
old, hidden and visible. The practical and ideological battles that played out in the Futa came to 
define the post-colonial Guinean state, and ultimately were central to the linking of ethnicity and 
politics in post-colonial Guinea. Most importantly, in the “anti-ethnic” First Republic, “the 
Fulbe” as a rhetorical device came to represent the “ethnic,” and therefore the “anti-national.” In 
PDG rhetoric, “ethnicity” and “the nation” were diametrically opposed. In use, though, both 
belonged to similar modes of thought that sorted who did and did not belong, either within Futa 
social hierarchies or in the post-colonial Guinean nation.149 
The PDG government’s linking of economic and political crises with progressively larger 
and less plausible plots afforded the party, at least for a time, the political stability it so 
desperately desired. However, when the accused neo-colonial traitors eventually included a 
plurality of Guinea’s population, either through active treason or passive conspiracy, the plot as 
political device – and increasingly the institutions of state repression – collapsed under the 
weight of their own enormity. The age of plots and purges may have ended in 1977. The 
“Particular Situation,” however, ended up being one of the few lasting legacies of Guinea’s 
experiment in creating an African socialist revolutionary state. What started out as a project 
aimed specifically at the Futa Jallon became a larger discussion about the role of ethnic 
community in Guinean politics.  
The language and logic deployed by Sékou Touré, and more broadly within Guinean 
political culture, was specific and represented a particular legacy and mobilization of history. 
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Stepping for a moment outside the particular case of Guinea, though, one can identify several 
similarities with other post-colonial West African states. From the perspective of the state, the 
PDG government’s tactics – including it’s assault on the chieftaincy – mirrored similar 
developments in its neighbor to the north, Mali, at least until the 1968 coup d’état that toppled 
the Modibo Keïta regime.150 In Touré’s capturing and then systematic elimination of rival parties 
and politicians one sees reflections with Leopold Sedar Senghor’s hounding of Mamadou Dia 
and the Parti Africain de l’Indépendance. Considering the fate of Fulbe politicians such as Barry 
Diawadou and Ibrahima Barry III – and, as we’ll see in the next chapter, the cadre of opposition 
members who chose exile – one is reminded of the fall and eventual resistance of Niger’s 
Sawaba, armed intervention and all.151 To return one of the key questions that has driven 
Guinean historiography – namely, what made Guinea different? –  despite having temporarily 
diverged from other former French colonies in West Africa by voting “no” in the 1958 
referendum, what occurred in Guinea from independence to the mid-1970s reflected larger trends 
in the area. The PDG might have been more audacious in pushing for immediate independence 
and eventually targeting such a large portion of Guinea’s population. The strategy it used and 
ideology it deployed, however, was unfortunately common. 
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Chapter Five 
Neither Home nor Abroad: Fulbe Migrants and Exiles, 1958-1984 
 Mobility has played a central role in the history of the Futa Jallon. Successive waves of 
Pular-speaking migrants contributed to the rise of the pre-colonial Islamic state, and the region’s 
scholars became an important participants in West African circuits of religious knowledge. For 
much of the 18th and 19th centuries, the Futa Jallon occupied a node in a West African system of 
trade and migration that made the region an attractive target for European commerce and then 
conquest by the late 19th century. During the 1930s, the region’s closer integration into the 
colonial economy strengthened already existing waves of seasonal agricultural migration from 
the Futa Jallon, cresting in the early 1950s with more than 30,000 young Fulbe men working in 
Senegal’s peanut fields each rainy season. Finally, counter to popular portrayals of Guinea as a 
“closed” country, tens of thousands of young Guineans from the Futa Jallon continued to cross 
new national borders following independence, primarily to Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire. Reflecting 
the larger horizons of Fulbe migration, imaginings of “abroad” have been central to how the 
Fulbe have thought about themselves as comprising regional and trans-national communities. In 
turn, Fulbe mobility has shaped how others have thought of them either as members of pre-
colonial states, French colonies, or post-colonial nation-states  
This chapter builds upon this rich history to explore the development of trans-national 
Fulbe networks after independence, and how migration and exile shaped Fulbe ideas about where 
they belonged in an emerging post-colonial order. It also examines the ways in which Fulbe 
migration figured in discourses surrounding Guinean citizenship in the wake of 1958. Despite his 
articulation of a vivid pan-African imaginary, Sékou Touré argued that the Fulbe abroad were 
building the wrong sorts of trans-national communities, ones that undermined African 
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sovereignty rather than securing its survival. Fulbe exiles and migrants were not much more 
welcome in their host communities; either due to ambiguous legal status, the problems they 
provoked for foreign governments when dealing with the Guinean state, or simply due to the 
local politics of xenophobia, these economic and political refugees often lived under the threat of 
forcible repatriation, and therefore imminent demise. What emerges from this period is a picture 
of a trans-national network comprised of exiles and migrants who were, to varying degrees, 
neither “at home” nor “abroad,” instead forging an interstitial community in an independent 
West Africa comprised of nation-states.  
I argue that following independence trans-national networks became increasingly 
important resource for Fulbe self-preservation and self-imaginings following. As their position 
became gradually more threatened and marginalized under the First Republic, many Fulbe of 
both elite and non-elite status turned to exile and migration to form alternative ideas of political 
community and economic strategy. Different groups went about securing their positions in 
different ways – exiles relied upon elite political networks tied to a fading imperial imaginary to 
find jobs, fund opposition movements, and launch rhetorical and actual assaults against the 
Touré regime, while the much larger group of migrants relied upon economic power, building 
trade networks and establishing near monopolies on niches within foreign economies. As 
repression became more acute during the First Republic, though, both came to see themselves as 
constituting trans-national communities, although the scope and content of those networks 
diverged.  
A focus on networks of Fulbe exiles and migrants opens up other avenues of historical 
analysis. The Fulbe – as both ethnic minorities in most of the countries in which the live and as 
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migrants – have often been placed at the margins of the post-colonial nation.1 Yet, most notably 
in Guinea, the Fulbe were at the center of debates about citizenship and belonging in the decades 
following independence. This seeming contradiction takes on new meaning, however, when the 
history of post-colonial debates about Fulbe belonging and citizenship in African nations are 
placed within wider contexts. Such a conceptual move is not unprecedented. Scholars have 
undertaken significant work on fluid contestations of citizenship and political subjectivities 
within the framework of empire.2 Far from developing into hermetically sealed national debates, 
governments and groups continued to engage in discourses of citizenship and belonging in supra- 
and trans-national contexts after independence. Rather, national debates about rights – both legal 
and social – unfolded within the context of a history of regional migration stretching back to 
before European colonization. As a dispersed and mobile population, Fulbe became one of the 
more visible representations of the wider horizons of citizenship following independence. 
The post-colonial history of Futa Jallon Fulbe migrants offers fertile ground to examine 
the history of a post-colonial trans-national network and its position within the political histories 
of several African nation-states. As some 1/3 of Guinea’s total population lived abroad by the 
1970s, a comprehensive study of the Guinean diaspora is beyond the scope of this chapter. The 
histories presented below focus instead on one important axis of the Futa Fulbe diaspora that 
linked and continues to link Senegal with the Central and Northern Futa Jallon. The choice of a 
narrower scope of analysis is not coincidental. Fulbe from what is considered the “heart” of the 
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Futa Jallon (although not the pre-colonial political capital) have migrated north to what became 
the colony and later nation-state of Senegal since at least the nineteenth century. The areas these 
migrants left became the central areas of anti-PDG discontent following independence. Lastly, 
one specific form of mobility, namely seasonal agricultural migration from the Central Futa to 
Senegal called the navétanat, became central to state-dominated discourses about belonging and 
citizenship and post-colonial Guinea. Senegal has not been the only destination for Futa Fulbe 
migrants; it was and still is, though, the most numerically and historically significant.  
The organization of this chapter reflects post-colonial trajectories of Futa Jallon Fulbe 
exiles and migrants. I begin with an examination of the reasons why individuals hailing from or 
with roots in the Futa Jallon left their home communities, and point to the different 
circumstances of departure for exiles and migrants. Reflecting the internal division of the Futa 
trans-national Fulbe community, I then consider how exiles and migrants sought to define their 
positions abroad – as opposition members, students, and veterans, on the one had, and as tailors, 
charbonniers (charcoal makers), and fruit vendors on the other. This section also examines how 
they attempted to effect change within Guinea and/or maintain connections with their families in 
the Futa Jallon. The second part of the chapter then moves onto debates within Guinea and 
Senegal about the belonging and citizenship of the Fulbe, a state-dominated discourse in which 
the mobility of Fulbe and their large numbers in Senegal played a central role.  
Departures 
Exiles 
For an elite sliver of Guinea’s population, the short-term effect of Guinea’s 
transformation into a nation-state was especially traumatic. Independence meant the severing of 
imperial circuits within which Guineans could move to make use of professional or educational 
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opportunities. One of the chief ways that young Guineans had left their territory of birth was 
through a set of schools created to train future civil servants. The French colonial administration 
had invested little in Guinea’s education system, relying on religious schools to do much of the 
primary instruction in the interior. Officials in Conakry established a small network of teacher 
training schools only following the end of the Second World War, but these offered limited 
education to a small number of Guineans.3 Guinea’s sole secondary school up to independence, 
the École Georges Poiret, focused on technical training and was geared towards producing low-
level civil servants such a telegraph technicians.4 Therefore, those students wishing to pursue a 
“classical” education or wanting to move up to the higher ranks of the civil service looked 
elsewhere, notably to the École William Ponty outside of Dakar, Senegal. Dozens of young 
Guineans, mostly the sons of colonial chiefs or notable merchants, eventually made their way to 
the École Ponty starting in the 1930s. In fact, most of Guinea’s post-WWII political elite were 
“pontins,” as graduates of the Dakar school were known. 
 Independence marked a drastic reorganization of the educational system within Guinea. 
As many of the secondary teachers in Guinea were French and were paid by the French state, the 
lion’s share of the country’s educators departed along with the French government. Faced with 
limited resources and few qualified teachers, the post-colonial PDG-led government decided to 
invest heavily in rural education. The choice was both ideological and practical. Party ideology 
placed the heart of the Guinean nation in the country’s rural population, and much of the party’s 
rise in the interior relied upon promises to extend to the wider public the benefits of education 
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that had under colonial rule been restricted to a small elite. While the Guinean government 
opened a series of high schools in most of the country’s major cities, it did not establish a 
university until 1963. Even then, one former student told me, the level of instruction was low and 
political influence high.5 Opportunities to study abroad were similarly limited. The French 
government ended support for Guinean students wishing to study in Senegal. The Guinean 
government offered some scholarships for study abroad, but rumors of political and ethnic 
favoritism clouded the program throughout its short existence.6  In response, students who before 
might have continued their studies at Ponty to eventually return to Guinea as civil servants 
responded by opting out of Guinean system altogether. In the months following Guinean 
independence, 82 young men chose to pack up and travel to Senegal, clandestinely and under the 
cover of night, in order to continue their studies at the University of Dakar.7 Their departure was, 
at least at the time, definitive; to leave Guinea and forsake the nation-building project was an act 
of betrayal to the state, especially when one’s destination was “neo-colonial” Senghor-led 
Senegal.  
 Other elites, especially former opposition members, fled Guinea out of fear of political 
repression. The list of exiles included rival trade unionists such as David Soumah, the 
Confédération Française des Travailleurs Chrétiens (CFTC) Guinean branch head and rival to 
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Confédération Générale des Travailleurs Africains (CGTA) leader Sékou Touré.8 Soumah made 
clear in public statements that his departure was a firm rebuke to Touré’s Guinea, and a mere six 
months after independence had already laid the groundwork for an opposition in exile centered in 
Dakar.9 Other exiles came from the highest ranks of the government. Fearing arrest after falling 
out of favor with Touré and his allies, Camara Faraban, a former a Minister of Education, 
ambassador, and member of the powerful Bureau Politique National (BPN), fled Conakry for 
Paris in April 1959.10 In response, the Guinean government claimed that Camara was working 
for French Intelligence services – he did eventually find a post in the French civil service, 
although one similar to his previous post as a colonial labor inspector – and threatened to expel 
forty French nationals living in Guinea.11 Although neither exile had roots in the ethnic Fulbe-
dominated Futa Jallon region, Sékou Touré claimed in a speech that both were involved in a 
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Nationalist Movement in Guinea (New York: Heinemann, 2005), 79-80; For Touré’s 
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growing discontent with what he believed to be looming dominance of political parties in the 
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and British Africa (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 417-419. For Soumah’s 
departure, see Victor T. Le Vine, Politics in Francophone Africa, (Boulder, CO.: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 2004), 222-223. 
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French plot unfolding in Dakar to overthrow the Guinean government with the help of disloyal 
elements within the Futa.12  
 For others, the choice at hand dealt more with negotiating a possible return. Thousands of 
individuals from the territory of Guinea had worked within various parts of the French 
government before independence. Some civil servants, like Diallo Telli, future Secretary General 
of the Organization of African Unity and one of the few Guineans at the time to hold a law 
degree, decided to return to aid the understaffed independent government. The vast majority of 
Guineans in the French government, though, served in the armed forces. Although enrollment 
had fallen from its Second World War peak, some 15,000 Guinean soldiers in the French Army 
were still stationed outside of Guinea at the time of independence. According to French reports, a 
majority of soldiers was in favor of Guinea’s continued membership in the French community, 
and most believed that Guinea’s voters would fall in line with the rest of the former French 
colonies in West Africa by supporting the proposed constitution in the 1958 referendum. These 
soldiers were caught by surprise, then, when some 97% of Guineans voted for immediate and 
total independence. Writing to French President De Gaulle on the eve of Guinea’s official and 
irrevocable proclamation of independence, one Guinean officer stationed in Biskra (Algeria) 
refused to recognize his homeland’s new status apart from the French community: 
Since MEDINE, FACHODA, MAROC, VERDUN, CHEMIN DES DAMES, 
DARDANELLES, BIBANE, ‘39-’45, INDOCHINE and up to A.F.N. [French 
North Africa] [all French conflicts in which African soldiers participated], the 
loyalty of Africans has been beyond reproach. All of [our] freely offered 
sacrifices during these periods are concrete evidence of a guarantee and of 
[Guinea’s] sound development within the [French] community… All African 
soldiers solemnly condemn the inconsiderate actions of Monsieur Sékou Touré, 
who drove the Guinean people to a “no” vote in the referendum. We all know that 
the Guinean people, intentionally misinformed and living under an obvious 
dictatorship, voted against the constitution. It must be underlined [however] that 
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this decision was forced.13 
 
The soldier’s letter presented a rosy picture of Guineans’ participation in the French armed 
forces – especially with regards to the less-than-voluntary recruitment practices that existed up to 
and through the Second World War – but he argued that the “blood debt” African soldiers paid in 
conflicts reflected their dedication to a reformed French state.14 Breaking the bonds that linked 
Guineans to the French state – which, as we’ll see, were forged not only through the symbolism 
of “blood debts” but also by actual debts owed to retired soldiers through pensions – was not as 
clear-cut as holding an election and signing a declaration. 
 Despite some misgivings, the majority of Guinean soldiers decided to return home. Yet 
concerns amongst some, especially those of higher rank, still persisted. One French officer 
reported that the soldiers feared that if they were to refuse to go back to Guinea they would be 
labeled as traitors by the government and their families would face reprisals.15 Some chose to 
remain in the French Army or in some cases to be discharged but settle either in Dakar or Paris. 
One Guinean former non-commissioned officer told me that his decision was easy.  He did not 
join the PDG in the 1950s, siding with the opposition DSG before independence. Furthermore, 
the rupture in relations between Guinea and France after the 1958 referendum meant that he 
could not receive a pension if he returned. He decided to stay in Dakar, took a position as a 
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surviellant at the Lycée Delafosse, and would later join a series of opposition parties whose 
primary goal was the overthrow of the PDG regime.16 
 Indeed, in addition to fears of a growing “dictatorship” in Guinea, pensions were the 
main area of concern for most Guinean former soldiers. Those living abroad did not have to 
worry, at least in the short term; the French government maintained their status as citizens of the 
French Community into 1960, and made sure that they continued to receive payments after they 
had assumed citizenship in their new host communities.17 The majority of soldiers who returned 
to Guinea, on the other hand, could not count on French support. Following independence, the 
French government ceased direct payments to veterans within Guinea, instead handing the funds 
earmarked for pensions over to the Guinean Armed Forces with the expectation that their 
Guinean counterparts would ensure their payment to the beneficiaries. In 1962, though, the 
French Army command received reports that most veterans had not been receiving their pensions 
since 1959 and others’ had been subject to a 5% tax.18 As a result, the French government began 
to consider suspending payments to the Guinean government altogether. By the next year, the 
France’s decision to cut its veterans in Guinea free was made clear. French officers posted to 
former recruitment centers in Guinea and Mali burned the personnel files of former soldiers, 
which severely hampered the latter’s attempts to establish their rights to pensions.19 
In 1962, the French government also began to discharge soldiers who had decided to 
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remain in the French army with the aim of eventual repatriation to Guinea. The second part of 
the plan was never put into action. Guinean soldiers feared that their pensions, paid in full once 
they left the armed forces, would be seized by the Guinean Government upon arrival.20 Sékou 
Touré did not want the soldiers to return either; perhaps fearing the same fate as his Togolese 
counterpart, Sylvanus Olympio, who was assassinated during a January 1963 coup d’état, the 
Guinean Government refused to accept the more than 250 discharged Guinean veterans and their 
families.21 In 1965, the Guinean government made a second effort to repatriate Guinean veterans 
living in Dakar, perhaps as a means to stifle the exiled opposition. Negotiations between the 
Guinean, French, and Senegalese governments failed, however, when the soldiers asked for an 
assurance from the French government that they would not be punished upon their return to 
Guinea. Even if making such a guarantee was possible, the French officials had little political 
will to do so. Any possibility of return was foreclosed later that year when the Guinean 
government accused French intelligence services of supporting a plot to overthrow the PDG 
government and France removed its ambassador in Conakry. The dispute had more severe 
ramifications for veterans in Guinea; following a break in diplomatic relations, all pension 
payments by the French government were halted.22  
In its decision to marginalize veterans within Guinea and refuse the repatriation of those 
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still abroad, the PDG government’s policies diverged from other former French colonies, notably 
Mali. There, Madeira Keita, the Minister of the Interior, used France’s default on pensions to 
critique the neo-colonial policy of the former metropole. Furthermore, rather than seizing the 
payments veterans did receive, the Malian government welcomed the infusion of cash these 
payments made into the national economy.23 Perhaps, given the dramatic break of 1958 and the 
France-encouraged turmoil that followed, Touré was wary of any connection to the former 
metropole, regardless of whether or not it could be used for his advantage in international affairs. 
After a series of coups d’état unfolded in Africa during the 1960s, the Guinean leader most likely 
thought the marginalization of the military and veterans more valuable than their incorporation 
into the national community and economy. Whatever his motive, Touré was clear that he did not 
wish to court the favor of veterans, either at home or abroad. 
 Thus, for a small group of exiles deemed dangerous by the Guinean government, 1958 
represented an important rupture. Their choice to either flee Guinea or remain abroad marked 
them as traitors to their nation. As both educated and familiar with French political and state 
networks, the French press often seized upon these exiles stories to show the ugly underbelly of 
what others had described as Guinea’s triumphant march of African nationalism. As Guinea 
increasingly closed itself to outside observers over the course of the 1960s, their words would 
come to determine how those in the West came to see what they believed to be an increasingly 
repressive and paranoid state. Thus, in both veterans’ lives and the international press’s 
imaginary, the Guinea became a “closed state.”  
Migrants 
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 For another, much larger group departing Guinea, independence marked a change but not 
a drastic departure. The Futa Jallon had for centuries occupied the center of regional networks of 
migration.24 The region’s integration into the colonial economy spurred increased numbers of 
circular migration, most notably tied to agricultural work in Senegal’s peanut fields. By the 
1950s, these navétanes from the Futa Jallon constituted a plurality of all seasonal agricultural 
workers in Senegal, with 50,000 from the Futa Jallon participating in 1950 growing season.25 
Migration to Senegal, especially for young men of slave status, was therefore a common and 
possibly profitable practice. 
It was at the height of this particular migration practice during the 1950s that patterns 
began to shift. Rather than returning home to the Futa Jallon during the dry season, Futa Jallon 
navétanes started to move to Dakar to work as laborers, cooks, or domestic servants. Guineans 
had already formed a sizeable community in the AOF capital by at least the late 1920s. French 
administrators began to notice the large numbers of Guineans in the city starting in the late 
1940s. One administrator writing in 1947 remarked that – with a little hyperbole – “In Dakar, 
currently, there are as many Guineans as there are Senegalese.”26 Rural to rural Fulbe migration 
flows were gradually bent towards urban spaces, reflecting the perception that cities provided 
opportunity and a chance to change one’s social and economic condition. A wave of political 
violence in Conakry in 1957 pushed Fulbe migrants to leave the Guinean capital, and many 
chose to move to Dakar. The elimination of the chieftaincy the same year and the more gradual 
unraveling of bonds between former masters and slaves afforded greater freedom of movement 
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for previously marginalized groups. The failure of post-independence economic reforms (and, 
some argued, deliberate sabotage by the French government) caused even more Guineas to leave 
for Senegal, the majority of whom decided to settle in Dakar. Finally, the continued degradation 
of soil in the Futa meant that agricultural work paid progressively fewer dividends, leading many 
rural families on the high plateau to send working-age men to seek employment either in the 
Senegalese peanut fields or former AOF capital.27  
As numbers of immigrants grew over the course of the 1950s, the fully formed Guinean 
Fulbe community in Dakar began to take shape. A colonial report from the early 1950s remarked 
that the largest numbers of Guineans in Dakar had roots in the Futa Jallon or self-identified as 
Fulbe, although it did not list any exact numbers. While in Dakar, the majority of Guineans 
worked as domestic workers, although a small cadre earned a living as traders, specifically of 
fruit. Most migrants stayed in Dakar only temporarily, often during the dry season when 
agricultural demands in the Futa Jallon and throughout West Africa were low, before returning to 
the Futa Jallon during the May to September rainy growing season. Housing in Senegalese 
capital was also linked to the Futa. Unmarried young men from the same village or canton lived 
together in a room or small apartment, which constituted an informal mutual aid organizations 
based upon kinship and/or common geographical roots.28 
 The PDG government’s policies had several important effects on migration flows 
between the two territories after Guinean independence in 1958. Coming and going from Guinea 
was more complicated for the thousands of temporary migrants who constituted the majority of 
the Guinean community in Dakar, as the border between Guinea and Senegal wasn’t nearly as 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27 Papa Ibrahima Diallo, Les Guinéens de Dakar: migration et intégration en Afrique de l'Ouest 
(Paris: L’Harmattan, 2009), 45-46. 
 
28 “Les Guinéens à Dakar,” 1953 (?), ANS 17G/534. 
! 318 
porous after 1958 as it had been before. Shortly after independence, the PDG-led government 
emphasized controlling Guinea’s international borders. Part of the reasoning behind this policy 
was symbolic; one of the justifications the French government gave for refusing to recognize an 
independent Guinea was that the Guinean government could not control its borders, and 
therefore failed one of the basic tasks of a sovereign state.29 Therefore, sealing the border 
became a means for the Guinean government to prove that it was building a modern nation-state. 
As the ‘60s wore on and Touré’s rhetoric against Senghor became more vehement, the 
Senegalese border began to serve as a symbolic frontline against the neo-colonial threat to the 
Guinean socialist revolution. 
 The most obvious danger the border posed to the stability of the Guinean government 
was the high volume of clandestine migration and black market trade that moved between the 
two countries. During the early 1960s, Guinea was plagued by rampant inflation and periodic 
shortages of basic goods. The government tried to combat inflation by instituting price controls. 
The policy failed, however, because Guinean traders simply bought goods at the lower state-
mandated price in Guinea and sold them at a much higher price in neighboring countries, 
pocketing the profit while causing mass shortages in Guinea. The Government responded by 
closely controlling internal trade and setting up a series of state-run shops to ensure the supply 
chain in the Guinean interior. Again, the government reforms ran into significant problems. State 
run enterprises proved largely ineffective at transporting consumer goods and foods. Government 
reports at the time describe metric tons of basic grains rotting in Conakry warehouses while 
waiting to be taken into the interior (see Chapter Four).  
 The Guinean government decided to redouble its efforts to control the border and the 
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national economy with the 1964 Loi Cadre economic reforms. Smuggling became a capital 
crime, and the number of officially sanctioned merchants was culled drastically. The government 
also stepped up patrols along the border to stop migrants and smugglers. As the numbers of 
border guards was low in Guinea – yet another legacy of poor training during the colonial era – 
the government drafted local PDG paramilitary youth wings to patrol the borders and markets in 
the interior in order to stifle black-market trade. The policies, again, were only partially effective. 
For a time arrests increased, but for the most part migrants and traders were still able to cross the 
border en brousse. There were symbolic arrests of clandestine migrants and smugglers to 
discourage the others, especially after a supposed neo-colonial plot to overthrow the government 
was announced, and for a time after the 1970 Conakry invasion, crossing the border was nearly 
impossible.30 Based on Guinean security reports, though, for the much of the First Republic the 
greatest risk most clandestine migrants apprehended near the border faced was losing the money 
or goods they were bringing back to their families in the Futa Jallon. A few groups of migrants 
were temporarily detained, but the standard punishment was repatriation to their home 
communities. The punishment for smugglers was more severe, but by the 1970s they had become 
adept at disappearing into the countryside when confronted by border guards, losing some 
merchandise but preserving their freedom. There were significant risks associated with crossing 
the border. But the task was not impossible, nor even uncommon. 
 The diverging types of departures taken by different groups of Guineans before and after 
independence underscore the need for greater precision when discussing Guinea and its borders 
under the First Republic. The Guinean government was not alone in attempting to control and 
even stem emigration; indeed, several of its neighbors, including Senegal and Mali, enacted 
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similar restrictions in order to, as Mann writes, “recognize migrants as ‘theirs.””31 However, the 
Guinean government was the most eager to project of image of controlling its borders and 
dissuading those who might be tempted to cross them. Perhaps this is the reason why popular 
depictions of the country have emphasized progressively stricter controls over the flow of 
persons, goods, and information across the border following independence. Images of an 
“isolated” Guinea had by the late 1960s become a way for journalists, diplomats, and exiles 
outside Guinea to draw attention to the increasingly dictatorial tendencies of the Touré regime. 
But was Guinea a “closed country” during the First Republic? For some parts of the Guinean 
diaspora and international community – exiles, “fugitive” students, and opposition members, or 
the only Guinean sources on First-Republic Guinea available to the foreign press – the answer is 
“yes.” Return would have meant almost certain death. It’s no wonder, then, that for the vast 
majority of people outside, Guinea seemed like an impenetrable fortress in to mold of other 
autocratic states of the time.  
For the vast majority of individuals who crossed and re-crossed the border between 
Guinea and Senegal, though, government attempts to restrict migration were uneven and at times 
ambivalent. This is not to argue that the Touré regime did not display increasingly insular and 
anti-democratic tendencies as the glow of independence faded; segments of the government 
certainly attempted to strictly control what and who passed through the national borders, 
although given the reported active participation of many high-level civil servants in regional 
black market trade it’s important to note that those wishing for a closed border might have been a 
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minority.32 Rather, a more detailed history of mobility across the border demonstrates that 
control of the border was more importantly used as a rhetorical and ideological tool rather than 
as an attempt to be in complete command of the Guinean economy, especially following the 
failed experiment of centralized control during the mid-1960s. 
Home and Abroad 
Opposition Members, Students, and Veterans 
Actual and purported connections between the Futa Jallon and abroad became central to 
Guinean political discourse as the First Republic dragged on. In government rhetoric, certain 
figures within exile networks came to signify the Guinean community abroad as a whole. One of 
the most prominent of these types, at least in the speeches and writings of Sékou Touré, was that 
of exiled opposition member. For these most visible parts of the foreign Guinea community, 
“home” and “abroad” were muddled and complex ideas. Unlike some Guinean veterans and civil 
servants, they did not decide to build a permanent “home” – meaning a sense of belonging in 
addition to a practical domicile – while abroad. In fact, their public personas were dedicated to a 
future return in order to rebuild Guinea after Touré’s era had passed. Yet their connection with 
imagined “homes” in Guinea was severed after independence; in the intermediate time frame 
they had little hope for return without prison and possible execution, and their communication 
with their families in Guinea was infrequent and sparse.  
 Along with Paris and Abidjan, Dakar became one of the central poles of activity for 
political exiles, especially for those with connections to the Futa. The choice of the Senegalese 
capital as a base of operations made sense. The relationship between Guinea and Senegal had 
been complicated in the aftermath of former’s declaration of independence, and during early 
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1961 broke out into outright hostility shortly after Guinea left the Franc zone. On April 21st, the 
Guinean government claimed that the French Service de Documentation Extérieure et de Contre-
Espionnage (SDECE) had worked with the Senegalese and Ivorian governments to arm 
opposition members in anticipation of an invasion to topple the Touré regime.33 External forces 
were supposedly working with a ring of religious leaders, former colonial chiefs, and merchants 
in the Fulbe-dominated Futa Jallon, all of whom were sympathetic to the French and had been 
paid significant sums to participate. Unlike subsequent plot attempts, which were often 
denounced by governments outside Guinea, the 1960 plot seemed to have been a real threat to 
Guinea; Senghor’s Senegalese government corroborated Guinean reports that arm depots had 
been established along the Senegalese side of the Guinean border, and for a moment opposition 
members feared that their largely unimpeded activity in the Senegalese capital would be sharply 
curtailed. 
 Despite the Senegalese government’s contention that it had played no role in the plot, the 
Guinean government painted Senghor as De Gaulle’s puppet and an integral cog in the neo-
colonial plot to overthrow the PDG government. Whereas before the Senegalese government had 
been ambivalent to Guinean opposition members, it now had little incentive to control activities 
aimed at overthrowing the Guinean government. Thus, the conflict between Senegal and Guinea 
opened a space for exiled opposition members to engage in explicitly political activity. Prior to 
Guinea’s independence in 1958, there existed only one political group within the Guinean 
community in Dakar: Solidarité Guinéenne, a non-partisan organization meant to represent the 
political interests of the Guinean community. Growing political division in Guinea created a 
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schism within the group, with the two sides breaking down between those who supported the 
PDG and those aligned against it. Divisions within Solidarité were reflected by the different 
alliances the two competing camps formed with Senegalese political parties; pro-PDG members 
joined the opposition Mouvement Populaire Sénégalais while those aligned against Touré joined 
Senghor’s Union Progressiste Sénégalaise. Following independence, the two groups withdrew 
from direct involvement with Senegalese parties. PDG sympathizers created the Union 
Fraternelle Guinéenne (UFG), ostensibly apolitical but in fact supported by the Guinean 
embassy, while opposition members took over what remained of Solidarité.34 Senghor banned 
the UFG following the 1960 plot scandal, but allowed the opposition-controlled Solidarité to 
continue its activities. In return, Touré welcomed exiled leaders of the Parti Africaine 
d’Indépendance, a communist-aligned group outlawed by the Senegalese government, the same 
year.35 While the Guinean embassy was able to shift tactics, establishing semi-clandestine PDG 
comités de base in Dakar and throughout Senegal, the new policy of the Senegalese government, 
however, was clear; Guinean opposition activity would be tolerated, if not actively supported, 
while those openly allied with Touré would be “invited” to return to their home country. 
The complicated position of Guinean exiles was encapsulated by the experiences of the 
aforementioned students who fled Guinea in the wake of 1958. The young men were exiles the 
moment they left Guinean soil, due to the Guinean government’s contention that unsanctioned 
migration was a form of treason. One former student said that the group of Guineans came to be 
known as les fugitives, or “the runaways.” Some of them had relatives in Dakar who could help, 
but others who did not were not able to receive any scholarships due to their irregular status. 
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With the help of a Senegalese students’ organization they were able to convince the rector of the 
University of Dakar to give the Guinean students tuition, housing, and dining vouchers. In 1963, 
their prospects improved when the French government offered scholarships to the Guinean 
students in Dakar. The French proposal, though, came with one stipulation: the students had to 
secure permission from the Guinean government. According to one former student, the Guinean 
government refused, claiming that “the only real Guineans are in Guinea.” By 1965, about 250 
Guinean students had made their way through Dakar to French universities, but their footing was 
not on solid ground. The Guinean government continued to refuse to recognize the students’ 
status as Guinean citizens, and thus denied them passports, making the procurement of official 
documents like visas difficult.36 
Much like the students, opposition members’ main concern was solidifying their 
ambiguous position abroad. The easiest path towards both formal recognition and material 
support was the formation of a unified political group that could lobby foreign governments. It 
took until 1966, however, for exiles to make an attempt to unify the myriad opposition groups. In 
April 1966, Solidarité Guinéenne – recently rechristened the Regroupement des Guinéens au 
Sénégal (RGS) – joined a newly organized opposition umbrella organization named the Front de 
Libération Nationale de la Guinée (FLNG). Shortly after its establishment in Abidjan in March 
1966, the FLNG had spread rapidly to Liberia, Haute Volta, Sierra Leone, Niger, and finally to 
France, where leaders set up a central office.37 The FLNG’s list of accusations against the PDG 
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echoed earlier ones made by opposition groups: the government had ruined the Guinean 
economy; forced the population to participate in political activities like mass meetings; exiled 
any who dared oppose the government; and over all “transformed [the Guinean people] into a 
slave force ready to serve.”38 Although the group purported to represent all oppressed Guineans, 
the groups leadership drew from exclusively Guinea’s exiled elite; the FLNG’s board was 
comprised of well-educated civil servants, including a professor of history (Ibrahima Kaké), two 
doctors, three economists or accountants, and Siradiou Diallo, a recent college graduate and 
future Jeune Afrique editor in chief.39 The FLNG’s leadership used connections within foreign 
governments and French political parties to secure support for their movement. In Côte d’Ivoire, 
for instance, the group was welcomed and funded by President Felix Houphouët-Boigny. Yet 
most governments that would seemingly be predisposed to support opposition’s cause 
approached the group with apprehension. In Senegal and France, both countries with hostile 
relationships with the Guinean government, the FLNG was only tolerated and told to not become 
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too zealous in its activities.40 
 The members of the FLNG were unified by one goal: the end of the PDG regime and the 
eventual return of Guinea’s exiled “elite.” However, consensus on the means through which 
regime change would be accomplished – not to mention the ideological position from which 
FLNG members critiqued the Touré regime and imagined a reconstructed post-PDG Guinea – 
was elusive. The group leadership ranged from David Soumah, the conservative Christian trade 
unionist mentioned above and the head of the Dakar branch of the FLNG, to a young Alpha 
Condé, president of the radical FEANF (Fédération des Étudiants d’Afrique Noire en France) 
during the 1970s, future President of Guinea elected in 2010, and in 1973, according to French 
intelligence services, a strident pro-Maoist who critiqued the PDG from the left, arguing that 
Touré and his allies were corrupt form their “complicity with capitalism.”41 Such ideological 
diversity – or incoherence, some argued – prevented the FLNG from being taken as an effective 
and serious political movement, a characterization the group would attempt to overcome for 
much of its existence. 
 In fact, for the vast majority of the organization’s existence, the FLNG was content with 
securing the position of exiles rather than bringing about regime change in Guinea through direct 
means. The one very notable exception was the organization’s participation in the November 
1970 Portuguese-backed assault on Conakry, perhaps an attempt to display the group’s 
opposition bona fides. The daylong attack, during which around 300 mercenaries, Portuguese 
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Special Forces, and a contingent of FLNG fighters invaded Conakry and controlled strategic 
points in the capital for nearly a day, continues to be shrouded in mystery. PDG supporters both 
at the time and since have argued that the assault represented no less than a neo-colonial attempt 
to overthrow the “revolutionary” Touré regime. Their claims were bolstered by the fact that, 
counter to pronouncements of non-involvement from Lisbon, it soon became clear that the 
Portuguese government had funded the attack. The colonial power’s motives were obvious. For 
years, the PDG government in Guinea had both harbored and actively supported the Partido 
Africano da Independêcia da Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC, or African Party for the 
Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde), an organization headed by Amílcar Cabral dedicated 
to armed struggle against Portuguese colonial rule in West Africa. During numerous raids into 
Guinea Bissau staged from Guinea, PAIGC soldiers had captured some 23 Portuguese soldiers, 
who were held in prisons in Conakry. The Portuguese government’s bankrolling of the Nov. 22 
assault, therefore, was most likely motivated by the desire to free those prisoners and, if possible, 
to assassinate Cabral and other prominent PAIGC leaders living in Conakry. They succeeded in 
the former goal but failed in the latter.42 
 The FLNG’s participation in the attack seems to have been an attempt to piggyback on 
the specific Portuguese goals in order to overthrow the Guinean government during the chaos 
unleashed by the invasion. Their general strategy depended upon a small group of trained 
guerillas assaulting Conakry from the boats stationed off the coast, seizing the Guinean 
government’s radio and television broadcasting buildings, and assassinating Touré and his allies. 
Their surgical strike would be combined with a more general invasion from Guinea Bissau into 
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the northern Futa Jallon, an area the opposition members thought ripe for rebellion against the 
PDG. Finally, and crucially for the overall goal of regime change, the FLNG leaders counted 
upon a mass revolt against the Touré regime once the FLNG forces had proven that Touré and 
his security forces were vulnerable. The assault showed the Guinean Army to be ineffective and 
disorganized – it took more than 24 hours for reinforcements to arrive in Conakry from Kindia, 
due in no small part to the government’s decision to garrison them far from the capital for fear of 
a military coup d’état – yet no public uprising came to pass. Some civil servants and mid-level 
politicians used the opportunity to turn against the government, but once it was clear that the 
FLNG’s wider goals had failed, those who rose up within Guinea to oppose the regime either 
fled the country, were captured, or ended up dead.43 
 The “neo-colonialist” invasion provided a unique opportunity for Touré’s government. 
After the immediate threat was over, the PDG used the attack as a means to improve their 
position internationally and consolidate control domestically. Touré and his allies within the 
government had used a series of purported plots during the 1960s to eliminate enemies and 
rivals. These plots had mostly been approached with a healthy dose of skepticism by foreign 
governments and intelligence services. With the 1970 assault, however, Touré had visible proof 
that at least one colonial power had moved to overthrow his regime with the help of a “fifth 
column” within Guinea. The fact that the FLNG had worked closely with the Portuguese – 
despite the opposition organization’s obviously false statements that they alone funded and led 
the assault – only discredited the movement even more, drawing into stark relief the seemingly 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
43 Etienne Burin des Roziers, Ambassadeur de France en Italie to Ministre le MAE, “a.s. 
Situation en Guinée,” no. 33/AL, 15 Dec. 1970, CADN 163PO/1/38.  
 
! 329 
dubious claim that FLNG leaders were dedicated to democracy and liberty for all Africans.44  
On both a tactical and psychological level, the FLNG’s assault was a disaster. Mass 
defections from the FNLG followed in its wake, and by mid-1971 the group was effectively 
defunct.45 In fact, after a brief moment of doubt during the invasion – Touré supposedly cowered 
in his office in the Presidential Palace convinced that his end was near – the PDG regime and 
Guinean president were stronger than ever. Meant to usher in the revival of the Guinean 
democracy snuffed out shortly after independence, the FLNG and Portuguese assault in fact 
initiated a wave of intense repression, and the six years following the failed invasion witnessed 
thousands of arrests and summary executions eventually culminating in the 1976 Fulbe plot. 
 In the wake of the failed assault, foreign heads of state – chief among them Leopold 
Sedar Senghor – quickly turned against the movement. Counter to Guinean claims that the 
Senegalese government offered full-throated support for the FLNG, Senghor implemented tight 
restrictions on the political actions of exiled opposition, and in early 1971 rounded up politically 
active Guineans in Dakar and deported them to France.46 France did not welcome the exiles with 
open arms; while the government offered asylum to many opposition members, they were quick 
to remind them that the benefits of asylum came with the responsibility to practice a certain 
amount of “reserve” in public statements and writings.47 For both governments, the possibility of 
rapprochement with the Guinean government combined with international outrage over the 
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invasion outweighed the increasingly unlikely possibility that the opposition would be able to 
bring about any type of regime change.  
The FLNG was never able to recover from their disastrous expedition in Guinea. David 
Soumah, the leader of the Senegal FLNG branch, soon wound up in jail. While the Portuguese 
had bankrolled some of the 1970 invasion, they had not offered funds to train the FNLG 
members. To make up the difference in material support, Soumah embezzled some 50 million 
FCFA from a housing development corporation he headed to underwrite the invasion, had been 
caught, and then was ordered by Senegalese courts to remain in jail until he could repay the 
organization for the funds he owed.48 Although the FNLG continued on in name, it slowly faded 
within the opposition community in exile. For the moment, the dream of uniting the Guinean 
exiled opposition was dormant. 
It took another year for another movement to occupy the empty space left by the FLNG’s 
implosion. Siradiou Diallo, part of the FLNG’s Paris branch leadership, used the organization’s 
dissolution to create his own organization of exiled opposition members, the Regroupement des 
Guinéens de l’Extérieur (RGE). The RGE grew out of an organization called the Regroupement 
des Guinéens en France created by Diallo in 1969, a group that, according to its leadership, was 
non-political and meant to serve as a mutual aid group and a “forum for discussion.”49 Following 
the FLNG’s failure, Diallo remodeled the RGE into an umbrella opposition organization in the 
mold of its more intervention-oriented predecessor and made early moves to constitute a 
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government in exile.50  
The RGE also turned to more frequently highlighting political and economic repression 
within Guinea. Many of the organization’s early critiques appeared in a monthly journal, Guinée: 
Nouvelles Perspectives, published starting in 1972. Diallo sought use the organization’s organ to 
influence politicians, sending copies to prominent heads of states and politicians free of cost to 
“raise awareness” of the plight of Guineans both inside and in exile.51 The magazine also 
positioned itself as a window onto the “closed” “totalitarian” Guinea. One of the recurring 
themes was a series of anonymous letters from “inside Guinea” published in the journal listing 
the country’s slow descent into dysfunction and despair. One letter claimed that the PDG’s 
supposed requirement that all Guineans to celebrate “Gowon, Ahidjo, Boumédiène, and Mobutu” 
(the heads of Nigeria, Cameroon, Algeria, and Zaire, respectively)” was reflective of Touré’s 
abandonment of ideals in favor of the naked pursuit of power.52 Another article focused on the 
plight of medical doctors, noting that of the fifty that were in Guinea at the moment of 
independence, only ten remained in 1972 and some twenty had been jailed in Camp Boiro after 
the 1970 Conakry assault.53  
As the 1970s wore on, those aligned against the Touré regime began to focus more on the 
network of prisons filled with supposed enemies of the state. By the late 1970s, some of the 
loudest critics of the Touré regime included Amnesty International and Nadine Barry, a French-
born spouse of an imprisoned Guinean civil servant who created an association for family 
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members of political prisoners in Guinea. These groups, however, made few inroads within 
foreign governments. Senghor continued to discourage and overtly political activity, at one point 
threatening to deport RGE leaders in Senegal back to Guinea.54 Despite sending numerous letters 
well into the 1980s imploring the French government to find out if her husband was still alive, 
Nadine Barry made little headway pushing the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to clarify the situation 
of political prisoners in Guinea, including her husband.55 While there was a rapprochement 
between the Guinean government and its erstwhile enemies in Paris, Dakar, and Abidjan in 1977, 
Touré and his advisors continued to resist any possible return for the opposition in exile. 
Furthermore, the RGE had not been particularly effective in uniting the Guinean opposition, and 
throughout the 1970s rival groups would emerge and disappear like comets across the night sky 
of exile. Although the opposition in exile seized upon an increasingly problematic image of 
Sékou Touré against which to organize, they were in reality no more organized in 1980 than in 
1960. 
An analysis of the post-colonial trajectory of the Guinean exile in opposition points to 
several conclusions. First, opposition to Touré moved from armed struggle to shedding light on 
political prisoner and abuses of power within Guinea. This development reflected both practical 
and ideological shifts. The FLNG invasion had failed, and indeed had caused significant 
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blowback. It became increasingly clear to men like Siradiou Diallo that similar assaults would 
only give rise to more accusations of neo-colonial collaboration and further undermine his 
movement. Ideologically, the 1970s also witnessed a progressive shift towards the language of 
human rights.56 In the case of Guinea and other totalitarian regimes, political prisoners became a 
key means through which one could critique these types of political systems. Those opposed to 
Touré’s regime, in particular Nadine Barry but also the RGE leadership, lobbied foreign leaders 
and international organizations to undermine the Guinean governments’ international standing 
or, in the case of the former, to simply find out the whereabouts of their loved ones. 
Second, the exiled opposition members were just as concerned with clarifying their 
ambiguous place in international networks – getting passports, establishing residency, making an 
income, etc. – as with armed struggle against the Guinean government. Most exiles remained 
passionately dedicated to their opposition to the Touré regime, but the concerns of daily life for 
exiles often trumped the fervor of convictions. Exiles had to secure papers, search for jobs and 
houses, and try to find a way to bring any family members still in Guinea abroad to meet them. 
They remained steadfast in their critiques of the Touré regime. Ambiguous legal status and 
unsure financial standing, though, often trumped their desire to effect regime change within 
Guinea. Sometimes, life just got in the way of political action. 
Tailors, Charbonniers, and Fruit Vendors 
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 Although the exiled opposition garnered the lion’s share of attention from the Guinean 
and Senegalese governments, the much more numerically significant community of Futa Fulbe 
laborers structured the Guinean community in Dakar. These temporary or permanent migrants 
maintained the strongest ties between the Senegalese capital and the Guinean high plateau. And 
as the 1970s wore one, their prominence within Guinean political discourse would increasingly 
reflect their influence both “at home” and “abroad.” 
By 1974, researchers and the Senegalese government estimated that Guineans in Dakar 
numbered more than 70,000 and in Senegal as a whole more than 300,000.57 Of those Guineans 
living in Dakar, around 75% came from the Futa Jallon, and the majority were men, although in 
a more equal proportion to women than in the 1950s. Slightly more than half of the Guinean 
migrants in Dakar were temporary, meaning that they anticipated staying in the city for only 
between one month and one year, although the majority eventually stayed in Dakar between four 
and five years. Of the other half of “settled” migrants, most (56.5%) had migrated more than ten 
years before. The two groups of migrants, temporary and settled, had some similarities: for most 
this was their first time coming to Dakar, but a significant minority reported multiple trips 
between the Senegalese capital and the Futa Jallon. Furthermore, the vast majority (90%) was in 
Senegal without official papers.58  
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The list of Guineans’ occupations in Dakar remained largely the same as their 1950s 
predecessors, although there were important shifts in the numbers of Fulbe workers in each 
profession. Totals of domestic workers declined significantly, from “the majority” to 15%. 
Merchants – ranging from smugglers to market stall owners and street vendors – constituted a 
little more than 25% of the total workers, followed by “students, the unemployed, and others” at 
24% and “independent” or salaried laborers, both around 18%. Those engaged in commerce 
tended to concentrate in the areas of fruit selling – some 60% of all fruit vendors in Dakar’s 
markets were Futa Jallon Fulbe – which relied upon trade routes connecting Dakar to Gaoual and 
Labé for merchandise; meat butchering, of which 60% were Futa Fulbe; and charcoal making 
and selling, of which 95% were Futa Fulbe.59 The last two professions dominated by Fulbe 
laborers demonstrate the prominence of slave-status migrants in Dakar. Few free Fulbe – or high 
status Senegalese, for that matter – would voluntarily decide to be a butcher or charcoal maker. 
Futa Fulbe of slave status, therefore, decided to exploit an opening in the local economy, 
although to varying degrees of success.  
What emerges is a familiar picture of labor migration that occurred throughout the world 
during the twentieth century.60 Most early migrants, almost uniformly male, were neither the 
poorest nor the richest. They made the decision to leave based upon a combination of “push” (i.e. 
taxes or exactions) and “pull” (i.e. opportunity) factors. As the Guinean community in Dakar 
grew, numbers of women migrants increased. The larger community eventually became self-
sustaining, decreasing the viscosity for other migrants from the Futa Jallon to come to Dakar, as 
the decision to make the long and sometimes dangerous trek from Labé to Dakar was made 
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easier when one knew a cousin living near Sandaga Market who could provide temporary 
housing and perhaps even some work upon arrival. A larger and more varied Guinean 
community, however, did not mean that migrants turned attention away from their links with the 
Futa Jallon. Most of the young migrants thought their stay in Dakar would only be temporary, 
and many went back to the Futa, if only for an extended visit. Overall, while abroad nearly every 
Guinean migrant maintained connections with “home,” meaning the physical and familial space 
of the Futa Jallon – even those who chose to build new homes in Dakar. 
The material and imaginary connections that provided structure for the transnational 
community centered on the Futa Jallon proved to be an integral part of the post-colonial 
experience of Guinean Fulbe. Many Futa Fulbe migrants maintained connections with their 
families by sending remittances back home. Material support often took the form of consumer 
products, as economic reforms under the First Republic caused severe shortages for even the 
most basic goods such as shoes and soap. One Guinean migrant, a tailor named Mohammed 
Diallo who works near the Sandaga market in Dakar, said that he would send goods, including 
sacks of rice, back to his parents in Bantignel, either carrying the packages himself or sending 
with an acquaintance returning to his home village. Diallo also recalled that it was normal for 
migrants to undertake an extended stay back in Guinea every couple years. Often times these 
trips back home would have to be delayed by a crackdown on clandestine migration by the 
Guinean government, usually after a plot attempt had been announced by the state media. But 
passages across the border were never fully out of the question for those not specifically engaged 
in political activity.61 
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In fact, most Guineans in Senegal were explicitly apolitical, or at least staked ambiguous 
positions towards the Guinean government in public. Of the main opposition groups in Dakar, 
those in leadership positions were nearly exclusively elites either through education or birth who 
had chosen exile. While some migrants were active in political organizations, just as many chose 
to focus on economic activities. Or, as Mohammad Diallo told me: “we didn’t get mixed up in all 
that stuff [opposition groups]. We were more concerned with making money and helping out our 
families.”62 Indeed, most of the associations in which migrants participated focused on the 
difficulties associated with living hundreds of kilometers away from one’s family, often under 
less than legal status. Each village in Guinea had a connected bolönda, or mutual aid 
organization, whose main functions were the repatriation of the sick or deceased, welcoming 
notable Guineans passing through the city, and the regulation of civil disputes. The smaller 
village-based organizations were grouped into four larger associations, reflecting the four ethno-
regional divisions of Guinea (Basse Côte, Futa Jallon, Haute Guinée, Forest Region). In turn, the 
four associations were governed by a larger group called the Amicale des Guinéens, which 
mediated between ethnic communities and lobbied the Dakar government on issues of concern 
within the Guinean community.63 These groups were not apolitical, in the sense that they 
mediated between individual members within the Guinean community, on the one hand, and 
between the large Guinean community and the Senegalese government on the other. They were, 
however, much more focused on the daily concerns of Guinean migrants rather than precipitating 
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change within Guinea, a strong contrast – at least in rhetoric – to the exile-led political 
organizations.  
Guinean Exiles, Migrants, and Belonging in Senegal 
That most migrants chose to remain distanced from Guinean political parties while living 
in Senegal was not coincidental, as there were several disincentives associated with open 
political activity in Senghor’s Senegal. Some former exiles today, looking back on their years of 
political activism against the PDG while in Dakar, have remarked that Senghor aided Guineans 
who had chosen to flee their home country. One leader within Siradiou Diallo’s RGE explained 
that it was only natural that the Senegalese president support those aligned against the PDG 
regime, as the Guinean and Senegalese states had a long-running feud dating back to at least 
1960. Furthermore, the former opposition member remarked, helping out the Guineans in need 
was simply part of Senghor’s nature, as “being catholic, Senghor was a natural humanitarian.” 64 
Discussions within the Senegalese government about what to do with the increasing influx of 
exiles and migrants, however, shows that the position of Guineans in Dakar was much more 
precarious. Senghor faced a vocal and active political opposition, culminating in the 1968 
student protests in Dakar that temporarily closed down the University of Dakar.65 When 
presented with turmoil in the capital, the Senegalese government attempted to tamp down 
Guinean political groups, many of whose members had been students at the University 
themselves. While Senghor sought to rein in pro-Touré leftist Guinean groups in particular, 
opposition groups were also told to curtail their activities. The government’s attempts to control 
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– or even eliminate – the Guinean community in Dakar weren’t limited to the politically active. 
Senegalese security forces also conducted sweeps in the Senegalese capital targeted at Guinean 
migrants, most notably in 1967, when Senghor, complaining of Dakar being “invaded” by the 
unemployed, sent police to local markets to round up Guinean “non-authorized sellers,” placing 
some 150 Guineans in a truck headed towards the Guinean border.66 
The failed 1970 Conakry Invasion drastically shifted the Senegalese government’s policy 
towards the Guinean community in Senegal. In the weeks following the attack, the Guinean 
government accused its Senegalese counterpart of working with the widely despised Portuguese 
government. In response, the Senegalese government made moves to expel leaders of the 
Guinean opposition, arresting several leaders and threatening with deportation.67 Pro-Touré 
activists were not spared either; according to reports from the French Embassy in Dakar, 
Senegalese security forces went through Guinean neighborhoods picking up any suspected of 
actively supporting the PDG.68 Although Senghor had previously tolerated Guinean political 
groups as long as they did not participate in Senegalese politics, after the invasion – and the 
international scandal it precipitated – political action was largely cut off for Guinean exiles. 
The Senegalese government dealt with other ripples from the failed 1970 invasion. 
Waves of purges within Guinea followed the attack, causing thousands of Guineans to flee the 
country. Many “refugees” chose to migrate to Senegal. As implied by my use of quotation 
marks, the status of those who fled Guinea during the purges was unclear, and both the 
Senegalese government and the UN debated their rights under international law. While in 1971 
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the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) wavered over whether or not to 
apply refugee status to Guineans living in Senegal, the Senegalese government’s position was 
clear: it resisted any attempts to accord special status to the nearly 300,000 expatriate Guineans, 
hoping to avoid the obligations connected to UN recognition.69 A later wave of Guineans fleeing 
towards Senegal four years later only confirmed the Senegalese government’s hostility towards 
Guinean refugees. Following reforms to cattle ownership within Guinea in 1975, whole villages 
in the northern Futa Jallon resettled in Southern Senegal.70 The Senegalese Government gave 
orders to its civil servants and security forces to drive the Guineans back, as they believed the 
Guinean refugees to be security and disease risks. Dakar’s attempts to stem a growing tide, 
however, were largely futile; local civil servants in Kédougou, presented with the what they 
hoped would be a jolt to the backwater region’s economy from the refugees extensive herds, 
ignored Dakar’s orders.71  
Thus, the Guinean community’s position within post-colonial Senegal was marked by 
both danger and ambiguity. For a select few opposition members, a sort of uneasy status could be 
secured as long as their activity did not substantially threaten regional and international relations. 
When it did, though, opposition leaders faced the possibility of deportation. The status of the 
majority of Guineans living in Senegal – namely those who had migrated looking for economic 
opportunity – was much more ambiguous. Guinean migrants dealt with inconsistent and at times 
contradictory policies, the threat of seemingly arbitrary deportation, and an ambiguous legal 
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status. For both the Guineans and the Senegalese government alike, it seems, the room for 
maneuver afforded by the non-recognized condition of Guinean migrants and refugees was more 
important than legal clarity. 
Fulbe Migrants, Exiles, and Citizenship in Guinea 
 While the position of the Guinean community in Senegal continued to be ambiguous, the 
1970 Conakry invasion calcified an already antagonistic relationship between Fulbe migrants 
and the Guinean Government. As purges intensified, the PDG-led government thrust the Guinean 
community abroad into the center of public discourses about citizenship within Guinea. Fulbe 
migrants, especially those falling under the increasingly nebulous category of navétanes, became 
prime examples of corrupted citizens or, in Touré’s strongest rhetoric, foot soldiers for anti-
national forces. 
For Sékou Touré, political exiles were easy to locate in public discourse. Their active 
opposition to the Guinean state and the PDG regime clearly marked men like Siradiou Diallo and 
David Soumah as enemies of the state and, according to PDG ideology, the Guinean nation and 
people by transitive relation. Yet the PDG leadership also downplayed the exiles’ influence 
within Guinea. In both the government-written White Paper investigating the 1970 Conakry 
invasion and in subsequent speeches, the Guinean president made clear that exiled opposition 
members were simply the purchased puppets of neo-colonial forces.72 Public statements on the 
internal “fifth column” – a supposed network of corrupt civil servants, merchants, and politicians 
working from within to overthrow the PDG regime and with extensive contacts with outside 
groups – similarly emphasized payments from French or American intelligence sources as the 
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main motivation for treason.73 Thus, while the exiled opposition served as a means to accuse 
domestic rivals or enemies of being traitors through association, Touré and other PDG leaders 
were also careful not to overstate the importance of groups like the FNLG or RGE.  
 The PDG’s castigation of migrants, however, became much more prominent following 
the failed invasion. While clandestine migration to neighboring countries had concerned the 
PDG leadership since independence, the Guinean state had neither the means nor the desire to 
completely stem the tide of Guineans leaving to work in neighboring countries during the 1960s. 
During the same period, migration became increasingly important for the basic survival of many 
Guinean families. Beginning shortly after independence, Guinea had been in a state of nearly 
constant economic crisis, ranging from temporary shortages of consumer goods to, at times, 
limited famine. By the 1970s, it was clear that the state’s attempts to reform the economy 
through centralized control had failed. Agricultural and industrial production within Guinea 
decreased steadily after the early 1960s. Most importantly for public perceptions of the PDG-
dominated state, the standard of living for the average Guinean had drastically deteriorated since 
1964.74 In response, families turned to labor migration as a means to diversify sources of 
revenue, providing outside material support during lean times. The arrival of a relative who had 
spent time abroad often coincided with an influx of items rarely found within official channels in 
Guinea, or in other times might mean a sack of rice not available otherwise. Foreign migration, 
therefore, functioned as a important safety valve for an ailing Guinean economy, a role the 
Guinean government must have recognized. 
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As government purges gradually expanded their reach, however, trans-national 
connections became a double-edged sword. A traveling relative could be arrested and detained at 
the border. Receiving commercial goods or money from a relative abroad could mark someone 
as a member of a “fifth column” network. Finally, connections abroad could conceivably limit 
one’s ability to rise within the political hierarchy of the PDG, which by the late 1960s was the 
only licit avenue for social and economic betterment. At the same time, these sorts of limitations 
might have ended up being a blessing, as the victims of the purges were more often from the 
upper echelons of the party leadership and civil servant corps 
The 1970 Conakry invasion changed the calculus for migrants and their families. 
Following the international outcry against the Portuguese government, Sékou Touré and his 
inner circle had the political capital necessary to act with near impunity. The post-invasion 
purges eliminated political rivals, ranging from former political rivals to longtime Touré allies. 
For a time, state repression largely focused on political elites. In 1975, however, the PDG 
government turned its gaze towards merchants and clandestine trade. In January, Sékou Touré 
declared that the emphasis of the party and the people that year would be to eliminate what he 
called “Cheytane [Satan] ’75,” or one particularly resilient enemy of the Guinean nation: the 
merchants. The government soon announced new, tighter restrictions on commerce combined 
with greater enforcement and more significant sentences for economic crimes.75 As economic 
activity and smuggling was not limited to one region of Guinea, the fight against the exploiter of 
the people would unfold throughout Guinean territory. Due to strong economic ties between 
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Fulbe communities in Guinea and Senegal, however, merchants in the Northern Futa Jallon in 
particular felt the brunt of the government’s new emphasis on stamping out private commerce.  
The following year, the PDG’s began to place emphasis to eliminating the “anti-national” 
traits of Futa Jallon society, and highlighted the crimes of Fulbe migrants in particular. The 
PDG’s rhetorical shift was presaged by a change in the topics of emphasis and language within 
the Guinean security apparatus. Following the 1970 invasion of Conakry, daily security reports 
given to the President signaled a new focus on re-securing Guinea’s borders. The new emphasis 
resulted in more arrests of clandestine migrants attempting to cross the Senegalese border, as this 
was where, Touré claimed, part of the attack had originated. Just as notable, though, was the fact 
nearly all individuals detained for illegally crossing Guinean border – whether or not those 
borders were with Senegal – began to be referred to as navétanes.76 That term, previously 
applied to seasonal agricultural workers who worked in Senegal’s peanut fields, was commonly 
associated with the Fulbe, as the vast majority of navétanes before independence hailed from the 
Futa Jallon. Thus, within the internal logic of the PDG security apparatus, the problem of 
migration became tied to a single ethnic group. That this ethnic group’s elites had long been 
suspected of organizing a series of plots meant to overthrow the PDG only reinforced the belief 
that the core of Futa Jallon society was corrupted. Treason through migration simply 
demonstrated that the rot had spread to the Fulbe community as a whole.  
Increased scrutiny of the navétanes and the families they left behind in Guinea was 
reflected in public rhetoric. In one political meeting in Labé, local officials warned that some 
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wives in the Futa Jallon had “adopted the traitorous ideas” of their migrant husbands, implying 
both that the act of mobility was an act against the nation itself and that treason could be 
contagious.77 Another public conference dedicated to the “problem of the navétanat in Middle 
Guinea [the Futa Jallon]” counseled the wives of migrants to remarry. Although some women in 
attendance expressed concern that they would lose access to their husband’s fields if they opted 
for divorce, the civil servant facilitating the meeting warned that “all navétanes are mercenaries” 
and that the Senegalese government was paying Guinean migrants to make sure “they never 
return.”78 The navétanes’ break from the Guinean nation was, therefore, was both complete and 
irrevocable. 
For the first half of the 1970s, government accusations only hinted at assumed 
connections between treason and ethnic identification, leaving the public draw their own 
conclusions. The “Fulbe plot” of 1976, however, signaled a shift in PDG strategy, one that 
publically outlined the supposed crimes of the Fulbe. In his speeches on the “particular 
situation,” Sékou Touré diagnosed a more general disease within the Futa Jallon, and Fulbe 
trans-national networks became the means through which Touré was able to expand what had 
before been a corruption within the Futa’s elite to Fulbe society as a whole. Fulbe migrants and 
traders were greedy, he claimed, more interested in making money abroad than staying home and 
building Guinea through hard work. The Guinean government tried to entice migrants to stay by 
providing seed and soil for communities in the Futa Jallon. Yet, Touré lamented, the navétanat 
had continued. Therefore, he argued, the thousands of young men and women who left the 
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plateau for Senegal signaled a more general moral decay, whose symptoms included rampant 
alcoholism, prostitution, and theft in addition to migration.79 
Touré’s grouping of migration – and specifically the navétanat – with other forms of 
moral failing was an effective means of marshalling evidence to support his identification of a 
supposed “Fulbe plot.” Drinking alcohol in public was and still is not acceptable in the 
conservative Futa Jallon. Prostitution was strongly frowned upon by the Guinean government, 
and therefore tended to be conducted in private (or, according to many, had disappeared almost 
entirely after independence).80 Likewise, as it was punishable by death under the First Republic, 
theft largely disappeared, at least according to one former PDG official.81 These crimes, 
therefore, were not present in the public domain, and when committed were done so behind 
closed doors. 
Migration, however, was still a semi-public transgression. As both the ability and will of 
the government to stop clandestine border crossing was questionable, crackdowns on migration 
were infrequent and largely symbolic for much of the First Republic. When Touré and other 
PDG leaders wanted to make a public gesture to improve the Guinean economy or to show that 
they closely controlled Guinea’s borders in the wake of another supposed plot attempt, they 
would arrest a group of migrants. At the local level, however, migration abroad functioned much 
as it had before independence. Most communities in Guinea, and especially the Futa Jallon, were 
home to young men and women who periodically left for neighboring countries and eventually 
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provided for their families during lean times. When confronted with migrants returning with 
commercial goods unavailable in Guinea, officials in these villages and towns simply turned a 
blind eye, often after taking a cut for themselves.82 Thus, clandestine migration was still an 
illegal practice, one that vaguely represented some type of moral fault, yet one that was also 
much more visible that its more lascivious counterparts. Either through choice or through a lack 
of means, the PDG leadership had allowed the practice to continue after it was explicitly banned. 
At the same time, during the 1970s the government linked the general act of illegal migration 
with a particular form of seasonal migration closely associated with the Futa Jallon in public 
meetings and published reports. As such, when Sékou Touré decided to turn against the Fulbe as 
a whole, he had a visible and powerful tool for incrimination at his disposal.  
An appraisal of how Touré and the Fulbe alike used migration to situate themselves and 
others elucidates one of the ways in which trans-national networks entered into and interacted 
with post-colonial discourses on nationality and citizenship. Early studies that examined trans-
national migrant networks either posited an antagonistic relationship between these networks and 
that nation-state, or in some cases saw no effective relationship at all.83 Other scholars have 
considered trans-national networks as net positives for national communities, pointing to both 
the ways in which states have used these networks to extend either political influence and 
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identify possible economic resources while also examining how migrants have used groundings 
in multiple state systems to diversify opportunity and mitigate risk.84  
The central question these two scholarly approaches attempt to answer – namely, the 
inherent implications supra-nation networks carry for post-imperial nationalism – partially 
misses the role trans-nationality plays in discourses about citizenship and belonging. The history 
of regional and international Fulbe networks during the First Republic offers an alternative 
approach to conceptualizing the relationship between migration and the nation-state, one that 
recognizes that mobility and the trans-national networks that emerge from the act of migration 
creates are tools used by individuals, groups, and the state to both construct and demarcate 
communities. In the years immediately after independence, several states in West Africa chose a 
path similar to that of the PDG, namely to discourage migration and cast migrants as malcontents 
or, at worst, anti-national traitors.85 More recently, migration has acted as a source states have 
drawn upon to re-imagine the expanded boundaries of the state or to support national 
economies.86 In both periods, though, trans-national networks held no inherent implications for 
the construction of national identities other than those assigned to these communities by the state 
and public themselves. In sum, much like the concepts of “ethnicity,” “race,” and “the nation,” 
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migration has been used in Guinea and elsewhere as a way to mark difference and extend 
inclusion, determining its most basic level those who belong and those who do not.  
Conclusion 
 The worlds of Guinean exiles and migrants existed in related but separate realms. Much 
of what divided the two groups had to do with politics; explicit opposition to Sékou Touré and 
the PDG determined in large part how one interacted with both host and home governments. 
Furthermore, social status and education in the two groups were on the whole different (although 
exceptions did exist), in effect recreating in an altered form many of the hierarchical divisions 
that existed in the Futa Jallon. Much of the gulf between the two sets of Fulbe abroad, though, 
had to do with different ways to build community. Exiles, veterans, and students could count on 
previously existing although sometimes fading networks comprised of universities, civil service 
institutions, a tradition of political exile within the Francophone world, and connections with 
French parties to help structure life in exile and secure basic needs. Most migrants, however, 
relied upon previous arrivers and an established Guinean community that had since the 1950s 
preferred to remain outside the limelight in Senegal. Their families in the Futa Jallon and 
elsewhere relied upon remittances to fulfill even their most basic needs, especially during the 
protracted economic crises that followed the 1964 Loi Cadre. Over time, the relationship 
between Guinean migrants and host and home governments would become more similar to those 
exiles had experience almost immediate after independence, a trend that accelerated after the 
1970 invasion of Conakry. But for the most part, these two worlds’ orbits passed each other only 
rarely. In the end, the gulf between the two determined the opposition’s failure just as much as 
exiles’ failure to gain full support from foreign governments or internal fighting. 
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The “Fulbe Plot” of 1976 temporarily pushed the worlds of exiles and migrants closer to 
one another. Shortly after Touré’s August 1976 articulation of the “particular situation” in the 
Futa, the PDG government moved to eliminate private commerce. The shift towards strict 
enforcement was not surprising, given Touré’s emphasis on the moral failings of labor migrants 
and smugglers. In fact, it was in large part the PDG’s renewed interest in controlling commerce – 
and not only the fact that the government had declared nearly 40% of the nation’s population 
traitors – that brought to a close the especially violent period of state repression. Increased 
inspections and seizures by Guinea’s economic police further strained an already distressed 
national economy. Raids on unlicensed market vendors in particular made the daily procurement 
of even the most basic goods – including even staples – increasingly difficult.  
The loosening of economic restrictions and opening of the borders with Senegal and Côte 
d’Ivoire following the 1977 market women’s revolt allowed Guinean migrants living abroad to 
more easily return back home when they wished. Exiles, on the other hand, would have to wait 
another seven years before the PDG regime fell. While by then the First Republic lay in the 
dustbin of regimes past, the PDG’s increasingly antagonistic relationship with expatriate 
Guinean communities – and especially those with roots in the Futa Jallon – continued to shape 
the ways in people both within and outside Guinea thought of themselves as citizens of a post-
colonial African nation. Those migrants and exiles who eventually chose to return, as well 
Guineans as a whole, would have to deal with these complicated ripples that emanated from the 
departed First Republic. 
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Epilogue 
Returning to a Post-Socialist Guinea 
On March 26, 1984, Sékou Touré died on a surgery table in Cleveland, Ohio, after having 
been evacuated while on a state visit to Saudi Arabia due to heart problems. Eight days later, a 
military coup brought an end to the PDG’s rule before Touré’s successor could be named. As 
they had on September 28, 1958, Guinean exiles faced a choice: would they remain abroad, 
where they had built lives and raised families? Or would they return to Guinea in order to, as a 
group of scholars asked, “help rebuild their nation?”
1
  
Those who chose to return found a different Conakry than the one they had left behind. If 
they had left Guinea during the years immediately following independence, returnees had likely 
never seen in person what is perhaps Guinea’s most imposing building: the Palais du Peuple, 
which serves as a meeting hall and as home to the National Assembly. Constructed by the 
Chinese Government in 1967 – notably, just months before the PDG government would call for 
its own Mao-like “Socialist Cultural Revolution” – the building dominates the thin isthmus that 
links the downtown island of Tumbo to the suburban peninsula. The Palace was also the site 
where in 1976 Touré announced the discovery of the “Fulbe plot” in a speech that figures in the 
beginning of this dissertation. For those exiles who had fled following the start of government 
purges in 1968, the impressive Palais des Nations, which is situated along the coast downtown, 
would have been a new addition. A large assembly hall surrounded by more than 50 associated 
villas, the complex was designed by a team of Moroccan architects, constructed in the late 1970s, 
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and was intended by Touré to host a May 1984 meeting of the Organization of African Unity.
2
 
Touré’s death prevented the complex from serving its intended purpose, and following the 
Second Republic’s neo-liberal reforms, the villas served as headquarters for various international 
NGOs until a 1998 bombardment by a group of mutineer soldiers made the complex 
uninhabitable. Thus, after 1984 Sékou Touré might have been dead and buried, although exactly 
where his body rests is the subject of considerable rumor.
3
 But the architectural symbols of both 
his power, vision for an independent Africa, and ultimate failure continued on, in varying states 
of repair, for all to see. 
Not all changes to Conakry’s geography were plainly visible. In her article on migrants’ 
imaginaires of three African cities, Dominique Malaquais writes of the “architectural rumor” 
present in many capitals on the continent. Laying (often literally) below visible buildings, 
Malaquais argues, are a set of “edifices that exist only (or mostly) as rumor.”
4
 Regularly 
associated with violent state repression, these obscured architectures often come in the form of 
secret jails or torture chambers hidden under, for instance, the Kinshasa stadium that hosted the 
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famous 1974 “Rumble in the Jungle.”
5
 In Conakry, the site of these types of rooms was never in 
doubt – by the late 1960s, Camp Boiro had already gained a reputation both inside and outside 
Guinea – but its internal shape and functioning were still obscured. Camp Boiro functioned as a 
sort of black box. “Traitors to the nation” were taken in, and spectacular confessions came out, 
but what went on in the prison’s cells and interrogation rooms was largely up for speculation. 
Even after the publication of numerous former detainee’s memoirs – in Guinea, often referred to 
as a group as the “literature of suffering” – stories of torture in Boiro are still contested, said to 
be exaggerations and political ploys rather than reflections of historical facts.
6
 By now, the 
buildings in Camp Boiro that held political prisoners both before and after Touré’s regime have 
been torn down. But the shadows of the structures contained within those departed buildings, I 
believe, are still perceptible to anyone who passes the camp’s gates while traveling along the 
Route de Donka.  
Other sites in Conakry mark where the realm of rumor and intrigue burst into the open, 
often with violent results. In his memoire In Search of Africa, Manthia Diawara, himself an 
exile, writes of his return in 1996 to his childhood hometown of Conakry. While searching for 
one of his collège (middle school) friends, Diawara’s taxi driver, Cémoko, drives him along the 
isthmus that connects the peninsula and Tumbo: 
Cémoko said that even though Conakry was a very long city, it was not wide 
enough – especially toward the neck, which was so narrow it could accommodate 
only two roads, one to and the other from downtown. At the end of the neck, 
before the road divided into several arteries that served the downtown area, we 
came to the Bridge of November 8, 1970, also known as the Hanging Bridge 
because some former ministers of Sékou Touré’s government… had been hanged 
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there in the presence of a large and excited crowd. 
 
Near the bridge was the Palais du Peuple (People’s Palace), famous for being the 
site of Sékou Touré’s long and eloquent speeches against colonialism and 
imperialism. It was also where he had read out the many names of people accused 
of treason and crimes against the state: people considered “enemies of the nation,” 
members of the “fifth column”… Cémoko said that people were always afraid 
whenever Sékou Touré had entered the Palais du Peuple, because anybody could 





Those two structures, at Conakry’s strategic choke point, were key sites of turmoil following the 
1970 Portuguese-backed invasion, when, according to Touré, Guinea was under siege by neo-
colonial forces. The Palais was later renovated after a fire, and the Hanging Bridge was torn 
down and replaced in 2013 with a new interchange. They remain, however, visible 
representations of the important role the “plot” has played in Guinean politics, a discourse that is 
alive and well still today.
8
 
 Guinean politics has continued to be marked with other legacies, ones that are not linked 
only to the PDG government and some with roots before the party’s 1950s rise. Lansana Conté, 
who had led the military coup d’état that overthrew the PDG government and shortly thereafter 
named himself president, may have changed Guinea’s economic policy, but his political tactics 
largely continued what had existed under the previous regime. Conté’s government banned all 
political organizations outside the ruling Comité Militaire de Redressement National, and after 
an attempted coup d’état in 1985, jailed and executed former Touré allies, especially those who 
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were identified as ethnic Maninka. Due in part to international pressure and the complaints of the 
Guinean opposition, Conté initiated a shift to multi-party politics in the early 1990s, only the 
second such period in Guinea’s history. Several former exiles had returned following the 1984 
coup d’état. This new political opening allowed them to craft their own official political 
movements. One such aspiring party leader was Siradiou Diallo who, along with other mostly 
Fulbe opposition figures, formed the Parti Guinéen du Progrès (PGP). Less than a year later, 
Diallo would leave the PGP to found his own party, the Parti du Renouveau et du Progrès. 
Diallo’s break could have simply reflected the multiplication of parties after 1991, a 
development that Mohammed Saliou Camara has argued was by government design.
9
 I heard 
rumors that complicated that narrative, however, especially from those who were close to Diallo 
while he was in exile. According to this alternate explanation, Diallo’s leaving the PGP had to 
due with the continued salience of Fulbe social hierarchies. During a debate over who should 
become the party’s head, another party leader who hailed from one of the Futa Jallon’s most 
prominent families told Diallo that he could not become the party’s Secretary General because he 
was from one of the “lesser” aristocratic Fulbe families. To paraphrase from the various tales I 
heard: “Your ancestors carried the flag into battle,” the man had supposedly said; “You do not 
have the right to sit on the skin of authority.”  
 The ways in which parties organized themselves in the 1990s, and again after 2010, 
displays another lasting feature that emerged during Guinea’s first period of multi-party politics: 
the ethno-regional party. Siradiou Diallo’s PGP and PRP had never been explicitly Fulbe parties. 
They did, however, draw from networks of Fulbe exiles and leaders to build their parties and 
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Camara, His Master’s Voice: Mass Communication and Single Party Politics in Guinea under 
Sékou Touré (Trenton: Africa World Press, 2005), 195-197.  
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marshal support. Just as importantly, both were considered by the public to be Fulbe-led 
organizations, naturally reflecting the interests of the Futa Jallon. During the most recent period 
of multi-party politics, Cellou Dalein Diallo and other prominent politicians established the 
Union des Forces Démocratiques de Guinée (UFDG) in opposition to Alpha Condé, who was 
elected president in a contested 2010 vote and had previously been part of the exiled opposition 
to both Sékou Touré and Lansana Conté. Although he hails from a prominent Futa Jallon family, 
Dalein Diallo has not publically situated himself as the political leader of the Futa Jallon, a role 
Barry Diawadou and Almamy Sory Dara Barry, for example, eagerly embraced. And like the 
BAG, DSG, PRA, PGP, and PRP, Dalein Diallo’s party rejected claims that it exclusively 
represents either the Fulbe or the Futa. Yet all of these political organizations depended upon 
political, social, and economic networks with strong roots in the central plateau, and Guineans 
outside the Futa considered both parties to represent the interests of the Fulbe. “It’s our turn,” 
many Fulbe often told me (and others).
10
 And the UFDG, many Fulbe believe, represents the best 
chance to ensure one of their own becomes president.  
 Some fractures are not contained to the borders of Guinea. According to Manthia 
Diawara, a deep divide existed between Guineans in Guinea and the newly returned exiles. “The 
return of Guineans from exile also coincided with an influx of French diplomats, businessmen, 
and professionals, who took the jobs of those Guineans who were deemed loyal to Sékou Touré,” 
Diawara writes. “Guineans at home thus considered the returnees no better than the foreigners 
and imposters whose only desire was to exploit the country.” Time has not healed this rift. 
During the 2010 presidential elections, there was rampant speculation over which wealthy 
expatriate Guinean businessmen (and their French allies, some claimed) were backing which 
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candidates. The implication in many accusations was that the expatriate community used money 
to unduly influence Guinea’s internal politics. In the extended run-up to the round of legislative 
elections in 2013, a controversy emerged over whether or not Guineans living abroad would be 
allowed to vote. Citing potential fraud and real logistical problems, Alpha Condé resisted 
opposition demands that polling stations be set up abroad, most likely because the majority of 
overseas Guineans are Fulbe, and therefore would support Condé’s rival, Cellou Dalein Diallo. 
Others within Guinea made less politically calculating arguments against including the overseas 
vote; one man told me that “they [Guineans living abroad] build big houses here [in Guinea], but 
they never live in them. They don’t care about Guinea.” The era of a “closed” Guinea might have 
itself come to a close, but the mark of non-belonging assigned to those with significant 
connections abroad persists.  
 The most pervasive divides within Guinea linked to the subject of this dissertation – or, at 
least, the ones that were the obvious to me while I was conducting research in Guinea during 
2013 – are more local and outside the realm of high politics. While in the capital, I stayed in the 
Taouyah neighborhood, an area I knew well from my days as a Peace Corps volunteer. During 
the work week, I would take a shared taxi from that neighborhood, about 2 miles up the 
peninsula, down to the National Archives, which is next to what used to be the central train 
station in Tumbo. I’d spend my days in the archives reading about street battles between rival 
political parties during the 1950s, and the repression of open conflict along ethnic lines that 
followed independence. One day when returning from the archives, the taxi I was in stopped at 
the Hamdallaye roundabout, a half of a mile from where I lived. As the car was continuing on to 
the Kipé neighborhood by way of the Route de Taouyah, along which the troubles supposedly 
originated, everyone in the car got out. There were riots up ahead, we were told, and no one 
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could pass until gendarmes had secured the area. Few of the people delayed at Hamdallaye, I 
imagine, were surprised. By this point, a weekly cycle had developed over the months I had 
spent in Conakry. Claiming the government was attempting to steal the election, the opposition – 
led by Cellou Dalein Diallo and his UFDG – would call for an anti-government march early in 
the week. Security forces would then attack the protesters, killing one or two young men, and by 
Friday riots and conflicts would engulf whole neighborhoods of Conakry.  
Some people were forging ahead on foot and, being tired and hungry, I joined them. After 
about 200 meters, though, everyone stopped near the Taouyah market. On one side of the road 
stood young supporters of the opposition, and on the other equally youthful supporters of the 
government, and the two groups were throwing stones at one another. All of the opposition 
activists shouted in Pular, and their rivals across the way responded in Malinké, the mother 
tongue of ethnic Maninka and also that of Alpha Condé. I stood with a group of fellow onlookers 
discussing which neighborhoods were “too hot” at the moment, and we got to talking about how 
the families of these two groups had lived in the same neighborhood for decades. Recently, 
though, things had become more divided. Protests, followed by government crackdowns, 
followed by yet more protests had opened old wounds. The city was now divided between Fulbe-
dominated neighborhoods and market stalls, on the one hand, and everywhere and everyone else 
on the other. Some people even speculated that the rolling blackouts in Conakry were targeted 
towards Fulbe neighborhoods in particular. After some good conversation and political rumor 
sharing, security forces arrived and scattered the rioters and onlookers with tear gas, and I went 
home to cook dinner.  
Later on, I reflected on the journey I had taken that afternoon. I started at the National 
Archives, not too far from the President’s residence in the Palais Sékhoutouréya – not built until 
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1998 but named after Guinea’s “founding father” – and the Palais des Nations. I had hopped in a 
shared taxi near the Marché du Niger, passed by the Palais du Peuple, and gone under and then 
over the “hanging” Bridge of November 8. Along the Route de Donka, I had looked to my left 
and seen the gates at the entrance of Camp Boiro. And once arriving at Taouyah, a neighborhood 
in which ethnic Fulbe were prominent, I had seen the same types of street battles peripheral to 
political parties – as well associated government crackdowns – that had occurred during 1956 
and 1958. These buildings – or hidden architectures, sites, legacies, features, fractures, and 
divides – do not doom Guinea to a dystopian future. They are, however, salient to any 
understanding of how the past still informs the way people think of themselves as constituting a 
political community, be it as an inhabitant of a former runde in the Futa Jallon, as a member of 
the Fulbe elite, as citizens of Guinea, or as part of the larger Guinean diaspora. Sékou Touré – as 
both a man and a set of symbols – might be dead,
11
 and the “particular situation” solved, or at 
least faded into the background. Those two components – the man and the divergence he 
articulated – still inflect Guinean politics today, and can be seen or sensed on any trip, however 
convoluted and delayed by traffic, one takes through the Guinean capital. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Appendix I: Voters in Guinean Elections, 1945-1958 
 
Table 1: Registered Voters (RV) and Voting in Guinea, 1945-1957  
 
Election Dates Registered Voters Voting 
RV% of 
Population 
21 Oct. 1945 1,944* 1,418* 6.18 
2 Jun. 1946 22,522* 18,492*   
10 Nov. 1946 131,309 96,099   
17 Jun. 1951 393,628 224,182   
2 Jan. 1956 976,662 569,319   
31 Mar. 1957 1,376,048 c. 765,000 55.24 
*Second College Voters 
From:Ruth S. Morgenthau, Political Parties in French-Speaking West Africa (Oxford; Oxford 
University Press, 1964); and J. R. de Benoist, l'Afrique Occidentale Française de 1944 à 1960 
(Dakar: Nouvelles Éditions Africaines, 1982) 
 
Table 2: Voters by Region in Two Elections, 1956 and 1958 
 
  2 Jan. 1956 18  May. 1958 
Basse Côte 141,360 162,614 
Futa Jallon 259,191 234,985 
Haute Guinée 55,587 170,469 
Région Forestièrre 105,809 217,907 






Appendix II: The Futa Jallon, Guinea, and Fulbe in West Africa 
 
Figure 1: The Futa Jallon 
 
 











Figure 4: Administrative Map of Guinea (2010) 
 
 
